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This research investigates absorptive capacity in South Africa‟s public health sector 
in relation to scaling up financing for HIV/AIDS treatment. The thesis constructs a 
conceptual framework, which follows the flow of public funding for HIV/AIDS 
treatment. The study combines a quantitative budget analysis, which looks at 
expenditure and spending patterns, with qualitative in-depth interviews with key 
stakeholders exploring causes and consequences, which are the main pillar of the 
primary research. The study applies the conceptual framework nationally, as well as 
in the Free State and Western Cape provinces.  
 
The contributions of the thesis are two-fold: At the conceptual level, the study 
defines and constructs an analytical framework of absorptive capacity and related 
bottlenecks in the context of funding for HIV/AIDS treatment in the public health 
sector. It identifies five major areas where bottlenecks may arise: financial, human, 
infrastructural, institutional (within the health system) and structural (outside the 
health system). At the empirical level, the study assesses and compares absorptive 
capacity and major bottlenecks encountered nationally and in the Free State and 
Western Cape provinces in respect of the public sector funding for the HIV/AIDS 
treatment programme.  
 
The results confirm that absorptive capacity is not merely about spending funding. 
Spending should not compromise other programs or elements of the public health 
system, and it should be efficient, equitable and sustainable. The findings show that 
South Africa‟s absorptive capacity was constrained by several obstacles, such as 
poor practices and a shortage of human resources, insufficient financial capacity and 
demanding requirements of conditional funding, inadequate infrastructure, and 
inadequate national leadership. To overcome these obstacles, the mere injection of 
even more funding would be an insufficient response. Consequently, the study 
indicates which other reforms are required, including: further integrating 
antiretroviral treatment services within the public health structures; further 












balancing the conditional grant and equitable share; and enhancing coordination 
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CHAPTER 1 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE  
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
For truth, classically, is freedom, and from freedom in truth comes the capacity to 
build and plan and act better. HIV/AIDS in Africa calls us to unleash that capacity.  
Edwin Cameron in Lecture at Harvard Law School‟s Human Rights 
Program, April 2003 (Cameron 2005, p.138) 
 
In 2007, about 33 million people worldwide were estimated to be infected with the 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), of which 2.7 million had been infected that 
year (UNAIDS 2008). South Africa has the largest population living with HIV in the 
world, and also the highest number of orphans due to the Acquired 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) (UNAIDS 2008). It is estimated that about 5.7 
million people were HIV-positive in South Africa in 2007, and that 350,000 died 
from the disease that same year. The extent of this epidemic and its devastating 
effects are posing serious challenges for the social, political and economic structures 
of South Africa.  
 
Recently, a thus far unprecedented commitment to fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
worldwide has resulted in substantial increases in funding for HIV/AIDS programs 
in Africa. This is also the situation in South Africa, where the HIV/AIDS funds in 
the 2004/05
1
 budget were nearly seven times larger than the funds in the 2000/01 
budget (Hickey et al. 2004). Moreover, the Operational Plan for Comprehensive 
HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa (hereinafter 
referred to as the Comprehensive Plan), launched by the South African government 
in November 2003, emphasises the need for sustained increases in financing. In 
2007, South Africa was the country with the largest number of people on 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) in the world. 
 
However, despite increasing HIV/AIDS budgets, it is argued that spending of such 
allocated funds has been slow (Steward and Loveday 2005). In some provinces, in 
fact, the allocated funds have not been fully spent (Hickey et al. 2004). The 
                                                 
1
 The South African financial year runs from April to March. Thus, the year 2004/05 refers to the 












increasing challenge for HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa seems to lie in utilising 
these newly available funds for the effective implementation of programs (Hickey et 
al. 2004). South African provinces, which are responsible for implementing health 
programs, have experienced increasing spending pressures, which are likely to 
continue in the near future (Hickey et al. 2004). There is a danger, however, that 
pressures to spend public HIV/AIDS funds quickly may compromise their efficient 
utilisation and the achievement of optimal outcomes. 
 
Why are HIV/AIDS funds not fully utilised? International organisations point to the 
lack of absorptive capacity of health systems as holding back the utilisation of 
HIV/AIDS funding (Global Health Council 2004; Lu et al. 2006; UNAIDS 2008; 
World Bank 2005; WHO 2004). This is especially true for the case of scaling up 
HIV/AIDS treatment in resource-limited settings. International institutions refer to 
absorptive capacity as the ability to train more doctors, to build more health 
facilities, to manage more programs, and other prerequisites for establishing and 
scaling up HIV/AIDS related services. The problem is thus a lack of „spare‟ capacity 
in a system that could be employed by new programs. It is argued that health 
systems with limited resources are already weak and overwhelmed, and hence lack 
the capacity to introduce new programs without compromising existing ones. This is 
particularly relevant for complex interventions, such as ART. The concepts of 
absorptive capacity and bottlenecks are defined in Chapter 3.  
 
These challenges are mirrored in the case of South Africa and the implementation of 
the Comprehensive Plan. Since this plan was launched, the program has 
continuously been behind its targets. Although it seeks to provide equitable access to 
comprehensive ART treatment and care to all South Africans who need it by 2008 
within their own municipality, only around 28% of people in need were actually 
accessing it by December 2007 (WHO et al. 2008). Barriers are encountered in 
several areas, such as human resources, financial management and infrastructure. 
Thus, it is crucial at this point to examine the interplay between absorptive capacity 
and HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa in order to ascertain how all available 













1.2  Importance of the topic 
 
National and international HIV/AIDS funding in South Africa has grown rapidly 
over the last few years and is expected to grow further in the near future (Hickey et 
al. 2004; UNAIDS 2004). Nevertheless, there are concerns that the benefits of such 
funding may be limited due to insufficient ability to spend and utilise such resources. 
Some provinces have shown difficulties in spending funds to deliver interventions in 
terms of the Comprehensive Plan and to build new health infrastructure, especially at 
the beginning of the new program.  
 
Furthermore, as difficulties are mostly felt in the areas with less capacity, those 
provinces with higher absorptive capacity (richer provinces) will benefit the most. 
This would put at risk the equitable allocation of resources, as stipulated in the 
Comprehensive Plan. There are signs that provincial underspending in South Africa 
may cause reallocation of resources towards provinces with stronger performance 
records. This trend was pointed out by the National Treasury in the 2003 Division of 
Revenue Bill (NT 2003a). This jeopardises the equity principle in the distribution of 
health resources.  
 
In addition, the overall equilibrium of the health system may also be compromised 
when allocation of resources among health interventions is distorted by new 
priorities. As pointed out by Steward and Loveday (2005, p.24) “the introduction of 
the Comprehensive Plan onto [sic] an already over-burdened public health system 
with too few staff may result in reallocation of these scarce resources, possibly to the 
detriment of other core services”. Only by clarifying the nature of the risks involved 
with regard to absorptive capacity will it be possible to plan adequately for an 
efficient and integrated response.  
 
These challenges are echoed internationally. There is a growing concern around 
absorptive capacity as a major obstacle for scaling up HIV/AIDS policies and, in 
particular, ART programs (Bennett and Fairbank 2003; Copson and Salaam 2003; 
Lewis 2005a; Over 2004; Schneider et al. 2004; UNAIDS 2006a; UNAIDS RTC 












United Nations General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) on HIV/AIDS in 
2001. The rationale behind these rapid increases is that early interventions can have 
a dramatic impact on reducing new infections, and thereby halting the epidemic 
(MSH 2005).  
 
Moreover, recent commitments point to the need for substantial increases in funding 
in order to scale up access to ART, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries, which may accentuate even further the challenges around absorptive 
capacity. In 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Joint United 
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) launched the strategy called “3 by 5”, 
which sought to treat with ART 3 million people living with HIV/AIDS in low- and 
middle-income countries by the end of 2005 (WHO and UNAIDS 2003). Although 
the target was not achieved at that time, access to treatment was significantly 
expanded. In two years, the number of people being treated in low- and middle-
income countries more than tripled, and in Sub-Saharan Africa it increased by more 
than 800% (WHO and UNAIDS 2006). As a result, more than 1.3 million people in 
low- and middle-income countries were receiving treatment in 2005 (WHO and 
UNAIDS 2006), rising to 2 million by December 2006 (WHO et al. 2006). The 
international commitment to continue scaling up ART access increases. In 2006, the 
United Nations (UN) General Assembly High-Level Meeting on HIV/AIDS agreed 
to work towards the goal of universal access to comprehensive prevention, treatment 
and support, by 2010. This commitment translated into reaching the 3 million people 
on ART in 2007 (WHO et al. 2008). These fast advances indicate that not only 
higher levels of funding but improved absorptive capacity will be needed to achieve 
the goals of expanding treatment to all people in need of such treatment.  
 
Furthermore, not only is the magnitude of HIV/AIDS funding a factor, but also the 
speed at which such funding grows. The high priority given to ART programs in 
order to achieve goals quickly may lead to the rapid spending of funding. In 
addition, when the performance of a grant is assessed partly by how much and how 
quickly resources are actually spent, the incentive is to spend quickly, overlooking 
the real and effective absorption of funding. This may lead to the non-efficient 
allocation of funding. Moreover, it has also been argued that the current trends of 












officials, especially where health systems are fragile and there is insufficient 
monitoring (Transparency International 2006). All these factors feed into current 
debates on the extent to which countries can absorb increasing funds. 
 
At the same time, it is feared that current claims that the absorptive capacity is 
insufficient may hinder the actual disbursement of the required funding, and that it 
will ultimately put further increases in financing at risk. This problem can be 
illustrated as a vicious circle, represented in Figure 1.1: a lack of absorptive capacity 
leads to money not being spent, which prevents the allocation of resources; 
consequently, capacity is not expanded, thereby reinforcing the deficiency of 
absorptive capacity.  
 













Source: Adapted from Teixeira (2004, p.2)  
 
In fact, other authors have argued that the problem of absorptive capacity has been 
overstressed even though there have not been proper studies done, and that it has 
furthermore been used to justify the insufficient increases in HIV/AIDS funding. 
Utan (2004, p.15) places the discussion about absorptive capacity in the context of 
HIV/AIDS policies by questioning the utilisation of the concept as “a prerequisite 
for care or an excuse for inaction”. Along the same lines, a member of the Global 
Fund recognises:  
“Money cannot be spent” 
Capacity is not built 
Government and 
donors do not 
allocate resources 














There is a problem. There are issues of absorptive capacity. But it has been elevated 
to the status of a myth. And now it‟s being used as an excuse - or to back up 
arguments against providing more resources. (Dr. Moghalu, in AllAfrica 2003, p.1) 
 
Thus, it is crucial at this point to clarify to what extent the lack of absorptive 
capacity is hindering the utilisation of funding and the implementation of HIV/AIDS 
programs, and to identify the specific bottlenecks that are being created in order to 
design appropriate responses to these problems.  
 
To respond to those questions it is necessary to study the constitutive elements of 
absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS policies. This is not a 
straightforward endeavour. The problem lies in the absence of a widely accepted 
solid theoretical framework for the analysis of absorptive capacity (Asian 
Development Bank 2003). Questions like „how is absorptive capacity measured?‟ 
and „what indicators can be used to decide if health systems are ready to expand?‟ do 
not have a systematic, evidence-based direct answer. As a result, policy-makers lack 
the tools to assess what level of absorptive capacity would allow the utilisation of 
new funds.  
 
With regard to ensuring the effective implementation of HIV/AIDS treatment 
policies, several gaps in scientific investigations remain, which challenge the 
institutional efforts of controlling the epidemic. It is crucial to watch closely the 
actual utilisation of HIV/AIDS funds and to assess accurately the actual realisation 
of the objectives, in order to take advantage of the opportunities granted by 
additional funding to control this epidemic and to improve health services overall.  
 
1.3 Aim and objectives  
 
This research aims to advance the existing body of knowledge of HIV/AIDS 
financing policies in relation to absorptive capacity in the South African context. 
The meaning and scope of absorptive capacity in the context of financing HIV/AIDS 
treatment policies in South Africa is defined in Chapter 3 of the thesis. The ultimate 












efficient allocation of HIV/AIDS funding in order to strengthen the outcomes of 
South Africa‟s HIV/AIDS treatment policies.  
 
The study consequently has the following research objectives:  
 
 To explore the meaning and constituent elements of absorptive capacity for 
public sector HIV/AIDS financing. 
 To investigate the extent to which insufficient absorptive capacity hinders the 
spending of available funding and delays the implementation of public ART 
programs in South Africa. 
 To identify and understand the major bottlenecks, or points of congestion, 
hindering the absorption of HIV/AIDS treatment funding in South Africa‟s 
public health sector. 
 To explore feasible and appropriate options to unblock these bottlenecks in 
South Africa‟s public health sector. 
 Based on these findings, to make recommendations on how best to expand 
the absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS treatment financing in South Africa‟s 
public health care sector. 
 
1.4 Expected results 
 
This study aims to contribute to the understanding and improvement of government 
responses to HIV/AIDS treatment in South Africa. It is expected that the findings 
will be useful for supporting practical action in response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
as well as for strengthening the performance of the South African public health 
system. In particular, this thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge 
and practice on HIV/AIDS policies on two major fronts:  
 
With regard to the conceptual analysis of absorptive capacity, the study aims to do 
the following: 
 
 To explore the concept of absorptive capacity and major related issues in the 












 To review theories from the disciplines of economics and public health and 
their relation to absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS financing in the public 
health sector. 
 To disentangle the nature and severity of the major barriers hampering the 
utilisation of HIV/AIDS treatment financing in the public health sector. 
 
With regard to the South African case, this study sets out to do the following:  
 
 To contribute to the existing knowledge on South Africa‟s public health 
system in relation to its capacity to respond to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. 
 To investigate and clarify the major obstacles hindering the effective use of 
the increasing funds being allocated to public sector HIV/AIDS treatment 
policies. 
 To provide a comparative analysis of the different levels of capacity for, and 
obstacles to the implementation of public sector HIV/AIDS treatment 
programs in South Africa. 
 
Overall, it is expected that the findings of this research will be useful in ascertaining 
policy options and supporting practical action to improve South Africa‟s capacity to 
benefit from increased HIV/AIDS funding. 
 
1.5  Thesis outline 
 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 presents the methodological 
approaches applied in the study. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature, and provides the conceptual framework for the analysis of absorptive 
capacity and the assessment of the bottlenecks encountered by public HIV/AIDS 
treatment funding. The background on HIV/AIDS treatment and financing policies 
in South Africa is outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 discusses the HIV/AIDS budgets 
in South Africa. The empirical findings of the research are presented in Chapters 6 to 
8. The study findings are discussed in Chapter 9. Finally, Chapter 10 presents 
updates to the study findings in the light of more recent events, and it explains their 

























CHAPTER 2 STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
The case study approach is used in this research as the vehicle of inquiry. A 
distinctive element of the case study method is that “it investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin 2009, p.18). This 
close relationship between the phenomenon (viz. difficulties in absorbing HIV/AIDS 
funding) and the context (viz. the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the health system in South 
Africa and the HIV/AIDS financing policies) is evident in the research presented in 
this thesis. The case study is also of an explanatory nature, as this approach is 
particularly suited “to explain[ing] the presumed casual links in real-life 
interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies” (Yin 
2009, p.19). The complexity of factors to be explained in this particular research 
reinforces the use of the case study method. 
 
This thesis combines a theoretical review of the concepts and theories of absorptive 
capacity with both a budget analysis and with fieldwork to explore perceptions of the 
problems affecting HIV/AIDS public expenditure in South Africa. The research thus 
combines an analysis of national health policy goals and expenditure with 
operational research. It brings together several disciplines, including economics and 
public health.  
 
This methodological approach thus encompasses a literature review and an analysis 
of new data gathered in the fieldwork, as well as combining quantitative and 
qualitative methods of inquiry. The literature review is used to develop the 
background to this topic and to outline the theoretical framework. The absorptive 
capacity for HIV/AIDS funding in Provincial Departments of Health (DoHs) in 
South Africa is explored first through quantitative analysis, and thereafter 
complemented with an application of the qualitative fieldwork in order to enrich, 
explain and fill the gaps left by the budget analysis. The use of both methods has 












O‟Cathain et al. 2007) as being the most appropriate when neither approach can be 
relied upon to provide the full information required. A mixed methods type of 
research allows us to gain a greater understanding of the issues being studied, as it 
addresses different aspects of the research question, which would not be possible if 
only one of the two methods was used (O‟Cathain et al. 2007). This combination of 
methods furthermore corresponds to the double nature of the objectives of this 
investigation, combining basic and applied research, as defined by Hart (1998). 
Firstly, basic research is used to define the concept of absorptive capacity in the 
given context; and secondly, applied research is used to determine the major 
bottlenecks to spending in the specific case under study.  
 
2.2  Literature review 
 
Chapter 3 develops a conceptual framework for the study of absorptive capacity in 
relation to HIV/AIDS financing, by building on a review of related theoretical and 
empirical literature from inside and outside South Africa. This literature relates to 
both the fields of HIV/AIDS and health financing but also to the broader fields of 
economics and public health.  
 
A review of the literature is also employed in Chapter 4: this summarises the existing 
knowledge on the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, and the government‟s 
response to this epidemic, in particular the treatment plan. In addition, it maps out 
the stakeholders and major financial mechanisms around HIV/AIDS financing 
policies in the country. Chapter 4 draws largely on existing South African literature 
and data available from the following: (a) government sources, specially the 
National and Provincial Departments of Health (PDoHs) and the National Treasury; 
and (b) studies by other organisations, such as research institutions and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), e.g. the Actuarial Society of South Africa 
(ASSA), the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Joint Civil 
Society Monitoring Forum (JCSMF), and the Health Systems Trust (HST). An 













Chapters 3 and 4 follow the business process management (BPM) approach in 
describing the mechanisms of financing and implementation of the Comprehensive 
Plan. BPM consists of “the explicit representation of business processes with their 
execution and the execution constraints between them”, where a business process is 
defined as “a set of activities that are performed in coordination in an organizational 
and technical environment” (Weske 2007, p.5). Thus, these chapters describe the 
components and interactions in the chain that goes from the public financing of 
HIV/AIDS treatment (input), via the implementation of the activities by the public 
health system (process), to the consecution of targets (outputs). 
 
2.3  Quantitative research through budget analysis 
 
The quantitative part of the research is undertaken through an analysis of public 
expenditures relating to HIV/AIDS in South Africa. As the literature review in 
Chapter 3 shows, such an examination of expenditure and – more specifically – of 
spending the available budgets is the first tool used to assess absorptive capacity. 
Thus, the quantitative investigation commences with this examination. The use of 
financial allocations and processes involved in public budgeting has been previously 
highlighted as a crucial tool for understanding and revealing social and political 
processes, which go well beyond financial trends (IDASA 2007; Norton and Elson 
2002). The examination of national and provincial HIV/AIDS expenditure within the 
health budgets is provided in Chapter 5. 
 
The quantitative analysis of the expenditure is undertaken from the financial year 
2000/01 up to Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) estimates for 
2008/09. This analysis draws attention to the spending patterns, and compares the 
two main HIV/AIDS funding streams in the country: (a) HIV/AIDS funds that have 
been transferred from the National DoH (NDoH) to the Provincial DoHs through 
conditional grants; and (b) funding allocated to HIV/AIDS programs from the 
equitable shares sent from the National Treasury to the Provinces. The South Africa 
government launched the HIV/AIDS conditional grant as the main mechanism of 
funding HIV/AIDS programmes. These grants can only be used for specific 












quarterly basis. This mechanism contrasts with the funding allocated through the 
equitable share mechanism, in terms of which funds are allocated by National 
Treasury to provinces at their own discretion. These two mechanisms are described 
and analysed in Chapter 4. This investigation focuses only on HIV/AIDS 
expenditure within the PDoHs. It does not examine the HIV/AIDS conditional grants 
sent to the Department of Education (DoE) and the Social Development Department 
(DSD); although these are important for ensuring a multisectoral approach and thus 
for an effective response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic, they are beyond the scope of 
this research. 
The budget data used in Chapter 5 are those, which were available in May 2006: 
audited financial statements for years 2000/01-2004/05 (thus actual expenditure); 
pre-audited financial statements for 2005/06; current allocations for 2006/07; and 
budgeted projections over the MTEF (prior to adjustments and rollovers) for 
2007/08 and 2008/09. Calculations in Chapter 5 are based on the budget data 
available in May 2006 in order to reflect accurately the information available at the 
time of the fieldwork. Calculations have been updated in Chapter 10 with data 
available in January 2009.  
 
The use of different sources, i.e. actual expenditure and current allocations and 
actual expenditure vs. projected budgets,,may systematically bias the analysis, 
resulting in lower HIV/AIDS budget increases, for two reasons. Firstly, for the years 
2000/01-2004/05, when audited actual expenditure is used, it is argued that there was 
underspending of budgets; this means that the initially budgeted amounts were 
higher than the actual figures spent. Secondly, the projected figures used for 
2007/08-2008/09 are claimed to be mere increments over the baseline, and lower to 
what the budgets would be (see later in the chapter).   
 
This analysis draws on data available from budgets reports (Budget Reviews, 
Medium Term Budget Policy Statements, and Division of Revenue Bills) from 
National and Provincial Treasuries and DoHs. Data on the spending of conditional 
grants is regularly available because provinces are required to submit quarterly 
reports to the NDoH on conditional grant expenditure. Transfers through equitable 












Estimation of discretionary funding for HIV/AIDS 
 
The estimations of equitable shares in Chapter 5 need to be taken with caution as 
there may be deficiencies in the calculation. Unlike conditional grants, HIV/AIDS 
allocations made from equitable shares are not easy to track due to the lack of 
readily available data, as they are allocated by the province at their discretion and are 
not audited in as much detail as conditional grants, nor as often. Thus, discretionary 
funding needs to be estimated. This thesis calculates discretionary funding by 
subtracting the earmarked expenditure from the total HIV/AIDS payments reflected 
in the HIV and AIDS sub-program in provincial budgets (NT 2006a-2006i). This 
method is also employed in the research of IDASA (Ndlovu and Daswa 2006a; 
Hickey and Ndlovu 2005).  
 
However, the HIV and AIDS sub-program in provincial budgets was only 
standardised in 2003/04, as part of the District Health Services Program Budget Line 
(NT 2003b). Thus, the earlier estimates for 2000/01 and 2001/02 are not calculated 
in this manner, and come from National Treasury (2006j-2006l). Hence, deviations 
in estimates may partly reflect changes in estimation practices. There was not 
enough information available to recalculate the estimates for these two years using 
the same approach as in later years. Overall, although there may be deficiencies in 
the calculations, the use of these approximations remains valid to identify trends in 
time. 
 
2.4  Qualitative research through in-depth interviews 
 
The main fieldwork strategy is based on qualitative investigation undertaken through 
in-depth qualitative face-to-face interviews. Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the findings 
of these in-depth interviews. Field visits were used in order to fill in the gaps left by 
both the literature review and budget analysis. In addition, in-depth interviews were 
the tool used to assess and understand the major bottlenecks and obstacles to 
HIV/AIDS spending. Hence, interviews were the main pillar of the research, 












possible to gain a greater understanding of the critical issues in relation to absorptive 
capacity and problems with spending, as provided by selected key informants.  
 
The use of qualitative research in assessing health system performance nevertheless 
has its limitations. Qualitative research is often criticised for its lack of rigour and 
credibility, and for not being clear or theory-based (Mays and Pope 2000; Neergaard 
et al. 2009). Subjectivity is also strongly present in qualitative work, emanating both 
from the positions of the informant and the researcher. Their perceptions, 
inclinations, or even the circumstances in which the research takes place may 
strongly determine or shape the result of the investigation and its interpretation. 
 
The qualitative part of the study thus has several limitations; results emanating from 
the interviews are subjective and dependent on the participants interviewed, on how 
interviews were conducted, and on how data was analysed by the researcher. They 
nonetheless shed important light on what is thought and believed in relation to ART 
financing and implementation in South Africa by crucial stakeholders. The approach 
taken in the qualitative part of the study concurs with the grounded theory 
perspective, which “focuses on understanding human behaviour from the research 
subjects‟ perspective. It supposes that, to understand behaviour, what people believe 
to be true is often more important than objective reality” (Huston and Rowan 1998, 
p.2455-2456).  
 
Several authors defend the validity and usefulness of qualitative techniques in 
medical research (Huston and Rowan 1998; Mays and Pope 2000; Neergaard et al. 
2009). Mays and Pope (2000, p.51), for example, hold that, although research 
involves subjective perception and although it is important to consider the means 
employed and the perspective adopted, “there is an underlying reality which can be 
studied”. The authors conclude that, in qualitative, as well as in quantitative 
research, the basic strategy to ensure rigor is “self conscious research design, data 
collection, interpretation, and communication” (Mays and Pope 2000, p.52). The 
following sections explain how these interviews were prepared and conducted, and 













A  Selection of participants 
 
The qualitative study was based on purposeful sampling, rather than random 
sampling. Purposeful sampling is the most common technique in qualitative research 
(Devers and Frankel 2000). In-depth qualitative interviews were thus conducted with 
personnel working in the financing and/or implementation of the Comprehensive 
Plan at national or provincial levels, and with representatives of other key 
organisations also working in the same area of study. Participants were selected 
through purposeful sampling, using their position or focus of work, and their 
relationship with the topic as criteria. Participants were thus selected for being 
„information rich‟ and for being able to provide personal and professional insights 
into the area of study. Chapter 4 maps out the stakeholders around the 
Comprehensive Plan and their relationships in order to understand how their 
influence is exercised.  
 
A total number of 42 interviews were conducted during the research. Table 2.1 
below classifies interviewees according to the organisation to which they belong, 
and its location (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of respondents‟ 
profile). Nonetheless, this classification is not definitive. Often many of the 
participants belonged to one organization but were doing work for another one. 
Many academics or researchers, for example, were working for the National or 
Provincial DoHs, as consultants, members of an, advisory team, or participants of a 
project. Also, some interviewees were working for a national organization but were 
based in one of the provinces and thus had particular knowledge about that province. 
Thus, the categorization of interviewees would look quite different if it was based on 













Table 2.1: Number of people interviewed in national and provincial government 
departments and outside government* 
 South Africa Western Cape Free State 
DoH 6 6 7 
Treasury 1 2 3 
Outside government 9 2 5 
* There was one further interviewee from local government. 
 
In order to access both „insider‟ and „outsider‟ perspectives, respondents from both 
within and outside the public sector were chosen. A potential limitation of this study 
is that interest groups have their own agendas and that therefore their opinions on a 
particular programme may be biased and guided by the interest they represent. 
Hence, the participation of different and opposing interest groups as a triangulation 
technique is used to enhance the comprehensiveness and validity of the research, as 
supported by Mays and Pope (2000). Furthermore, the large number of in-depth 
interviews enhances the comprehensiveness of the resulting outputs. In addition, 
many participants belonged or related to more than one organisation, often both 
within and outside government. As a result, they interacted with several of the 
interests groups represented, which meant that they were able to offer a more 
comprehensive perspective on the issues discussed and on the differences between 
organisations.  
 
Within government, two departments were selected: the Treasury and the DoH, both 
at national and provincial levels. Within the DoH, the team responsible for the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan was chosen. The main selection criterion 
with regard to the participants outside government was that their research or 
involvement in this area had to be related to the study topic. The snowball sampling 
technique was also used in order to identify other important participants. At the end 
of each interview, participants were asked to suggest other relevant informants who 
could be interviewed.  
 
Because the focus of the research is on the public ART programmes, no participants 
were selected from the private-for-profit sector delivering ART. The private-for-












and it carries out several ART programmes in South Africa. This is a limitation of 
the study, as this sector could have added another interesting perspective to the 
delivery of ART in South Africa; however, it was excluded because it was outside 
the focus of the research, which was centred in public programmes. 
 
The potential participants were contacted by fax, email or telephone, and sent 
presentation letters informing them of the purpose of the study, the relevance of the 
study to his/her organisation and/or personal work, the estimated time needed for the 
interview (1 hour), and the expected benefits for their organisation. Presentation 
letters were accompanied by a copy of the research proposal and/or a 1 page 
summary, the letter of authorisation for the research from the Ethics Committee, and 
the curriculum vitae of the researcher. When the participants requested more 
information on the particular issues for discussion, a copy of the interview guide was 
sent to them. They were also asked to sign a consent form before the interview 
began. 
 
Most of the people contacted agreed to be interviewed. When this was not the case, 
it was either because (a) the contacted individual agreed to participate but 
appointments were postponed on repeated occasions, which meant that the said 
interview could not be conducted before the research was completed; (b) informal 
conversations had taken place previously with the individual, which the individual 
regarded as sufficient to incorporate his/her views; (c) the individual requested 
permission from his/her organisation to participate in the research, but was never 
granted such permission. In fact, one interview was conducted informally and off the 
record, with the responses not included in the research because the participant could 
not obtain the necessary authorisation from his/her superiors to participate in such 
research. 
 
B  Sequencing of interviews  
 
Interviews took place in three major phases: the first at national level, the second in 
the Western Cape province, and the third in the Free State province. The first phase 
interviews were conducted with personnel responsible for the financing and 












and in organisations doing related research at the national level. These included: the 
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC), the Medical Research Council 
(MRC), IDASA, HST, the Human Science Research Council (HSRC), UNAIDS, the 
Centre for Health Policy of the University of Witwatersrand, and the Global Fund 
for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund). These interviews 
explored the perceptions of the interviewees on the concept and characterisation of 
absorptive capacity; the identification of the bottlenecks; the implications for the 
strengthening of health systems and for the principles of equity, efficiency and 
sustainability. The analysis of the information gathered during the first round of 
interviews prompted a revision of the interview guides for the next phases of data 
collection.  
 
The interviews in the Western Cape and the Free State applied the framework of 
study, refined through the first round of interviews. The Western Cape was studied 
first, as it is the most advanced province in terms of the distribution of ART. In both 
provinces, the respective managers of the Comprehensive Plan at the Western Cape 
DoH (WCDoH) and the Free State DoH (FSDoH) were initially contacted in order to 
obtain their permission for the study and to identify the major problems for the 
absorption of funds in the region. Next, provincial interviews targeted the financial 
managers as well as those managers within the PDoH responsible for the major areas 
identified as problematic, such as human resources or drug management. At the 
same time, interviews were conducted within the Provincial Treasury and 
stakeholders outside government, both within academia and research institutions. 
Additional interviews were conducted following referrals provided in these 
interviews. 
 
Some participants were contacted after the interview to follow up with them, to 
clarify responses, to update data, to develop ideas or issues further, and to collect 
data not available at the time of the initial interview. Follow-up contacts were done 
via email or another face-to-face interview, depending on the nature and duration of 













C Data collection through in-depth qualitative face-to-face interviews  
 
In-depth face-to-face qualitative interviews were the main tool used to collect data in 
the field. The use of intense open-ended interviewing benefited the research in that 
participants were able to express their opinions and assessments in their own words, 
thereby adding depth, detail and meaning to the issue investigated (Patton 2002). 
Face-to-face interviews are also an opportunity to obtain not only information, but 
also the participant‟s interpretation of such information (Mack et al. 2005). The 
research was thus built on the value of detailed first-hand information in deepening 
our understanding of the issue of absorptive capacity in South Africa. This method 
was preferred over more structured questionnaires for enhancing the depth of 
information collected in the participants‟ own voices. Interviews are furthermore 
preferred over focus groups when sensitive topics are discussed, as groups might 
limit or even prevent open discussions (Mack et al. 2005).  
 
Face-to-face interviews further involved direct and personal contact with participants 
in their own environments. All interviews were conducted by the researcher. This 
facilitated the researcher‟s understanding of participants‟ contexts and issues, which 
enhanced the understanding of their contributions. Nevertheless, a balance was 
pursued between closeness and empathy with the participant on the one hand, and 
distance and neutrality towards the information and opinions provided on the other, 
as is recommended for this type of research (Patton 2002). By having personal 
contact with the participants through the interviews in the participants‟ own context, 
the researcher could also observe and thus understand their environment better. At 
the same time, by engaging exclusively through the interview process, the research 
aimed to maintain neutrality and an image of being external and detached. This 
balance is what Patton (2002) refers to as „empathic neutrality‟:  
 
At first, the phrase “emphatic neutrality” may appear to be an oxymoron, combining 
contradictory ideas. Empathy, however, describes a stance toward the people on 
encounters –it communicates understanding, interest, and caring. Neutrality suggests 
a stance toward their thoughts, emotions, and behaviours – it means being non-













The fact that the same researcher was solely responsible for data design, collection 
and analysis enhanced the clear and systematic communication of information in the 
interviews, both from the interviewer to the interviewee and vice versa, as well as 
the assimilation and understanding of the resulting inputs. 
 
Interviews were recorded using a small digital recorder. The advantage of this was 
that it was not perceived as intrusive by the participants, which was one of the 
dangers of using a recording device. This was thanks to the digital recorder‟s small 
size and its simplicity as compared to tape-recorders, as it did not make any noise 
nor did it require turning or swapping the tape during the course of an interview. In 
fact, it was noted that participants often tended to forget about the recording, thus 
facilitating their relaxation and openness during the course of the interview. 
Moreover, digital technology also made it easier to make back-up copies of the 
recordings for quick transmission to the transcriber. The interviewer verbally 
requested the respondents‟ permission to tape the interview as well as via the 
consent form signed by all respondents before the interview. No interviewee 
requested to see the transcription of his/her interview. 
  
D Interview guides 
 
All interviews used structured interview guides with pre-prepared questions on 
strategic themes previously identified in the literature review. This helped with 
systematically collecting data from all groups of participants and gaining the most 
value from the interview time. In addition, it facilitated the grouping of responses, 
showing common and diverging points of view, while seeking patterns across 
experiences and perspectives.  
 
The guide developed for the interviews was not applied uniformly across all 
interviews, however; questions were adapted to the participants being interviewed. 
Some parts were common across all interviews, whereas other parts varied, 
depending on the position and area of specialisation of the participant. There were 
some standard questions for specific positions, such as for financial officers, for 
human resources officers, and for chief pharmacists. For these, very specific 












the participant in that area. Appendix 2 contains several examples of the interview 
guides used in the various in-depth interviews.  
 
The approach followed was a mixture between a general interview guide and the 
standard open-ended interview, as described by Patton (2002). This combination 
consisted of the preparation of a detailed interview guide before the interview, where 
not only issues but specific questions were worded and sequenced in detail (as in the 
standard open-ended interview); at the same time, the interviewer had flexibility in 
determining when it was appropriate to omit some questions, change the order, or 
explore certain subjects in greater depth (as in the general interview guide).  
 
In other words, the in-depth interview guide provided a framework and full set of 
questions, to be used or omitted by the interviewer at her own discretion during the 
course of the interview. The interviewer was thus making decisions along the way 
about which information to pursue in detail, and hence making it possible to pursue 
issues that arose in the course of the interview but that had not been included in the 
interview guide. The interviewer used the interview guide as a tool to guide the 
interview, rather than as an end in itself. This flexibility was possible as all 
interviews were conducted by the investigator, who was able to take such decisions. 
In words of Yin (2000, p. 71), the approach was “to balance adaptiveness with rigor 
– but not rigidity”. 
 
Interview guides consisted of both open-ended and multiple choice questions, 
adapted to the different issues under study. Firstly, open-ended questions were 
designed in order to capture participants‟ opinions and perspectives in their own 
words, using their own categorisations, and even the depth of emotion in relation to 
the issue being discussed (Patton 2002). For example, open-ended questions were 
used to explore the issue of absorptive capacity, in order to capture the opinions and 
positions of the interviewees in their own words. The responses to open-ended 
questions are believed to be more limited when collected through self-administered 
interview guides, due to the writing skills and time required (Patton 2002). However, 
in this research, participants were not asked to fill in a questionnaire; instead, the 












and allowing for fuller explanations by the participants, including the use of follow-
up questions. 
 
Secondly, multiple choice questions were used to collect and compare participants‟ 
opinions systematically across similar issues. The main purpose of this to identify 
major bottlenecks and obstacles encountered in the spending of funds for the 
Comprehensive Plan. During the course of the interview, participants were shown a 
table (Table 3.2 in Chapter 3), illustrating the potential bottlenecks and obstacles; 
they were then asked to comment on which of these applied to South Africa and/or 
their province. The use of multiple choice questions for this issue enabled 
comparisons to be made across responses, and it simplified the final assessment of 
bottlenecks and obstacles experienced in spending HIV/AIDS funding. In this case, 
the use of multiple choice questions was preferred over that of survey techniques 
because it made better use of the bottleneck framework of the study, facilitating 
comprehensive and fast responses by interviewees. In particular, it helped 
participants to cover a wide range of possibilities, instead of commenting only on the 
first possibilities that came into their minds. Although participants were asked 
whether they wanted to add any elements not included in the table, it is likely that 
the pre-selection and classification of issues in Table 3.2 influenced their responses 
to some extent, and that this could be regarded as another limitation of the 
qualitative data gathered.  
 
E Data synthesis and analysis using NVivo qualitative software 
 
The analysis of the data collected combined both inductive and deductive 
approaches: inductive reasoning in using the data to generate ideas, and deductive 
reasoning in confirming pre-determined hypotheses and findings (Thorne 2000). For 
example, the exploration of the concept of absorptive capacity, which is dealt with in 
Chapter 6, follows an inductive approach, whereas the confirmation or not of the 
potential bottlenecks confronted, which is dealt with in Chapter 7, is a deductive 
enquiry. This combination corresponded to the mixed nature of the questions 













All interviews were recorded, and transcribed either by the researcher or by a 
professional transcriber. Transcriptions were then entered and analysed in a 
systematic way through the qualitative research software NVivo 7, the most recent 
version of NVivo available at the time. NVivo provides a rigorous tool for the 
analysis of qualitative data, and it is designed to assist in the categorisation, 
classification and analysis of non-structured data. NVivo works around a 
codification of data, assigning data to categories previously defined by the analyst, 
and in this case according to the themes and questions in the interview guide. NVivo 
is highly recommended for research that follows the grounded theory approach 
(Gibbs 2002). 
 
The use of this program allowed for the assimilation of complex narrative data 
through matrices that connected the related issues. The program also works with 
cross-cutting themes without altering the information. The challenge of using such 
qualitative computer software is that the researcher may rely too much on building 
up the data set and organisation by means of codes and labels, thereby deflecting the 
researcher‟s attention from the actual analysis of information and interpretation of 
results. However, the program does facilitate gaining analytic distance through tools 
for identifying relationships and cross-referencing ideas across different data inputs, 
thus enabling better reflection on the information. In addition, the systematic 
compilation and classification of information through the program made it possible 
to identify patterns quickly and to capture relevant insights. Hence, the use of NVivo 
7 supported the qualitative methodology of this research, thus enhancing the quality 
of the study. 
 
Data was coded and organised according to a set of nodes, which initially follow the 
themes in the interview guide. This facilitated the classification of data and the 
categorisation of inputs. There were three types of nodes: free nodes, which were 
independent; tree nodes, which had ramifications; and case nodes, which referred to 
the case studied.  
 
During the course of the analysis, some categories were identified as non-relevant, 
while new categories were added. The emphasis again was on flexibility in order to 












patterns to emerge and it made it possible for the researcher to seek further 
clarification and understanding of the major issues identified, without making 
assumptions and presuppositions about the key themes in advance.  
 
Thereafter, information on each of the themes was summarised according to a mix of 
criteria, summarised below: 
 
A. Importance value: These are issues that were considered most important, in 
other words:  
a. Issues most emphasized as crucial by respondents 
b. Issues identified by the largest number of respondents  
c. Issues discussed longest (in terms of text length or interview time) 
d. Issues mentioned most times in the course of an interview 
 
B. Explanatory value: These are issues that revealed crucial information 
because:  
a. They responded directly to questions posed in the research 
b. They offered a new and relevant perspective on the issue discussed 
 
During the data collection and analysis process, themes and ideas emerged that lent 
focus to a significant part of the discussion and that were identified as crucial in 
understanding or explaining the phenomena studied. These emerging themes and 
ideas were incorporated into the research in order to gain a deeper understanding of 
them; examples of such themes included „decentralisation‟ or „nurse-driven ART 
delivery‟.  
 
2.5  Design of the case study 
 
This section explains how the case study was designed, how South Africa as a 
country was selected as a national case study, how the Western Cape and the Free 
State were selected as specific provincial case studies, and why the study focused on 













A  Selection of South Africa as a case study  
 
South Africa was chosen as the case study for a number of reasons. Firstly, given the 
high burden of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa, the extent to which funding 
that has been made available to fight the epidemic is actually used to implement the 
response, is crucial. Moreover, the issue of absorptive capacity limitations for 
HIV/AIDS funding in South Africa was raised recently after the rapid and significant 
increases in HIV/AIDS funding in the country were followed by slow spending rates 
(Hickey et al. 2004; Steward and Loveday 2005). These concerns increased as the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan fell below targets (WHO et al. 2008).  
 
Secondly, South Africa is a very interesting country for this study, as it is one of the 
few countries in Africa that fund HIV/AIDS policies primarily from domestic 
funding rather than through donor aid. A comparative study (Gayle 2003) of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe 
concluded that all countries studied, with the exception of South Africa, financed 
HIV/AIDS expenditure mainly from external sources. Thus, the study of absorptive 
capacity in the South African context is crucial for revealing potential bottlenecks to 
HIV/AIDS spending beyond foreign aid issues.. Although most relevant literature 
discusses the difficulties of absorbing external HIV/AIDS funding, the disbursement 
of domestic expenditure is also challenging and equally important. 
 
Thirdly, South Africa‟s budgetary system is regarded as very good and transparent, 
providing extensive and timely public expenditure information in the public budget 
documents. In fact, a study conducted by the International Budget Partnership (IBP) 
of budget processes across 59 countries, concluded that only 6 of the 59 countries 
studied were able to provide extensive and satisfactory budget information, with 
South Africa being one of them (IBP 2006). Given the relevance of expenditure 
information for the issue of absorptive capacity, this high quality and availability of 
budget information is an additional factor that makes South Africa a suitable case for 
this research. At the same time, the particularly robust budgetary system may create 
a positive bias in absorptive capacity, and thus limit the applicability of this study to 













B Selection of Western Cape and Free State provinces 
 
In South Africa, the provinces are responsible for implementing health policy and 
consequently they utilise the greatest part of public health and HIV/AIDS 
expenditure (Hickey et al. 2004). Local government is excluded from the core of the 
analysis because its responsibility on the financing and implementation of ART is 
minimal in comparison with the provincial or national level, as will be explained in 
Chapter 4. Furthermore, one representative of local government was interviewed 
early in the fieldwork, and confirmed that the involvement of local government in 
HIV/AIDS treatment activities was minimal. Thus, the study embarked upon an in-
depth analysis of two provinces in order to gather further understanding of the issues 
under investigation. The provinces of Western Cape and Free State were identified 
through the literature review as potential candidates for the study for the following 
reasons. The Western Cape was selected for being a pioneer in implementing ART 
projects in the country, with the start of pilot projects in Khayelitsha
2
 even before the 
launch of the Comprehensive Plan. This has facilitated its fast advances in attaining 
the goals of the Comprehensive Plan. In addition, it is also a leading province in 
terms of good spending records of HIV/AIDS budgets. The province of the Free 
State is an average one in terms of its health infrastructure and medical resources, 
and thus more representative of the national situation. Furthermore, the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan in this province has been widely 
researched and documented, thus providing more information than other provinces. 
Appendix 3 compares the basic socio-economic and health indicators for both 
provinces and for South Africa as a whole. Moreover, during the first round of 
interviews conducted at the national level, the opinions of participants regarding this 
selection were explored. Their feedback corroborated the usefulness of the joint 
selection of these two provinces. 
 
Interviewees also advised against the study of provinces like the Eastern Cape, 
Mpumalanga and Limpopo. Although these provinces probably do have more acute 
problems and limitations in absorptive capacity, there are strong concerns around the 
availability and accessibility of information required for the study. Reasons for this 
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include: (a) these provinces only started to implement the Comprehensive Plan very 
late and thus it may be too early to identify results; and (b) these provinces have 
undergone recent changes in their leadership around the Comprehensive Plan, which 
may hinder the acquisition of information on the processes followed and the 
experience gained.  
 
The province of KwaZulu-Natal was not selected despite the fact that it is the 
province with the highest burden of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Several interviewees 
agreed that this province has very case-specific characteristics and particular 
political dynamics that are difficult to disentangle. This intricate setting may hide the 
trends and points in questions in the spending of funding and implementation of the 
program behind other parallel matters as well as limiting the applicability of the 
results to other provinces.  
 
C Focus on financing of ART 
 
The study focused specifically on the ART component of the Comprehensive Plan, 
also referred to as treatment with antiretroviral medicines (ARVs), and the related 
services delivered through the public health system. The most effective way of 
treating AIDS is through ART. It is a complex intervention, based on Highly-Active 
Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) and consisting of a triple combination of ARVs. 
When properly managed, ARV treatment brings the HIV infection to levels so low 
that the virus is practically undetectable. As a result, treatment reduces morbidity 
and mortality and improves the health status of people living with AIDS. The 
importance of ART is that it has transformed the HIV/AIDS disease from an 
invariably deadly one to a chronic one. Despite the complexity of HAART, though, 
the feasibility of providing ART in low-resource settings has been demonstrated in 
numerous pilot projects (Coetzee et al. 2004; Farmer et al. 2001).  
 
Because South Africa‟s HIV/AIDS policy understands prevention, treatment and 
care as a continuum in that these services are interrelated (DoH 2003a), it is difficult 
to isolate the ART component from the rest of the services included in the 
Comprehensive Plan. Yet, from a financial point of view, the ART is the most 












the budget. The ART component was projected to cost more than one third of the 
total cost of the Comprehensive Plan in 2006/07 (DoH 2003a). In fact, the 
expenditure analysis in Chapter 5 does not focus specifically on funding for ART but 
on HIV/AIDS expenditure in PDoHs in general due to data limitations, though it 
does differentiate between conditional grants, which are more directly linked to the 
ART program, and equitable shares.  
 
The study focuses on the provision of ART services through the public health sector, 
but does not exclude joint public and private initiatives for the delivery of ART. The 
study follows the categorisation of public sector facility used in Steward and 
Loveday (2005), which includes as public sector ART programs those assisted by 
other organisations such as NGOs and academic institutions, but which utilise 
existing public sector resources to cover patients without medical aid. Steward and 
Loveday (2005) argue that, “while neat and clear cut categories of private-not-for-
profit and the public sector are useful in conceptualising role-players, in practice 
such neat delineations are not always feasible” (p.8). The stakeholders included in 
the research are those groups, within or outside government, responsible for 
financing and implementing the public ART program.  
 
2.6  Ethical considerations 
 
Ethical approval for the research was obtained from the University Ethics 
Committee on 11
th
 November 2005, REC. REF. 421/2005. Permission for the 
research was sought from the NDoH and PDoHs. At the national level, no overall 
permission was granted, the reason given that the research dealt with very sensitive 
topics (HIV/AIDS and financing). However, permission was not denied either. 
Consequently, permission was sought by participants on a one-to-one basis at the 
national level, which made the research process more difficult. Nevertheless, it also 
highlighted the need and value of this investigation in the given context. In the two 
provinces, in contrast, this overall permission was obtained without any resistance. 
The other two HIV/AIDS-related academic dissertations referred to in this research 
(Fourie 2004; Naimak 2006) do not acknowledge similar institutional resistance. 












Cape based research of Naimak (2006) notes that the unproblematic access to 
interviewees and information might be because the research focused specifically on 
the success of a grant. 
 
Ethical considerations were also covered in the Participation Consent Form and 
confidentiality agreements. Before each interview, the participant was asked to read 
and sign a Participation Consent Form (see Appendix 4), which was done in all 
cases. In addition, the researcher reminded participants of the confidentiality 
agreement and asked permission to record the interview. At the beginning of the 
interview, the researcher explained the purpose of the study, and allowed the 
participants to ask questions. All participants agreed for the interview to be tape-
recorded. Recordings were transcribed partly by the researcher, and partly by two 
official transcription companies. The contracts that the researcher signed with the 
transcribers included a confidentiality clause.     
 
2.7  Conclusion 
 
The methodological tools used by the research followed several approaches, so that 
the research methods were adapted to the purpose and context of the investigation. It 
employed a combination of quantitative and qualitative research and a combination 
of review of existing information and collection of new data. In-depth qualitative 
face-to-face interviewing was the mainstay of the fieldwork. Intensive interviews 
were conducted with previously developed qualitative and detailed interview guides, 
consisting of both open-ended and multiple choice questions. The interviewer had 
the flexibility to use and adapt these interview guides so that they best fitted the 
collection of data. This method proved useful in providing depth and detail of 
responses, as well as providing a systematic and rigorous collection of data. 
Moreover, the direct contact of the interviewer and interviewee in the participant‟s 
context enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of the setting and the 
issues faced. In addition, the use of the computer software NVivo 7 facilitated the 
synthesis of the qualitative information collected as part of the fieldwork according 
to the themes previously defined, and provided tools supporting the analysis of 












CHAPTER 3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
The term absorptive capacity is described in different ways in the literature 
depending on the particular context. Specifically in the case of HIV/AIDS funding, 
and despite numerous recent debates, there is not sufficient understanding of the 
constitutive elements of absorptive capacity, nor of the ways in which it can be 
measured. It is precisely this deficiency, which is a major justification for this study.  
 
The first six sections of this chapter review existing concepts and indicators to assess 
absorptive capacity in several disciplines, and to reflect on how these concepts and 
indicators may be extrapolated to this study. Based on this review, the last two 
sections develop the conceptual framework that will be applied in this study of 
absorptive capacity for HIV/AIDS financing in South Africa‟s public health sector. 
 
3.2  Emergence of absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS and health 
financing issues in the literature  
 
The issue of absorptive capacity in relation to HIV/AIDS financing has been raised 
mainly in relation to the recent increases in international funding to fight the 
epidemic (Lewis 2005b; UNAIDS RST-ESA 2006). It arises from the fact that for 
many Sub-Saharan countries, HIV/AIDS is largely financed by donor aid. Hence, 
these studies deal mostly with funding from international organisations, and often 
focus on the constraints arising from the international nature of the funds, although 
they do also take into account some of the hurdles from the recipient side. In this 
context, absorptive capacity refers to:  
 
The ability of developing countries to efficiently spend foreign aid money. Given 
the limitations of health systems in some developing countries, it can be challenging 
to process, disperse and manage outside assistance, especially since many 
developing countries receive aid from numerous donors, each with their own 













The UNAIDS 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic (UNAIDS 2004) pays 
special attention to the challenge of spending current increases in international 
HIV/AIDS funding efficiently. It recognises that, despite the increasing availability 
of funding, countries, especially the heavily affected ones, “face serious bottlenecks 
to spending it effectively” (UNAIDS 2004, p.131). Thus, the message of UNAIDS 
becomes two-fold: “increase resources to match the need and remove the 
bottlenecks” (UNAIDS 2004, p.131).  
 
Similarly, there have been recent debates on absorptive capacity in relation to health 
financing, and not just HIV/AIDS financing, but also referring to new flows of 
international donor aid. For example, the new edition of Disease Control Priorities 
in Developing Countries (Jamison et al. 2006), a leading reference book in its field, 
deals with the issue of absorptive capacity solely in relation to new international aid 
flows. Sharing the understanding of the combination of aid-led constraints and health 
sector supply constraints, the authors emphasise that, ironically, the productive use 
of funding is at risk when aid is targeted at specific areas:  
 
Health sector supply and demand constraints can also hinder countries‟ effective 
employment of large increases in health resources ... Additional funding alone does 
not create sufficient conditions for overcoming structural weaknesses, particularly in 
the short run. If aid is targeted to specific diseases or interventions, effective use of 
such aid may “consume” different amounts of a country‟s administrative capacity. 
(Jamison et al. 2006, p.232) 
 
The recent World Bank guide on health financing (Gottret and Schieber 2006) also 
discusses absorptive capacity in relation to whether countries are able to spend 
effectively those new resources for health made available by donors. This guide goes 
one step further and points out that absorptive capacity is not exclusively a problem 
encountered with donor aid, but that it affects domestic expenditure as well. From 
the perspective of domestic expenditure, Gottret and Schieber (2006) highlight the 
importance of public expenditure management in scaled-up funding to the health 
sector. They define absorptive capacity as follows: 
 
Absorptive capacity includes the ability of the public sector to design, disburse, 
coordinate, control, and monitor public spending. This coordination is both vertical 
(between central and local governments) and horizontal (between line ministries at 












health ministries have the capacity to manage a large increase in real expenditures 
beyond a usual trend. (Gottret and Schieber 2006, p.239) 
 
Another important approach to improving the absorptive capacity of health areas is 
taken by Mooney and Houston (2004). They argue in favour of improving health 
resource allocation formulae by incorporating indications of the „capacity to benefit‟ 
from the recipient health areas. The authors explain „capacity to benefit‟ as the 
extent to which health areas can take full advantage of resources allocated for health 
interventions. The capacity to benefit depends on the „Management Economic Social 
and Human‟ (MESH) infrastructure, which determines the ability of health areas to 
make use of health resource allocations. The authors explain that this approach 
depends not on the size of the problem or the magnitude of resources needed to solve 
it, but on considerations from the recipient‟s side. By incorporating MESH 
infrastructure into resource allocation formulae, this approach takes into account the 
particular needs of disadvantaged areas in terms of their MESH infrastructure, as 
explained in Mooney and Houston (2004).  
 
Embracing this framework, Botha (2008) builds a case for analysing absorptive 
capacity in relation to equity processes in primary health care (PHC) in the Eastern 
Cape province of South Africa. In the context of PHC policies in South Africa, 
absorptive capacity is understood as “a pre-condition for equitable health services 
and gains in health equity” (Botha 2008, p.i). She explores the complexity of the 
intervening variables that drive spending constraints. The study concludes that 
mechanisms for budgeting, managing and spending are at the core of absorptive 
capacity or its lack. Consequently, it recommends broadening our understanding of 
these processes by considering the intervening variables, which may hamper 
absorptive capacity in each particular context. 
 














3.3 Absorptive capacity from a budgetary perspective 
 
Absorptive capacity of health financing (and thus HIV/AIDS financing) can be seen 
as an issue of maximisation of the utilisation and the efficiency of public expenditure 
and budget management. From this budgetary perspective, Palma (2001a) refers to 
absorptive capacity within the health financing context as: 
 
The extent by [to] which the Department of Health maximises the utilisation of its 
available financial resources, sourced from the national government‟s annual 
budgetary allocation to all public agencies and institutions, including ODA 
[Overseas Development Assistance]. (Palma 2001a, p.6)  
 
This approach emphasises the maximisation of the utilisation of funding, both in 
terms of processes of expanding public expenditure as well as improving the 
efficiency of the expenditure. Budgetary management theories explain issues in 
relation to the expansion and performance of public budgets. Roberts (2004), for 
example, highlights key problems in maximising efficiency while scaling up public 
expenditure, for both developed and developing countries. These problems include: 
(a) funds may remain unspent while implementing agencies become ready; (b) 
technical efficiency (ratio output/input) may fall, as inexperienced staff are 
employed to operate the expanded services; (c) costs of inputs and staff may rise 
because of supply shortages, lack of competition between contractors, and the high 
logistical costs of, and incentive payments for staff, working in remote areas; (d) 
intended beneficiaries may not be reached because of limited access.  
 
The distinctive element of the problem of maximisation of absorptive capacity from 
that of maximisation of efficiency of expenditure is that the potential problem of 
insufficient absorptive capacity has arisen because of a process of increasing 
finances. In other words, limited absorptive capacity results from rapid increases in 
financing. Although it is possible also to discuss absorptive capacity in the context of 
sustained expenditure, this case would refer more specifically to theories of 
maximisation of efficiency of expenditure. Nevertheless, it is from this budgetary 
approach that the most relevant tools for measuring absorptive capacity arise, and 













A Measurement of absorptive capacity by spending performance 
 
The main approach used for measuring absorptive capacity with regard to 
HIV/AIDS and health funding involves calculating how much of allocated 
expenditure has actually been spent in the previous term (also referred in the 
literature as „actual expenditure‟). The understanding is that when a country, 
province or department has spent its entire previous budget, it has enough capacity to 
spend such funds, and may therefore have the capacity to spend more. Conversely, if 
the country, province or department has not spent all its funds at the end of the 
financial year, it would be logical to conclude that it does not have spare capacity to 
utilise even more funds. This is the rationale followed by IDASA in South Africa 
(Guthrie and Hickey 2004) and the starting point for the analysis of Palma (2001a 
and 2001b) in the Philippines.  
 
There are several mechanisms and sources for tracking HIV/AIDS expenditure and 
spending. National Health Accounts (NHA) is a key instrument for analysing health 
budgets and is being used to track HIV/AIDS funding (Schneider and Bhatt 2004). 
NHA enables the tracking and study of disease-specific analysis at the national level. 
Disaggregating disease-specific expenditures, such as those for HIV/AIDS for 
instance, can offer significant information in relation to how expenditures are used, 
and their sources and recipients, arming policy-makers with a powerful tool for 
budget analysis. Tracking resource flows of public expenditures is challenging, as it 
requires strong reporting systems. Similar to this approach, UNAIDS uses a 
framework known as National AIDS Spending Assessment (NASA) (Izazola-Licea 
2005), which combines several tools for resource tracking and budget analysis to 
monitor, and to some extent compare, expenditure on HIV/AIDS across countries 
(see Appendix 5). Whereas NHA is limited to health budgets, NASA methodology 
also tracks non-health expenditure related to HIV/AIDS. 
 
In the case of South Africa, IDASA examines the allocations of government funding 
to HIV/AIDS programs. It investigates the mechanisms for intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and the budgetary processes involved. A recent study by IDASA concluded 
that there had been a massive improvement in spending HIV/AIDS expenditure by 












improve the budgeting and financial management capacity (Hickey et al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, the main focus of that study was budgetary allocation, and not the 
analysis of actual spending (Hickey et al. 2004). 
 
A more robust analysis of absorptive capacity through the budget is provided by the 
examination of absorptive capacity of government and donor funding in the DoH in 
the Philippines (Palma 2001a and 2001b). The study creates and compiles four 
measures with which to assess the utilisation and absorptive capacity of an agency, 
such as the National Health Department, with regard to its available financial 
resources. The four indices for measuring budget utilisation rates are: appropriation 
utilisation index; budget programming index; allotment utilisation index; and overall 
absorptive capacity index (see Box 3.1 for definitions).  
 
Box 3.1: Budgetary measures of absorptive capacity in the DoH in the 
Philippines 
Four indices were used to measure budget utilisation in the DoH in the Philippines: 
 
Appropriation Utilisation Index (ApUI) = Obligation/Appropriation – indicates the 
agency‟s ability to utilise funds relative to the legislated/statutory spending target.  
 
Budget Programming Index (BPI) = Allotment/Appropriation – shows the extent to 
which the legislated budget (appropriation) of the agency for the year has been 
prioritised by fiscal authorities, given the actual availability of funds from domestic 
and external sources. In this way, it indicates the relative importance given to the 
agency‟s programs, activities and projects in comparison to other agencies.  
 
Allotment Utilisation Index (AUI) = Obligation/Allotment – shows the extent to 
which an agency effectively utilises the available resources at any given time.  
 
Overall Absorptive Capacity Index (OACI) = AUI/BPI – measures the congruence 
between an agency‟s ability to utilise the allotments received (AUI) and the relative 
priority given to the agency by the fiscal managers (BPI). 













The study of Palma (2001a) is instrumental in providing and testing measures of 
absorptive capacity through budget utilisation indices for the Philippines DoH. 
Nevertheless, as Palma (2001a) recognised, these measures need to be correlated 
with measures of accomplishments or outputs of the specific programs. Thus, 
favourable increases in utilisation rates may not necessarily imply better functioning 
of programs (Palma 2001b). This and other limitations of such a budgetary approach 
to absorptive capacity are discussed in the following section.  
 
B Limitations of using budget spending for measuring absorptive capacity  
 
Using spending data as a proxy for assessing absorptive capacity has several 
limitations, and can lead to misleading conclusions. To start with, even in a situation 
where all funds are fully spent, it may be that funds were allocated to interventions 
other than the intended ones (although not accounted or reported differently). In a 
context of weak health systems, especially at the local level, health centres may 
prefer to invest the funds that were originally allocated to HIV/AIDS in other 
pressing needs. This deviation may be difficult to track in the presence of weak 
financial reporting mechanisms or practices. Thus, it is important for this study to 
determine whether funding was indeed invested in the intended interventions, as 
otherwise the use of the term absorptive capacity may be meaningless. Tracking 
financial flows up to their final destination and disaggregating them by means of 
spending categories is a first step in identifying spending in the intended 
interventions.  
 
Secondly, when allocated funds are not fully spent, it may be because there are 
bottlenecks to spending in certain areas, though there might be spare capacity in 
other areas. An overall assessment of an unspent budget would in this case create a 
misleading picture of the existing capacity. When lack of capacity in some areas 
coexists with spare capacity in others, a disaggregated analysis is necessary to 
identify those areas, for example by geographic sectors or program components. 
However, such disaggregated information is often difficult to find in regular, 













Thirdly, it is also claimed that merely increasing one‟s spending is not sufficient; it 
is also important to spend more efficiently (Wagstaff and Claeson 2004). For 
example, organisations typically are under pressure to spend their allocated funds 
before the end of the financial year to ensure allocations in the following year. This 
encourages easy and fast spending, creating the risk of compromising the criteria 
used in financial allocations. This may lead to inefficiency in spending, which might 
not be recognised by looking only at overall spending patterns of the budget. 
Equally, some budgetary approaches such as incrementalism may in fact encourage 
high utilisation of funds, though not necessarily in priority areas. Hence, not only 
spending but also the returns or outcomes of such spending need to be included in 
the analysis.  
 
Lastly, disaggregated data on actual spending of health budgets, as well as outcome 
data, is scarce in South Africa, and even more so in the rest of Africa. In addition, 
refined budget measurements of absorptive capacity as developed by Palma (2001a) 
require a budget reporting system that provides such detailed information on a 
regular basis. Previous studies in South Africa have pointed out that the 
shortcomings of spending data hinder financial analysis of HIV/AIDS beyond 
tracking expenditure (Hickey et al. 2004).  
 
C Marginal budgeting for bottlenecks (MBB) 
 
Another budgetary approach to tackle absorptive capacity issues is given by the 
MBB. This instrument has been developed by the United Nations Children‟s Fund 
(UNICEF), the World Bank and WHO for performance-based planning, to enable 
translating more money into better health outcomes (WHO 2003), through purposely 
identifying obstacles to spending. The model uses a spreadsheet-based tool 
consisting of three main modules – identification of bottlenecks, costing and 
budgeting, and assessing the impact. The model is being tested in several countries 
such as Ethiopia, Ghana and Mali. It can potentially improve budgeting by tackling 
obstacles that hinder spending. 
 
The MBB identifies implementation constraints of the health system that should be 












costs of overcoming those constraints … It facilitates a process of budgeting for 
government health expenditures that starts by improving allocative efficiency of the 
newly available resources, and provides a basis for policy dialogue and planning. 
(Knippenberg et al. undated, p.1)  
 
 
MBB is a continuous process, which consists of five major steps (Knippenberg et al. 
undated): 
 
1. Identification of bottlenecks 
2. Setting performance frontiers to overcome barriers, based on country-specific 
opportunities and constraints 
3. Estimation of costs to overcome the bottlenecks and achieve performance 
frontiers 
4. Assessing the impact of overcoming such bottlenecks 
 
Nevertheless, as stated by Knippenberg et al. (undated), the specific tools need to be 
adapted to each context and to the specific objectives of study. Thus, although the 
same conceptual approach may be followed by different countries, the specific 
methodology in terms of indices and measuring tools cannot be replicated from one 
country to another. Furthermore, this tool cannot be used on its own for assessing all 
aspects of absorptive capacity, as other considerations such as efficiency of spending 
need to be taken into account too, as explained above. 
 
In conclusion, there are no commonly accepted frameworks and comprehensive 
tools to assess absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS and health financing. 
Budget spending is a first indicator of the readiness of a system to utilise more 
funding. However, it is also an insufficient indicator, which can lead to erroneous 
assessment when considered on its own. Broader considerations of how the money is 
actually being spent need to be taken into account.  
 
3.4 Capacity building from an institutional perspective  
 
Moving from the budgetary perspective to a more institutional perspective, there are 












building and related terms such as capacity development and capacity strengthening 
(Lusthaus et al. 1999; UNDP 1998). The meaning of the term has moved away from 
the more traditional approaches, which focused on the training of personnel, towards 
a more holistic one. Kuchenbecker (2004), for instance, speaks of capacity building 
in the health sector, explaining that capacity building goes beyond training, although 
they are often used as synonyms.  
 
Hilderbrand and Grindle (1994) define capacity in relation to the public sector as 
“the ability to perform appropriate tasks effectively, efficiently, and sustainably” 
(p.16). This definition thus extends beyond a focus on human resources training 
only, and focuses on the particular tasks to be performed by the organisation, 
according to three basic principles: effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. 
Milèn applies this definition to the field of health and defines capacity in the health 
sector: 
 
Capacity of a health professional, a team, an organisation or a health system is an 
ability to perform the defined functions effectively, efficiently and sustainably and 
so that the functions contribute to the mission, policies and strategic objectives of 
the team, organisation and the health system. (Milèn 2001, p.4) 
 
With regard to the operationalisation of the term, it is argued (Milèn 2001) that 
capacity development consists of three phases: assessment of capacity gaps, 
designing strategies and implementing actions, and monitoring and evaluation. 
These phases are interlinked and occur in a circular way, rather than in a linear 
sequence (Milèn 2001). For example, in applying capacity building to health sector 
reform, major issues that need to be taken into account include (Milèn 2001, p.15): 
developing skills to manage the change process; ensuring adequate basic capacities; 
addressing organisational culture; coping with external constraints; and phasing 
reforms. Hence, the process needs to be defined and evaluated, given the particular 
intended objectives and the context in which it will take place.  
 
Existing practices of capacity development within health policies are, however, 
widely criticised in the literature (Labonte and Laverack 2001; Magwaza et al. 
2003). Some critics emphasise the need to ensure local ownership of the process and 












assumptions about conventional planning and monitoring approaches and instead 
emphasise the application of systems thinking to broaden the understanding of 
complex processes (Hauck 2005). James (2005), for example, looks at the challenges 
for building organisational resilience to confront the implications of HIV/AIDS 
within organisations. 
 
The insights of capacity building theories are particularly valuable because they 
focus on the process dimension of absorptive capacity, rather than on the inputs or 
the outputs. Capacity development deals specifically with the inherent dynamics and 
structures that may transform absorptive capacity. Thus, the issues highlighted by 
Milèn (2001) in applying capacity building to the health sector are likely to be part 
of the process of expanding absorptive capacity as studied in this research. 
 
Applying these theories to the particular concept under study, capacity building may 
be understood as an integrative part of the process of enhancing absorptive capacity. 
Substantial increases in funding need to be met with capacity developments to 
enable the public health system to utilise such funding in an efficient, effective and 
sustainable way. Training of personnel would not suffice, and what is needed is to 
improve the way the system functions, the ability of the personnel to perform their 
work, and their engagements with the clients. Therefore, in order to enhance 
absorptive capacity in order to utilise increasing HIV/AIDS funding, it may be 
necessary to enquire what capacity building may be necessary to enable the public 
health system to perform its functions in an efficient, effective and sustainable way.  
 
There are two possible scenarios. On the one hand, the more the country spends, the 
more it will be able to spend in the future, as this puts in place the right mechanisms 
and as it improves the country‟s capacity to spend. On the other hand, the more the 
country absorbs today, the more it will utilise the available spare capacity, and thus 
reach saturation point once that spare capacity has been exhausted. Therefore, the 
capacity to spend needs to be built as funding allocations increase, including 
spending funding on building such capacity. If capacity to spend is not improved as 
spending levels are increased, there will ultimately be a ceiling to the ability to 
spend. The ability of new funding to boost the capacity to spend depends a great deal 












3.5  Absorptive capacity of technology of private firms 
 
The absorptive capacity concept has also been studied in other fields outside the 
financing area, such as for example from the perspective of private firms and 
knowledge. There is a large literature (Easterby-Smith et al. 2005; Jansen et al. 2005; 
Schmidt 2005) examining the capacity of firms to assimilate new technologies and 
information, rather than increasing funding. In this context, absorptive capacity was 
first defined by Cohen and Levinthal (1989, p.569, in Schmidt 2005), pioneers in 
this work, as “the firm‟s ability to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from 
the environment”. This definition suggests that absorptive capacity is not a one-
dimensional concept, but that it consists rather of various skills and dimensions 
(Schmidt 2005). Later, the authors suggest another definition: 
 
Absorptive capacity is a limit to the rate or quantity of scientific or technological 
information that a firm can absorb. If such limits exist they provide one explanation 
for firms to develop internal R&D [Research and Development] capacities. (Cohen 
and Levinthal 1990, in Econterms 2005, p.1)  
 
Thus, the absorptive capacity of a firm limits its ability to acquire and benefit from 
external information, which determines its internal R&D. Absorptive capacity works 
at both the individual and the organisational level. At the individual level, the 
accumulation of prior knowledge enhances the ability to acquire new knowledge. 
Absorptive capacity at the organisational level is shaped by organisational structure 
in conjunction with the absorptive capacity at the individual level  
 
In relation to building that capacity, Schmidt (2005) notes that expenditures on R&D 
predominantly are ways of developing new knowledge and innovation, rather than of 
building absorptive capacity, though in the end it would nonetheless help by building 
a knowledge stock that could be utilised in the future. In order to build absorptive 
capacity, Schmidt (2005) points out, it is more relevant to create a culture that leads 
to informal knowledge transfer rather than to create one where information provision 













Recently, the literature around the absorption of knowledge has made particular 
advances on the process dimension of absorptive capacity. In this regard, Zahra and 
George (2002, p.188) redefine absorptive capacity as “a set of organizational 
routines and processes by which firms acquire, assimilate, transform and exploit 
knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability”. They distinguish 
between capabilities and dynamic capabilities, the latter ones specifically directed 
towards “effecting organisational change” (Zahra and George 2002, p.188).  
 
Attention is thus given in the literature to the mechanisms and conditions that favour 
or promote absorptive capacity within firms. For example, Ratten (2004) holds that 
trust plays a crucial role in enhancing absorptive capacity of information, because 
“the more trust a firm has in its alliance partner(s), the more likely it is that 
information will be shared” (p.2). Easterby-Smith et al. (2008) argue in favour of 
paying attention to how power determines the way knowledge is absorbed by 
organisations. The study of Fernandez et al. (2004) reveals that the absorptive 
capacity of an organization is enhanced by the complexity, and thus the dimension, 
of the organization. Volverda et al. (2009) focus on the importance of managers in 
dealing with information, and hold that absorptive capacity is strongly influenced by 
cognitive processes on the managerial levels.  
 
The literature devoted to the measurement of absorptive capacity of firms since the 
work of Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990) highlights the difficulties of empirically 
measuring absorptive capacities (Becker and Peters 2000, in Schmidt 2005). Despite 
several attempts to operationalise the concept of absorptive capacity, it is noted that 
the lack of a direct empirical tool hinders the research and comparability of results 
on the process of absorptive capacity development (Lane et al. 2002; Schmidt 2005).  
 
3.6  Absorptive capacity of international aid 
 
The issue of absorptive capacity has recently been intensively studied and discussed 
in relation to the absorptive capacity limitations of ODA (Bevan 2005; Clemens and 
Radelet 2003; De Renzio 2005; Heller 2005; ODI 2005). This approach is the closest 












concerns around aid absorption reflect the recognition that “aid may become 
problematic when it is large relative to the economy it is intended to assist, even if it 
is well-managed” (Bevan 2005, p.2). Clements and Radelet (2003, p.131) observe 
that “large amount of funds and demand for quick results can create bottlenecks by 
placing increasing demands where resources are already scarce and take time to 
build up”. This not only means that fast and significant increases in aid may not be 
spent, or spent efficiently, but even more problematically, that such resources may 
be spent counterproductively (Bhagwati 2005). Consequently, the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) states: 
 
The „scaling up‟ of aid flows that could materialise in 2005 is likely to run up 
against „absorptive capacity‟ constraints, unless these are taken into account from 
the beginning, and adequately addressed in the design and implementation of 
improved aid delivery mechanisms. (ODI 2005, p.1) 
 
These concerns are placed in a context of a renewed emphasis on scaling up 
development aid. International efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) have brought along renewed pledges to increase foreign assistance (UN 
Millennium Project 2005a; ODI 2005). In addition, Bevan (2005, p.2) argues that, 
“in recent years, aid flows have tended to become more concentrated on a sub-set of 
developing countries”, hence accentuating the challenge of absorptive capacity in 
these countries.  
 
However, quick and substantial increases in aid per country do not necessarily imply 
that the funds will be misused or wasted. It is believed, for example, that countries in 
a post-conflict era are more able to utilise high levels of aid effectively (Clemens and 
Radelet 2003; ODI 2005). For example, Mackinnon et al. (2003) suggest that in the 
case of a post-conflict context such as in Rwanda, there is great absorptive capacity 
for budget support. Clemens and Radelet (2003, p.131) highlight the double-edged 
sword of aid and the need for an appropriate case-specific balance: “large amounts 
of aid can create these bottlenecks by placing demands on scarce resources. At the 
same time, well-targeted aid can relieve these bottlenecks”.  
 
Reference is also made to the different forms in which aid is delivered. De Renzio 












government‟s administration given the amount of resources involved, and thus 
budget support and sector program are preferred over project aid. This means that 
the absorptive capacity constraints depend largely on the mechanisms used to 
transfer ODA to recipient countries. This suggests that constraints may be more 
pressing in the case of funding that has been specifically ring-fenced for HIV/AIDS, 
and even more if limited to treatment programs. However, if funding were given to 
the DoH to spend at its own discretion and on its own identified priorities, the DoH 
would be able to investigate which areas have the spare capacity to utilise such 
funding and which ones do not, and allocate it accordingly. 
 
In relation to allocation criteria, the Global Monitoring Report (World Bank 2005) 
indicates that the allocation of international aid is driven by two main criteria: “to 
better performers – those with stronger policies and institutions – and to poorer 
countries” (p.152). In fact, the World Bank (2005, p.168) states that “broad 
consensus has emerged that development assistance is particularly effective in poor 
countries with sound policy and institutional environments”. For this same reason, 
Clemens and Radelet (2003, p.126), in the context of aid provided by the United 
States of America (USA), advocate “moving towards a results-based approach with 
more funds going to larger countries where appropriate”. In contrast, Collier and 
Dollar point out that:  
 
Donors prefer to spread their money across as many countries as possible, even 
though a reallocation of aid based on need and results would lead to a much greater 
reduction in global poverty from current aid flows than is currently the case. (Collier 
and Dollar 2002 in Clemens and Radelet 2003, p.126) 
 
Bevan (2005, p.8) highlights the consequences of existing market inefficiencies in 
many developing countries, leading to situations where “there may be serious 
bottlenecks in some sectors simultaneously with spare capacity in others. Indeed the 
bottlenecks may largely explain the inability to utilise the existing capacity”. The 
importance of this recognition is that it suggests a more positive approach to the 
challenge of absorptive capacity, where the existence of spare capacity means that 
funding may be utilised once the encountered bottlenecks have been removed. The 
important policy implication is that aid could “act to remove capacity constraints and 













The static conceptions of absorptive capacity in which the constraints are a given in 
the model have been criticised. De Renzio (2004) mentions cases where large 
increases in aid were successfully transferred to recipient countries initially facing 
constraints in absorbing them, such as weak institutions and insufficient skills. There 
were also examples where the obstacles faced were not overcome and thus monetary 
aid flows did not materialise. The positive experiences postulate a more dynamic 
concept of absorptive capacity, which would include ways to address the constraints 
faced. The Global Monitoring Report (World Bank 2005) also specifies that “even 
though capacity may be limited today, it can be built over time – and aid can play an 
important role in that as well” (p.152). The key thus seems to be that aid flows 
should aim to minimise the burden on the recipient country‟s administration, and 
that it should be directly targeted to overcome the initial obstacles faced in receiving 
and utilising such funding.  
 
The dynamic perspective of absorptive capacity is important in considering policy 
options.  It implies that it is not only important to search for immediate results in the 
short term, but rather to seek the initiation of changes in the right direction. Hence, it 
is important to have policy interventions, which go beyond immediate results to take 
into account the wider institutional capacity building process and potential positive 
externalities (De Renzio 2004). The United Nations Millennium Project (2005a) 
emphasises “the need for simultaneous investments in direct service delivery and in 
building capacity, here defined as public sector management and administration, 
infrastructure and human resources” (p.99). The attention is placed on the double 
action of providing services at the same time as building capacity for 
implementation. However, defining the simultaneous actions for each program 
requires an ad hoc policy design.  
 
A Measurement of absorptive capacity of international aid 
 
Attempts to measure or quantify the absorptive capacity of a country or region are a 
challenging task. Clemens and Radelet (2003) represent absorptive capacity of 
foreign aid (theoretically) as the existence of a so-called „saturation point‟, defined 











consequently decreasing rate of returns. For example, the authors review studies 
where the relationship between ODA and a country‟s economic growth is positive 
though non-linear, that is, where every extra dollar of aid provided brings along 
smaller increases in gross domestic product (GDP), until a point where the impact is 
zero. To measure the marginal rate of return, any aid objectives can be used, such as 
economic growth, poverty reduction or reduction of mortality rates (Clemens and 
Radelet 2003). 
 
Empirical studies suggest that the saturation point of aid ranges between 15% and 
45% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Clements and Radelet 2003; ODI 2005). 
However, these broad estimates should not be taken as indicators to guide policy, as 




In relation to the marginal rate of return, Clemens and Radelet (2003) state that “a 
country reaches its absorptive capacity for foreign assistance when the marginal rate 
of return on additional aid falls to a minimum acceptable level” (p.136). 
Nevertheless, the exact definition of the minimum acceptable level is not a straight-
forward question. As the authors recognise, “in practice, of course, it is very difficult 
to measure rates of return on foreign assistance programs across countries with the 
precision suggested by this allocation rule” (Clemens and Radelet 2003, p.127). 
Collier and Dollar, conversely, suggest that the minimum acceptable level of the rate 
of return of aid to one country should be at least equal to or greater than the rate of 
return to another country (2002, in Clemens and Radelet 2003). This argument could 
also be applied, for example, to the rate of return of one health program in 
comparison to that of another health program.  
 
The assessment of absorptive capacity of international aid relates to analyses of 
efficiency of aid allocations, where measures of efficient allocation of aid remain a 
controversial issue. Collier and Dollar (1999; 2002) argue for a „poverty-efficiency‟ 
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 Clemens and Radelet (2003) make a hypothetical calculation in an attempt to calculate the exact 
saturation point of foreign aid. Their exercise shows that estimates of this kind are inherently 
imprecise and highly dependent on the way aid is delivered and the quality of the country‟s 












criterion, based on the argument that aid is more effective in very poor countries
3
. 
This argument has been challenged from a distributive justice perspective, arguing 
that it is also necessary to take into account “the very great inequality in poverty risk 
between inhabitants of countries with widely varying structural disadvantages” 
(Cogneau and Naudet 2004, p.2). Other studies, like those by Guillaumont et al. 
(1999) and Dehn and Gilbert (2000), argue that aid can be more effective in 
countries prone to severe external shocks.  
 
This review shows that measurement indicators for absorptive capacity of 
international aid are still at a very early stage and difficult to apply, although they are 
closely related to ample theoretical and empirical literature on foreign aid efficiency. 
Advancements in the measurement of aid performance are likely to bring about key 
inputs for the assessment of absorptive capacity of aid. In this regard, a significant 
initiative has been the recent High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (High Level 
Forum 2005). It established a set of twelve indicators and possible targets for 2010 
for monitoring progress on aid delivery and management in the areas of ownership, 
alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability (see 
Appendix 6 for more information on the agreed indicators) (High Level Forum 
2005).  
 
B Categorisation of obstacles to absorptive capacity of international aid 
 
Recent work by the ODI (2005) provides a typology of four major categories of 
obstacles to absorptive capacity in relation to international aid, noting that there may 
be more than four: 
 
1. Macroeconomic constraints. A major concern is that significant increases in 
the amounts of aid would cause an appreciation of the exchange rate, which 
would have damaging effects on the economy, in the form of hindering 
exports, for example. This effect is called the „Dutch disease‟. Recently, 
however, the Economics Reference Group of UNAIDS and the World Bank 
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 The authors derive a poverty-efficient allocation of aid using several measures of poverty (the 
headcount, poverty-gap and squared poverty gap). Their analysis shows that the resulting poverty-













noted that “so far, HIV-orientated aid flows have not been large enough to 
have Dutch disease impact on external balances, savings and investments” 
(UNAIDS and World Bank 2008, p.2). 
 
2. Institutional and policy constraints. According to Clemens and Radelet 
(2003), increases in foreign aid may decrease ownership of the recipient 
country in relation to the use of funds and increase opportunities for 
corruption and misuse of funds. Conversely, though, such increases could 
also create opportunities for strengthening the capacity of the recipient 
country through technical assistance.   
 
3. Technical and managerial constraints. Increasing amounts of aid puts 
pressure on public officials, on their time and skills, occupying personnel and 
other resources, which are likely to be overburdened already in public 
administration, and even more so in low-income countries. At the sector 
level, such as health, resources are often limited, and hence the expansion of 
services would require addressing the human, institutional and logistical 
constraints.  
 
4. Constraints generated by donor behaviour. Donors are multiple and their 
activities often uncoordinated, each with its own monitoring requirements; 
the aid provided is furthermore subject to volatility and unpredictability, 
where “pledges do not always lead to commitments, and commitments do not 
always lead to disbursements” (Bevan 2005, p.19). For Clemens and Radelet 
(2003), donor practices are at the core of and exacerbate absorptive capacity 
problems.  
 
In addition, constraints can be categorised according to the time and effort required 
to overcome such constraints. ODI (2005) provides a preliminary classification of 
obstacles according to the time required for improvements, which has been 














Table 3.1: Long- and short-term constraints to absorptive capacity with regard 
to international aid, sorted by constraint category  
Constraints 
category 
Short-term constraints Long-term constraints 
Macroeconomic 
constraints 
„Dutch disease‟ effects*  
 
Levels of dependency on aid 




Inadequate public expenditure 
management systems 
Perverse incentives in public 
officials‟ performance 
Major deficiencies in 
institutions and policy 
processes 
Social factors determining 




Lack of adequate 
infrastructure equipment 
Technical and managerial 







interventions   
Difficulties in full shift to 
improved practices around 
donor aid  
* This refers to currency appreciation and increasing inflation because of increasing ODA 
Source: Adapted from ODI (2005) 
 
All four typologies of constraints have both short- and long-term obstacles. The line 
between short-term and long-term constraints is nevertheless a thin one. For 
example, „aid volatility‟ is characterised as a short-term constraint, whereas 
„difficulties in full shift to improved practices around donor aid‟ are a long-term 
constraint. However, reducing aid volatility could be understood as a component of 
improving donor practices. In addition, although „improvements in public 
expenditure management systems‟ are categorised as a „short-term constraint‟, other 
experiences in enhancing budget performance suggest the difficulty of such task, 
especially in the presence of informality, instability and lack of leadership (CABRI 
2005; Roberts 2004; UNECA 2003). Not surprisingly, De Renzio (2004, p.3) states 
that “problems of absorptive capacity are likely to increase as services reach out to 
the most remote areas or to the most excluded social groups”. Generally, Bevan 
(2005, p.7) argues that “specific constraints are more likely to be encountered where 













Equally, the classification of obstacles into the four categories provided by ODI 
(2005) could be a matter of discussion. For instance, „inadequate public expenditure 
management systems‟, which are classified as an institutional constraint, could also 
be understood as a technical and managerial constraint when caused by insufficient 
financial capacity of public servants. Therefore, although hypothetical classifications 
are useful in providing a framework for analysis, they are relative and dependent on 
the particular context. Thus, such typologies should be treated with caution, and 
applied and refined according to the particular case of study.  
 
Evidence on the impact of these constraints is scarce, much of it “scanty and non-
conclusive” (ODI 2005, p.3). There seems to be consensus, nevertheless, in that, 
despite occupying much of the discussion, the macroeconomic effects are not the 
most stringent constraints, as policy options exist to address macroeconomic 
imbalances quickly (De Renzio 2004). However, cases have been reported in which 
concerns about macroeconomic imbalances have been used to  reject substantial 
HIV/AIDS funding, such as happened with a Global Fund grant in Uganda  (Global 
Fund Observer 2003; Wendo 2002).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
Specific evidence is provided by examining the absorptive capacity of Global Fund 
grants. The study conducted by Lu et al. (2006) examines the determinants of the 
disbursement of funds, which is also called grant implementation, as the criterion for 
assessing absorptive capacity. The study finds that, for a given country, several small 
grants may be better absorbed than a few large grants. Moreover, it suggests that 
disease type (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, or malaria) is not significant in explaining 
variations in grant implementation, and that the apparent low disbursement rate of 
HIV/AIDS grants can be explained by other variables in the model. Moreover, the 
study finds that the lower the income of the recipient country, the higher the level of 
grant implementation. Nevertheless, the study also recognises its limitations, in that 
it only examined one component of absorptive capacity, namely, the extent to which 
grants are used, and that it does not consider, for example, program achievements 













C Policy options to address obstacles to absorptive capacity 
 
Several suggestions are made in the literature on how to address the absorptive 
capacity issue. De Renzio (2004) presents several suggestions for donors in the short 
term, such as providing additional targeted assistance where constraints are 
particularly strong. The ODI study (2005) suggests potential approaches to promote 
favourable conditions for a more effective use of additional aid resources. Crucial 
areas to be addressed are:  
 
 Finding more evidence on the specific processes of transformation of public 
resources into development outcomes; 
 Improving donor practices in terms of  harmonisation and alignment of aid; 
 Taking absorptive capacity constraints into account in designing 
interventions, including measures to overcome short-term and long-term 
constraints; 
 Macroeconomic management to deal with increases in aid, including the 
orientation of such investments to avoid loss of competitiveness; 
 Renewed focus on infrastructure and other productive sectors where 
substantial amounts of aid can be absorbed quickly; 
 Investigating innovative delivery mechanisms in the form of incentives or 
targeting.  
 
A way to bypass the issue of absorptive capacity is proposed by Bhagwati (2005), 
namely, to dedicate international aid for the cause, but not necessarily to spend in 
situ. For example, HIV/AIDS funds could be dedicated to vaccine research in other 
countries, and not just necessarily spent in affected countries. Nevertheless, this 
perspective is less applicable to the implementation of programs, which necessarily 
need to occur in the particular country.  
 
In designing appropriate strategies to tackle these constraints, sequencing of 
investment is crucial (Heller 2005; World Bank 2005). Prudent approaches advocate 
caution and moderation. Bevan (2005, p.12) identifies the general principle that 












given a similar total increase in transfer over time”. Moreover, the insufficiency of 
ex post facto measures is also highlighted, thus calling for forward looking 
diagnostic tools, such as activity-based budgeting, to make it possible to identify 
problems in advance (Bevan 2005). 
 
Flexibility to re-direct funds should bottlenecks arise is key to tackling absorptive 
capacity constraints (Clemens and Radelet 2003). This is why forms of aid, such as 
budget support, where recipient governments can decide on the allocation of 
resources and change allocations as needs evolve, are better able to overcome 
problems of absorptive capacity. The opposite applies to project-specific or 
earmarked aid; if obstacles arise in the implementation of a project, and if funding is 
ring-fenced to that particular project, money would remain unspent.  
 
What is clear from this discussion is that there is not a single strategy to handle the 
obstacles of absorptive capacity, but rather that “a variety of spending paths is 
feasible” (Bevan 2005, p.16). In the specific case of this thesis, with regard to 
substantial HIV/AIDS increases, it is relevant to consider how this funding could be 
harnessed to achieve the intended objectives together with overcoming the potential 
constraints to absorb it. Moreover, enhancing absorptive capacity does not need to 
entail the injection of new funds; it may also comprise the better utilisation of 
existing funds via appropriate modifications to the relevant systems. The solution 
needs to be case specific.  
 
D Implications for the study of absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS financing 
in South Africa  
 
The above analysis of absorptive capacity of international aid is important to shed 
light on and provide guidance for analysing absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS 
financing in South Africa. This group of theories provides an initial structure of 
analysis, which will be useful for building up the theoretical framework for this 
study. It furthermore suggests potential limitations of the study. For example, it 
highlights the difficulty of arriving at measurement indicators, which can be applied 













In relation to the obstacles to absorptive capacity, many similarities are likely to 
emerge between the cases of international donor financing and HIV/AIDS financing 
in South Africa. For example, institutional and policy constraints, as well as 
technical and managerial constraints, are likely to be relevant to the case of South 
Africa. Although South Africa is a middle-income country, with significantly higher 
institutional capacity than the rest of the Sub-Saharan region, the spectrum of 
capacities varies greatly geographically and socially due to the diversity and history 
of the country. Also relevant are the suggestions in the literature for long-term 
strengthening of capacities, instead of just seeking quick service delivery, and for 
investments in those areas with higher rates of return, although it need not bring 
about equitable outcomes. These points are of particular relevance for the case of 
inter-provincial distribution analysis in South Africa. 
 
Other constraints, nevertheless, may not be relevant for the particular context of 
domestic HIV/AIDS financing in South Africa. As will be shown later, issues related 
to the foreign character of aid, such as macroeconomic constraints and constraints 
generated by donor behaviour, are less relevant for the case of South Africa, where 
the majority of HIV/AIDS funding is domestic, and not international.  
 
The consideration that the satisfactory rate of return should be at least the same as 
for other health programs may not be relevant in the case of HIV/AIDS in South 
Africa. Given the urgent need to respond to the crisis, even if rates of return on 
HIV/AIDS are lower than for another health program, there is still a justification 
(moral, social, economic, and strategic) to invest in HIV/AIDS programs.  
 
3.7 Conceptual framework: Definition of absorptive capacity  
 
The conceptual framework is constituted by two major elements: absorptive capacity 
(dealt with in this section) and bottlenecks (dealt with in the following section). 
Whereas the main focus of this study is absorptive capacity, a study of the 













How can absorptive capacity be defined for the particular context of HIV/AIDS 
treatment financing in South Africa, and which tools should be employed to assess 
it? The previous sections have presented different approaches to the understanding 
of the term and its measurement. From this review, it follows the importance of 
qualifying the term for the intended objectives as well as the particular setting, 
answering questions such as: what is it to be absorbed, how, and by whom? In 
addition, the tools employed for assessing absorptive capacity also depend on how 
the term is understood. Consequently, this section sets out the critical issues 
characterising absorptive capacity in relation to HIV/AIDS treatment financing in 
South Africa, with the intention of developing a definition of absorptive capacity to 
guide the research.  
 
(I) This thesis deals with the ability of South Africa’s public health sector to 
absorb new and increasing public HIV/AIDS expenditure. Nonetheless, the 
factors determining the ability of the country to absorb HIV/AIDS funds can 
be found both within and outside the health system. Whereas this is often the 
case for other health programs too, factors outside the health system are 
especially important for HIV/AIDS due to the extent of the crisis and the 
stigma attached to the disease.  
 
(II) Although the term absorptive capacity refers to the ability of the country as a 
whole, it is important to recognise that multiple and different absorptive 
capacities may actually coexist within one country at a time. For example, if 
the understanding is that a country has a medium capacity, it does not mean 
that all sectors in that country have medium capacity; it may be that some 
sectors have high capacity, whereas others have low capacity. In addition, it 
is likely that, if some sectors are not functioning properly, the capacity of the 
other sectors may not be able to compensate, thereby affecting the whole 
system. For example, if a country lacks sufficient medicines, no matter how 
much trained medical personnel it has, it will not be able to deliver treatment.  
 
Distinguishing between different absorptive capacities is particularly relevant 
for the case of South Africa, as the country is characterised by extreme levels 












services, and so on. In addition, geographical patterns of inequality are 
clearly distinguishable in the country; there is inequality between provinces, 
with Gauteng and the Western Cape generally being better off; and there is 
inequality within provinces, and both are closely interlinked.  
 
(III) In the case of HIV/AIDS financing in South Africa, the issue of absorptive 
capacity arises as an effect of the substantial increases in funding that have 
taken place over the last few years. South Africa introduced dedicated 
funding for HIV/AIDS in the budget year 2000/01, through the launch of 
three conditional grants to fund specific HIV/AIDS programs. In addition, 
provincial departments also allocate funding for HIV/AIDS from their own 
budgets. Since 2000/01, funding has increased at very high rates for both 
mechanisms, reaching year-on-year growth rates of over 100% in real terms 
in several years, as will be discussed in Chapter 5. The investigation of 
absorptive capacity could also be meaningful in a context of steady 
expenditure, and not jut increasing expenditure, although this is not the case 
in this particular study of South Africa.  
 
(IV) What does it mean to absorb funding? Merely receiving money does not 
mean that it has been absorbed; funding needs to be spent and utilised. 
Strictly speaking, it is not until the money has been used, that it has been 
absorbed. The concept of „used‟ is not a straightforward one, though; there 
are different accounting methods with regard to utilisation, depending on 
when the budget has been allocated, whether an expense has been committed, 
disbursed, or paid. According to the South African public finance system, it 
is only when the money is actually paid that it is considered spent. If it is 
committed, but not paid yet (due to projects not being completed, for 
example), for instance, then it is still considered unspent.  
 
Furthermore, it is possible that HIV/AIDS funding allocated to the health 
sector has been used in other non-HIV/AIDS health areas, although not 
registered as such in the budgetary reporting system. This is especially the 
case in low-resource settings with competing health needs and priorities. 












have been used for the intended HIV/AIDS objectives. Ensuring that 
allocated expenditure is indeed spent on HIV/AIDS is dependent on the type 
of mechanism used for transferring the funds, whether ring-fenced for 
HIV/AIDS or not. Hence, the study of both of mechanisms is very relevant 
for the analysis of absorptive capacity in South Africa.  
 
(V) Since the launch of the Comprehensive Plan (DoH 2003a), greater emphasis 
has been placed on rolling out HIV/AIDS treatment through ART. The 
Comprehensive Plan aims to treat all South Africans who need treatment 
within the public health service, on conjunction with strengthening the health 
system. The substantial increases in funding are closely linked to the process 
of ‘scaling up’ ART to more people. The process of scaling-up refers to the 
substantial expansion from existing local pilot programs to national 
programs. It involves reaching more people, but also expanding horizontally 
to new areas and population groups, with these often being more difficult to 
access. The high prevalence of the epidemic combined with the large 
population of the country has resulted in a large number of people requiring 
treatment. Such a scale-up of ART has crucial implications for the health 
system as a whole.  
 
(VI) This thesis focuses on the delivery of ART through the public health 
sector. This means that programs are to be funded, planned, administered, 
and implemented through the public health system. Consequently, it refers to 
a horizontal approach of delivering and integrating the new program within 
the existing health care structure and regulations. Integration within the 
system goes beyond service delivery to include integration of other areas 
such as planning, financing, and evaluation mechanisms. South Africa 
follows a different process than many other African countries where ART 
projects were often established with donor support and managed through 
international NGOs, outside the Ministry of Health. It is also different from 
private sector delivery, whether regulated or not through the public sector. As 
explained in Chapter 2, in South Africa, projects run as a joint collaboration 
between the government and NGOs or other organisations are generally 













The approach of delivering ART through the public health platform concurs 
with the WHO‟s recommended strategy to deliver ART (WHO 2002). The 
focus is on a horizontal rather than a vertical approach. The public health 
debate between vertical and horizontal approaches is extensive. On the one 
hand, vertical approaches are believed to be more effective and quick in 
achieving results (e.g. expanding coverage) by circumventing the problems 
of weak health systems. However, their effect on the health system as a 
whole is less significant and can even be negative. Horizontal approaches, on 
the other hand, may have a greater impact on health outcomes broadly and in 
the longer term. The review of horizontal vs. vertical approaches undertaken 
by Oliviera-Cruz et al. (2003) concludes that both approaches are needed, 
and that they must be guided by the specific characteristics of the health 
system at the time. 
 
(VII) Increases in HIV/AIDS funding and the start of a new HIV/AIDS treatment 
program are expected to benefit the health system
4
 as a whole. The 
Comprehensive Plan highlights the importance of supporting system-wide 
components parallel to delivering HIV/AIDS services. Providing ART 
services is expected to release the burden placed on health facilities by ill 
people. In addition, new funding is expected to support the overall health 
system.  
 
Some examples of ways in which the scale-up of ART can support health 
systems include (WHO and UNAIDS 2004): installation of systems for 
essential drug procurement and management; strengthening financial 
systems; confronting human resources challenges through treatment, 
incentives and challenges; support of local networks for PHC; and involving 
communities and social networks. 
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 Health system is defined as “the people, institutions and resources, arranged together in accordance 
with established policies, to improve the health of the population they serve, while responding to 
people's legitimate expectations and protecting them against the cost of ill-health through a variety of 












A major concern is that prioritising ART programs may come at the expense 
of other health programs. There are some negative externalities involved in 
the process of scaling up substantial financing for a particular program. For 
example, budget for other health interventions may be crowded out by 
increases in the ART budgets, and incentives to recruit and motivate 
personnel for ART services may draw resources from other health areas that 
are also important.  
 
(VIII) Another element of the absorption of funding is that it needs to respect the 
core principles of efficiency, equity and sustainability of the country‟s 
health policy. The concepts of strengthening health systems, efficiency, 
equity, and sustainability are closely interrelated. For example, in order to 
ensure that policies are sustainable in the long term, it is necessary for them 
to be efficient and equitable, and not to weaken the overall health system. 
Aggressive ways of absorbing rapid increases in funds may compromise 
these principles, thus contravening the country‟s public health strategy. Such 
an approach is congruent with the above definitions of capacity by 
Hilderbrand and Grindle (1994) and Milèn (2001). 
 
These three principles can be understood and measured in multiple ways, and 
using many different theories and approaches. The aim of this study is not to 
explore these concepts in more depth but rather in relation to absorptive 
capacity. In terms of efficiency, two types are commonly distinguished
5
: 
allocative and technical efficiency (EOHSP 2007; McIntyre 2007). The 
concept of efficiency should be distinguished from those of effectiveness and 
efficacy. These are some definitions: 
  
Efficiency: the capacity to produce the maximum output for a given input. 
(WHO 2000a, p.27) 
 
Allocative efficiency: the allocation of resources preferentially to health 
services providing care for those aspects of ill-health for which effective 
interventions exist and which are most common in the community being 
served, with priority given, among those preferential services, to the most 
                                                 
5
 In addition, Schneider and Bhatt (2004) also consider a third type of efficiency, economic 
efficiency, which deals with resource management issues, looking at financial input combinations to 












cost-effective interventions, i.e. interventions offering the lowest cost per 
unit of health outcome. (McIntyre 2007, p.viii) 
 
Technical efficiency: a measure of the maximum number of health services 
that can be provided within a specific budget or a measure of the lowest cost 
needed for each health service to function without compromising quality of 
care. (McIntyre 2007, p.xii) 
 
Effectiveness: a measure of the extent to which a specific intervention, 
procedure, regimen, or service, when deployed in the field in routine 
circumstances, does what it is intended to do for a specified population. 
(WHO 2000a, p.26) 
 
Efficacy: Whether or not an intervention can work under ideal conditions 
relates to efficacy. (Spraycar 1995 in Pittler and White 1999, p.1)  
 
Efficiency is a wider concept than effectiveness, and thus more relevant for 
this study. Both aspects of efficiency, allocative and technical, are important 
for this study. Both are affected by substantial increases in funding for 
scaling up HIV/AIDS treatment programs. This current research is not 
concerned with efficacy, as it refers to the effects of a program or policy 
under optimal conditions in a clinical trial, and not in a real-world situation 
as in the case of efficiency (Flay et al. 2005).  
 
Equity is a much-debated topic (McIntyre 2007). The International Society 
for Equity in Health provides a working definition for equity in health: 
 
Equity in health is the absence of potentially remediable, systematic 
differences in one or more aspects of health across socially, economically, 
demographically, or geographically defined groups or subgroups. (ISEqH 
2001) 
 
Two major types of equity can be distinguished: horizontal equity, focusing 
on the equal treatment of equals; and vertical equity, the unequal, but 
equitable, treatment of unequals (Mooney and Jan 1997). Thus, vertical 
equity acknowledges differences in individuals, and consequently 
recommends that individuals should pay or receive more according to their 
level of resources and need respectively. Published literature largely focuses 
on horizontal equity (Macinko and Starfield 2002). In relation to these 














Equity: principle of being fair to all, with reference to a defined and 
recognized set of values. (WHO 2000a, p.30)  
 
Equality: Principle by which all persons or things under consideration are 
treated in the same way. (WHO 2000a, p.28) 
 
Whereas there is a wide body of literature reviewing equity in the provision 
of HIV/AIDS services and particularly with regard to access to ART 
(Equinet 2007; Ntuli et al. 2003; MSF 2002; Wilson and Blower 2005), less 
attention has been paid to equity in the allocation of HIV/AIDS funding. 
When equity in financing is examined, it normally considers the financing 
contributions made by different agents (McIntyre et al. 2005; Schneider and 
Bhatt 2004). Particularly in the case of South Africa, there is a significant 
body of literature looking at the role of government health expenditure in 
redressing historical inequalities (McIntyre et al. 1998; McIntyre et al. 2000; 
McIntyre and Doherty 2004).  
 
Efficiency and equity are often seen to be in conflict, as it is more expensive 
(a loss in efficiency) to provide services to the poorest populations or to those 
with more difficult access (a gain in equity). There is a wide-ranging debate 
around making choices between the two of them (Kernick 2002; WHO 
2000b). Strategies for maximising overall social benefit often imply a 
discrimination against those who are most difficult to reach, and thus the 
question is how much social benefit a society is willing to trade for the sake 
of fairness (WHO and UNAIDS 2004).  
 
Sustainability in the health policy context can be characterised as: 
 
The capacity of a health system to continue its activities in the future and to 
expand such activities to keep up with population growth and with the 
additional demands created by diseases such as HIV/AIDS. (Schneider and 
Bhatt 2004, p.5) 
 
In the health context, sustainability often refers to financial sustainability, 












financing, sustainability issues most often refer to the availability of donor 
funding in the future.  
 
Given all these considerations, this study defines absorptive capacity as follows:  
 
A country’s absorptive capacity for higher HIV/AIDS funding for scaling 
up HIV/AIDS treatment through the public health sector refers to the 
ability of that country’s public health system, to absorb and use the funds 
for the intended objectives in a way that tries to maximise the positive 
impact and to minimise the negative impact on other health areas and in a 
way that respects the core principles of equity, efficiency and sustainability 
of the country’s health policy. 
 
As suggested in Chapter 2, there are two dimensions of absorptive capacity, which 
deserve special attention: dynamism and relativism.   
 
Absorptive capacity is dynamic  
 
The level or degree of absorptive capacity is not fixed; rather, it evolves as the 
constituting elements and determinants of absorptive capacity change. This dynamic 
nature is more acute in relation to increased funding for ART, as this new 
intervention requires substantial financial and human resources, which will thus 
necessarily influence the levels of absorptive capacity.  
 
In fact, it is possible to identify two phases of scaling up, firstly when there is spare 
capacity that can be used for the new program, and secondly when the capacity 
utilisation reaches the ceiling and thus new capacity needs to be built or brought in. 
The higher the efforts in expanding capacity, the later the ceiling would be reached. 
In addition, it is important to identify where exactly the spare capacity is. The term 
„spare‟ can be understood as existing capacity that is not being used at the time, 
capacity that is not used efficiently, or capacity that it is used for a „non-
indispensable‟ objective. Of course, such characterisations as „indispensable‟ are 
relative, as it is a matter of perception and dependent on the options available, which 













Absorptive capacity is relative  
 
The level of absorptive capacity changes as the key components in the definition 
change, such as how much needs to be absorbed, how fast, by how many recipients, 
and so on. Absorptive capacity is relative to the specifics of each intervention. For 
example, absorptive capacity issues could be minimised simply by reducing 
increases in funding. However, this does not necessarily imply an achievement in 
itself (in tackling absorptive capacity limitations); rather, it might actually be a 
problem, as needed funding is not being allocated.  
 
Moreover, the conceptual approach that is to be followed also depends on the 
intended objective. It is important to ask „what is it that we want from absorptive 
capacity?‟ In this particular case, the aim is to increase the capacity of South Africa 
to absorb increasing funding for scaling up the public sector ARV treatment 
program. It is about unleashing capacity, which comprises both liberating existing 
capacity and building new capacity. With this aim in mind, the framework moves on 
to identifying the bottlenecks that may impede the utilisation of funding in order to 
unleash such capacity.  
 
3.8  Conceptual framework: Identification of bottlenecks  
 
The analysis of absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS financing requires a consistent 
conceptual framework that can be applied to a specific context, in this case South 
Africa. The approach taken by this research focuses on examining the bottlenecks 
where available funds are not spent, and the obstacles impeding their utilisation. 
Unspent funds may accumulate at certain points in the health system for several 
reasons, such as a lack of personnel or insufficient budget management capacity, for 
example. These constraints lead to the formation of bottlenecks where funds cannot 
be spent in a way that is acceptable to the overall health system, efficient, equitable 
and sustainable. The objective is to remove these obstacles in order to unblock the 














This study defines „bottlenecks‟ as areas of congestion in the flow of funds. Figure 
3.1 below shows the rationale behind this view of bottlenecks, represented quite 
literally in the shape of a bottle. It follows the flow of HIV/AIDS funds received by 
PDoHs from the NDoH and Treasury. In utilising these funds for the implementation 
of programs, provinces encounter several obstacles. Some of these obstacles occur 
inside the health system (represented by the narrow neck of the bottle in Figure 3.1), 
whereas others lie outside the health system (represented by the cork in Figure 3.1).  
 










The aim of this representation is to highlight the identification of the bottlenecks and 
of the obstacles that may cause them. The one-directional arrows in the figure show 
the flow of HIV/AIDS funds towards the provision of treatment services (outputs).  
 
However, the arrows also flow in the opposite direction (indicated by the dotted line 
in the diagram), such as when the implemented policies serve to strengthen the 
health system and thus to boost its absorptive capacity, permitting and/or bringing 
about further HIV/AIDS funding increases.  
 
Absorptive capacity could be improved in other ways, rather than by unblocking the 
specific constrictions. For example, a country could strengthen the capacity of the 
health system in areas, which, although important, do not constitute major 
bottlenecks for the expansion of the program. This would not solve the actual 
problem. This is why identifying and targeting specific obstacles is so important.     
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The analysis of bottlenecks involves the identification of the areas where they are 
being experienced, the obstacles causing them, and the ways in which such 
constraints may be overcome. Hence, two main steps are identified for the analysis, 
explored in the following sections. Firstly, the analysis looks at the areas in which 
the bottlenecks may be created, and the intensity of the constraints experienced. 
Secondly, the analysis considers the issues involved in removing the obstacles 
through the injection of new funds or by appropriate modifications to the relevant 
systems that would allow better utilising available funds.  
 
A Categorisation and intensity of bottlenecks  
 
Hanson et al. (2003) provide a framework for identifying the constraints in 
expanding access to priority health interventions. They define „constraints‟ as a 
range of factors that may limit the rapid expansion of priority health interventions, 
noting that these may include not only inputs, but also systems, processes, incentives 
and values or norms (Hanson et al. 2003). In addressing these constraints, Hanson et 
al. (2003) note the need for (a) characterizing the existing constraints; and (b) 
classifying the countries following the range and intensity of the constraints faced. 
They identify four levels of constraints: (a) community and household level; (b) 
health services delivery level; (c) health sector policy and strategic management 
level; (d) public policies cutting across sectors; and (e) environmental and contextual 
characteristics. For each level, several constraints are identified and classified 
according to their low, medium or high amenability to be improved with additional 
funding. Other literature that also helps in conceptualising the obstacles for the 
expansion of HIV/AIDS programmes include Hanson et al. (2001), Travis et al. 
(2004), Vergin (2000), and Wagstaff and Claeson (2004).   
 
Hanson et al. (2003) and the above mentioned literature, however, deal with the 
scaling-up of health interventions, and not specifically with how such scaling-up is 
to be financed. With regard to financing, several sources identify and categorise the 
constraints of HIV/AIDS financing in particular, including Greener (2004), Lewis 













Other literature examines the obstacles faced in financing and implementing 
HIV/AIDS and ART programs, in particular in the South African and African 
context; this serves to identify the most relevant obstacles for the case of ART in 
South Africa. The relevant literature includes Attawell and Mundy (2003), CHGA 
(2004), Grubb et al. (2003), Hickey et al. (2004), Ijumba et al. (2004), ITPC (2005), 
Kaiser Family Foundation (2004), Kolyada (2004), Schneider et al.(2004), Stevens 
et al. (2003), Steward et al. (2004), Steward and Loveday (2005), UNAIDS RST-
ESA (2006), UN Millennium Project (2005b), WHO (2004), and WHO & UNAIDS 
(2003).  
 
Thus, the review of the above literature makes it possible to construct the framework 
of bottlenecks in scaling up HIV/AIDS financing for the Comprehensive Plan in 
South Africa. Table 3.2 below illustrates the categorisation of bottlenecks and the 
potential obstacles that may cause the bottlenecks in each area. Although this table is 
part of the framework, some elements of this table were included after the first 
interviews were held: the categorisation of financial bottlenecks, and the obstacles of 
insufficient clinic space and issues of access. The refinement of the framework along 
with the data collection is a common practice in the iterative process of qualitative 












Table 3.2: Categorisation of bottlenecks and obstacles for HIV/AIDS fundinga  















Conditional grants reporting requirements highly demanding  
No HIV/AIDS spending specification of equitable shares 
Weak financial management capacity at decentralised levels 
Mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations  
Fiscal policies may restrict health spending 
HUMAN 
Shortage of medical personnel: doctors, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacists, nutritionists, counsellors 
Shortage of non-medical personnel: program managers and 
administrators, data capturers and administrative clerks 
Inadequate personnel management and training 
INFRASTRUCTURAL b 
Insufficient clinic/hospital space 
Lack of storage space for drugs 
Inadequate laboratory infrastructure 
INSTITUTIONAL 
Poor monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information systems 
Weak drug and medical equipment procurement systems 
Need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis services 
Lack of successful pilot studies 
















Issues of access: cultural barriers, stigma and transport 
Insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of 
funding 
Lack of ownership of decision-making  
Slow government bureaucratic system 
Need for public-private partnerships 
Lack of community outreach and participation 
Need for social insurance schemes 
a
 Although this table is part of the framework and not the presentation of results, some elements of 
this table were included after the second interviews were held: the categorisation of financial 
bottlenecks, and the obstacles of insufficient clinic space and issues of access.  
b
 It refers only to physical infrastructure, not to support infrastructure like procurement 
Source: Adapted from Attawell and Mundy (2003); CHGA (2004); Grubb et al. (2003); Hanson et al. 
(2001); Hanson et al. (2003); Hickey et al. (2004); Ijumba et al. (2004); Kolyada (2004); MSH 
(2005); Schneider et al.(2004); Stevens et al. (2003); Steward and Loveday (2005); Steward et al. 
(2004); Teixeira (2004); Travis et al. (2004); UN Millennium Project (2005b); Vergin (2000); 













Table 3.2 classifies the potential bottlenecks and obstacles that may prevent the 
absorption of increases in funding for the scale up of the Comprehensive Plan..The 
areas where bottlenecks may arise are classified into five major categories: financial, 
human, infrastructural, institutional (inside the health system), and structural (outside 
the health system).  
 
The purpose of such classification into five major bottlenecks as in Table 3.2 is not 
only to help facilitate the identification of bottlenecks, but also to help identify the 
appropriate levels of intervention, according to levels of responsibility. For example, 
financial, human and infrastructural resources are separated as distinctive areas, as 
they are dealt with by different departments and/or inter-departmental sections. The 
category of institutional factors includes those bottlenecks that depend on the health 
system, whereas structural factors include those external factors that lie outside the 
health system. The category of infrastructure refers only to physical infrastructure, 
not to support infrastructure, such as procurement.The obstacles examined may arise 
from the financial spending effort, or from the implementation process of the 
Comprehensive Plan. Whilst there are obstacles that directly prevent spending, such 
as the reporting requirements of conditional grants, other obstacles may prevent the 
actual implementation of the program, e.g. a shortage of doctors, which ultimately 
prevents the spending of allocated funds. Obstacles like the restriction of funding by 
fiscal policies, or the insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of 
funding are identified in the case of absorptive capacity of international aid.  
 
It is important to clarify that some obstacles lead to the formation of bottlenecks, 
while other obstacles do not. Obstacles are considered to constitute blockages when 
they hold back the spending of funds (directly or indirectly through hindering the 
progress of the program). For example, there may be insufficient storage space for 
ARVs, but this can be overcome by means of a quick and effective drug distribution 
system, hence not impeding the delivery of treatment. In this case, the lack of 














There are three major criteria for identifying bottlenecks, and all three must be met. . 
The first one considers cases where money is allocated but not spent. The second 
criterion examines whether the spending strengthens the health system and whether 
it could be considered efficient, equitable and sustainable. The third criterion 
identifies the gap between need and availability, that is, where resources are not in 
place although a need has been identified (with or without funds being allocated). 
For each area, it is necessary to ask whether the capacity is sufficient in relation to 
the stipulated targets.  
 
These elements are interrelated and interdependent. Improvements in an M&E 
system, for instance, can ease the workload of doctors and free up their time by 
enhancing tracking and management of patients‟ progress. Political leadership can 
seek solutions and facilitate partnerships with communities and the private sector. 
Improvements in recruiting policies may facilitate the employment of financial 
officers, which may enhance budget management and spending of budgets. A rapid 
drug procurement system eases the space need to store drugs. The bureaucratic 
nature of the government affects the way in which financing and human resource 
practices, for example, are performed. These interactions also imply that, if one 
particular area is not functioning properly, it will affect the rest of the system. 
 
The above categorisation of bottlenecks and grouping of obstacles based on relevant 
literature is, however, imprecise and subjective. Their relevance to the South African 
case needed to be studied. Consequently, qualitative research was employed in this 
research to collect the opinions of key informants. As explained elsewhere, this 
approach was believed to be a useful tool for exploring the issues in the particular 
context and polishing the proposed framework, based on the feedback from 
participants during the fieldwork.  
 
B Amenability to unblock bottlenecks 
 
The next step was to examine what it would take to unblock the reported 
bottlenecks, in terms of the required timeframe and resources. Firstly, some elements 
of HIV/AIDS services and health systems do take longer to be provided. It is 












easily improved in the short term, and those that are expected to take longer. For 
example, whereas the issue of a reliable supply of medicines could be tackled in the 
short term with changes in regulations, improvements in the financial management 
capacity of provinces are expected to require a much more complex and long-term 
intervention.  
 
Secondly, some bottlenecks may be more responsive to the injection of funds than 
others. For example, it may solve problems of shortage of drugs in the short term, by 
covering the cost of purchasing branded instead of generic drugs, or importing drugs 
to fill the gaps of local distribution. This, however, assumes an elastic supply, which 
may not be the case with market failures, such as in the case of restrictions 
emanating from trade regulations. In this regard, the regulations of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) are critical in determining the production and commerce of generic and 
branded ARVs in less developed countries. Furthermore, some bottlenecks may be 
removed without financial support but rather by means of improvements brought 
about by changes in the relevant systems and organisations. These changes may thus 
take place without increases in funding, or they may be pursued via targeted reforms 
that have been funded and promoted with the injection of financial resources. It is 
especially relevant in this context to investigate whether increases in funding may or 
may not erase existing obstacles, and if not, which appropriate modifications to the 
relevant systems would allow better utilisation of available funds.  
 
Finally, following the adopted definition of absorptive capacity, it is necessary to 
consider the potential negative impacts of tackling the bottlenecks on the health 
system as a whole. Some policy options that could overcome bottlenecks in the short 
term may not be desirable in the long term. The potential negative effects of tackling 
bottlenecks and positive effects in strengthening the overall health system are 
directly related to the speed of spending of funds. It is believed that the greater the 
speed in expanding the program, the more likely it will be carried out in a vertical 
approach (WHO and UNAIDS 2004).  
 
It is important to recognise that the appropriateness of speed in the expansion of 











example, the study of the implementation of ART in the Free State highlights the 
crucial importance the slow start-up of the program in this province, in comparison 
to the Western Cape, played in allowing capacity to develop at the delivery facilities 
(HST 2005). This slow approach facilitated the management and control of the 
program even in the event of negative external shocks, such as drug shortages (HST 
2005). This strategy contrasts with the situation in the Western Cape, where 
expansion of the program to larger number of patients could be sustained based on 
numerous earlier experiences in the region (HST 2005). Therefore, there is a need to 
weigh the trade-offs between spending quickly and tightly monitoring the results, 
finding the balance between the quick delivery of services with the overall 
strengthening of health systems.  
 
Consequently, these issues call for a contextualisation of the process of absorbing 
the funding available for implementing the ART component of the Comprehensive 
Plan in order to identify meaningful policies to remove the obstacles encountered. 
This is why a qualitative research approach is employed in the analysis.  
 
3.9  Conclusion  
 
This chapter provided a conceptualisation of the term absorptive capacity. Based on 
a review of the literature on absorptive capacity in several disciplines, and other 
related theories, it follows that there is no clear and definitive framework to apply to 
the study of absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS financing. The study of 
absorptive capacity of international aid, for example, overlaps with that of 
HIV/AIDS financing in many areas; however, it cannot be applied to South Africa, 
because HIV/AIDS policies in this country are funded mainly from domestic 
sources, and international funding plays only a secondary role. Regarding 
approaches to the measurement of absorptive capacity, this chapter reviewed and 
critiqued the use of budgetary underspending as the sole measure of absorptive 
capacity.  
 
Consequently, the chapter developed a conceptual framework for the study of 











framework is two-fold. Firstly, it defines the term „absorptive capacity‟ in the 
specific context of increasing HIV/AIDS financing to scale up ART programs in 
South Africa. The conceptual framework spells out the core terms characterising 
absorptive capacity in the particular context of the investigation. Absorptive capacity 
is defined in a broad sense, which goes beyond the quantitative spending of funding 
to look into the quality and results of spending. This definition emphasises a mode of 
absorption that strengthens rather than weakens the overall health system, and that is 
coherent with the principles of efficiency, equity and sustainability of the public 
health system.  
 
Finally, this thesis studies the bottlenecks to spending encountered in order to tackle 
the problems of absorptive capacity. The rationale is that unblocking the bottlenecks 
would release and enhance the system‟s ability to spend funds in the desired manner. 
Thus, this chapter built an analytical framework to identify the obstacles encountered 
and the bottlenecks experienced in this particular case. Based on a theoretical and 
empirical literature review, it categorised the potential bottlenecks into five major 
areas: financial, human, infrastructural, institutional and structural. It is expected that 
the systematic study of these bottlenecks and obstacles will provide key information 
to understanding the specific relative factors and dynamics, which allow for the 












CHAPTER 4 HIV/AIDS TREATMENT AND FINANCING 
POLICIES IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
South Africa is the country with the largest population living with HIV in the world 
(UNAIDS 2006b). The epidemic continues to grow (DoH 2006a; UNAIDS 2006a), 
although there are indications that the rate of increase is declining (Dorrington et al. 
2006). Nonetheless, it poses serious challenges to social, political and economic 
structures (Barnett and Whiteside 2002).  
 
The government‟s response to the epidemic is generally characterised as late (Fourie 
2004; Nattrass 2007). Nevertheless, in recent years there has been an extraordinary 
increase in HIV/AIDS funding, which marks a turning point in the history of 
government‟s response to the epidemic. This chapter provides an overview of the 
extent of the epidemic and of the government‟s response to the epidemic, in 
particular in relation to the recently launched treatment component of the national 
HIV/AIDS policy. It thus dwells in detail on the funding framework for these 
policies with a view to informing the analysis of government expenditure data in 
Chapter 5.  
 
4.2 The burden of HIV/AIDS in South Africa 
 
It is estimated that more than 5.5 million people in South Africa are HIV-positive 
(DoH 2006a); according to UNAIDS (2006b), this means that the country has the 
largest number of people infected in the world
6
 (UNAIDS 2004; UNAIDS 2006a; 
UNAIDS 2006b). The HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa is further defined as a 
generalised epidemic (DoH 2007a), meaning that it affects the general population 
rather than being limited to specific risks groups such as sex workers.  
 
                                                 
6













According to the DoH (2006a), South Africa had an HIV prevalence rate of 18.8% in 
the adult population (15-49 years) in 2005. Women in the age group of 25-29 years 
are the most affected group, with prevalence rates of approximately 40% (DoH 
2006a). Although HIV prevalence among young pregnant women ( 20 years) seems 
to be stabilising, for older women the prevalence continues to increase (DoH 2006a; 
UNAIDS 2006b). The prevalence rate among women is higher than among men. 
 
There are variations in the estimates according to the source, with the number of 
HIV infections generally varying between 5 and 6 million for 2005. The HIV 
infection rate figures of the ASSA projections (2005a)
7
 are slightly lower than the 




. For example, for the year 2005, the 
ASSA2003 model (Dorrington et al. 2006) estimates that 5.2 million people are HIV 
infected, while the estimate of the DoH (2006a) is about 5.54 million, and the 
UNAIDS (2006b) estimate around 5.5 million
10
. Nevertheless, these are all 
approximate figures, and discrepancies among the three sources are due to 
differences in methodological approaches and statistical assumptions. What is 
important is that all sources are consistent in the approximate figure, of around 5.5 
million HIV infected people in the country in 2005. 
 
In mid-2006, according to the ASSA2003 model, the number of HIV-positive people 
rose from 5.2 million to about 5.4 million, with the prevalence rate being a little over 
11%. Of those infected, it was estimated that around 600,000 were sick with AIDS 
(11% of the HIV infected) (Dorrington et al. 2006). A more in-depth description of 
the epidemic in the country is given in Appendix 7, which presents an evolution of 
the epidemiology of HIV for the period 2000-2006. 
 
                                                 
7
 The ASSA AIDS model uses data from several sources to represent the HIV/AIDS epidemic, its 
potential course, and its demographic impact on the population of South Africa. It has been developed 
by the AIDS Committee of the Actuarial Society of South Africa. The ASSA2003 model was 
released in November 2005, and is the most recent version of the ASSA AIDS model (ASSA 2010; 
Dorrington et al. 2006). The models of ASSA are based on known prevalence rates, observed 
mortality rates, and age profiles. 
8
 The HIV/AIDS estimates of the DoH are based on surveys of women attending selected prenatal 
clinics across the country.   
9
 The HIV/AIDS estimates of UNAIDS are based on surveys of women attending selected prenatal 
clinics across the country.   
10












For financial planning purposes, it is important to project what the future impact of 
the epidemic will be on society: with more people being infected every year, the full 
impact of AIDS deaths and the resultant impact on development are yet to 
materialise. Figure 4.1 shows the trend in HIV prevalence rates based on data from 
public sector antenatal clinics. These figures are important because national adult 
prevalence is calculated from the data received from antenatal clinics. Prevalence 
among pregnant women attending antenatal clinics shows higher infection rates than 
among the overall population, as these estimates are for a specific sexually active 
group. Thus, while antenatal HIV prevalence in 2006 was 28.3%, prevalence was 
19.2% for the entire adult population (ages 20-64), and 11.2% for the total 
population (ASSA 2005a). As Figure 4.1 shows, HIV antenatal prevalence has 
increased throughout the entire period 1990-2005. This implies that the national HIV 
prevalence has also increased throughout this period. 
 
Figure 4.1: National HIV prevalence among antenatal clinic attendees in South 
Africa 
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Nevertheless, the HIV epidemic seems to have reached a mature stage, in that the 












(Dorrington et al. 2006) show that the HIV incidence
11
 peaked around 1998 and that 
it is now decreasing. This evidence is supported by similar evidence in other 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and in India (Shelton et al. 2006) to the effect that 
the numbers of new HIV infections are decreasing. However, the prevalence of HIV, 
in other words, the total number of HIV infections, does not seem to have reached a 
plateau yet (UNAIDS 2006b). These statements are not contradictory, as the former 
deals with incidence, and the later with prevalence.  
 
There are two separate, though related, epidemics: one of HIV infection, and one of 
full-blown AIDS. The latter follows the former albeit with a few years‟ lag. The 
number of people who have fallen sick from AIDS has also been increasing, albeit 
with a few years‟ lag. ASSA (2005a) projections show that the total number of 
people with AIDS is set to increase from 599,298 in 2006, to 701,508 in 2010 and 
797,003 in 2015. Because the AIDS epidemic lags behind the HIV epidemic, the full 
impact of today‟s HIV infections in terms of the number of AIDS cases and AIDS 
deaths will only manifest after a few years (DoH 2003b).  
 
Nevertheless, the impact of the epidemic is already being felt in the country. Life 
expectancy in 2006 is estimated to be around 50.7 years, which is approximately 13 
years less than what would be expected without HIV/AIDS (Dorrington et al. 2006). 
It is projected, moreover, that life expectancy will decline further without the 
provision of ART, to an average life expectancy of less than 48 years by 2015 
(Dorrington et al. 2006). South Africa is also the country with the highest number of 
orphans due to AIDS (UNAIDS 2006b). It is estimated that there are a total number 
of 1.5 million maternal orphans under the age of 18 years in the country. Of these 
orphans, it is estimated that about two thirds have been orphaned because their 
mother or both of their parents have died from AIDS. There were about 300,000 new 
HIV/AIDS orphans in 2006 (Dorrington et al. 2006).   
 
The epidemic is distributed unequally among the provinces. KwaZulu-Natal carries 
the hardest burden with over 1.5 million of its population infected, and the highest 
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 HIV incidence reflects the number of new infections, as opposed to HIV prevalence, which reflects 
the total number of HIV infections. Thus, incidence is the key indicator to assess the future trends of 
the epidemic. Nevertheless, incidence is more difficult to measure than prevalence, and prevalence is 












infection rate in the country: 40.2% of infections in antenatal clinics and 26.2% of 
infections in the adult population (ages 15-49) in 2006 (ASSA 2005a). On the other 
end of the scale is the Western Cape with the lowest infection rate: 15.5% of 
prevalence in antenatal clinics and 8.6% of prevalence in the adult population (ages 
15-49) for the same year. The Free State is closer to the national average, with a 
prevalence of 33.7% in antenatal clinics and 22.2% in adults aged 15-49, for 2006. 
Table 4.1 shows disaggregated HIV prevalence and incidence figures for the nine 
provinces. For a more detailed analysis of the epidemiology of HIV/AIDS across the 
nine provinces, see Appendix 8. 
 
Table 4.1: HIV/AIDS prevalence and incidence in South Africa per province, 
2006 
 HIV adult* prevalence (%) New HIV infections 
Eastern Cape 17.4 80,968 
Free State 22.2 35,073 
Gauteng 22.2 111,589 
KwaZulu-Natal 26.2 136,582 
Limpopo 12.1 46,691 
Mpumalanga 21.8 40,684 
Northern Cape 11.2 6,907 
North West 20.5 44,153 
Western Cape 8.6 27,605 
* Ages 15-49. 
Source: ASSA (2005a) 
 
The need for the ART program 
 





were in need of ART, and that only around 32.6% of them were receiving the 
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 Although Dorrington et al. (2006) mention 711,000, the correct figure should read 764,000, as per 
ASSA2003 (2005b) (Leigh Johnson, personal correspondence 2 February 2007). 
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 According to Dorrington et al. (2006) there is more people in need of ART (764,000) than people 
sick with AIDS (600,000) for 2006. The reason is that 75% of people cease to be classified as 'AIDS 
sick' after starting ART (a model assumption) (ASSA 2005b and Leigh Johnson, personal 












treatment (Dorrington et al. 2006). This implies that by the middle of 2006 there 




The AIDS cases estimates used in the Comprehensive Plan (DoH 2003a) were based 
on the ASSA2000 model output for each province (ASSA 2003), and they exclude 
the people who are members of medical aids (and who would therefore not require 
publicly funded health care). Table 4.2 below shows the numbers of new (not 
cumulative) cases of AIDS as estimated in the Comprehensive Plan (DoH 2003a). 
The most severely affected provinces are KwaZulu-Natal followed by Gauteng and 
then the Eastern Cape. Appendix 9 shows the disaggregated numbers per province. 
 
Table 4.2: Estimated new AIDS cases in South Africa, 2003-2007* 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
New AIDS cases 388,701 462,841 530,658 586,181 624,720 
*These figures are not cumulative and exclude the population covered by medical aid 
Source: DoH (2003a, p.240) 
 
Table 4.2 shows the increasing needs for ART. In 2003, approximately 388,701 new 
AIDS cases occurred. By 2007, this figure was projected to rise to 624,720. These 
figures are not cumulative, however, and only reflect new AIDS cases per year. The 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the large number of people infected, together with 
the growing need for ART over time, emphasise the urgency of a response, and the 
magnitude of the challenges ahead. In fact, it is argued that providing adequate 
treatment through ARVs to the population has become a moral challenge in the 
country, considering the high numbers who need them as well as the economic 
affordability and long-term benefit of ART (Nattrass 2004).  
 
4.3 The Comprehensive Plan 
 
This section provides the background to the evolution of HIV/AIDS policies that led 
to the Comprehensive Plan. It also presents the objectives of the Comprehensive 
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Plan and its cost implications, and discusses the achievements in implementation at 
the national level, in the Free State and in the Western Cape. 
 
A  The evolution of HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa 
 
The South African response to the epidemic within the health sector is built upon a 
series of guiding policy plans. The strategy of the South African Government is a 
multisectoral response where sectors beyond the health sector, such as education and 
social development, also confront the epidemic, led by the HIV and AIDS and 
Sexually Transmitted Infections Strategic Plan for South Africa 2000-2005 (DoH 
2000), which was later replaced by the new HIV & AIDS and STI
15
 Strategic Plan 
for South Africa 2007-2011 (DoH 2007b). Appendix 10 provides an overview of 
various policy developments shaping the HIV/AIDS strategy of the government.  
 
In relation to the treatment policy in particular, the public sector‟s treatment 
response to the epidemic has been characterised as being late because it only 
materialised in November 2003. In that year, the DoH estimated that approximately 
400,000 people would develop an AIDS-defining illness (DoH 2003a), and that 
more than 4.7 million people were HIV-positive and eventually would need ART 
when developing full-blown AIDS (ASSA 2005b). Consequently, the epidemic in 
the country was already at an advanced stage when the treatment program was 
launched, and this poses various challenges.  
 
The inaction of HIV/AIDS policies took different forms before and after the first 
democratic elections in 1994. Furlong and Ball (2005) explain that, during apartheid 
(before 1990), the reaction of the government to HIV/AIDS, which affects black 
disproportionably, has been characterised as “denial, discomfort and racism” 
(p.127). The new government in 1994 advanced the fight against the epidemic and 
its impact in many ways; among others, budgets grew and structures were put in 
place to lead interventions against the disease (Furlong and Ball 2005).  
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Nevertheless, advances were hampered by the controversial stances of governmental 
leaders in respect of many HIV/AIDS issues; a particularly controversial one was 
Thabo Mbeki‟s questioning of the scientific evidence that AIDS was caused solely 
by HIV (BBC News 2000; Fourie 2004; Furlong and Ball 2005). Later, another 
major controversy was the fact that the Health Minister Manto Tshabalala-Msmang 
supported the intake of garlic, beetroot and oil to deal with the effects of AIDS, 
instead of fully promoting ARVs (BBC 2006). Due to these controversies, the South 
Africa‟s government has been perceived as lacking a clear position and decision in 
fighting against the epidemic with all its strength, and more particularly in the use of 
ART (Furlong and Ball 2005; Nattrass 2007). 
 
A Joint Health and Treasury Task Team (JHTTT) was responsible for laying the 
groundwork for the treatment plan, and they delivered their report (DoH 2003b) to 
the Minister of Health in August 2003. This report is not a policy document, but 
provides the groundwork that informed the launch of the Comprehensive Plan later 
in the same year. It provides a first estimation of the cost of providing ART
16
. The 
cost of providing ARV to 100% of all new cases is estimated to be between R13.4 
and R15.7 billion by 2008 (DoH 2003b). However, the report acknowledges that 
further detailed analysis of the routing and funding mechanisms under various 
scenarios will be required (DoH 2003b). This report was followed in August 2003 by 
the announcement to roll out ART, which was formalised in November 2003 with 
the launch of the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
B  The Comprehensive Plan 
 
The Government of South Africa launched the Comprehensive Plan (DoH 2003a) in 
November 2003. This plan became the most important guiding policy for the public 
health sector‟s response to HIV/AIDS. The most important new element of the 
Comprehensive Plan, in relation to previously existing policy, is the ARV treatment 
component.  
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Objectives of the Comprehensive Plan 
 
The Comprehensive Plan aims to provide all South Africans who require 
comprehensive care and treatment for HIV/AIDS, with equitable access to the 
program within their local municipal area by 2008 (DoH 2003a). It aims to establish 
a minimum of one service point in every health district by the end of the first year of 
implementation. The Comprehensive Plan stipulates the provision of the continuum 
of care and support through several components, including: prevention strategies; 
voluntary counselling and testing (VCT); medical care and treatment (including 
ART); psychosocial support; nutritional assistance; social support; and home- and 
community-based services (DoH 2003a). 
 
A core element of the Comprehensive Plan is that treatment is to be delivered in an 
integrated manner that will strengthen the overall health system. In fact, the national 
strategy aims to achieve two interrelated goals (DoH 2003a, p.24): (a) to provide 
comprehensive care and treatment for people living with HIV and AIDS; and (b) to 
strengthen the national health system in South Africa.  
 
The Comprehensive Plan estimates that approximately 53,000 patients would be 
receiving ARVs in 2003/04, and they would increase to 381,177 by 2005/06 (DoH 
2003a). Table 4.3 illustrates the rapid scale-up of ART services envisaged in the 
Comprehensive Plan. These estimates are crucial for the planning and budgeting of 
the plan, as well as giving a benchmark to monitor progress. 
 
Table 4.3: Total patients projected to receive ART, 2003/04-2007/08 



















Implementation of the Comprehensive Plan- Accreditation of service points 
 
ART is to be delivered only through accredited service points, which can be 
constituted by a single hospital or clinic, or by a group of facilities. In order to 
ensure a quality service, the Comprehensive Plan established a set of norms and 
standards for the accreditation of ART service points. A full list of accreditation 
requirements is included in Appendix 11. Particularly relevant for this research is the 
core staffing requirements per site to deliver ART shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: Core staffing requirements per treatment site (to deliver ART to 500 
patients) 
Category of Staff Minimum full time equivalent  
Medical officers 1 
Professional nurses 1 
Pharmacists 1 
Dieticians/nutritionists 1 
Social workers 0.5 
Lay counsellors 5 
Administrative clerks 1 
Data capturers 1 
Source: DoH (2003a, p.104) 
 
There is a difference between enrolling in the program and receiving ART. Not all 
patients enrolling into HIV/AIDS treatment receive ART. This may be because they 
are not eligible yet, or because they are undertaking the treatment readiness course, 
or because they are still waiting for ART. Even when a person who is tested is HIV-
negative, he/she still receives counselling and advice to prevent HIV-infection for 
the future. HIV-positive individuals may be referred for ART, prophylaxis for 
opportunistic infections, or routine follow-up, depending on the advancement of the 
disease. Patients with a CD4 count of less than 200 and/or who are symptomatic are 
offered the option of ART
17
 (DoH 2003a). 
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 The criteria for initiation of ART in non-pregnant adults and adolescents are: (1) CD4 ≤ 200 
cells/mm
3
 and/or symptomatic, irrespective of state; or (2) WHO stage IV AIDS defining illness, 















The total cost for the Comprehensive Plan is anticipated to grow from R296 million 
in 2003/04 to nearly R4.5 billion in 2007/08. Figure 4.2 shows a breakdown of the 
projected budget according to categories in year 2006/07 (see Appendix 12 for the 
evolution of costs). It shows that ARVs are the largest cost-driver in the budget, 
followed by health care staff and then laboratory testing. Thus, from a financial 
perspective, the core of the plan centres on ARVs, as ARVs alone consume the 
biggest proportion of the budget. This is because ART is drug-intense and because of 
the high cost of several ARVs. This is despite the fact that the Comprehensive Plan 
was formulated at a time when the price of ARVs had decreased significantly, 
making it more affordable to scale up ART.  
 

















Source: Adapted from DoH (2003a, p.48) 
 
Thus, although ART is only one of several components in the Comprehensive Plan, 
it is the biggest component in the budget of the Comprehensive Plan.  
                                                                                                                                          
The criteria for initiation of ART in children under 6 years are: (1) CD4 < 15% and symptomatic; or 
(2) WHO Paediatric Stage III AIDS defining illness, irrespective of CD4; and (3) at least one 













Emphasis on strengthening the health system, efficiency, equity, and 
sustainability 
 
The Comprehensive Plan, as well as previous health policy documents, emphasises 
the commitment to the overall goals of strengthening the health system and 
achieving equity, efficiency and sustainability
18
. These four core principles harness 
South Africa‟s public health policy towards redressing historical disparities, 
promoting more equitable and efficient health systems and strengthening PHC.  
 
In terms of strengthening of the health system, the Comprehensive Plan highlights 
the need to allocate additional investments to improving the capabilities of the 
national health care system as a whole, with special emphasis on upgrading the skills 
base, recruiting new professionals, retaining health care professionals in historically 
underserved areas, investing in physical infrastructure, and laboratory and drug 
procurement services. It also calls for the need to integrate ART within the overall 
public health system. 
  
A fundamental principle is the strengthening of the national health system as a 
whole in order to ensure the effective delivery of comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
care and treatment. It is also essential to ensure that this plan is not implemented at 
the expense of other equally important healthcare priorities and programs. (DoH 
2003a, p.18) 
 
The Comprehensive Plan contemplates that as much as 36% of its budget is to be 
devoted to strengthening the health system over the first five years. In addition, it 
gives the assurance that it will not transfer resources away from other health 
programs, as it is based on new budgetary resources. However, these new resources 
to be devoted to health system strengthening refer exclusively to financial resources, 
not to human resources, infrastructure or other resources.  
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In addition, the Comprehensive Plan contemplates that treatment and care for 
HIV/AIDS be integrated within the district health system (DHS)
19
. The DHS is the 
national approach to health care delivery, and it is characterised by delivering PHC 
in an integrated way, dealing with the broader socio-economic aspects influencing 
health. It has a bottom-up approach by getting closer to communities and focusing 
on a redistributive objective (Van Rensburg and Pelser 2004). The DHS involves the 
decentralisation of particular health care responsibilities to provincial and local 
governments (Van Rensburg and Pelser 2004). This decentralisation implies that 
absorptive capacity needs to be examined at the provincial and local levels where 
responsibility for implementation lies. Integrating into the DHS system is 
particularly relevant as ART transforms HIV/AIDS into a chronic disease requiring 
life-long care. This integration is seen as a prerequisite for the plan to strengthen and 
not weaken the health system, as well as to ensure its sustainability.  
 
In terms of efficiency, the accreditation of service points through standard 
requirements, as explained earlier, would ensure the quality of the continuum of 
care. More specifically, the Comprehensive Plan envisages enhancing efficiency 
through: the improvement in procurement mechanisms and laboratory infrastructure, 
which should lead to significantly lower prices, the revision of work definitions and 
scopes of practice by professional groups, the upgrade of patient information 
systems, the implementation of M&E systems to enhance the management of the 
program and to ensure effective quality assurance, the monitoring of adverse events, 
and the maximisation of ordering and procurement systems. In order to monitor 
progress in the implementation of the program, the NDoH developed an M&E 
framework (DoH 2004a), which is explained later in the chapter.  
 
In relation to equity, the Comprehensive Plan stipulates the allocation of greater 
financial resources and technical assistance towards historically disadvantaged areas 
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 Since 1994, South Africa has moved towards focusing on the DHS as the best approach to health 
care delivery, in order to compensate for historical distortions. This approach implies boosting 
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Pelser 2004). Nonetheless, the implementation of DHS has proved difficult. The shared 
responsibilities by local and provincial spheres have resulted in different employment conditions and 
remuneration packages, making the integration of management of health workers challenging (Van 
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(DoH 2003a). In addition, the goal of opening at least one treatment site in every 
health district in the first year of the program aims to contribute to intra-provincial 
equality.  
 
South Africa‟s commitment to equity is much stronger than in other countries, due to 
particular historical developments and imbalances. The first democratic Government 
in 1994 inherited a country characterised by stark economic, social and political 
inequalities, which were mirrored in access to and quality of health services. Thus, 
improving equity in health allocations and tackling historical disadvantages became 
a major issue in policy planning.  
 
With regard to sustainability, the Comprehensive Plan highlights the importance of 
securing funding for its implementation over the long term, mainly by financing the 
program through domestic funding, and using donor resources only as a 
supplementary source of financing. In addition, the national plan stipulated that the 
treatment program must be cost-effective and efficient in order to achieve 
sustainability. Other related aspects considered in the document include the long-
term sustainability of training programs and the continuity of drug and other 
supplies, which is to be enhanced by pharmaceutical tender processes, permitting 
contracts to be split among suppliers. 
 
C  Progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan 
 
This section first presents the M&E framework for the Comprehensive Plan, and 
thereafter discusses the current achievements of the plan, nationally as well as 
provincially (Western Cape and Free State).   
 
The M&E framework for the Comprehensive Plan 
 
In 2004, the NDoH issued the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for the 
Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment Plan for South 
Africa (DoH 2004a), to guide this process. The framework includes a set of core 












shown in Appendix 13, and a list of programmatic indicators
20
 in the following areas 
(DoH 2004a): 
 
 Budget expenditure; 
 Human resources and training; 
 Accreditation of service points; 
 Nutrition related intervention; 
 Drug procurement and distribution; 
 Laboratory services; 
 Patient information systems, monitoring and research; 
 Patient outcome and impact: VCT, prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (PMTCT), tuberculosis and sexually transmitted infections 
(STIs); 
 Traditional medicine; 
 Social mobilisation and communication; 
 Pharmacovigilance; 
 Health system strengthening. 
 
This M&E framework is a crucial step towards improving the quality of services in a 
coordinated manner. However, an M&E framework is only useful as long as it helps 
to collect and organise information that is ready to be used by the targeted recipients. 
To date, the NDoH has only published one report on progress on the Comprehensive 
Plan (DoH 2004b), which is hampering the proper evaluation of its implementation. 
Thus, the DoH has been criticised for not reporting sufficiently on the progress of 
the rollout of the Comprehensive Plan. Consequently, parallel M&E processes have 
been started by civil society to monitor the progress of the program (JCSMF 2004; 
JCSMF 2005; Ndlovu and Daswa 2006b).  
 
Progress to date 
 
As noted before, this study focuses exclusively on the ART component of the 
Comprehensive Plan, and thus progress is only reported on this indicator and not on 
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the rest of components of the plan. In terms of availability of ART services, there are 
clear improvements. By the end of September 2004, 50 of the 53 health districts in 
South Africa had at least one service point accredited (DoH 2004b), and by 
December 2005 there were 204 accredited and operational service points 
countrywide (DoH 2006a), meeting and exceeding the original target in terms of 
accreditation of service points per district. 
 
However, because the accreditation requirements are high and difficult for smaller 
health facilities to meet, mainly hospitals rather than clinics were the first to be 
accredited as ART treatment sites. Consequently, although the long-term objective is 
that ART be integrated in and provided through the DHS structure, this proved 
difficult in the early stages of the implementation.  
 
With regard to patients on ART, targets in the Comprehensive Plan have not been 
met. When the Comprehensive Plan was launched, fewer than 5,000 people in the 
country were on ART (ITPC 2005). By August/September 2004, nearly 10,000 
people had started ART (DoH 2004c). Early in the rollout, it was clear that the target 
of nearly 190,000 people on ART by March 2005 was far beyond the capacity of the 
program, and consequently the target was adjusted downward to 53,000 patients on 
treatment, which had been the original goal for the previous year. The targets of the 
Comprehensive Plan were revised twice: first by the Health Minister and then by the 
President in his 2004 State of the Nation Address (ITPC 2005).  
 
The DoH estimated that at the end of March 2005, more than 42,000 people had 
been put on ARVs. This is still less than the revised target of 53,000 (JSCMF 2005) 
(and even less than the original target of nearly 190,000). The next year, the DoH 
(2006b) estimated that the cumulative number of patients on ART was 178,635 in 
June 2006 and 213,828 by September 2006. Thus, in only three months, the number 
of people on ART increased by more than 35,000, at an average of 11,000 new 
patients per month, which represents a significant improvement (DOH 2006b)
21
. 
However, despite these advancements, progress has lagged behind targets. 
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Implementation, however, varies across provinces. Looking at ART coverage of new 
AIDS cases in December 2006, the Western Cape has the second highest rate (64%), 
exceeded only by the Northern Cape; however, the figure for the Northern Cape 
seems too high, which suggests that there may be errors in its data
22
. The Free State 
has the third lowest enrolment rate of new AIDS cases (12%), only lower than the 
North West (5%) and Mpumalanga (10%). Overall enrolment rates for the country 
are also low (21%). Appendix 14 shows full calculations and results of the coverage 
of the new AIDS cases calculated by the new ART enrolments, by province. These 
calculations are nevertheless imprecise (for the reasons detailed in Appendix 14) and 
thus should be taken only as an approximate indication. These calculations are 
nevertheless valuable because they are based on DoH reported data of ART 
enrolments and not on ASSA projections as was the case in other similar studies.  
 
Other studies also show very low ART coverage rates and similar provincial 
ranking. Nattrass (2006) provides an estimate of ART coverage as at the end of 
2005, relating to total AIDS population (cumulative) rather than new AIDS cases. 
Her study shows a higher national coverage (25%), probably partly due to the 
inclusion of ART provision through the private sector. In terms of provincial 
ranking, the Free State has the third lowest coverage (21%), and the Western Cape 
has the highest coverage (56%), followed by the Northern Cape (32%). The 
calculations of Nattrass (2006) are also based on the ASSA2003 model (ASSA 
2005b) rather than on government reported figures of people on ART as in Appendix 
14, and include both public and private provision of ART.Thus, despite some 
differences, the results are relatively consistent with the ones in Appendix 14 in that 
the Free State has one of the lowest coverage rates, and the Western Cape one of the 
highest.  
 
Another estimate is provided by the ASSA model (2005b), according to which 
around only 32.6% of HIV-positive people in need of ART had access to treatment 
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 The figure for the Northern Cape shows about three times as many people enrolled as people sick 
from AIDS, but the author is unable to provide any explanation for the potential errors in the data. 
Source: Author‟s calculation of new ART enrolments based on data from DoH (2006a) for 2006, and 
SACOB (2007) for 2005. Data for estimated new AIDS cases from DoH (2003a). Coverage of new 














,  with nearly 540,000 people sick with AIDS who did not have access 




Furthermore, the ART enrolments reported by the DoH (DoH 2006a; SACOB 2007) 
only indicate the number of people who have started treatment, but not how many 
are currently receiving treatment. To have a complete picture of the progress of the 
program, it is necessary to know how many patients have dropped out of the 
program, and how many died while on treatment. These numbers may be high, 
especially during the early stages of a treatment plan, as previous experiences have 
shown that the first people accessing ART are generally those who are more ill and 
have lower CD4 counts, and thus are less likely to succeed (Pienaar et al. 2006). The 
DoH stated that nearly 6,000 people have died while on ARVs since the rollout of 
the Comprehensive Plan began (SABC News 2006a).  
 
The slow speed of the ART rollout is also evident from the existing waiting lists for 
enrolling in the ART program. According to the DoH, a study conducted between 
March and June 2006 showed that there were 31,255 people on waiting lists for 
receiving ART. This number refers exclusively to people who have presented 
themselves to the clinic, who have qualified for treatment in accordance with the 
clinical guidelines, and who were prepared to initiate ART through the treatment 
readiness courses (SABC News 2006b). The AIDS Clinicians Society however 
disputes this figure and argues that the figure is substantially higher (SABC News 
2006c).   
 
All these estimates coincide in that achievements in terms of the number of people 
on treatment not only fall short but are substantially lower than the original targets 
and much lower than the estimated numbers who need treatment, given that targets 
rose gradually over time as planned coverage increased. 
 
However, even though late and below the targets, the advancements in achievements 
to date may also be considered remarkable. In fact, by 2005 South Africa was the 
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country with the highest number of people on treatment in the world (between 
178,000 and 235,000
25
 patients on ART), followed by Brazil (between 165,000 and 
183,000 patients on treatment) (WHO and UNAIDS 2006). Thus, it is a considerable 
achievement, especially given the short time since the launch of the treatment 
program. Given the magnitude of the numbers of people who require treatment, 
moreover, no other country is faced with such a huge challenge as South Africa. 
 
In addition, it has also been argued that the targets set in the Comprehensive Plan 
have not been achieved because they are too ambitious (Van Rensburg 2006a). It is 
argued that speeding up the rollout of ART to achieve high targets may actually 
damage the quality and sustainability of the process in the long term (McCoy et al. 
2005). The early phase of the program is crucial for building a critical mass of 
professionals with knowledge and skills related to HIV/AIDS treatment. Pressures to 
chase patient targets and to spend available resources thus may compromise the 
broader objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
Progress in the Western Cape 
 
The rollout of ART in the Western Cape is characterised by the rapid expansion of 
both service points and number of people on treatment, resulting in the province 
exceeding the targets for the patients receiving ART (WCDoH 2006a). A factor in 
this achievement is the existence of a significant number of people on ART before 
the Comprehensive Plan was launched; in April 2004, 2,327 patients were already on 
ART in 16 sites across the Western Cape (WCDoH 2006b), thanks to the 
collaboration of the provincial government with Médecins sans Frontières (MSF). In 
addition, the program has expanded continuously in the province. ART sites have 
increased from 16 in April 2004 to 46 in June 2006 (WCDoH 2006b). The number 
of patients on ART has increased from 2,327 in April 2004 to 16,234
26
 by the end of 
March 2006 (WCDoH 2006b) and 18,941 by the end of June 2006 (WCDoH 2006c). 
In the Western Cape, more than 1,000 new patients enrolled on ART each month by 
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early 2006 (WCDoH 2006b), with coverage
27
 reaching 65% in mid-2006 (Abdulah 
2006). 
 
Despite this success and the province‟s comparative advantage in health services 
(compared to the national average), the program is not free from obstacles. The 
WCDoH highlights two major constraints in the implementation of the program: 
inadequate physical facilities and insufficient health personnel (2006d). In addition, 
the challenge of the growing number of people on ART presents challenges to the 
health system‟s capacity. 
 
Progress in the Free State 
 
The achievements of the Comprehensive Plan in the Free State fall short of the 
targets, revealing the mismatch between an idealistic plan and its implementation 
(Van Rensburg 2006a). Only 1,165
28
 patients had commenced ART by the end of 
2004/05 (FSDoH 2005a), which is below the national revised target for the province 
of 2,127, and even lower than the original target of 11,883, and also lower than the 
FSDoH‟s own target of 5,000 (Van Rensburg 2006a). Of these 1,165 ART patients, 
it was estimated that only 1,065 still had to receive ART at the time (FSDoH 2005a). 
By the end of September 2006, it was estimated that 5,684
29
 adult patients had 
started ART, 25% of whom were lost to follow-up at that time (FSDoH 2006). 
However, the number of patients lost to follow-up may be an overestimation due to a 
backlog in capturing patient forms in the electronic record system (FSDoH 2006). In 
fact, by the third quarter of 2006, enrolment had increased markedly, with more than 
600 new HIV-positive patients having joined the program each month (FSDoH 
2006). 
 
Equally, the accreditation of service sites has also fallen short of targets (Van 
Rensburg 2006a). The Free State developed a particular organisational model to 
implement the Comprehensive Plan, consisting of one treatment site (hospital-based, 
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 This figure is only for adults and does not include ART patients in NGO sites. The figure is 1,288 
in Van Rensburg (2006a). 
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 This number excludes patients from sites without electronic data capturing systems, NGO sites and 












predominantly doctor-driven) connected to three assessment sites (PHC facility, 
nurse-driven), but allowing for combined treatment and assessment sites to be 
established at individual facilities, which allows for the different needs in more rural 
areas and isolated small towns (Van Rensburg 2006a). By the end of 2005, only 8 
treatment sites, 21 assessment sites, 10 combined sites and 1 satellite site
30
 had been 
established (not all sites were operational yet), which contrasts with the target of 
establishing 28 sites at hospitals and 116 sites at PHC facilities during the period 
2004-2006 (Van Rensburg 2006a).  
 
In addition, despite the increasing number of patients on ART, the FSDoH has noted 
a slow-down in the speed of the expansion of the program in the third quarter of 
2006 (FSDoH 2006). This decline in expansion has been attributed to sites reaching 
their full capacity, thus pointing to the need for new sites and/or additional staff to 
continue the expansion of the program (FSDoH 2006). 
 
4.4  Mechanisms for HIV/AIDS financing and resource transfers 
 
The South African government‟s response to the epidemic is funded primarily from 
domestic resources, which is different from other African countries that have a high 
HIV/AIDS burden (Gayle 2003). This is recognised as an indication of the 
commitment of the country to tackle the crisis, as well as of its financial capacity to 
pay, which makes the country exceptional in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
The current framework for public HIV/AIDS financing in the health sector is 
organised into three major mechanisms:  
 
 Conditional grants for HIV/AIDS  interventions; 
 HIV/AIDS funds within the equitable share allocations; 
 The budget of the Chief Directorate: HIV and AIDS, STI and tuberculosis 
(TB) in the NDoH (hereinafter the National Directorate).  
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The first two mechanisms incorporate provincial expenditure, and account for the 
major share of HIV/AIDS health budgets, whilst the National Directorate refers to 
national expenditure, not provincial, and receives a relatively small share of funding 
(Hickey et al. 2003). Nearly 85% of public sector health funding flowed through 
provincial health departments, with the other 15% divided between national and 
local levels (NT 2005a). Therefore, the budget of the National Directorate is not the 
core focus of this research. The next section reviews the conditional grant and 
equitable share mechanisms, through which the bulk of HIV/AIDS resources are 
transferred to PDoHs. 
 
A  Conditional grant allocations for HIV/AIDS 
 
Conditional grants are also referred to as dedicated budgets, ring-fenced funds or 
earmarked funds; they drive the multisectoral HIV/AIDS response in the country, 
and in particular the Comprehensive Plan. This dedicated budget started to finance 
the multisectoral response to HIV/AIDS
31
 in 2000/01. The conditional grant 
mechanism involves the transfer of funds from national departments to their 
provincial counterparts. Funds are ring-fenced for specific programs designated by 
national government, and attached to specific conditions and monitoring 
requirements. The implementation of the Comprehensive Plan is mainly funded 
through the conditional grants mechanism in order to safeguard and speed up 
funding on HIV/AIDS activities. 
 
Besides the HIV/AIDS conditional grant allocated to the DoH, there is also a 
conditional grant for HIV/AIDS to the Department of Education (DoE). This grant 
covers the life skills program, which aims to provide education on life skills, 
sexuality and HIV/AIDS in primary and secondary schools. Prior to 2006/07, there 
was a third conditional grant for HIV/AIDS to the Department of Social 
Development (DSD), the smallest of the three
32
. The conditional grant for health has 
always been the biggest of the three grants, and it has further grown more than the 
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others) by means of their regular budgets, without such clear specification of how much was being 
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other two. In 2004/05, it received around 80% of the total HIV/AIDS funding to the 
social sector
33
 (NT 2004a). This grant has grown since its inception partly due to the 
expansion of activities covered, and in particular the inclusion of ART interventions 
(Ndlovu and Daswa 2006a). Both its size and growth suggest that absorptive 
capacity problems may be greatest with this particular grant. This study focuses 
exclusively on the HIV/AIDS conditional grants for health as the instrument of 
financing the treatment component of the Comprehensive Plan. The education and 
social development grants are beyond the scope of this research. 
 
Allocation mechanisms  
 
The total amounts of conditional grants to health are negotiated between the National 
Treasury and the NDoH. The NDoH presents an estimated budget with the costs of 
interventions, and the National Treasury decides how much of the budget requested 
in the DoH proposal it will fund. It has been the case for the HIV/AIDS grant that 
the NDoH did not receive all requested funding; for example, only R334 million 
were granted in the budget 2003/4 out of the R428 million requested (i.e. 78% of the 
total amount requested) (Hickey et al. 2003). This could be because the budget was 
not properly justified or because National Treasury did not agree with the priorities 
presented, among other reasons34.  
 
Once the amount has been determined, the NDoH determines the horizontal division 
of conditional HIV/AIDS grants among the provinces35. The final funding received 
by provinces thus depends firstly on the total allocation from the National Treasury 
to the NDoH, and secondly on its distribution among the provinces by the NDoH. 
 
Provinces annually submit business plans to the NDoH with their estimated resource 
needs. The NDoH then uses these plans to prepare their overall budget proposal to 
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 In 2004/05, amounts allocated to the three conditional grants were R782 million to the DoH, R129 
million to the DoE, and R70 million to the DSD (NT 2004a) 
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 From interviews with members of Treasury. 
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 The division is based on the antenatal HIV prevalence survey, the estimated provincial shares of 
HIV-positive births, the shares of reported rapes and the estimated shares of HIV/AIDS cases (NT 
2003a). In relation to the criteria used, Hickey et al. (2004, p.119) note that “indicators of need, as 
opposed to a province‟s relatively ability or readiness to spend, have become a more prominent 












the National Treasury. The business plans therefore are a crucial instrument in the 
planning and allocation of HIV/AIDS conditional grants.  
 
Interventions funded  
 
Conditional grants may only be spent on specified activities, including VCT, 
PMTCT, community home-based care and support (CHBCS), step-down care, 
provincial management, and ARVs. The limited list of activities to be covered limits 
the capacity of provinces to use the grants for related support activities. Thus, it 
raises concerns of the extent to which conditional grants can actually support the 
strengthening of the health system, as aimed at by the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
The amount to be allocated to each activity was initially directed from the national 
level, but this has changed and now provinces make the decision at their discretion. 
Provinces are allowed to modify the distribution of the total amount among the 
components during the course of the year, provided they have received approval 
from the NDoH.  
 
Monitoring and reporting  
 
Conditional grants are characterised by strong monitoring and reporting 
requirements. Provinces need to report quarterly on their expenditures to the NDoH, 
which is responsible for the overall monitoring of the grants. Monitoring 
requirements of dedicated funding are high. Moreover, the requirements for the 
HIV/AIDS conditional grant are said to be even higher than those for other health 
conditional grants
36
, which places an extra burden on the financial managers.  
 
B   Equitable share transfers for HIV/AIDS 
 
This transfer mechanism is also referred to as discretionary or own provincial 
funding. Provincial discretionary funding includes the equitable share it has received 
from national government as well as revenue raised by the province itself and donor 
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funding given directly to the province, Yet, the latter funding sources are not 
normally considered in budgetary analysis because of their relative small 
contribution. Because of the equitable share mechanism, there is a pool of funds 
transferred to Provincial Treasuries from National Treasury, which provinces 
distribute among various provincial departments at their discretion. This mechanism 
is crucial to ensure the distribution of power and responsibilities towards the nine 
South African provinces according to the Constitution. This mechanism is also 
important in that it reflects province‟s commitment to the areas funded (Hickey et al. 
2003).  
 
In addition to the general functioning of the equitable share mechanism, a new 
mechanism was introduced in the 2002/03 budget (NT 2002a). National Treasury 
introduced targeted funds for HIV/AIDS through the equitable share pool. These 
funds were to be „top-sliced‟ from the general provincial budget (Hickey et al. 
2003). Within the PDoHs, these funds could appear on the HIV and AIDS sub-




Equitable share transfers flow from National Treasury to the Provincial Treasury, 
which allocates these resources among provincial departments, e.g. education, 
health, transport. National Treasury allocates the shares among the provinces 
according to a specific formula used for the horizontal division of revenue
37
. This 
formula is intended to address equity issues across provinces, but it has been 
criticised for not doing so sufficiently, partly due to the weights attached to its 
different components (McIntyre and Doherty 2004).    
 
From the provincial allocations, a part is assigned by the province towards the PDoH 
for health interventions, and from there another part is assigned by the PDoH to 
specific HIV/AIDS interventions. Spending of this funding is thus entirely at the 
discretion of the provinces.  
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In relation to the targeted increments for HIV/AIDS introduced in 2002/03, although 
these are in principle to be dedicated to HIV/AIDS, it is noted that national 
government has no legal mechanism to guarantee the use of these funds for the 
intended objectives (Hickey et al. 2003). No specific guidelines were found on how 
this mechanism works. Interviews conducted clarified that, at the same time as it 
transfers the equitable share funding, National Treasury sends an „indication‟ of how 
much should be dedicated to particular areas, one of them being HIV/AIDS. 
 
Interventions funded  
 
The funding from the equitable shares to the PDoHs covers the implementation of 
overall health policies, not just HIV/AIDS. This mechanism supports the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan in two ways. Firstly, by financing the 
overall health system it supports the base for implementing HIV/AIDS interventions. 
And secondly, it funds the areas of the Comprehensive Plan not covered by 
conditional grants, such as administrative costs for example. This suggests that the 
discretionary mechanism may be more appropriate for supporting capacity building 
within the health system than the conditional one that is limited to a few specific 
interventions.  
 
In particular for the targeted increments over the equitable share mechanism, the 
2002/03 budget specifies that they are intended to deal with additional costs arising 
from the care of HIV/AIDS infected persons, including costs of hospitalisations and 
treatment of opportunistic infections (NT 2002a), and the 2003 budget stipulates that 
they are intended to promote the use of HIV/AIDS funding to strengthen provincial 
health systems and support HIV/AIDS treatment and care interventions once the 
Comprehensive Plan has been approved (NT 2003c). 
 
Monitoring and reporting  
 
Provincial allocations from their own budgets are not linked to specific 
interventions, and thus expenditure on HIV/AIDS is difficult to isolate and track. 












their expenditure as regularly as for conditional grants, nor do expenditures need to 
be disaggregated by program or intervention. Hence, it is difficult to track progress 
on specific activities against expenditures allocated to those through the equitable 
share mechanism, and to determine to what extent this funding has actually been 
used for HIV/AIDS interventions. This also applies to the targeted increases on the 
equitable share for HIV/AIDS. 
  
C   Donor funding 
 
It has already been noted that the public HIV/AIDS policies in South Africa are 
mostly funded from domestic funding. Hence, this thesis concentrates on public 
financing of HIV/AIDS treatment. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge the 
role of external aid in South Africa for two reasons.  
 
It has been claimed that there is a lack of precise information on how much funding 
donors provide and to whom
38
 (Ndlovu 2005a). Thist lack of systematic recording of 
donor funding may have caused the underestimation of foreign aid for HIV/AIDS 
policies in the country. There are two major types of HIV/AIDS transfers by donors: 
bilateral aid to government departments, and international aid agency funding to 
NGOs (Hickey et al. 2004). When donor funding goes directly to provinces, they 
need not report back to national government on this spending. Hence, there are no 
official documents on the flow of funds from these foreign sources (Ndlovu 2005a). 
Moreover, the lack of coordination of donor contributions and the lack of 
accountability makes it difficult to track donor funding. Indeed, Ndlovu (2005a) 
notes that most of the available information on donor funding is based on financial 
commitments rather than actual expenditures.  
 
Secondly, some provinces may be receiving significantly high external contributions 
from donors, specifically for ART. This could be explained by the international 
momentum to fund this type of interventions, as well as by the gap created by the 
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delayed launch of the treatment plan by the South African government. For example, 
the WCDoH receives a grant from the Global Fund, which accounts for as much as 
one third of the total cost of the province‟s ART program (interview with the HIV 
and AIDS, TB and STI director, WCDoH, October 2006).. For these two reasons, it 
is important to take into consideration the role of foreign aid in financing the 
implementation of the treatment component of the Comprehensive Plan. Thus, the 
following sections examine the contributions of South Africa‟s two major donors in 
relation to HIV/AIDS policies: The United States President‟s Emergency Plan for 




PEPFAR claims to have given South Africa approximately $1,447.2 million between 
2004/05 and 2008/09 (approximately $89.3 million in 2004, $148.2 million in 2005, 
$221.5 million in 2006, $397.8 million in 2007, and $590.9 million in 2008), and 
planned to give other $550.1 in 2009 for comprehensive HIV/AIDS prevention, 
treatment and care programs (PEPFAR 2010a). This represents an enormous amount 
of funding. For example, in 2004/05, PEPFAR funding to South Africa amounted to 
about R612 million
39
,which would be as much as half of the total public HIV/AIDS 
provincial expenditure for that year (R1,148 million) in nominal terms, based on 
calculations in Chapter 5. Nonetheless, these figures need to be viewed with caution. 
It has been claimed that actual PEPFAR disbursements (and not only commitments) 
are not known. The study of Oomman et al. (2007, p.12) concluded that “aggregate 
figures on disbursements (i.e., outlays) from PEPFAR to individual recipients and 
the amount of money expended by recipients are collected by the U.S. government 
but are not made publicly available”. Thus, it would be necessary to find out the 
actual disbursements and not only the committed amounts. In addition, it is not clear 
what exactly is considered under PEPFAR funding, as for example, in some 
instances PEPFAR includes the contributions given to the Global Fund as PEPFAR 
funding (PEPFAR 2010b). Moreover, it is noted that most PEPFAR funding goes to 
U.S. non-governmental entities, principally the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
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(Oomman et al. 2007, p.ix). Thus, although PEPFAR funding for HIV/AIDS 
treatment seems to be very significant, it is not clear to what extent and in which 
way. 
 
The Global Fund 
 
A different picture emerges from the Global Fund reporting, where data is clearly 
made available for each country and each grant, with details on funding committed 
and disbursed readily available on their website. The Global Fund disbursed a total 
amount of $191 million to South Africa by April 2010 (The Global Fund 2010a). 
Table 4.5 below provides full details of each of the six grants given by the Global 
Fund to South Africa up to 2010, including the amounts disbursed and the amounts 
still to be disbursed. Overall, 84% of total grants have already been disbursed (The 
Global Fund 2010a). All grants are HIV/AIDS-related. The principal recipient of 
these grants is the NDoH (according to Global Fund 2010), except the grant referred 
to as “strengthening and expanding the Western Cape HIV/AIDS prevention, 
treatment and care programmes”, whose principal recipient is the WCDoH. Thus, 
because of the significant amounts disbursed, and because the National or provincial 
government are the principal recipients of the funding, the Global Fund is an 













Table 4.5: Global Fund grants to South Africa, committed and disbursed ($) 
Grant title and number Principal 
Recipient 
Committed  Disbursed  Amounts 
not yet 
disbursed  
Strengthening national capacity 
for treatment, care and support 
related to HIV and TB, building 
on successful behaviour change 
initiatives in South Africa (Soul 
City) SAF-102-G01-C-00. 
NDoH  2,354,000 2,354,000 0 
Strengthening national capacity 
for treatment, care and support 
related to HIV and TB, building 
on successful behaviour change 
initiatives in South Africa (Love 
Life) SAF-102-G02-C-00 
NDoH 17,872,665 17,872,665 0 
Enhancing the Care of 
HIV/AIDS infected and affected 
patients in resource-constrained 
settings in KwaZulu-Natal SAF-
102-G03-C-00 
NDoH 62,476,536 49,771,823 12,704,713 
Strengthening National and 
Provincial Capacity for 
Prevention, Treatment, Care and 
Support Related to HIV and 
Tuberculosis  
SAF-202-G05-C-00 
NDoH 24,400,220 17,168,533 7,231,687 
Strengthening and expanding the 
Western Cape HIV/AIDS 
prevention, treatment and care 
programmes  
SAF-304-G04-H   
WCDoH 66,501,629 62,190,178 4,311,451 
Expanding Services and 
Strengthening Systems for the 
Implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan for HIV and 
AIDS in South Africa  
SAF-607-G06-H 
NDoH 55,071,906 41,933,349 13,138,557 
Total   228,676,956 191,290,548 37386408 
Source: Global Fund (2010a and b) 
 
4.5   Mapping stakeholders around the Comprehensive Plan 
 
This section maps out the major actors in relation to the HIV/AIDS Comprehensive 
Plan financing policy and implementation arena in South Africa. It sets the scene to 












stakeholders in terms of resource allocations and spending. It looks at four major 
sectors: government, private for-profit, private not-for-profit and beneficiaries of 
health services. The criteria to identify stakeholders are that these play a role in (a) 
financing the Comprehensive Plan, or (b) implementing the ART component of the 
Comprehensive Plan, or (c) benefiting from the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
A  Intra-governmental relationships 
 
Three types of divisions characterise intra-governmental relationships in South 
Africa: across departments of government, across the national, provincial and local 
levels or spheres of government (vertical division), and horizontal division across 
provinces. In relation to the financing of the Comprehensive Plan, there are two 
major governmental departments involved: the DoH and Treasury, with their 
national and provincial counterparts. Figure 4.3 represents the relationship between 
these two core departments at the provincial and national levels with regard to the 
financing of the Comprehensive Plan.  
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Figure 4.3 shows two flows of funds: on the one hand, conditional grant allocations 
flow from National Treasury to the NDoH, and on to PDoHs. On the other hand, 
equitable share allocations flow from National Treasury directly to Provincial 
Treasuries, and on to PDoHs. The vertical arrows denote the vertical relationships 
across national and provincial levels of government, whereas the horizontal small 
arrows denote the intergovernmental relationship between the DoH and Treasury. 
There is an extra governmental relationship not included in Figure 4.3, viz. that 
across the nine provinces of South Africa. These three interactions are explored 
below. 
 
Vertical division and fiscal decentralisation   
 
Following the first democratic elections of South Africa in 1994, South Africa‟s 
governmental structure was organised vertically into three levels: national, 
provincial, and local. Their functions and structures in relation to health are set up by 
means of several legislations40, establishing the norms for the delivery of health 
services in the country. However, the arrangement of these structures is not yet 
finalised, in particular the division between local and provincial level (Van Rensburg 
and Pelser 2004).  
 
Since 1994 there has been an ongoing process of fiscal decentralisation, from the 
national sphere towards provincial and local levels, involving both the transfer of 
funds and decision-making power with regard to how to spend these funds. Overall, 
the NDoH is responsible for, among others (Van Rensburg and Pelser 2004):  
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 Leadership in formulating policy and legislation, planning, strategic 
management, and quality assurance; 
 Support to build the capacity of PDoHs and municipalities, and to access cost-
effective health commodities; 
 Regulation of the public and private sectors.  
 
Provinces in turn are responsible for the implementation of policies and delivery of 
services. Whilst provinces need to act in accordance with the national health policy, 
they have a certain degree of autonomy in relation to legislation of certain province-
specific matters, in the same way as local governments (Van Rensburg and Pelser 
2004). Local government is organised into district and local municipalities
41
. A 
health district is the structure at the local level, and it is responsible for delivering 
PHC.  
 
In relation to health matters, local governments are primarily responsible for 
environmental health. In relation to HIV/AIDS services, local governments provide a 
range of activities, including home based programmes and addressing the impact of 
AIDS on communities (Blaauw et al. 2004). Some cities like Cape Town have a 
significant role in financing HIV/AIDS programmes. Nevertheless, overall, the 
participation of the local government in the financing and implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan is relatively small in comparison to the other levels. The local 
government and national government together allocate only 15% of the health 
budget, with the remaining 85% being allocated by provincial governments (NT 
2005a). Therefore, local government is thus excluded from the analysis presented in 
this thesis. 
 
The vertical division of the national budget determines the allocation of resources 
according to the three spheres of government. In the case of health, a higher 
percentage of the budget is allocated to provinces for the implementation of health 
programs, in comparison to the overall public transfers. This vertical division of 
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revenue also shapes government‟s HIV/AIDS response. At the national level, the 
National Directorate at the NDoH is at the centre of HIV/AIDS programs. The 
Directorate is responsible for the enactment, management and M&E of the 
Comprehensive Plan. It is also responsible for tasks that may not be adequately dealt 
with at provincial level, notably drug procurement and distribution. At the provincial 
level, the provincial HIV/AIDS units within PDoHs coordinate the execution of the 
program. PDoHs receive and manage the conditional grant for HIV/AIDS via 
HIV/AIDS directorates or sub-directorates with full time staff responsible to 
implement HIV/AIDS activities. Some PDoHs also employ HIV/AIDS coordinators 
at a district level. 
 
Departmental divisions along HIV/AIDS policy  
 
It has already been noted that the South African Government‟s response to the 
epidemic is multisectoral, as HIV/AIDS is not merely a health issue. Consequently, 
several other governmental departments, such as the DSD and the DoE, are involved 
in the implementation of HIV/AIDS policies. In relation to the financing of the 
HIV/AIDS treatment response within the health sector, two departments are 
involved: the DoH is at the core of the response, while Treasury plays a key role in 
financing, allocating and monitoring expenditures. Other ministries could be added 
to the framework; for example, it could be argued that the role of the Presidency is 
also crucial in providing overall guidance and leadership in government, and 
prioritising the fight against the epidemic. However, this study focuses exclusively 
on Treasury and DoH, as they are the most instrumental in financing HIV/AIDS 
treatment. 
 
The relationship between the DoH and Treasury over HIV/AIDS finances at the 
national level is built upon a series of processes. The NDoH presents the National 
Treasury with a proposed HIV/AIDS budget for the following year. National 
Treasury is responsible for approving the budget, totally or partially, or not 
approving it, and transferring the resources to the NDoH. In addition, National 
Treasury is responsible for transferring the national equitable shares grant to 
provinces. Then Provincial Treasuries would distribute that funding among the 












of the National Treasury, and thereafter from Provincial Treasuries, affect directly 
the overall budgets of the PDoHs. 
 
Horizontal division of HIV/AIDS funding 
 
The horizontal division of expenditure refers to that of the nine South African 
provinces formed after the first democratic elections in 1994. The allocation of 
resources among the provinces is vital for equity purposes. Due to the historical 
imbalances, the main priority of the democratic system is to tackle the geographical 
differences and assist traditionally disadvantaged areas. This is pursued, among other 
things, through the national division of revenue across provinces.  
 
With regard to HIV/AIDS financing in the health sector, there are two major 
divisions of the budget across provinces: firstly, the division of the national revenue 
through the equitable share mechanism, undertaken by National Treasury; secondly, 
the division of the HIV/AIDS conditional grant for the health sector, allocated by the 
NDoH across provinces.  
 
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC)  
 
SANAC was established in 2002 to coordinate the country‟s multisectoral response 
to HIV/AIDS. SANAC includes a broad range of civil society organisations, private 
sector, people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and government departments (not 
only DoH). Nonetheless, the meaningful participation and coordination of the 
Council has been questioned (Strode and Barret 2003). It is argued that with the 
secretariat based within the DoH and actual domination by members of government, 
there has been little space for the civil society sector to have a strong voice. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that the influence of SANAC in HIV/AIDS 
policies has been weak due to the lack of a strategic plan and organisational policies 
(Strode and Barret 2003). 
 
In 2003, SANAC was restructured. However, its capacity in monitoring financial 
flows remains deficient, which has hampered its involvement with the 












society organisations to pursue other forums. Again, the Presidency announced the 
re-structuring of SANAC on December 2006 (Presidency 2006).  
 
B  Non-governmental stakeholders in the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan  
 
As this study follows the allocation of public funds, it concentrates in particular on 
governmental relationships. However, the full spectrum of stakeholders involved in 
the Comprehensive Plan cannot be described without considering the rest of the 
stakeholders in ART delivery, namely the private for-profit and not-for-profit 
sectors, and beneficiaries. The Comprehensive Plan recognises the role of the private 
sector, NGOs and community-based organisations in enhancing treatment by 
providing assistance with adherence and a caring support network (DoH 2003a). 
Besides treatment delivery, there are other inputs of the private sector in relation to 
the financing and implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, which are briefly 
summarised below.  
 
Private for-profit organisations 
 
Also referred to in this study as the private sector, it includes private hospitals and 
other centres providing ART and other HIV/AIDS related services. This sector is 
important, as it began to provide ART in South Africa before the launch of the 
Comprehensive Plan. It is estimated that around 110,000 people were receiving ART 
in the private sector in 2006 (WHO et al. 2008). The Comprehensive Plan advocates 
making more use of private health professionals in the public sector and enhancing 
public-private partnerships (DoH 2003a). The role of the private sector is crucial in 
delivering HIV/AIDS related services, but also in other areas, such as training and 
medical support, and drug procurement.  
 
The private health sector is particularly strong in South Africa, and it concentrates 
more resources onto each person covered since 1994 than the resources devoted to 
people covered by public health expenditure (McIntyre and Doherty 2004). Its strong 
presence has often resulted in imbalances between public and private health care, 












in South Africa (McIntyre and Doherty 2004). Its great capacity could also be seen 
as an opportunity, as it could be a major source for resources, for example in terms 
of personnel and expertise, to be used for the public ART program. Indeed, the 
Comprehensive Plan is supportive of engaging in public-private partnerships (PPP) 
to utilise the great potential of the private sector.    
 
Private not-for-profit sector 
 
The private not-for-profit sector is composed of NGOs and civil society 
organisations (CSOs), including faith based organisations (FBOs) and community-
based organisations (CBOs). This sector mobilises and leverages social forces in the 
fight against the epidemic. The capacity of these organisations is crucial in 
combating the epidemic at all levels, from informing and shaping policy through 
implementing programs to monitoring achievements. This sector has played a crucial 
role in several aspects of the HIV/AIDS response in the country, and in particular in 
developments around HIV/AIDS treatment. There is a wide range of organisations, 
which constitute a rich critical mass of social capital. The list presented below is not 
exhaustive, but aims to provide an overview of the rich variety of existing private 
not-for-profit organisations active in the HIV/AIDS field.  
 
Firstly, MSF has been a pioneer in establishing ART projects in the country. Their 
project in Khayelitsha is often mentioned as a „best case‟ example worldwide, 
showing that it is possible to provide ART in low-resource settings (WHO 2003b; 
Kasper et al. 2003).  
 
Secondly, activist organisations, such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), 
which uses a human rights approach to promote the right to access ARVs and puts 
pressure on government to deliver ART
44
. Thirdly, other umbrella organisations and 
forums, such as JCSMF, undertake regular monitoring of the rollout of the treatment 
program. Fourthly, research institutes, such as IDASA or HST, are crucial in 
analysing and monitoring government‟s HIV/AIDS expenditure and outcomes. 
Fifthly, PLWHA associations could be a significant lobby group given the high 
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number of people infected and affected by the epidemic. Finally, FBOs and 
community based organisations have mobilised around a wide range of issues to 
alleviate the impact of the epidemic, such as delivering home-based care to people 
infected and affected by the disease. 
 
The interaction of these organisations with government is diverse and dynamic. 
Overall, it seems that NGOs have a somewhat controversial relationship with 
national government, but a closer interaction and more cooperative relationship with 
provincial and local government, although experiences vary across the territory.  
 
Beneficiaries   
 
In this thesis, the term „beneficiaries‟ refers exclusively to HIV-infected individuals 
who are in need of ART. Around 764,000 people were in need of ART in 2006, out 
of which only 32.6% were receiving it (Dorrington et al. 2006). 
 
Nevertheless, the scope of the beneficiaries group reaches beyond the infected 
individuals, as treatment benefits directly the families of the people on treatment, 
and the wider community. Moreover, the group of beneficiaries could also be 
understood as the whole country, given the demonstrated impact of the epidemic at 
all levels of the society, the economy and political affairs (Barnett and Whiteside 
2002; Haacker 2004; Marais 2005). For example, private companies directly benefit 
from providing ART to their employees by extending their lives and boosting their 
productivity. 
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
South Africa has the largest population infected with HIV in the world. 
Nevertheless, it was only in 2003 that a government plan for treating the AIDS sick 
population with ART was first announced. The large and growing population in need 
of ART poses one of the major challenges for the program‟s success. The 
Comprehensive Plan is the benchmark in the promotion of HIV/AIDS treatment 











enrolled on ART has increased significantly, though is still well below the target. 
The progress in its implementation could be interpreted as slow and unsuccessful 
when compared to the original targets, or as fast and substantial, taking into account 
achievements made in the short time of implementation.  
 
A wide range of actors is involved in the financing and implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan, including the DoH and Treasury, and other stakeholders 
outside government, such as the private for-profit and private not-for-profit sectors, 
and beneficiaries. The complex interaction among these actors hints at the 
importance of effective mechanisms for communication and coordination. 
 
In relation to funding mechanisms, conditional grants are the pillar supporting the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, enabling a direct transfer of funding and 
ensuring its allocation to HIV/AIDS. Equitable shares, conversely, seem more 
suitable for funding overall capacity building in the system and for supporting 
activities not covered by the conditional grants. The next chapter investigates the 
growth and spending patterns of both mechanisms, as an indication of the capacity of 












CHAPTER 5 HIV/AIDS BUDGETS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
South African PDoHs have multiplied their HIV/AIDS expenditure significantly 
since 2000/01. Growth rates of HIV/AIDS funding are far above those of overall 
health funding; during the period 2000/01-2008/09, public health expenditure grew 
at an average of 4% in real terms, while provincial public HIV/AIDS expenditure 
within the health sector grew at an average of 50% in real terms. HIV/AIDS is in 
fact one of the health sub-programs with the highest growth, and driving most of the 
growth in the overall health budget (NT 2004a). As explained in the previous 
chapter, expansion of HIV/AIDS provincial budgets is driven by both conditional 
grants and allocations from the equitable share formula, though the contribution of 
ring-fenced funding is significantly larger than from own provincial allocations. 
 
Nevertheless, actual spending has lagged behind budget allocations. Low spending 
rates of HIV/AIDS conditional grants emerged as a crucial challenge, particularly in 
the initial years of the conditional HIV/AIDS grant. Since then, spending has 
improved considerably, due to several factors, including among others the relaxation 
of reporting requirements on conditional grants. With regard to discretionary 
funding, it is difficult to track spending performance due to its „discretionary‟ nature 
and less strict reporting conditions. Yet, there are signs of spending deficiencies of 
discretionary funding too.  
 
This chapter examines the financing and spending patterns of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure for both conditional grants and equitable share allocations. It also 
provides insights into the capacity challenges of spending such increased funding, 
and it compares the strengths and weaknesses of both funding mechanisms. Finally, 
the chapter provides insights into the strengthening of the health system, and the 
efficiency, equity and sustainability of HIV/AIDS funding growth from a budget 
perspective. Except when stated otherwise, all expenditure data presented in this 












calculated with 2006/07 as base year. See Appendix 15 for the inflation rates and 
deflators used in the calculations of real values. 
 
As a methodological note, as noted in Chapter 2, calculations in this chapter are 
based on the budget data available in May 2006. Calculations have thus not been 
updated with more recent data in order to truly reflect the information available at 
the time of the fieldwork. The budget data are: audited financial statements for years 
2000/01-2004/05 (thus actual expenditure); pre-audited financial statements for 
2005/06; current allocations for 2006/07; and projected budgets for 2007/08 and 
2008/09. Chapter 10 updates the analysis with data available in January 2009.  
 
As explained in Chapter 2, there may be a systematic negative bias reducing the 
increases in HIV/AIDS budgets reflected in this chapter. This is due to the use of 
different budgetary sources, i.e. actual expenditure, current allocations and projected 
budgets, in two ways. Firstly, for the years 2000/01-2004/05, when audited actual 
expenditure is used, it is argued that there was underspending of budgets; this means 
that the initially budgeted amounts were higher than shown by the actual figures. 
Secondly, the projected figures used for 2007/08-2008/09 are claimed to be mere 
increments over the baseline, and lower to what the budgets would be (see later in 
the chapter). This bias could be eliminated as budgeted figures are revised with 
actual expenditure. 
 
5.2  Increases in HIV/AIDS expenditure in PDoHs  
 
Provincial public HIV/AIDS expenditure
45
 has been increasing continuously since 
2000/01, when the HIV/AIDS conditional grant mechanism was launched. Increases 
in PDoHs are led by both the HIV/AIDS conditional grants and allocations made 
from the equitable share mechanism. Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 give an overview of 
the evolution of funding for both mechanisms for the period 2000/01-2008/09. The 
aggregated provincial HIV/AIDS budget increased from about 100 million in 
2000/01 to 1,200 million four years later, and it is expected to rise to 2,600 million 
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in 2008/09. Overall, there has been a real increase of about R2.5 billion over the 
period, which means that in 2008/09 the budget is 25 times larger than in 2000/01.  
 




















Total HIV/AIDS provincial funding Conditional grant Discretionary funding
 
a 
Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author‟s calculations from provincial HIV/AIDS budgets (NT 2006a-2006i), NT (2002b) for 
2001/02 and NT (2004a and 2006l) for 2000/01; inflation from Statistics South Africa (SSA) (2008a) 
and NT (2008a) 
 




 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
HIV/AIDS 
expenditure, 
real (R million) 
99 132 405 707 1,248 1,754 2,441 2,548 2,617 
Real growth 
rate (%) 
 33.4 206.1 74.5 76.4 40.6 39.2 4.4 2.7 
a 
Real terms in 2006/07 prices.  
Source: Author‟s calculations from provincial HIV/AIDS budgets (NT 2006a-2006i), NT (2002b) for 













As Figure 5.1 and Table 5.1 illustrate, HIV/AIDS expenditure in the provincial 
budgets has risen sharply during this period. The average annual growth rates 
between 2000/01 and 2008/09 have been 50.5% in real terms and 60.6% in nominal 
terms (see Appendix 16 for nominal figures). The real growth rate in expenditure in 
2002/03 was around 200%, but it has declined over time. Over the last two years, 
real expenditure has grown by less than 5% on an annual basis (see Appendix 16), 
probably because the 2006/07-2008/09 figures are expenditure projections in the 
MTEF framework, which are often revised upward in actual budgets for the 
particular years.  
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, conditional grants are the major driver of this growth. 
Overall, conditional grants contributed around two thirds of total funding. Only in 
2000/01 did the share of discretionary funding exceed the share of earmarked 
funding, which indicates that provinces were already allocating funding for 
HIV/AIDS before the conditional grant mechanism was created. In 2001/02, the 
increase in conditional grants was parallel to a decrease in equitable shares. 
Disaggregated growth rates for the two financial mechanisms, presented later in the 
chapter, show that in 2001/02 HIV/AIDS conditional grant funding rose by 218%, 
while discretionary funding decreased by 21%. This trend suggests that in that year 
provinces were using their earmarked allocations to replace their own spending. 
Appendix 17 presents the proportional contribution of conditional grants and 
equitable shares in total HIV/AIDS funding.  
 
The next sections discuss the growth of HIV/AIDS conditional grants, of 
discretionary funding, in the Western Cape and in the Free State, as well as 
discussing capacity constraints in dealing with these funding increases.  
 
A  Increases in HIV/AIDS conditional grants in PDoHs 
 
HIV/AIDS conditional grants have grown continuously since their inception, in both 
nominal and real terms, as summarised in Table 5.2 (real figures) and Appendix 16 
(nominal figures). The HIV/AIDS conditional grant for health was created in 












years, and to over R1 billion in 2005/06 (in nominal terms). By the end of 2008/09, 
the grant exceeded R1.7 billion (nominal terms). These figures reflect very high 
investments in the grant, resulting in a total real increase by 2008/09 of about R1.5 
billion in conditional HIV/AIDS expenditure over 2000/01.  
 




 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Conditional 
grant, real (R 
million) 
25 74 268 385 850 1,184 1,567 1,534 1,534 
Growth rate, 
real (%) 
 192.8 263.7 43.4 121.0 39.2 32.4 -2.1 0.0 
a 
Real terms in 2006/07 prices  
Source: Author‟s calculations of growth rates and real terms from NT (2002b, 2004a, 2006k); 
inflation from SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a) 
 
The average annual real growth rate over the period 2000/01-2008/09 was 67.1%, 
and 99.2% in nominal terms (see Appendix 16). As shown in Table 5.2, growth was 
especially high at the beginning, when it reached rates of 192.8% in 2001/02 and 
263.7% in 2002/03. These rates reflect the big push given to HIV/AIDS funding 
with the introduction of the conditional grant in 2000/01. There was another 
substantial increase in 2004/05, which reflects the generous funding allocations for 
the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan (NT 2004a).  
 
In the financial year 2003/04, the conditional grant grew by 43.4%, a significantly 
smaller increase than in previous and following years. This may be due to the 
accumulation of unspent funding between 2000/01 and 2001/02, which may have led 
to (a) the need to spend the rollovers from previous years; and, as a result, (b) lower 
allocations to the grant by National Treasury and/or NDoH for that year. Yet, this 
increase in the grant is still substantial
46
. It is important to note that conditional grant 
figures up to 2004/05 are audited financial statements, which reflect final 
                                                 
46
 This increment was intended to implement additional program priorities: post exposure prophylaxis 













expenditure, and which may thus be lower than the initially budgeted and/or 
allocated amounts due to underspending.  
 
Since 2005/06, although ring-fenced funding continued to rise, it has done so at 
lower rates, below 40% in real terms in both 2005/06 and 2006/07. Growth rates 
decreased further at the end of the period, turning into a real decline by 2007/08. 
This decline in 2007/08 and 2008/09 is less relevant, as it reflects mere increments 
over the MTEF, around 5% in nominal terms (see Appendix 16). Budget revisions 
normally add increments over the MTEF baselines, and thus it is expected that these 
figures would be higher with the updates of the budget. However, the concern 
remains of how much the conditional grant would actually increase, as previous 
growth rates have been decreasing.  
 
When comparing financial allocations over time, it is important to bear in mind the 
change in activities covered by the grant (Hickey et al. 2004). In particular, the 
introduction of the treatment component introduced by the Comprehensive Plan 
launched in November 2003 was a turning point in the response to the epidemic. 
Earmarked funding had to increase considerably to respond to the demands of the 
new treatment component, among others. This explains the high growth rate of the 
grant in 2004/05 (121% in real terms). 
 
In summary, the HIV/AIDS conditional funding injected into PDoHs has grown 
markedly since its inception in 2000/01. Overall, three periods of growth could be 
identified: first, initial sharp increases up to 2002/03; second, intense but steady 
growth between 2003/04 and 2006/07; and finally, nominal increases around the 
inflation level for the last two years, which reflect only MTEF allocations rather than 
actual expenditure.  
 
B  Increases in discretionary funding for HIV/AIDS in PDoHs 
 
PDoHs have increased their HIV/AIDS allocations from their own budgets 
throughout the period 2000/01-2008/09, as reported in Table 5.3. The only exception 
is in the year 2001/02, when discretionary funding decreased by as much as 20.7%. 












2001/02 allocations were R43 million, this more than doubled the next year, 
reaching more than R350 million in 2004/05, and over 1.2 billion by the end of the 
period. Discretionary allocations increased by more than R1 billion from 2001/02 
until 2008/09 (in real terms), as shown in Table 5.3. For allocations in nominal 
terms, see Appendix 16. 
 




 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Discretionary 
expenditure, 
real (R million) 




-20.7 133.7 135.1 23.2 43.5 53.3 16.0 6.8 
a
 Calculated by deducing conditional grants expenditure from total HIV/AIDS expenditure of 
provincial budget statements. Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author‟s calculations from NT (2002b, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a-2006i, 2006k, 2006l); inflation 
from SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a) 
 
The average annual growth rate during the period was 39.8%, which is as much as 
49.2% in nominal terms (see Appendix 16). This is a very significant growth rate. As 
explained earlier in the chapter, the negative rate in 2001/02 may be a consequence 
of the high increase in conditional grants that year, and suggests that provinces 
started to use earmarked funding for items previously funded through equitable 
shares. Very high growth rates are recorded in 2002/03 and 2003/04 (in real terms, 
133.7% and 135.1% respectively), which may reflect the introduction of the new 
additions to the equitable share formula targeted for HIV/AIDS. This funding 
mechanism is examined later in this section.  
 
There was a notable decrease in the growth rates in 2004/05. Again, this may be 
attributed to the significant increase in the HIV/AIDS conditional grant of that year 
for the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. In 2005/06 and 2006/07, rates 













Nevertheless, allocations for HIV/AIDS from the equitable share mechanism are 
below those of conditional grants during most of the period. Equally, the real 
average annual growth rate for the period (39.8%) is below that of the conditional 
grant (67.1%).  
 
The comparison of other estimates of discretionary expenditure by other studies 
confirms the same positive trend of discretionary allocations over time (see 
Appendix 18 for a comparison of estimates). Although estimates vary slightly, the 
differences are relatively small and steady throughout the period, suggesting 
consistency with the results from different estimations. Differences may be due to 
different expenditure estimates available at the time of the study, whether past 
audited or revised, or future MTEF estimates, and/or calculation methods. The 
difficulty and differences in tracking HIV/AIDS discretionary funding, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, suggest that the figures need to be treated with caution.  
 
Targeted increases to the equitable share  
 
Very relevant for this period are the additions of HIV/AIDS funding to the equitable 
share transfers, as explained in Chapter 4. These increases were first conceived in 
the 2002/03 budget and were later revised in budget 2003/04, which are presented in 
Table 5.4 below. Appendix 19 compares 2002 and 2003 budgets.  
 
Table 5.4: Targeted allocations for HIV/AIDS added to the equitable share 
transfers in 2003/04 budget, 2002/03-2007/08 
R million 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 
Targeted allocations 0 500 1,000 1,500 1,590 1,670 




Table 5.4 shows that the budgeted allocations are substantial, exceeding R1,600 
million in 2007/08. These allocations even exceed the HIV/AIDS conditional grant 
allocations to PDoHs for those years. However, as it will be discussed later, the 
actual spending of this funding is a different matter.  
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 Figures for 2002/03-2004/05 are also in NT (2002a). However, the rest of the figures could not be 
found in any of the National Treasury budget documents for 2002 or 2003 available in the National 













Although Table 5.4 shows no allocations in the year 2002/03, budget 2002 estimated 
that R400 million were allocated through this mechanism in that year (see Appendix 
19). In addition, there are reasons to suspect that some extra allocations took place in 
2002/03. PDoHs spent around R107 million on HIV/AIDS from their own budget 
that year. This is a substantial amount, and it would indicate that PDoHs made a 
great financial effort, if budget 2003 indeed correctly reflects that there were no 
extra increases for HIV/AIDS that year. Moreover, the Adjusted Estimates of 
National Expenditure (NT 2003d) records that R90 million were allocated to 
HIV/AIDS for the national ART program, conditional on the approval of the 
Comprehensive Plan; this was classified under unforeseeable and unavoidable 
expenditure. This suggests that some extra allocations were transferred to provinces 
in one way or another. 
 
In summary, there were significant increases in discretionary HIV/AIDS funding 
throughout the period of 2000/01-2008/09. The highest annual growth rates in 
discretionary funding were recorded in the early years of the period, with growth in 
discretionary funding becoming more moderate since 2004/05. Targeted HIV/AIDS 
allocations over the equitable share are also substantial for the period 2003/04-
2007/08, or even earlier.  
 
C  HIV/AIDS financing increases in the Western Cape and the Free State 
DoHs 
 
The HIV/AIDS expenditure in the DoHs of the Western Cape and the Free State has 
grown substantially, though with different patterns and compositions. Figure 5.2 
below compares the evolution of overall HIV/AIDS expenditure in the PDoHs of 
both provinces for 2003/04-2008/0948. The detailed expenditures and growth rates 
for both provinces, disaggregated by equitable share and conditional grants is 
reported in Appendix 20. 
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WCDoH total HIV/AIDS funding
FSDoH total HIV/AIDS funding   
a
 Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author based on NT (2002b, 2003b, 2005c, 2006b, 2006i, 2006k); Ndlovu and Daswa 
(2006); inflation from SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a) 
 
The HIV/AIDS expenditure of both provinces has grown substantially, though at 
different speeds. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, total HIV/AIDS funding in the 
WCDoH exceeded that of the Free State until 2006/07; since then, the relationship 
has been inverted, though differences are small. During 2003/04-2008/09, WCDoH 
HIV/AIDS funding grew by R104 million, slightly below the R116 million increase 
for the Free State. For the same period, the average annual growth rate of the Free 
State (32%) is slightly above that of South Africa (30%) and above that of the 
Western Cape (27%). Both provinces showed higher annual growth rates at the 
beginning; this decreased over time, even reaching negative numbers in the last two 
years. Unfortunately, there is no growth data from 2000/01-2003/04, which would 




It is interesting to comment also on the financing relative to the burden of the 
disease. Table 5.5 below shows that, at national level, R443 was spent per each HIV 
infection in 2006/07. In the same year, the Western Cape spent more (R565) and the 
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 Although from 2000/01-2003/04 there is data on conditional grants, information on the equitable 












Free State less (R394) than the national average. The spending per AIDS sick 
population shows similar patterns, though the spending of the Western Cape is far 
higher, even twice as much as the national average. Thus, relative to the burden of 
the disease, the Western Cape spends more resources on HIV/AIDS than the Free 
State, and more than the national average. 
 
Table 5.5: Western Cape and Free State HIV/AIDS expenditure relative to the 
burden of the epidemic 
 Western Cape Free State National 
HIV infections, 2006  267289 387770 5511751 
AIDS sick population 
(mid 2006) 
19736 46249 633931 
HIV/AIDS funding, real 







Ratio expenditure per 
HIV infections (R) 
565 394 443 
Ratio expenditure per 
AIDS sick population (R) 
7649 3302 3851 
Source: Author based on ASSA (2005b) for HIV infections and HIV/AIDS prevalence; expenditure 
figures from NT (2006b, 2006,); inflation from SSA (2008a) 
 
With regard to the relative contributions of the two mechanisms, the Western Cape 
relies far more on its own provincial funding than the Free State does, as shown in 







































Total HIV/AIDS provincial funding (real)
Conditional grant (real)
Discretional funding (real)




























 Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author based on NT (2002b, 2003b, 2005c, 2006b, 2006i, 2006k); Ndlovu and Daswa (2006); inflation from SSA (2008a) and NT 
(2008a) 




















The contribution of ring-fenced funding to total HIV/AIDS funding in the Free State 
is very high, around 90% for the entire period. That of the Western Cape is 
significantly lower, around 60% until 2005/06, although it has also increased over 
time, up to nearly 80% since 2006/07, and it is closer to the average national 
contribution, which is between 50% and 70% between 2003/04-2008/09 (see 
Appendix 21 for the relative contribution of both mechanisms in the WCDoH, the 
FSDoH and at national level). This suggests a higher reliance on conditional grants 
in the Free State, and a greater commitment in the Western Cape to devoting 
additional funds from the province‟s own resources to the epidemic, maybe because 
the Western Cape is a wealthier province.  
 
In relation to the evolution of earmarked funding, it is clear from Figure 5.5 that it 
has grown in similar ways for both provinces.  
 
























WCDoH conditional HIV/AIDS funding
FSDoH conditional HIV/AIDS funding
 
a
 Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author based on NT (2002b, 2003b, 2005c, 2006b, 2006i, 2006k); Ndlovu and Daswa 
(2006); inflation from SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a)  
 
Earmarked funding in the Free State is superior to that in the Western Cape 












provinces has increased with time. This suggests that the Free State has been 
receiving more economic support from the NDoH for HIV/AIDS policies than the 
Western Cape. In terms of growth rates, the trends of both provinces are similar and 
resemble the national one. The average annual growth rate for 2001/02-2008/09 of 
the Western Cape (52.5%) is slightly below the national average (54.3%), and even 
smaller than that of the Free State (55.1%). These results confirm the stronger 
weight of the conditional grant in the Free State in funding HIV/AIDS, and lower 
weight in the Western Cape, as compared to the national average. 
 
The biggest differences between the two provinces can be found, however, in respect 
of the contribution from own funding. Figure 5.6 below shows the contribution of 
discretionary funding in both provinces for the period 2003/04-2008/09. Provincial 
disaggregated data for discretionary funding is not available for the years 2001/02 
and 2002/03. 
 
Figure 5.6: Real HIV/AIDS discretionary financing in the WCDoH and the 
























WCDoH discretionary HIV/AIDS funding
FSDoH discretionary HIV/AIDS funding
 
a
 Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author based on NT (2002b, 2003b, 2005c, 2006b, 2006i, 2006k); Ndlovu and Daswa 
(2006); inflation from SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a)  
 
As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the Western Cape spends substantially more from its 
own resources on HIV/AIDS than the Free State, reaching as much as R46 million in 












from its own budgets to HIV/AIDS
50
. In fact, the Free State‟s own financial 
contribution to HIV/AIDS has been minimal, only about 10% to total provincial 
HIV/AIDS expenditure, which is also much lower than the national average. Yet, the 
Free State‟s discretionary funding does seem to have increased from 2005/06. This 
upward trend contrasts with the evolution of discretionary spending in the Western 
Cape, which declined in 2006/07 and has stabilised since. This suggests that the 
proportional contribution of discretionary funding may be changing in both 
provinces, perhaps due to changes in the conditional grant and the capacity to spend 
earmarked funding.  
 
Thus, the overall picture of high and sustained growth of HIV/AIDS financing in the 
Western Cape and Free State DoHs mirrors the national evolution in HIV/AIDS 
expenditures. Clear differences emerge between the mechanisms used in financing 
HIV/AIDS in each province. Notably, the Free State relies mainly on conditional 
grants, whereas the Western Cape contributes much more from its own funding. 
Unfortunately, the lack of provincial discretionary funding data for the years 
2001/02 and 2002/03 limits the full understanding of its evolution over time.  
 
5.3  Spending performance of HIV/AIDS expenditure in PDoHs 
 
The relative large magnitude and fast growth of HIV/AIDS expenditure poses a 
major challenge to spending funds (NT 2003b). It may be more difficult to spend all 
the money or to spend it effectively when allocations have increased rapidly. Thus, 
this section looks at underspending and overspending patterns over the period 
2000/01-2008/09. This examination, however, faces serious data limitations. As 
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 In 2005/06, the own contribution of the FSDoH to HIV/AIDS is noted as 0, but this is due to 
limitations of the calculation method. The Free State provincial budget (NT 2006b) notes that 
provincial HIV/AIDS payments in that year are R86,394,000; however, this figure is smaller than 
earmarked funding allocated for that year, R100,874,000. This generates a negative number of 
discretionary funding for this year (minus R14,480,000). As provinces‟ own budgets cannot show 
underspending, the most likely interpretation is that it is the result of underspending on the 
conditional grant, which leads to low levels of total payments. In fact, the Free State provincial 
budget 2007/08 (NT 2007a) shows that the audited allocation for that year is R108,969,000. 
Calculating the discretionary funding from this new estimate would result in R8 million allocated by 
the Free State‟s own provincial funding, which is significantly higher than the figure estimated in the 
previous year. This situation provides another example of the limitation of the estimates of 













recognised by the Fiscal and Financial Commission (FFC), “an overall assessment of 
the actual allocated budget for HIV/AIDS is difficult due to conflicting sets of 
information in various official data sets” (FFC 2003, p.61) Nevertheless, this section 
reviews and evaluates the available information, first of conditional grants, then in 
relation to discretionary funding, and finally in the two provinces studied. However, 
the resulting figures and their meaning should be interpreted with caution.  
 
A  Spending of conditional grants 
 
The spending of HIV/AIDS conditional grants by PDoHs in South Africa has lagged 
behind the allocations. Provinces had more difficulties in spending conditional 
grants in the earlier years. During the first year, spending was very poor, as the 
system had to adapt to the new funding mechanism, and to set up the necessary 
structures and processes (Hickey et al. 2003 and 2004). Reasons given for this 
underspending thus include: slow disbursement of the funds to provinces; set-up of 
management structures; approval of business plans; and bureaucratic requirements 
inherent in all conditional grants (Hickey et al. 2003). In addition, it is argued that 
program regulations attached to the conditional grant funds were particularly 
restrictive in the early years, thus creating bureaucratic hurdles that affected the 
transfer and spending of funds (NT 2003a; Hickey et al. 2003). Table 5.6 
summarises the spending patterns of the HIV/AIDS conditional grant from 2000/01 
to 2003/04.  
 




 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 
Allocated (R thousand)  16,819 54,398 210,209 334,000 
Spent (R thousand) 10,000 45,095 172,879 320,640 
Percentage spent (%) 59.5 82.9 82.2 96 
a 
It excludes expenditure on rollover funds from previous years. 
Source: Hickey et al. (2004, p.175) for figures 2000/01-2002/03; DoH (2004d in Ndlovu 2005c) and 
(NT 2003a) for figures 2003/04  
 
Table 5.6 shows that provinces have made enormous strides in spending a larger 












in 2001/02. This rate was nearly maintained in 2002/03, even with an almost four-
fold increase in the grant during this period, and by 2003/04, it had increased to 
96%. It is important to appreciate the substantial improvements in spending capacity 
that provinces must make in order to improve spending records in a context of 
continuous sharp increases of funding. Moreover, the figures in Table 5.5 do not 
account for the spending of rollovers from previous years‟ budgets. When funds 
from conditional grants are not fully spent, unspent funds may be rolled over to the 
next year, thus increasing the amount of funds to spend. For example, National 
Treasury notes that R10.567 million of HIV/AIDS transfers to NGOs were rolled 
over from 2002/03 to 2003/04 (NT 2003d). Thus, considering the rollovers, the 
improvements in spending are even higher, though insufficient. 
 
It is worth noting that underspending on the HIV/AIDS ring-fenced grants to the 
education and social sectors initially exceeded underspending on the conditional 
grant to the health sector (Hickey et al. 2004), although it also improved 
considerably over time (see Appendix 22 for the spending of the three HIV/AIDS 
conditional grants). In particular, the conditional grant to the DSD had the highest 
underspending, with a spending record as low as 35.6% in 2000/01. It is argued that 
the cancellation of this grant in 2005 is an example of how National Treasury takes 
into account provincial spending records in determining future funding (Hickey et al. 
2003). This suggests that the initial high underspending of the HIV/AIDS 
conditional grant to DoHs during the early years may have been the reason why the 
new system was introduced for increasing HIV/AIDS expenditure through the 
targeted increases over the equitable share mechanism.   
 
National Treasury recognised that underspending was a problem in some PDoHs in 
the early years of the period being studied, and consequently suggested 
implementing interventions to simplify the procedures of conditional grants in 
2002/03 (NT 2003a). Provincial HIV/AIDS coordinators acknowledged that this 
relaxation of the conditional grant requirements improved spending significantly 
(Hickey et al. 2004). In addition, National Treasury recommended that the DoH was 













Improvements in spending of earmarked HIV/AIDS funding are seen as a normal 
consequence as programs mature (NT 2004a). It is argued that part of the 
improvement over the early years is partly due to surmounting the substantial 
administrative and financial management challenges experienced in the first years of 
implementing a large national program. The NDoH estimated that in 2003/04 
spending stepped up to 96% (DoH 2004d in Ndlovu 2005c). 
 
In recent years, the proportion of funds spent more closely matches the funds 
allocated. However, a closer examination of the data reveals some inconsistencies, 
which suggests that there may be hidden and underestimated underspending, such as 
overspending on conditional grants. For example, R24 million
51
 were overspent from 
the conditional grant in the year 2004/05 (NT 2006l), and R9,028 million was 
overspent in 2005/06 (Ndlovu and Daswa 2006a). However, this overspending has 
been interpreted as an error in budgetary reporting, as there should be no 
overspending of ring-fenced funding but rather higher spending of own provincial 
funding.  
 
Budgetary practices that may lead to overspending on conditional grants may be 
(Ndlovu 2005c): (a) reporting spending of rollovers of previous years against funds 
received exclusively in the current year; (b) reporting spending of conditional grants 
payments, which are not part of the earmarked funding but of own provincial 
funding; and (c) budgeting inaccuracies due to under-reporting and time-lags. 
 
The problem with these errors in budgetary practices, which inflate spending of 
conditional grants, is that they may hide possible underspending of conditional 
grants. For example, in a hypothetical case where provinces underspent on the 
conditional grant, this underspending may have been hidden by the computation of 
higher spending of discretionary funding, mistakenly reported as conditional grant 
spending. Consequently, the overspending of conditional grants in years 2004/05 and 
2005/06 suggests that the spending of the conditional grant was being overestimated 
in those years due to budgetary errors. Therefore, the overspending of conditional 
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grant figures as an indicator of the capacity to spend ring-fenced funding should be 
regarded with caution. 
  
Another approach to reveal spending records would be to disaggregate them by 
provincial distribution. Aggregated national data may in fact hide underspending of 
particular provinces. This is particularly important in the case of South Africa, given 
the very different health system capacities across provinces. In this regard, 
information about the Western Cape and the Free State is provided elsewhere in this 
section. Equally, it would be very valuable to have spending data disaggregated by 
area of intervention, in particular in relation to the ART component of the 
Comprehensive Plan. This may hide significant differences in spending 
performance, given the clearly defined areas of expenditure of the conditional grant. 
This information would be especially crucial in monitoring the HIV/AIDS treatment 
component of the Comprehensive Plan. Unfortunately, data limitations at the 
national level preclude such analysis.  
 
B Spending of discretionary expenditure 
 
As explained elsewhere, discretionary expenditure is identified as funds spent on 
HIV/AIDS related activities, which are not paid for from conditional grants. 
Consequently, this calculation equates discretionary spending with discretionary 
expenditure. In other words, all provincial funds allocated to HIV/AIDS are actually 
spent as such. Therefore, it is not possible to have unspent discretionary allocations 
in budgetary terms. Further, unlike conditional grants, provincial discretionary 
budgets do not have rollovers; funding can be shifted from one area to another, and 
if not spent, it becomes part of the next year‟s overall budget. 
 
Yet, underspending of equitable shares can be an issue. The fact that budgetary 
reporting does not reflect underspending of equitable shares does not imply that this 
mechanism is free from underspending problems. For example, it may be that a 
province intends to spend an amount of its own funding on HIV/AIDS-related 
activities, but that during the course of the year it fails to do so, or that funding is 
shifted to other priorities. Although these cases would not be accounted for as 












be considered as a failure to spend. Consequently, the insufficiency of budgets to 
identify underspending of discretionary funding necessitates further work tracking 
the spending of equitable share allocations towards HIV/AIDS. 
 
Spending of HIV/AIDS targeted increments over the equitable share 
mechanism 
 
A major concern is the extent to which the targeted increments on the equitable share 
made for HIV/AIDS trickle down to the PDoHs, and are actually spent on 
HIV/AIDS-related activities, either directly or indirectly. The comparison of the top-
sliced HIV/AIDS allocations to equitable share with the discretionary HIV/AIDS 
funds spent reveals a great mismatch, as reflected in Table 5.7. The discretionary 
spending of PDoHs is significantly inferior to the HIV/AIDS allocations sent to the 
provinces through the equitable share mechanism.  
 
Table 5.7: Comparison of provincial discretionary HIV/AIDS expenditure and 
targeted allocations for HIV/AIDS added to equitable shares, 
nominal terms, 2002/03-2007/08 
 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 
Discretionary spending 
PDoH (R million) 
107 280 366 547 874 1,088 
Additions on equitable 
share (R million) 
0 500 1,000 1,500 1,590 1,670 
Source: Author‟s calculations from NT (2002b, 2004a, 2005a, 2006a-2006i, 2006k, 2006l) for 
discretionary allocations, and NT (2002a) and Mark Blecher (National Treasury, personal 
correspondence April 2008) for additions on the equitable share mechanism 
 
As shown in Table 5.7, actual discretionary allocations have been significantly 
smaller than the targeted additions between 2003/04-2008/09. This mismatch could 
be caused by several reasons: (a) the funding does not reach the PDoH, because it 
goes to HIV/AIDS interventions by other provincial departments, such as DoE or 
DSD; (b) PDoHs spend these funds on interventions not journalised as HIV/AIDS 
because they deal with the overall health system, benefiting HIV/AIDS interventions 
indirectly; or (c) the funding is spent on other areas not related to HIV/AIDS, 













Given that the targeted increments were mandated to strengthen program 
management and to prepare the ground for the HIV/AIDS treatment and care 
response (NT 2003b), it is expected that most of this funding, if not all, would go to 
the PDoHs. Thus, the first reason does not seem to justify the mismatches. More 
relevant seem to be the other two explanations.  
 
A study by IDASA notes that provinces like KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the 
Eastern Cape, which set aside special funds for HIV/AIDS from these targeted 
increments, do partly reflect such allocations in their official budgets (Hickey and 
Ndlovu 2005). However, for other provinces, where these increments are not 
reflected in the budgets, it is difficult to know whether they were spent on 
HIV/AIDS-related activities or not. The effectiveness of this mechanism is 
undermined by the lack of a clear legal way of enforcing these allocations. Hence, it 
is not possible to assess spending performance on even the targeted HIV/AIDS 
increments on the equitable share mechanism.  
 
In fact, the FFC recognises that these targeted increments, because they are not ring-
fenced, may not be used to cover direct HIV/AIDS costs (FFC 2003). This concern 
is supported by FFC investigations in key provinces, which did not find any 
indication that this funding was employed directly in HIV/AIDS interventions (FFC 
2003). Consequently, the FFC recommended the revision of these increases to 
ascertain their efficacy (FFC 2003). A review of subsequent FFC submissions did 
not, however, provide any further reference to proposed changes to this HIV/AIDS 
funding mechanism, but only to conditional grants.  
  
Unfortunately, the disaggregation of provincial budgets as reported to National 
Treasury is not sufficient to identify the targeted increments for HIV/AIDS added to 
the equitable share allocations across provinces (Hickey and Ndlovu 2005), and the 
information of how much of the targeted increments each province had spent on 













C  Spending of HIV/AIDS budgets in Western Cape and Free State DoHs 
 
This section discusses the spending patterns of HIV/AIDS funding in the two 
provinces studied. It is based mainly on provincial documentation from PDoHs and 
Treasuries compiled during the fieldwork visits. Table 5.8 below presents the 
spending of the total HIV/AIDS funding in PDoHs in the two provinces, as reported 
by their DoHs. 
 
Table 5.8: Percentage of HIV/AIDS budget spent in the Western Cape and Free 
State DoHs, 2002/03-2005/06 
 2002/03  2003/4  2004/05  2005/06 
Western Cape (%) 57.5 70.3 104.8 100
a
 
Free State (%)  100 98.7 99.6 
a
 Target 
Source: WCDoH (2004; 2006d); FSDoH (2004b; 2005b) 
 
Table 5.8 reflects the spending of total provincial expenditure relating to HIV/AIDS, 
as reported in PDoHs‟ annual reports.  The spending of the WCDoH started from a 
very low rate (57.5% in 2002/03) and improved over time to exceed 100% in 
2004/05. Conversely, the spending of the FSDoH approximates 100% for the three 
years reported. These data reported by the respective PDoHs would suggest that the 
province of the Western Cape initially had problems to spend their funding, whereas 
the Free State did not have any significant difficulties in spending for the years 
reported.  
 
Nevertheless, other sources indicate that the Free State was in fact faring less well in 
terms of spending performance than indicated by the above figures. For instance, 
internal expenditure documentation gathered during fieldwork at the FSDoH 
identifies underspending trends in particular districts (FSDoH meeting December 
2006). It is noted that problems persist for particular interventions, such as home 
based care, despite the fact that these problems had been identified previously. In 
addition, Blecher and Harrison (2006) state that, in 2006/07, the Free State was the 
only province receiving health allocations below the initially budgeted amounts. 












which led to the reallocation of expenditure towards other provinces (Blecher and 
Harrison 2006).  
 
There seems to be, however, conflicting information from different sources. The 
conditional grant spending data received from the Free State Treasury during the 
field interviews does not coincide with the FSDoH data. For example, for 2004/05, 
the FSDoH points at 98.7% of underspending (FSDoH 2004b), whereas the Free 
State Treasury states that there was overspending of 131.6% (Free State Treasury 
meeting March 2007). These differences illustrate the complications of identifying 
and tracking spending, even for the earmarked funding.  
  
5.4  Comparison of conditional grants vs. equitable shares 
mechanisms  
 
This chapter has provided evidence that ring-fenced allocations are the preferred 
financial mechanism to fund HIV/AIDS within PDoHs despite the underspending 
records of conditional grants in initial years. However, the proportional contribution 
of equitable share funding has increased over time. Moreover, this chapter has 
revealed substantial differences in the use of both mechanisms between the two 
provinces studied, with the Free State using conditional grants more, and the 
Western Cape contributing significantly from its own resources. This difference 
suggests that the equilibrium in the mix of financial instruments used depends on the 
specific characteristics of each province, whether financial management capacity, 
priority of HIV/AIDS within the DoH, and others. Both mechanisms have their 
strengths and limitations in funding the government‟s response to HIV/AIDS, and 
they are thus compared in this section. 
 
Conditional grants provide more funding for the Comprehensive Plan than equitable 
shares. This is because ring-fenced allocations are believed to be better mechanisms 
for ensuring provincial spending in critical areas (NT 2002b; FFC 2006). Thus, the 
conditional grant may have been chosen for funding HIV/AIDS, given the 
importance and magnitude of the HIV/AIDS issue as a priority intervention for 












tracking expenditure and spending, even by program areas, and provides regular 
quarterly provincial reporting to NDoH. More specifically, the HIV/AIDS grant is 
categorised as a “special purpose grant”
52
 (NT 2002b, p.53), which is said to be “an 
option of last resort, considered only if a national department demonstrates that the 
equitable share mechanism has failed to get provinces to budget for specific 
priorities” (NT 2002b, p.53). Although this is the intention, another issue is whether 
earmarking funding has actually achieved the goal of prioritising provincial spending 
on HIV/AIDS. In addition, it is argued that the HIV/AIDS grant is needed for a more 
appropriate distribution of resources, as the distribution of equitable shares often 
differs from the distribution of the burden of the epidemic (NT 2003a). 
 
The downside of conditional grants is that earmarked funding is only appropriate for 
specific aspects of HIV/AIDS-related spending, such as, for example, PMTCT and 
home based care (NT 2003a). It is not appropriate for other aspects of HIV/AIDS 
interventions, which are more difficult to isolate from overall health expenditure, 
such as treatment of opportunistic infections and hospitalisation costs. For these 
aspects of HIV/AIDS funding, the equitable share mechanism is believed to be more 
effective (NT 2003a). In addition, the conditional grant does not allow for spending 
on areas outside the determined ones, thus limiting its usefulness as a funding 
mechanism to improve overall aspects of the health system that are important to the 
delivery of HIV/AIDS programs.  
 
On top of that, special purpose grants impose particularly strict conditions, and 
sanctions when they are not met (NT 2002b). The high reporting conditions require 
substantial time and investment in preparing reports, adding an extra load of tasks on 
managers and financial officers. When these requirements were relaxed, spending 
improved substantially, although underspending still remained an issue. National 
Treasury has recognised that problems of underspending and non-transfers remain in 
the conditional grant system (not just for HIV/AIDS), despite earlier reforms and 
improvements (NT 2002b). 
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The equitable share mechanism, however, covers expenditure for any need in the 
health system, and thus is more suitable for strengthening the health system, and in 
particular to fill funding gaps left by conditional grants. In fact, if all interventions of 
the DoH, which benefit HIV/AIDS services either directly or indirectly are 
considered, discretionary allocations may contribute more than conditional funding 
to overall HIV/AIDS-related expenditure. Furthermore, the use of discretionary 
funding is critical in fiscal decentralisation and the distribution of service delivery 
responsibilities as per the South African Constitution, as it allows provinces to make 
spending decisions. 
 
On the negative side, equitable share funding has less power to ensure spending on 
the desired national priorities, which may differ at local, provincial and national 
levels. Especially in traditionally disadvantaged provinces with weaker health 
services, the competing needs of other aspects of health care may leave discretionary 
funding as a less appropriate mechanism to fund and ensure spending on the 
Comprehensive Plan. This is aggravated by the less specific financial reporting 
required of discretionary funding, which makes it more difficult to monitor 
expenditure by area of intervention and actual spending, and hence to monitor 
spending performance.  
 
Overall, the FFC recommends that funding for all HIV/AIDS programs should be 
made available through earmarked funding in order to ensure sufficient focus and 
resources (FFC 2003 and 2006). At the same time, the FFC also recommends that 
the equitable share mechanism should be maintained and boosted to reinforce 
province‟s own expenditure on HIV/AIDS (FFC in NT 2003a). In addition, the FFC 
contemplates considering alternative systems, or re-modelling existing ones, such as 
a more open ended conditional grant (FFC 2003).  
 
In summary, a complex financial strategy for dealing with HIV/AIDS is needed, 
given the complex nature and impact of the epidemic. A coordinated financing 
framework is needed to implement the Comprehensive Plan. While conditional 
grants remain an important tool for driving specific earmarked programs, there 
nevertheless has been increasing support for equitable share financing. Whereas 












important to avoid artificial distinctions between HIV/AIDS and other health areas. 
The most appropriate mechanism, or combination of mechanisms, must be identified 
to facilitate and ensure program implementation.  
 
5.5  Health system strengthening, efficiency, equity and 
sustainability  
 
This section looks at the other crucial aspects of absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure as defined in the conceptual framework, from a budgetary perspective. It 
studies the extent to which the increasing HIV/AIDS financing presented earlier in 
the chapter strengthens the overall health system and enhances its equity, efficiency 
and sustainability, or the opposite. Given the limitations of data availability, this 
section is more of a reflection on the major issues to be considered rather than a 
presentation of evidence. This section highlights the particular issues confronted by 
South Africa and the limitations of a budgetary analysis in addressing them, in order 
to lay the groundwork and formulate the major questions guiding the actual 
fieldwork in this study.  
 
A Strengthening of health systems 
 
The implementation of the Comprehensive Plan impacts on the health system in 
many ways. From a budgetary perspective, it is important to contextualise increases 
of HIV/AIDS funding within the overall health budget, to provide a better estimate 
of how significant these increases are in the context of overall health expenditure. It 
is also important to examine whether there is a crowding-out effect of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure on other non-HIV/AIDS-related expenditure. This is especially 
important, as spending on the national HIV and AIDS sub-program has become 
larger than on other health programs, such as Maternal, Child and Women‟s Health 













Figure 5.7: Real increases in provincial public health expenditure per capita, 













Public health expenditure per capita Non-HIV/AIDS public health expenditure per capita
 
a
 Public expenditure is given for the financial year, but population figures are shown for the natural 
year 
Source: Author‟s calculations from NT (2002b, 2003b, 2004a, 2006a-2006i, 2006l) and Blecher and 
Harrison (2006); population from SSA; inflation from NT (2008) and SSA (2008a)  
 
Figure 5.7 depicts increases in overall health expenditure per capita, both with and 
without HIV/AIDS funding. Although differences were small at the beginning of the 
period, they increased with time. Provincial health expenditure per capita is set to 
increase in real terms at an average of 2.62% per year for the period 2000/01-
2008/09. However, when subtracting HIV/AIDS expenditure per capita from overall 
health expenditure per capita, the total growth goes down to 2.01% only, which is a 
substantial decline. When excluding HIV/AIDS-specific expenditure from provincial 
health budgets, health expenditures do continue to grow in per capita terms albeit at 
a lower rate. This would suggest the growing priority of HIV/AIDS over other health 
programs. Furthermore, the average annual growth rate of HIV/AIDS expenditure 
per capita in PDoHs during 2000/01-2008/09 was 48.5%, considerably higher than 














Looking at health expenditure nationally, the share of the health sector in total 
government expenditure has decreased from 11.5% in 2000/01 to 10.9% in 2007/08 
(McIntyre and Thiede 2008). Nonetheless, it is argued that this decline is the result 
of strong growth in social grant expenditure (Blecher and Harrison 2006; Hickey et 
al. 2003). Thus, there is not sufficient evidence to relate the decreases of the health 
portion of the national budget to a negative performance of health budgets. 
Nonetheless, the South African public spending on health is lower than the 15% 
target committed by the African Heads of State and Government in the Abuja 
Declaration and Framework for Action on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Other 
Related Infectious Diseases (OAU 2001).  
 
Having said that, the question remains of how much more or less the health budget 
could have grown without the substantial increases in HIV/AIDS budgets. On the 
one hand, it could be argued that these increases in the PDoH budgets might not 
have taken place or that they might not have been prioritised if they had not been 
driven by the HIV/AIDS crisis. On the other hand, the opposite might have been true 
too, namely that health was high on the government‟s agenda, and that larger 
allocations to PDoHs would have materialised even in the absence of increased 
HIV/AIDS funding; however, this would have benefited other non-HIV/AIDS health 
areas more directly. 
 
However, even in the hypothetical case where increases in HIV/AIDS expenditure 
have brought about corresponding decreases in non-HIVAIDS health funding, this 
situation would not necessarily imply a negative impact on health funding. For 
example, this situation could arise when HIV/AIDS-services that were previously 
included under other health budget lines, such as infrastructure upgrading or hiring 
of nutritionist personnel, were moved to the HIV/AIDS budget line. Thus, it could be 
that total expenditure has remained the same, and that only its categorisation in the 
budget has changed. 
 
Furthermore, this analysis refers exclusively to expenditure journalised as 
HIV/AIDS. Nonetheless, as it has been argued before, isolating HIV/AIDS 
expenditure from that of health expenditure is an artificial exercise. HIV/AIDS 












and the other way around. Due to this overlapping of HIV/AIDS and health 
expenditure, this budget analysis cannot offer any definitive answer on the effect that 
increases in HIV/AIDS expenditure have had on health budgets.   
 
From another perspective, a major component of health expenditure is personnel. In 
particular, increases in salaries boost expenditure substantially. In this regard, 
Blecher and Thomas (2004) examine the extent to which health inflation and 
increasing wages may constitute major drivers of increases in health expenditure. 
Their analysis shows that, parallel to an average real wage increase of around 28% 
between 1995/96 and 2003/04, there was a decrease of 19,000 employees in the 
public health sector. This suggests that increases in public health expenditure need to 
be interpreted with caution, as it may be incorrect to assume that increasing funding 
leads to the expansion of programs.  
 
Moreover, this budget analysis leaves out many other crucial aspects in which 
HIV/AIDS policies may be jeopardising other health areas, such as strategic 
prioritisation; utilisation of human resources and existing infrastructure. Thus, it is 
necessary to complement this budget analysis with an exploration of other respects 
in which HIV/AIDS funding may be strengthening and/or weakening the health 
system. 
 
B  Efficiency 
 
With regard to outputs achieved, a broad assessment of inputs against outputs 
reveals striking differences between provinces. A comparison of the Western Cape 
and the Free State reveals substantial differences in the „value for money‟ achieved 
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Table 5.9: Western Cape and Free State HIV/AIDS expenditure per patient on 
ART, 2005 and 2006  
 Western Cape Free State 
Patients on ART 2005 a 7,670 b 1,165 c 
HIV/AIDS nominal funding 
2004/05 (R thousand) 94,394 75,911 
Patients on ART 2006 d 16,234 b   3,900 c   
HIV/AIDS nominal funding 
2005/06 (R thousand) 126,754 100,874 
Expenditure per patient 2005 (R 
thousand) 12 65 
Expenditure per patient 2006 (R 
thousand) 8 26 
a 
By 31 March 2005 
b  
Patients on ART 
c  
Patients who have started ART (whether they continue on ART or not) 
d  
By 31 March 2006 
Source: Author based on FSDoH (2005a, 2005b and 2006); WCDoH (2006b, 2006d and 2006e). 
 
As shown in Table 5.9, the Free State spent nearly R65.000 in 2005 to keep one 
person on ART, whereas the Western Cape spent only one fifth of that amount.  
Between 2006 and 2005, both provinces reduced their expenditure per patient, which 
could be taken as positive signs for the cost-efficiency of the program.   
 
For the years 2004/05 and 2005/06, the Western Cape treated around 80% more 
people than the Free State, spending only 20% more. Whereas in 2006 the Western 
Cape enrolled around 1,000 new patients per month (WCDoH 2006b), the Free State 
reached only 600 per month (FSDoH 2006). These differences are reflected in terms 
of the need covered. As was shown in Chapter 4, by 2006 the Western Cape 
provided ART to nearly 64% of new AIDS cases, whereas the Free State only 
covered 12%. 
 
How do we interpret these results in terms of efficiency? The fact that the Western 
Cape is achieving substantially more than the Free State with nearly the same inputs, 
does not necessarily imply that the Free State is not using the allocated resources 












need to be taken into account. For example, in a more densely populated and 
urbanised area such as the Western Cape, health care delivery has lower marginal 
costs given the economies of scale, than in a less urbanised setting such as the Free 
State. In addition, it is important to bring into the equation the broader strategy of the 
Comprehensive Plan in terms of strengthening the health system. It is possible, for 
example, that the Free State is utilising its resources to prepare the ground and build 
the capacity in order to achieve the results in a progressive fashion.  
 
In relation to technical efficiency, some indicators seem to suggest similarities 
between certain aspects of the programs in the two provinces. For example, the 
retention in the ART care index is very similar for both provinces, around 70% in 
2006 (WCDoH 2006b and FSDoH 2006).  
 
From another angle, the classic trade-off between equity and efficiency is also 
reflected in the allocation of HIV/AIDS funding. From an efficiency perspective, 
expenditure will produce the highest outcomes when invested in better-spending 
provinces. But from an equity perspective, provinces with the lowest capacities, and 
thus the greatest difficulties to spend, should be supported in order to build their 
capacity for delivery. There are indications that the reallocation of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure from worse-performing provinces towards better performers has taken 
place in South Africa (NT 2003a). This indicates that there may be a relationship 
between low spending capacity and low funding allocations, when paradoxically it is 
precisely these provinces, which require higher investments to build their spending 
capacity. These reallocations would enhance the national financial performance of 
that year, but would conversely have a negative impact on the equitable distribution 
of resources across provinces, thus contradicting the initial goals of the 
Comprehensive Plan to improve equity and build capacity.  
 
C  Equity 
 
Equity is a major principle of the DoH‟s strategy to deliver health services, and in 
particular of the Comprehensive Plan. This section discusses two major perspectives 
relating to equity in HIV/AIDS financing: the horizontal distribution and the public-















As the majority of government spending occurs at the provincial level, inequities in 
provincial allocations relative to the burden of the epidemic are at the core of any 
equity analysis. Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 illustrate the provincial distribution of 
funding per HIV-positive population and per AIDS-sick population respectively. 
Appendix 23 shows the relevant data used in these figures. . 
 






































































Expenditure per HIV-positive population
 
a
 HIV positive population figures for the natural year 2006 
b Figures for Limpopo include only conditional grants due to data limitation in the provincial budget 
(NT 2006e)  





















































































Expenditure per AIDS-sick population
 
a
 AIDS-sick population figures for the natural year 2006 
 b
 Figures for Limpopo include only conditional grants due to data limitation in the `provincial budget 
(NT 2006e) 
Source: Author, based on ASSA (2005a); NT (2006a-2006i, 2006l, 2008a); Ndlovu and Daswa 
(2006); SAA (2006a) 
 
Public allocations to HIV/AIDS and relatively to both HIV-infected population and 
AIDS-sick population vary significantly across provinces, but with similar patterns 
for both estimates.  The Northern Cape and the Western Cape outpace the other 
provinces. In fact, the figures for the Northern Cape are remarkably high. One reason 
for the high health expenditure per capita in this province is that it has by far the 
smallest population density in the country
55
, which raises the average cost of medical 
services to reach the population (McIntyre and Thiede 2007). If the Northern Cape is 
excluded, the Western Cape is the best funded province for HIV/AIDS. Mpumalanga 
is the lowest funded province. The spending of the Western Cape province on the 
HIV-positive population is nearly double that of Mpumalanga, and more than triple 
that Mpumalanga‟s spending per AIDS-sick population, indicating that significant 
differences exist in the provincial allocation of HIV/AIDS funding.   
 
A different picture is given by the analysis of the expenditure relative to the number 
of patients on ART, as shown in Figure 5.10 below (full figures in Appendix 23).  
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 The population density of the Northern Cape was 2.3 persons per km
2
 in the 2001 census, much 












Relative to ART patients, the Northern Cape is still the province that is spending the 
most, but it is followed by KwaZulu-Natal and not by the Western Cape, as was the 
case in respect of expenditure per HIV-population and per AIDS-sick population. In 
fact, the Western Cape is one of the provinces spending the least per patient on ART, 
together with Gauteng.  
 

















 People on ART figures for the natural year 2006 
Source: author based on ASSA (2005a); NT (2006a-2006i, 2006l, 2008a); Ndlovu and Daswa (2006); 
ASSA (2005b) 
 
Another equity consideration is the difference in provinces‟ capacity to spend 
allocations. Previous studies suggest that provinces with lower capacities face the 
greatest difficulties in spending the conditional grants for HIV/AIDS, such as, for 
example, the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga (Hickey et al. 2004). In addition, while 
all provinces have experienced real increments in their budgets between 2001/02 and 
2008/09, it is Mpumalanga, the Northern Cape and Limpopo, previously 
disadvantaged provinces, which have seen the largest increases in HIV/AIDS 
expenditure in absolute terms, thus intensifying the pressure to spend budgets. In 
addition, traditionally disadvantaged provinces face difficulties in building up 
capacity to spend due to the difficulties in attracting and hiring professional 













































































important concern in relation to HIV/AIDS funding and further work is needed to 
investigate its nature and implications.  
 
Inequities between private and public health financing 
 
A major source of inequity in health financing in South Africa is the difference 
between public and private funding. Although 40% of total health care funding in 
2005 was public and 60% was private, the public sector nevertheless serves the 
majority of the population (85%), as compared to only 15% served by the private 
sector (NT 2006l; SAA 2006a). This means that, in 2005, the public health sector 
spent approximately R1,300 per person dependent on public health sector services, 
whereas the private health sector spent around R9,500 per person covered (McIntyre 
and Thiede 2007). Furthermore, private health sector expenditure has been growing 
more than public health expenditure since 2000 (NT 2006l), while the number of 
beneficiaries in the private sector has remained stable or even decreased, as 
contributions to medical aids have increased significantly (NT 2006l; McIntyre and 
Thiede 2007). As a result, the gap between the public and private health sectors has 
been widening in the last decade.   
 
These inequities between the public and private health sectors are at the core of 
policy concerns. The South African Health Charter states that the “most significant 
challenge facing the South African health system is to address the inefficient and 
inequitable distribution of resources between the public and private health sectors 
relative to the population served by each” (DoH 2004e, p.18). In addition to the 
financial inequalities, disparities between the public and private sector are even 
greater in relation to health professionals, with 75% of generalist doctors and 84% of 
pharmacists working in the private sector, and serving not more than 36% of the 
total population (McIntyre and Thiede 2007). 
 
There are reasons to believe that these inequities also will apply to HIV/AIDS 
expenditure. The private sector started to provide ART before the public sector. By 
mid-2006, around 67,600 people were receiving treatment from the private sector, 












from community treatment programs
56
 (Stevens et al. 2007). This is a significant 
number compared to the estimated 180,879 people estimated to have enrolled in the 
Comprehensive Plan by June 2006 (SACOB 2007). 
 
To summarise, this section has presented a strong basis for concerns around the 
equitable distribution of HIV/AIDS funding. Budget disaggregation reveals 
substantial differences across provinces. Moreover, people on medical aid are 
notably better funded than those who attend public health facilities. These 
differences in per capita expenditure suggest that South Africans have different 
chances of being cared for and treated for the disease, depending on the province in 
which they live. In addition, the large differences in financing and coverage between 
the public and private sectors remain a major source of inequity in health financing. 
Although there is no specific data in HIV/AIDS financing in the private sector, given 
the inequities in health expenditure, and the important role of the private sector in 
providing ART, there is a strong basis to suspect that equity in HIV/AIDS financing 
may also be eroded by the existing disparities between these two sectors.  
 
D  Sustainability  
 
The sustainability of HIV/AIDS financing is a major concern. It is not only about 
sustaining funding levels, but most importantly, about maintaining the increases in 
funding necessary in order to achieve the goals of the Comprehensive Plan. This 
needs to be achieved in a context of uncertainty about the future costs of the 
program, which makes financial planning difficult. Future costs could be expected to 
increase because more complex ARV treatments, which are more expensive, are 
becoming available. Conversely, costs could decrease because of economics of scale 
and the wider availability of ARVs. 
 
The Western Cape provides a clear example of the treatment and financial 
implications of sustaining current treatment levels. In this province, between 7,000 
and 10,000 patients died in 2005 without ever accessing ART. The WCDoH 
emphasises that “in order to keep this number constant or to reduce it, the monthly 
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number of new patients enrolled onto ART in the province needs to double over the 
next five years” (WCDoH 2006b, p.1). Thus, gradual increases in the number of 
people on ART would not suffice to enhance program achievements. Sustainability 
in this context implies that, in order to increase significantly the number of people on 
ART, substantial increases in funding likewise will have to sustain over some time.  
 
From another angle, South Africa is better off than other African countries in that 
HIV/AIDS policies are funded mainly through domestic resources. This reduces the 
uncertainty of dependency on foreign funding, which is commonly cited as the first 
obstacle for financial sustainability. However, the previous chapter argued that it is 
not clear how much donor funding contributes exactly, and that it may be more than 
what is recorded in public budgets. Hence, the element of foreign dependency cannot 
be disregarded as an issue in the sustainability debate, although such dependency is 
likely to be significantly smaller than for other African countries affected by the 
epidemic, given the size and strength of the South African economy.  
 
In addition, the Comprehensive Plan has emerged in a context where the 
sustainability of public health expenditure is not free from concerns either: it is 
argued that social expenditure expansion over the last decade has been enabled by 
prosperous economic growth (Blecher and Harrison 2006). However, it is also 
recognised that the opposite happened in the late 1990s, when public expenditure 
decreased, driven by macroeconomic and fiscal constraints (Blecher and Harrison 
2006; McIntyre and Thiede 2007). Thus, it is still a concern that a downturn in 
economic prospects may again restrict social expenditure and in particular 
HIV/AIDS financing.  
 
In addition to securing funding, sustainability applies to non-financial resources, in 
particular as these relate to the health system. It is important to question what 
adjustments are necessary in the health system in order to make the Comprehensive 
Plan consistent with overall health policies and thus sustainable. Critical issues in 
this regard are, for example, the integration of HIV/AIDS services within the DHS 














5.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented a picture of rapid and substantial increases in HIV/AIDS 
funding, for both conditional grants and discretionary funding. Real growth rates 
were very high, especially in the earlier years, and have become more moderate over 
time. Further, official budgets report failures to spend HIV/AIDS allocations. 
Consequently, the sharp increments in HIV/AIDS financing together with the 
recorded difficulties in spending these funds raise concerns over the capacity of the 
system to absorb the available funding. The chapter argues that, although spending 
capacity has improved over time, it remains problematic. However, in the light of 
shortcomings in available expenditure data and reports, the budget analysis is not an 
adequate tool for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the capacity of 
provinces to spend resources. In fact, such an analysis may actually offer a 
misleading picture when expenditure is recorded inappropriately or partially.  
 
This analysis has also compared the main two funding mechanisms of HIV/AIDS 
policies. The implementation of the Comprehensive Plan is funded primarily through 
the conditional grant. Because this mechanism earmarks funding, it seems more 
appropriate for ensuring spending on key priority areas, such as HIV/AIDS. 
However, as can be seen from the underspending records of the grant, it might in 
fact be hindering the spending of funds. In contrast, the equitable share funds 
allocated for HIV/AIDS are intended to provide provinces with funds to strengthen 
their health care services generally in order to respond to the added burden created 
by HIV/AIDS, which thus seems more appropriate for enhancing provincial 
capacities. Nevertheless, there is uncertainty about how much of the targeted 
additions on the equitable share mechanism are actually directed towards 
HIV/AIDS. Consequently, the question of how to strike a balance between the two 
funding mechanisms remains an open debate. 
 
The „quality‟ of the funding increments is another matter related to absorptive 
capacity. The analysis thus looked at the relationship between HIV/AIDS and health 
financing, and specifically at whether they strengthen or weaken each other. It also 












expenditure and the resulting outcomes. Concerns also emerged over the future 
availability of sufficient funding to respond to the large and growing need for 
treatment. The evidence presented provides an analytical understanding of the 
challenges faced in the efficient, equitable and sustainable absorption of public 
expenditure.  
 
In conclusion, the budget analysis undertaken in this chapter proved insightful but 
insufficient to determine fully the absorptive capacity of HIV/AIDS financing in 
South Africa. It leaves open many questions in relation to various crucial factors of 
the capacity to spend across provinces, and its implications for the overall health 
system. Consequently, these knowledge gaps were explicitly addressed in the 
fieldwork, which was conducted as part of this research. Chapters 6 to 8 report on 
the findings of this fieldwork in order to ascertain the crucial elements of absorptive 
capacity in the case of South Africa, and in particular for the Western Cape and Free 












CHAPTER 6 EXPLORING ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
6.1  Introduction 
 
The following chapters of the thesis present the findings of the in-depth interviews 
conducted with officials from the NDoH, PDoHs and National and Provincial 
Treasuries in the Western Cape and Free State, and with individuals from other 
organisations outside government (including academia, research institutions, and 
international organisations). Interviews were conducted between May 2006 and 
April 2007. Interview data were collected in order to fill in the gaps left by the 
literature review in Chapters 3 and 4, and the gaps in the budgetary analysis in 
Chapter 5, in particular with regard to the underspending difficulties and the quality 
of spending in terms of its effect on the overall health system, and its efficiency, 
equity and sustainability. This exploration of perceptions among key stakeholders 
aims to provide insight into absorptive capacity issues relating to HIV/AIDS 
financing in South Africa and the bottlenecks that exist. Most interviewees expressed 
their appreciation for the research and gave their overall support to the approach on 
absorptive capacity guiding the research. Most respondents were familiar with the 
topic, and many emphasised the national relevance and need for such analysis.  
 
The aim of Chapter 6 is to explore the understanding of absorptive capacity and its 
gravity, in South Africa in general and in the Western Cape and Free State in 
particular. This chapter also focuses on perceptions regarding progress in the 
implementation and financing of the ART component of the Comprehensive Plan. 
Chapter 7 presents participants‟ perceptions on major bottlenecks and obstacles 
encountered in scaling up funding for the South African ART program. Chapter 8 
reports on the implications for the overall public health system of increasing ART 
funding, and on related issues of equity, efficiency and sustainability. 
 
Participants had different perspectives on absorptive capacity, thus providing greater 
insight into the concept. The findings exhibit a wide and diverse understanding of 











absorptive capacity was problematic. Achievements of the Comprehensive Plan were 
considered both as too many and too few, and this contradiction will be explained 
below. In relation to funding, interviewees agreed that spending had improved over 
the last years, though it was not clear how well the money had been spent. Clear 
differences emerged between the provinces. Whilst there was consensus that the 
Western Cape was ahead in the implementation of the program, perceptions on 
achievements in the Free State were diverse. Section 6.2 deals with perceptions on 
the definition of absorptive capacity. Section 6.3 assesses the level of absorptive 
capacity in South Africa. Section 6.4 presents perceptions regarding progress in the 
implementation of ART as envisaged in the Comprehensive Plan. Section 6.5 is 
dedicated to perceptions on the financing side. Lastly, Section 6.6 summarises and 
concludes this chapter.  
 
6.2    Conceptualising and measuring absorptive capacity  
 
The first parts of the interviews explored the concept of absorptive capacity in the 
context of public HIV/AIDS financing. Interviewees‟ responses identified several 
aspects of the term, which are presented below in Section A. Section B sets out the 
perceptions around the assessment of absorptive capacity, and Section C is devoted 
to the process for expanding absorptive capacity.  
 
A  Financial spending and beyond 
 
In the first round of interviews at the national level, the first question asked was, 
“What do you understand by absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS 
financing?” The question was phrased openly in order to solicit interviewees‟ 
understanding of and approach to the issue of absorptive capacity. The meaning 
attached to this term in subsequent interviews with provincial stakeholders, which 
were informed of the definition of absorptive capacity adopted in the research, was 
therefore grounded in the responses and perspectives obtained from national-level 
interviews. Provincial respondents were asked whether this definition corresponded 












capacity gathered in this way were consistent with and expanded on the concept 
adopted by this research.  
 
The financial dimension was the first characterisation given of absorptive capacity. 
Absorptive capacity in this regard referred to the adequate rate or speed of increasing 
both funding and spending. The core issue was that increases should be implemented 
gradually, so that the system could utilise additional funds. This relates directly to 
the ability to spend allocated funding, and thus to historical spending performance.  
 
From a sense of treasury perspective, the most obvious feature is financial 
absorptive capacity: at what rate should we speed up funding and what has been the 
ability to spend the funding that we have allocated, historically. [National Treasury 
interviewee] 
 
Moreover, there was wide consensus that merely spending money was not a 
guarantee of absorptive capacity. It may be easy to spend substantial amounts of 
money quickly, but this did not mean that the country was really absorbing this 
funding. It was crucial, therefore, to inquire how well the money was being spent 
and utilised. Several respondents questioned the idea of whether funding could be 
considered as „absorbed‟ when the services provided were not of the desired quality. 
Therefore, the challenge of studying absorptive capacity also involved studying the 
quality of spending.  
 
I think it [your definition] is a good definition in the sense that it‟s wider than the 
sort of fiscal meaning that most people attach to absorptive capacity, which is 
important. We need to go beyond saying we spent all the money, we spent only 80% 
of the money to really assess how well we have spent the money. [Academia 
interviewee]  
 
Two interconnected elements of absorptive capacity emerged: spending and program 
implementation. This distinction was useful in discerning the complexity of the 
concept. Absorptive capacity was not only about financial spending, but related also 
to the whole range of issues around policy implementation and program 
management, which determined the use of funds; if the program was not being 
implemented, funding could not be spent. Ultimately, absorption meant the 
translation of financial resources into service delivery on the ground. In this way, it 













Oh no, definitely it's an issue. Financial resources seem to be available and yet the 
outcomes we see in different parts of the country are very different. Definitely if you 
just look at it in terms of inputs and outputs, there's a big box in the middle where 
things are not being translated into processes and processes aren't happening. So if 
absorptive capacity is about the processes of change from input to output then the 
variation between. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
Moreover, it was more than money that needed to be absorbed; absorptive capacity 
related to all resources, which needed to be increased, such as human resources. 
 
B           Assessing absorptive capacity 
 
Directly or indirectly, many participants pointed to financial disbursement rates of 
implementing agencies as the first indicator in assessing absorptive capacity. A 
respondent challenged this spending indicator, using the example of PEPFAR 
funding in Africa: although PEPFAR disbursement rates often reached 100% of the 
budget, this funding was disbursed mostly to American agencies, and it seemed that 
no follow-up was done on how much those agencies themselves spent. Therefore, 
the question remained open of how much was actually being spent on delivering 
services, and how much was „lost‟ in the middle. 
 
Spending patterns relate not only to how much was spent, but also to the timing of 
the spending. Some Treasury and outside government interviewees pointed out, for 
instance, that spending often increased sharply from February to March, just before 
the end of the financial year. They believed that this was related in part to deadlines 
for payments and tender processes. But mostly, it was linked to bad financial 
management. It was called the „March spike‟, and was used as an indicator for 
efficiency of spending. A benchmark of 12% was considered at the provincial level; 
thus, if a department spent more than 12% of its budget in March, it was considered 
to be „spiking‟. 
 
Financial spending on HIV/AIDS was considered relatively easy to measure, 
especially for conditional grants. As explained elsewhere, non-conditional spending 
was believed to be more difficult to monitor. For instance, it was not possible to 












as most patients did not know their status. Responses also converged on the finding 
that, although the non-financial side of absorptive capacity was more difficult to 
assess, it was as important as, for instance, the capacity of program officers to 
manage larger programs.  
 
During the in-depth interviews, time was spent discussing how to measure the „right‟ 
speed for increasing funding. This assessment was important for the expenditure 
allocations made by Treasury, as well as for the budget proposals made by DoH to 
Treasury, both at national and provincial levels. Respondents agreed that absorptive 
capacity was something which needed to be increased gradually over time and that 
there was thus a temporal and dynamic component to it, but that it was difficult to 
estimate what rate of increase would be appropriate. Responses to this question 
tended to be vague and diverse across participants, even for respondents within the 
same government department. This indicated that there was no agreement or model 
to follow on how to plan ahead and monitor the speed of funding increases according 
to the existing absorptive capacity to utilise such funding.  
 
Inputs from the Provincial Treasuries and PDoHs coincided, however, in that their 
assessment of how much more funding provincial departments could absorb was 
more a managerial or discretionary one rather than a technical assessment. Some 
participants from the WCDoH argued that there were no tools to measure absorptive 
capacity: managers took decisions on their capacity to spend additional resources 
based on their knowledge of the existing resources, their use, and the functioning of 
the program. In practice, such decisions were said to be based on a „gut feeling‟, in 
that managers allegedly acted on an intuitive feeling or understanding of what the 
absorptive capacity was, based on some basic numbers.  
 
Other respondents from Provincial Treasury reported on the criteria used to assess 
absorptive capacity in distributing extra HIV/AIDS allocations of equitable shares 
above the MTEF baselines across provincial departments
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. This decision was based 
on a combination of criteria, including:  
                                                 
57
 It was noted that the budget process was organised around the MTEF, which was a three year 
framework, with the baselines set. However, these baselines were revised each year for possible extra 













 Consistency with the national priorities;  
 Consistency with the provincial strategy; 
 Spending capacity through past spending performance; 
 Possibility of financing by shifting funds or reprioritising within the 
baseline;  
 Overall performance of the department. 
 
Thus, Provincial Treasury criteria balanced financial spending with policy priorities 
and overall performance. Consequently, it did not follow a scientific formula, but 
rather a holistic evaluation of the program itself and of the potential of the 
department for implementing it appropriately. The criterion of „overall performance 
of the department‟ depended on Provincial Treasury‟s perception of the overall 
competence of the particular department. This assessment involved several 
(somewhat subjective) elements, including: financial – appropriate spending of 
funds; overall strategic direction – whether it followed a good guiding plan; 
leadership – trust in the leaders of the program; and compliance with reporting 
guidelines to Provincial and National Treasury. 
 
This suggested that absorptive capacity was actually assessed in the provincial 
allocation of resources, though it was not measured in exact, quantitative terms. The 
closest proxy to a direct, quantitative measure was past spending performance. Yet, 
spending performance was a necessary but insufficient indicator. Consequently, the 
spending pattern was placed in the context of the policy plans and the overall 
credibility of the relevant department.  
 
C     Expanding absorptive capacity  
 
Interviews stressed that the core of the matter in relation to absorptive capacity of 
new HIV/AIDS funding was whether the new money was used for building capacity 
generally (e.g. for overall public health policies) rather than capacitating only a very 
specific intervention (e.g. ART). Thus, funding needed to be invested in a way that 
                                                                                                                                          













both met the purpose of the particular objective for which it was mobilised, and that 
contributed to a more general strengthening of the health system. This support to the 
broader health system would permit expanding the capacity for scaling up a specific 
program. This issue will be explored in more detail in Chapter 9.  
 
Some interviewees perceived the development of absorptive capacity as a process of 
setting up structures. Mobilising capacity to absorb more funds involved creating the 
necessary structures to receive, manage and utilise future funding. Provincial 
governments in South Africa, who are responsible for health service delivery, were 
the ones responsible for putting in place the mechanisms to utilise this increasing 
funding.   
 
The gradual process of absorbing funds was understood by some as a progression of 
two phases. The first stage consisted of building the capacity for service delivery, 
and it could have been monitored by means of process indicators, such as the 
number of people trained and the existence of procurement and laboratory systems. 
In the second stage, when services would be functioning, output indicators such as, 
for example, the number of people enrolled in the program, would be more relevant. 
It was in the first stages of building capacity for service delivery that spending would 
necessarily be slow, as, for example, in building infrastructure or recruiting and 
training personnel. This gradual approach to absorptive capacity questioned the 
practice of focusing on patient targets rather than on process indicators to monitor 
ART progress of the Comprehensive Plan during the early stages. Still, the question 
remains how long the first stage would last.  
 
6.3    Characterisation of absorptive capacity in South Africa 
 
This section presents the perceived descriptions and assessments of absorptive 














A  Absorptive capacity at the national level 
 
This section describes key features of absorptive capacity at the national level, 
namely: limited absorptive capacity is a problem; absorptive capacity has improved; 
new forms of capacity for service delivery have emerged; and there are marked 
inequalities in absorptive capacity. 
 
Limited absorptive capacity is an issue 
 
The research revealed a consensus that absorptive capacity was a problem in South 
Africa. Some respondents emphasised that it was a major problem throughout the 
country, whilst others acknowledged it merely as one of many concerns.  
 
Oh no definitely it's an issue. As you said, I mean, there is - financial resources seem 
to be available and yet the outcomes we see in different parts of the country are very 
different. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
Low spending rates of the conditional grant were noted as the first symptom of a 
lack of absorptive capacity. Moreover, the gap between the resources available and 
the results achieved was interpreted as another sign of the inability of the system to 
benefit from funding increases.  
 
It‟s of course a concern. Because if you talk to people in the country, if you talk to 
people in National Treasury, they will tell you that for HIV we‟ve given the 
department a lot of money. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
Considering that even greater funding will be needed in the future, many 
respondents believed that absorptive capacity would continue being a concern. 
Ironically, some suggested that, in the future, absorptive capacity might not be such 
a problem after all, because funding would not increase as much in future years, and 
would therefore flow less “freely”.  
 
Interviewees were asked whether South Africa was still utilising existing spare 
capacity in service delivery for implementing the Comprehensive Plan and, if so, 
how long it would be until the ceiling of that capacity would be reached. Many 












delivery capacity. During research across treatment facilities, a participant asserted: 
“there‟s definitely a limited ceiling, and people are reaching it quite quickly” 
[Research institution interviewee]. Consequently, appointing or using other service 
providers was crucial for expanding services and coping with the increasing demand. 
In particular, many respondents identified human resources as the area where the 
ceiling for service delivery would be reached first.  
 
Participants were also asked whether limitations to absorptive capacity were greater 
at national or provincial level. Respondents agreed that, because provinces were 
responsible for the implementation of programs, they were the ones experiencing the 
actual bottlenecks.  
 
I think it must be provincial and local because money is not spent at national level – 
you know; in the sense that there is a big problem at national level in terms of low 
capacity but the absorptive capacity, if you like, is that at the provincial and district 
level because that's where the money is going to. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
The role of the NDoH, however, was debated. While some interviewees at the 
NDoH argued that absorptive capacity limitations did not concern the NDoH, as it 
transferred resources to provinces, participants from the PDoHs and from other 
organisations suggested that many of the obstacles experienced by provinces were in 
fact caused by a lack of capacity on the part of NDoH to manage and provide 
guidance on crucial aspects of the financing and implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan. 
 
More broadly, there was a widespread recognition that the absorptive capacity in 
South Africa was good overall.  
 
We do have capacity, we are the only country which has capacity. Nevertheless, 
there are issues in spending the funds, because they do have challenges. Because it 
is a process and requires time. [NDoH interviewe] 
 
Especially in comparison with other African countries, South Africa was much better 
off for having certain major advantages: (a) stronger health systems plus (b) 
domestic financing and strong financial mechanisms. In addition, South Africa 












among for-profit and not-for-profit organisations. Nonetheless, some respondents 
argued that even with those advantages, South Africa had achieved poorer results in 
terms of ART than similarly affected neighbouring countries like Botswana, and 
interpreted this as a result of the inability to benefit from the existing resources, and 
thus as proof of unsatisfactory absorptive capacity. 
 
Absorptive capacity is dynamic and improving 
 
There was a recognition that, parallel to funding increases, the system had been 
working towards absorbing and utilising those additional funds, thus resulting in 
improvements in absorptive capacity in the country. There was a general feeling that 
spending rates had improved substantially, to the extent that overspending had been 
recorded in the Western Cape during 2006/07 and was expected in the Free State in 
2007/08. As expressed by members of the NDoH:  
 
There‟s been quite a dramatic improvement, because in the past we used to have 
quite huge underspending ... but now, during the last financial year, most grants, the 
spending is above 95%, ... so it is no longer such a problem, although for some 
provinces there is still underspending. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
Improvements in financial spending were interpreted by most as a sign that 
absorptive capacity was improving. Nevertheless, many warned that improvements 
in spending rates did not necessarily translate into improvements in absorptive 
capacity, arguing that spending was not a sufficient indicator of absorptive capacity. 
 
Quite often the money is spent in the last three weeks of the financial year and I get 
invited to hotels and I get flown around the country ... managers are getting smarter 
and smarter and realising that one of the ways in which they‟re judged is money 
spent, so they will start to plan how they spend their money. [Research institution 
interviewee] 
 
Furthermore, a member of NDoH warned that underspending might be under-
reported due to accounting practices, as provinces learned how the system worked. 
For example, sometimes health expenditure that is only partly related to HIV/AIDS 
was debited against the HIV/AIDS grant, reflecting HIV/AIDS expenditure when 
this was not really the case. Thus, past improvements in financial management 












better use of the funding for the specified objectives, but also potentially bad news if 
they know how to „play around‟ with funding so as to be able to spend it in other 
areas that are only marginally related to HIV/AIDS.  
 
Consequently, respondents questioned whether increasing spending rates in fact 
reflected adequate spending. Interviewees pointed out the need to examine funding 
jointly with outputs and processes, in order to understand the effects of the financial 
injections in term of results and spillovers. Many participants complained that not 
enough was known about the provincial implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, 
which is crucial for understanding absorptive capacity. For instance, some Treasury 
members noted that it was very difficult to take budget decisions without knowing 
exactly how many people were already on treatment. In view of these findings, 
Section 6.3 will present the participants‟ perceptions and information around the 
progress on the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
Furthermore, a major challenge was to spend optimally and in the right way. 
Participants raised concerns over whether the country was absorbing the funds 
properly in terms of providing the service, strengthening the system, and ensuring 
efficiency, equity and sustainability. In the face of these uncertainties, it was 
suggested that the increasing and high spending rates achieved may ultimately have 
been counterproductive. This uncertainty was perceived as a sign of the unresolved 
questions around absorptive capacity in the country. Chapter 8 will explore the wider 
implications of scaling up funding for ART for the overall health system and the 
implications for the principles of efficiency, equity and sustainability.  
 
So they are spending more and more money, but it‟s sort of a black box as to 
whether that spending is equitable, sustainable, whether it‟s efficient. I think we just 
don‟t know. We don‟t know if the program would be in the longer run more 
sustainable if we spend less money now ... If we don‟t know how to spend it well, 
should we wait? Should we roll over the spending, so that we can make better 
informed decisions? [Academia interviewee] 
 
Therefore, improvements in absorptive capacity could not be taken for granted, and 
thus it was imperative to monitor closely progress in strengthening the health 
financing and service delivery systems. One participant commented with concern 












in place before resources were being transferred: “There‟s an assumption that slowly 
things will get better but we‟re not measuring that in a systematic way” [Research 
institution interviewee]. 
 
Emergence of new forms of capacity for service delivery 
 
On the positive side, the absorptive capacity in the country had been expanded by 
the emergence of new forms of service delivery capacity to roll out the 
Comprehensive Plan. This applied in particular to community workers and NGOs, 
and also to public-private partnership arrangements. The range of emerging actors 
involved in implementing the Comprehensive Plan varied from lay counsellors to 
home-based care workers, treatment supporters, or support group facilitators. 
 
What we have had is the emergence of completely new forms of capacity. One is in 
contracts and partnerships with non-governmental organisations ... and that has 
emerged on a large scale. Not unrelated to that is also the emergence of a massive 
infrastructure of lay community workers. It‟s a very mixed category. But this 
represents a new form of capacity that wasn‟t there; and that‟s emerged around HIV. 
[Academia interviewee] 
 
Positive characteristics of these new forms of service delivery capacity were the 
flexibility and huge potential of outreach in relation to various components of the 
Comprehensive Plan. However, several concerns were raised with regard to lay 
counsellors and community workers, which are discussed in Chapter 7.  
 
Inequalities in absorptive capacity 
 
For many respondents the main characterisation of absorptive capacity in South 
Africa was „uneven‟, viz. uneven both between urban and rural areas, as well as 
within provinces, with high levels of absorptive capacity in big metropolitan areas 
like Cape Town, and very poor levels in most rural areas and provinces. The 
provinces of Gauteng, the Western Cape and, in some instances, KwaZulu-Natal 
were mentioned as doing relatively well, whereas Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the 













I think it‟s extremely uneven. There‟re different provinces that struggle and districts, 
it‟s enormously variable. And there‟re parts of the country ... stuck in very vicious 
cycles of inability to kind-of benefit from additional resources. [Academia 
interviewee] 
 
Differences in capacities to use funds were linked to the historical capacities of 
provinces. These differences showed up, for example, in the capacity to recruit staff 
rapidly, or the existence of the systems required to introduce and to implement a new 
program. In addition, comments were made in relation to leadership and 
management, as crucial “ingredients to success” in implementing the Comprehensive 
Plan.  
In terms of the characterization, I would say it‟s different. There would be high 
absorptive capacity depending on whether you have an urban province, whether you 
have leadership and management, whether you have the money available, whether 
you can recruit the staff rapidly, whether you‟ve got the systems in place to 
implement the programme ... Where you don‟t have those elements in place, what I 
would call the key ingredients to success, you are going to find that there are 
actually problems. But among those what is critical is leadership and management to 
make sure that you achieve programme objectives. [Research institution 
interviewee] 
 
Although spending performance had improved nationally, provincial trends differed 
greatly. Most developed provinces like Gauteng had learnt more quickly how to 
spend funds and develop modalities to improve expenditure, such as contracting out 
services to NGOs. Furthermore, it was precisely those provinces that had problems 
with spending, which also had weaker health systems. Hence, the discussion now 
looks at provincial stakeholders‟ perspectives regarding absorptive capacity in the 
Western Cape and the Free State. 
 
B  Absorptive capacity in the Western Cape and the Free State 
 
This section examines absorptive capacity specifically in the provinces of the 
Western Cape and the Free State. 
 
The Western Cape  
 
There was a clear consensus that absorptive capacity in the Western Cape was high, 
probably the highest in the country. Although absorptive capacity may have been an 












2006/07 and previous years, and had exceeded its targets with regard to people on 
ART. This suggested that the province could use even more funding than what it had 
actually received in order to deal with more patients. A member of the WCDoH 
characterised the province as having the ability to mobilise additional resources and 
to implement the Comprehensive Plan optimally, without distorting core principles 
underpinning public health policy imperatives.  
 
In relation to the increasing future targets for ART and the consequential required 
funding increases, absorptive capacity was also characterised as good. In fact, 
several participants within and outside the province, and within and outside 
government, argue that the province could treat significantly more patients if it were 
not for funding limitations imposed by the NDoH, as conditional funding received 
was below the amount requested. A member of the WCDoH described the problem 
as follows:  
  
We have got the right mix of a policy framework and an implementation service 
design to enable us to have a good absorptive capacity for the next three or four 
years; (a) in terms of accommodating more patients on treatment, (b) in terms of 
being able to absorb and utilise the resources funded, and (c) in terms of doing it in a 
way that it doesn‟t distort the primary health care platform. It actually strengthens it. 
[WCDoH interviewee] 
 
The Western Cape was said to be in a very privileged position within the country. 
The province had the lowest number of HIV/AIDS cases in the country, together 
with the highest medical staffing rates. Consequently, the province had a 
significantly higher absorptive capacity than the other provinces. Moreover, the 
Western Cape was generally an attractive place to live, and its administrative 
capacity was better than that of other provinces, thus creating a more efficient work 
environment: “In general, things run like clockwork here” [WCDoH interviewee]. 
These two factors facilitated staff recruitment in the province. Moreover, most 
respondents in the province, and several ones outside the province, felt that one of 
the major factors determining the success of the ART program in the province had 














Nevertheless, participants also noted that, despite the relative good situation in the 
province, the implementation of the ART program was not easy, with several 
remaining obstacles undermining implementation efforts.  
 
The Free State  
 
In the case of the Free State there was no such common understanding across the 
various respondents with regard to existing absorptive capacity in the province. 
Some participants at the national and provincial level characterised the Free State as 
a very „tricky‟ province in relation to HIV/AIDS absorptive capacity, meaning that 
the indications of good spending recorded and some implementation processes may 
have created a misguided picture of the progress in the program. Several 
interviewees stated that the Free State went a bit overboard with regard to the 
standards for upgrading ART facilities, in particular for personnel, resulting in a high 
spending per output. This led to high spending combined with relatively poor 
outputs. Consequently, the high spending may have given the (false) impression that 
absorptive capacity was high, which might not have been the case if the situation had 
been examined more closely.  
 
This high spending per output ratio was justified by some respondents, in particular 
within the FSDoH, as necessary in the initial years in order to build a solid 
foundation in terms of service delivery capacity to run the program. This strong base 
was achieved mainly by recruiting and training personnel, preparing the necessary 
infrastructure, and developing an M&E system. In ensuring that these elements were 
in place, the program began slowly, but soon began to treat increasing numbers of 
people with ARVs in a more sustainable way. The resultant, strong platform will 
enable an effective response to the growing demand as case loads increase as 
expected. This strategy was said to be particularly relevant for large scale programs, 
such as the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
Some Free State respondents argued that the Free State structure was stretched, in 
that it was using all its service delivery capacity, and that it would thus take some 











where it needs to make better use of its resources, and to overcome the obstacles that 
have restricted them from doing so.  
 
6.4  Progress in the implementation of the ART component of the 
Comprehensive Plan  
 
This section presents perceptions regarding the implementation of the ART program 
at national level, in the Western Cape and in the Free State. The information on the 
achievements of the plan – presented in this section – and on the financial trends – 
presented in Section 6.5 – are vital for characterising the absorptive capacity levels 
of the country and provinces, as argued earlier in the chapter.  
 
A  National implementation progress 
 
Interviews showed a wide recognition that treatment coverage had increased 
substantially up to 2007, with trends pointing to continued growth. In addition, 
successful programs often achieved results despite poor resources. Thus, there was 
an overall acknowledgement of the great efforts made at all levels to make the 
program work. For some respondents, the core element of success was that the 
program had moved beyond a few islands of success to more generalised progress on 
delivery, with the necessary changes in the health system. 
 
The positive signs are that people are on ARVs, and they‟re doing well, and they‟re 
living longer. It‟s prolonging their lives. That‟s the positive sign ... it‟s starting to 
move, in spite of everything. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
I don‟t feel as negative as some of the critics who are totally dismissive of the 
programme. To get up to 150,000 people in 18 months is, you know, in some ways 
good. But it‟s clearly not as fast as one would want. [National Treasury interviewee] 
 
Participants nonetheless tended to characterise achievements as either „too little‟ or 
„too much‟, depending on the issues considered. The implementation was considered 
as having been too slow and below the targets in relation to current and future needs 
for treatment. In addition, with respect to the overall service delivery capacity of the 












argued that South Africa had delivered services with both speed and scale below its 
capacity.  
 
However, in relation to the challenges the country was facing at the time, in 
particular the large number of people infected, and the potential effect these 
challenges might have on the health system, the progress appeared to be too fast, and 
with too much focus on delivering outputs. Many interviewees described the present 
and future targets of the Comprehensive Plan as “completely unrealistic” and very 
ambitious, though others resisted the idea of scaling down these targets because of 
the challenges the country faced. 
 
The frustrations I think we all have is that it‟s just not happening fast enough, the 
number of people living with AIDS and needing treatment is not being reduced as 
fast as we would like to see it. But maybe we also need to be more realistic about 
what is possible. [International organisation interviewee] 
 
Various interviewees recognised that, in order to assess progress accurately, it would 
be necessary to contextualise achievements against the challenges faced in 
implementing the program. It was acknowledged that, within two years of 
implementing the Comprehensive Plan, South Africa had become the largest 
treatment program in the world in terms of the number of people treated, even larger 
than Brazil‟s treatment program. Achievements could thus be characterised as very 
significant in terms of financial and human resources devoted to the Comprehensive 
Plan, processes started, and even people enrolled in the program.  
 
Respondents across all stakeholders interviewed raised concerns about the low 
number of people seeking treatment in relation to the existing need. Whereas this 
had not been a problem in the initial stages of the Comprehensive Plan, because the 
numbers of patients overwhelmed the capacity of health centres and waiting lists 
were long, as the program evolved, it became necessary to improve this demand-
side. Some participants noted great concern about the insufficient or even non-
existent marketing of the government‟s treatment program, pointing out that 













Although most interviewees assessed progress of the Comprehensive Plan by 
looking at the number of people on ART, it was also argued that this indicator on its 
own was not sufficient to evaluate the success of the program. Participants claimed 
that there was too much focus on the particular ART output indicator to the 
detriment of other considerations, such as the multiple aspects of the program that go 
beyond the delivery of ARVs, such as, for example, ensuring that patients 
understand how the treatment works, which is key for treatment adherence. The 
indicator of the number of sites distributing ART showed a clearer trend of 
improvement, even exceeding targets, suggesting that the system was putting in 
place the necessary means to implement the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
Maybe there‟s an overemphasis on that single indicator [number on people on 
ART], and there isn‟t a focus on other indicators that will tell you other things about 
what‟s happened. So the Treatment Action Campaign is the first to jump up and 
down and say but we‟re not meeting the targets. But I think at the same time there 
may be good reasons for not meeting the targets. Maybe we don‟t want to meet the 
targets if it compromises other goals. [Academia interviewee] 
 
Some respondents recommended that, in assessing the results achieved, it should be 
ensured that the services provided were quality services that were actually accessed 
by patients. A researcher gave the example that a clinic may technically speaking 
have provided PMTCT and thus it would have reported that the funding allocated for 
this purpose had achieved its objectives. However, it was also important to examine 
the number of people accessing the PMTCT service at the clinic, and the quality of 
such service.  
 
Putting the national experience into perspective, some interviewees compared 
achievements made by South Africa with those of other African countries. 
Botswana, for example, had much higher coverage rates in terms of ART, PMTCT, 
VCT and even condom access. Yet, South Africa has much more human capital to 
mobilise around HIV/AIDS because of its stronger public and private sectors, and it 
has a more vibrant civil society. As a result, it was argued that Botswana had 
achieved more than South Africa partly because South Africa wanted to do things 
“too well”. Whereas other African countries were effectively delivering VCT under 
a tree, South Africa wanted to build a specific room for that purpose in order to 












requirements ultimately made South African services „better‟ remained open to 
debate.  
 
Respondents from different organisations, from researchers to policy-makers, drew 
attention to the lack of sufficient information on the progress of the Comprehensive 
Plan, partly due to deficient M&E systems. One of the examples given repeatedly, in 
particular by participants related to the financing of the programme, was that figures 
were available nationally for the number of people who had started treatment, but 
not for the number of people who were currently on treatment. Thus, there was no 
information about the number of people who had defaulted or had been lost; neither 
was there information about those who died while on treatment, nor was there 
sufficient information about side-effects. This uncertainty was identified as a major 
difficulty for assessing progress, and for planning and budgeting purposes too. 
Conversely, some NDoH respondents argued that, although such figures were 
incomplete and different estimates existed, margins between the different figures had 
been converging over time, and rough treatment estimates were sufficient for 
strategic planning purposes.  
 
In response to the question of whether the differences in the implementation of the 
programme reflected overall differences in health systems across provinces, several 
respondents across the various groups commented that there were two major factors 
determining these differences: (a) health systems capacity and (b) leadership. Some 
participants pointed out that the roll-out figures did not follow any kind of 
predictable urban-rural, poor-rich characterisation, with the missing explanatory 
factor being leadership.  
 
B  Implementation progress in the Western Cape and the Free State 
 
The Western Cape  
 
The Western Cape had already been running pilot ART projects before the 
Comprehensive Plan was launched, which had produced expertise in this area, both 
in the province and with regard to the national plan. In addition, it was recognised 












Cape Town, which had a remarkably high availability of staff, and a particularly 
good capacity to recruit doctors, thus facilitating the high numbers of people on ART 
in the province.  
 
The province had gradually increased the number of people on treatment. An official 
of the WCDoH pointed out that the program initially enrolled around 100 patients 
per month, a figure that had increased to around 1,000 patients per month by April 
2006
58
. In relation to future targets, there was optimism that substantially more 
patients could be accommodated. Universal access to services was seen by many as 
possible in the near future, provided a continuous expansion of facilities and 
services. 
   
We are already enrolling at the moment 1,000 patients a month, and we should in 
theory increase that to 2,000 patients a month by our calculations over the next five 
years. I think that to double over the five years is something that‟s possible. But it 
needs sustained expansion. [Academia interviewee] 
 
However, it was also noted with concern that there had been a recent levelling off in 
new enrolments. The expansion of sites and staff employment had been limited or 
reduced, and consequently new enrolments had reached a plateau or even declined 
by the time of the research. According to an official from the WCDoH, this was due 
to a combination of three factors: (a) sites had reached their treatment capacity level: 
when sites had more than 1,000 patients on treatment, their ability to absorb more 
patients was limited; (b) poor demand: there were not enough people being tested 
and coming to the centres; and (c) limitations in human resources and physical 
infrastructure at some sites. This steadying-off was a reason for concern around the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
In addition, several respondents in the Western Cape warned that the program 
needed to grow every year in order to maintain current achievements. The 
epidemiology of the epidemic requires continuous expansion of services in order to 
prevent the treatment gap from growing; maintaining the same number of sites 
would only lead to increasing the treatment gap. Consequently, concern was 
expressed over the recent levelling off in enrolments, as it would compromise 
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achievements realised to date. Importantly, this particular concern was not raised in 
interviews at the national level or in the Free State.  
 
It is worth noting that the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan in the Western 
Cape was moving towards a more integrated system of ART delivery within the 
overall service delivery platform, through a more horizontal approach. This new type 
of expansion was said to be the main challenge for future years. The expansion re-
orientated services towards PHC clinics, using a „nurse led, doctor supported‟ policy. 
This approach had started in the Metro region, and it was expected to expand outside 
the region after April 2007. The approach involved having more facilities, which 
would treat fewer patients, but in a more integrated fashion. It was indicated that 
accreditation criteria so far had not impeded this expansion towards PHC clinics in 
the Western Cape; all sites applying for accreditation had obtained the necessary 
accreditation.  
 
The Free State  
 
The Comprehensive Plan in the Free State followed several phases: it moved from 
the preparation phase (Phase 1), through the establishment phase (Phase 2), to the 
expansion phase (Phase 3), which is where it was at the time of the interviews 
(December 2006). In the first year, the Free State sought to establish at least one 
treatment site
59
 per district. The program expanded by establishing at least one 
treatment site in each municipal area. By December 2006, in the two years of the 
program, 16 out of the total 20 municipal areas had been covered. It was expected 
that all 20 municipal areas would be covered by March 2007, which would mean 
100% coverage in terms of sites, based on the above mentioned targets. 
 
The provincial implementation of the national plan was described by many, both 
inside and outside the province, as (a) slow and falling short of targets in terms of 
patients on treatment, and (b) characterised by problems with underspending. Many 
respondents argued that with the numerous of resources invested in terms of funding, 
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personnel and health structures, several sites were enrolling patients far below their 
capacity; compared to other areas with similar inputs, outputs were lower.  
 
In explaining the low achievements of people on treatment given the high resources 
invested, several provincial interviewees within and outside government, pointed to 
the fact that established ART facilities had the same physical and personnel 
structure, independent of whether the facility was in an area with a high or low 
concentration of HIV-positive people. This led to a situation where some facilities 
were overburdened by treating numerous patients, whereas others functioned below 
their capacity due to lower demand. This was especially the case in the most rural 
areas. Furthermore, it was noted that using the same model regardless of patient 
burden was not corrected until the Phase 4 of the implementation, and thus was 
subsequently repeated. In designing Phase 4, the FSDoH took the under-utilisation 
of some sites into consideration, and thus the decision was not to open new sites but 
instead to strengthen and sustain existing ART facilities. This implied that, in order 
to expand the numbers of people on ART, the existing sites should take on more new 
patients.  
 
In the same way, the target of having a service point per district and per sub-district 
did not take into consideration that districts were not equally burdened in respect of 
the number of people infected with HIV or requiring treatment. Thus, the initial goal 
of achieving equity (through all districts having a program facility) may have led in 
the end to inefficiencies in the distribution of resources. This suggested: (a) the need 
to examine more closely the geographical location of rural facilities; and (b) the need 
to re-consider the use of more flexible criteria for the accreditation of sites, in 
particular the human resources requirements.  
 
In relation to monitoring treatment outcomes, the Free State experience revealed a 
high mortality rate among people who had enrolled in the program but who were not 
yet receiving ARVs because (a) they qualified for ART but were on the waiting list, 
or (b) they did not yet qualify for ART. This evidence suggests that, although a 
significant number of patients knew their status and had sought care, they were not 
systematically being cared for by the program. In fact, it was reported that quality of 












patients. Although pre-ARV patients should have received routine care for HIV, 
including regular weight monitoring and screening for tuberculosis, often they did 
not receive these services, with many in fact being lost to the program. Furthermore, 
it was claimed that the Free State was the only province that was systematically 
collecting information on mortality among patients enrolled in the program but not 
yet on ART; it did so by linking ART files to the population register. This evidence 
suggests that the strong focus of the Comprehensive Plan on increasing the number 
of people on ART may have been detrimental to other areas of the plan, such as the 
care for those HIV individuals who did not qualify for or were still waiting for ARV 
treatment.  
 
6.5  Financing the Comprehensive Plan  
 
This section presents perceptions on the financing of the Comprehensive Plan at 
national level and in the two provinces studied.  
 
A  Financing the Comprehensive Plan at the national level 
 
There was widespread recognition of the fact that HIV/AIDS financing had grown 
exponentially until recently, especially in the case of HIV/AIDS conditional grants, 
but also with regard to other public funding, together with donor funding and 
contributions from the medical schemes.  
 
I've not come across a clinic which has to such to down because it hasn't had enough 
funding. And I've not come across the problem that‟s just said “we haven't been able 
to open any more clinics because we don‟t have enough money”. [Research 
institution interviewee] 
 
Interviewees were asked whether they perceived HIV/AIDS and overall health 
budgets to have grown in parallel. Most respondents emphasised the difficulty of 
separating out HIV/AIDS expenditure from health expenditure, as both were closely 
interrelated. A member of National Treasury pointed out that, overall, about 20% of 













The magnitude of the funding increments made available to tackle the epidemic 
depended on the understanding of what exactly constituted HIV/AIDS funding. 
Interviewees distinguished among several dimensions of HIV/AIDS expenditure, 
varying from a narrow to a broader definition. As a participant from National 
Treasury noted: 
 
I normally classify it [HIV/AIDS expenditure] in three or four different ways. The 
most narrow perhaps is just like looking at the conditional funds, but the most broad 
is the costs of looking after all people sick with HIV related diseases in the hospital, 
the primary clinic. The first is close to 2-3 billion. The second is close to 10 billion. 
[Treasury interviewee] 
 
With regard to funding mechanisms, most respondents believed that the 
Comprehensive Plan was mostly funded by conditional grants. Nevertheless, several 
interviewees argued that equitable share allocations would exceed those of 
conditional grants when the whole cost of caring for HIV-positive individuals was 
counted as part of HIV/AIDS expenditure. The epidemic exerted pressures on the 
overall health system, with people coming to health centres when they got sick. 
Several participants emphasised that this was the biggest part of the pressures of 
HIV/AIDS on the health system, more than the need for HIV/AIDS-specific 
interventions. This reason encouraged the transfer of more HIV/AIDS funding 
through the equitable share procedure and not through conditional grants. However, 
the ART program in particular was funded almost fully through dedicated funding, 
either through the conditional grant or by donors; equitable share funding was used 
in turn for the likes of opportunistic infections and prevention programs.  
 
The study also enquired about the targeted increments on equitable shares allocated 
for HIV/AIDS. Several respondents at Provincial Treasuries and PDoHs said they 
did not know about this funding. Other interviewees from National and Provincial 
Treasuries explained that these increases were sent to provinces, accompanied by a 
„soft indication‟ of the relevant priorities. These priority areas were set and agreed 
on by the Medium Term Expenditure Committee (MTEC) for health
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. It was 
suggested that this mechanism had important implications for the vertical 
distribution of power because it shifted the authority and control over funding from 
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the NDoH towards the PDoHs, and there was no established system for the NDoH to 
oversee the use of such funding by the PDoHs. 
 
There was overall agreement that the availability of funding for HIV/AIDS was not 
an issue in South Africa:  
 
I‟ve not come across a clinic which has to shut down because it hasn‟t had enough 
funding. [Research institution interviewee].  
 
[National Treasury has] always tried to be ahead of the wave on this one. I think [it 
has] tended to be fairly generous. [National Treasury interviewee] 
 
However, concerns were voiced that National Treasury allocations to HIV/AIDS had 
actually slowed down. Many respondents expressed with concern their perception 
that HIV/AIDS expenditure had experienced a momentum, with extraordinary 
increases in funding, but that this momentum had now passed; currently it was time 
to move to other priorities. This meant that there would not be further huge jumps in 
HIV/AIDS expenditure as in the past. In fact, some interviewees, especially in the 
Western Cape, mentioned the forthcoming Football World Cup in South Africa in 
2010 as one of those priorities that were expected to absorb bigger portions of the 
national and provincial budgets in coming years. Conversely, other participants 
believed that health care allocations would stabilise because unit costs were likely to 
decline, as more people initiated treatment and as the epidemic reached a plateau and 
stabilised.  
 
Other interviewees argued that National Treasury may have revised the pace of 
funding in a process of rationalisation, because the treatment targets set had not been 
met and because of underspending records. At the same time, several respondents, 
mainly from National and Provincial Treasuries but also from other sectors, 
expressed their perception that National and Provincial Treasuries always responded 
positively to well-defended budget proposals. Thus, what was needed was to support 
financial requests with evidence explicitly demonstrating the need for extra funding, 













In relation to major cost-drivers, several respondents, in particular within the NDoH, 
described the components of the Comprehensive Plan as two-fold: (a) the ART 
component, and (b) the rest. This description illustrated the perceived importance of 
the drugs component within the program. The relative weight of ARVs and 
laboratory costs in the expenditure was very high, as a result of their intensive use in 
ART, and these costs were considerably higher than for other health interventions. 
Concerns were raised about the need to balance the expenditure of the major cost-
drivers of the program. In addition, many interviewees took a closer look at 
personnel costs, which was the biggest expense in health expenditure, making up 
around 65–70% of overall health expenditure. Hence, hiring personnel or increasing 
salaries was a quick way of spending the budget and „improving‟ absorptive 
capacity, although it may not exactly translate into better services: 
 
It‟s easy to absorb 6 billion in wages, because from tomorrow you pay everyone 
25% more. But do you get a better service? [National Treasury interviewee] 
 
Many participants recognised that donor funding was very important in the country, 
particularly with regard to PEPFAR and the Global Fund. However, it was noted 
with concern that its contribution was not exactly known, with the exception of 
Global Fund funding. An interviewee cited some estimates of donor funding of 
around R2.5 billion a year, and in any case exceeding R1 billion a year. Important 
concerns were raised that donor funding was not well aligned with government 
funding. A large share of donor HIV/AIDS funding went directly to NGOs. It was 
even argued that double accounting happened sometimes, where one item of 
expenditure was covered by more than one funding source, which made financial 
planning and assessment of absorptive capacity more challenging: 
 
Departments will put the same bid into government as they will into the donor. 
Neither will know they‟re funding the same thing. [National Treasury interviewee] 
 
Some participants highlighted the importance of not relying on donor funding, but 
rather using it to complement existing funding in order to achieve sustainability. 
This, however, required a commitment from government to fund the program. A 
respondent from the NDoH stated that the NDoH had been using donor funding 












implying that there was no risk of depending on such funding for recurrent 
expenditure. In many cases, donor funding was mentioned in relation to financing of 
research projects. Several interviewees at the national level, within and outside 
government, argued that donor funding was not free from underspending problems 
either. For example, a large share of donor funding directed to South Africa was not 
spent because the NDoH often did not approve projects or took a long time to do so, 
which led to donors shifting the funding to other countries.  
 
B  Financing the Comprehensive Plan in the Western Cape and the Free 
State 
 
Financing in the Western Cape  
 
Although the Western Cape initially underspent on HIV/AIDS, underspending was 
very small in relation to national levels, and ended in 2004/05 with the 
commencement of the national strategy. Since then, the Western Cape has overspent 
and exceeded targets in the first two years of the program. According to a WCDoH 
official, the Western Cape overspent approximately R10 million in the first year 
(2004/05), and R20 million in the second year (2005/06). For the current year 
2006/07, the province was planning on being R33 million over budget, and for the 
following financial year the province was R100 million under budget. Thus, the 
province kept applying for additional funding nationally while the province‟s own 
contribution to HIV/AIDS continued to increase.  
 
In funding the Comprehensive Plan, the Western Cape combined the conditional 
grant with the Global Fund grant
61
, which had been approved in 2003. This Global 
Fund financing was reported in the Western Cape provincial budget as a separate 
budget account, which facilitated its tracking and accountability. The Western Cape 
had been funding approximately two thirds of their ART program from the 
conditional grant and one third from the Global Fund. The WCDoH was also 
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managing the Global Fund grant in a strategic way to ensure sustainability over the 
long term, as will be explained in Chapter 8.  
 
Some respondents were asked about the relatively small MTEF increments in the 
conditional grant for 2007/08-2008/09. Some commented that these were mere 
increments over the baselines, which would be revised in subsequent years. A 
member of the WCDoH stated that their baseline had been revised in 2006/07, 
although it was still insufficient for their needs. Consequently, the WCDoH was 
requesting more funding for subsequent MTEF allocations. At the time of the 
research, the WCDoH was developing their motivation for these requested increases 
in future allocations. Expectations varied among interviewees as to whether the 
province would be successful in their request. It was also argued that increases could 
not be as high as in the past due to competing funding needs.  
 
Financing in the Free State  
 
There was an overall agreement that funding availability was not the problem. 
Rather, it was the ability to spend that funding appropriately that was of great 
concern. Most respondents in the province agreed that HIV/AIDS spending had been 
and still was a challenge in the Free State.  
 
Our experience in the province has been [that] it‟s been difficult to get funding 
moving because of capacity challenges of our basically district staff as well as our 
HIV/AIDS component. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Members of the FSDoH recognised that at the time of this research the department 
was underspending in some areas of the Comprehensive Plan, such as on step down 
care, whereas in other areas there was overspending, such as the ARV component. 
However, as explained by members of the FSDoH, the overall budget showed 
underspending results because the overspending expenditure could not compensate 
for underspending expenditure. Thus the budgets showed underspending, whereas in 
fact it was both under- and overspending at the same time. Even in the hypothetical 
case where overspending exceeded underspending, the budget would have shown 












program. Some expressed concern that this practice of not considering the existing 
overspending may have compromised future funding allocations. 
 
With regard to the overspending of the ARV component, members of the FSDoH 
pointed to difficulties of planning and budgeting due to insufficient information on 
service needs. It was also argued that there was a bit of underestimation on 
budgetary requirements because the budget was based on the number of patients, 
which did not fully reflect their needs in terms of resources. 
 
The Free State Treasury officials, in contrast, stated that, from their perspective, 
spending of conditional grants for health (i.e. not the HIV/AIDS grant exclusively) 
was not an issue in the province: underspending had been very low (less than 10% 
over the last years), and overspending was foreseen for future years. In addition, 
Provincial Treasury officials did not perceive any problems of capacity to spend in 
the FSDoH. This was qualified, however, by pointing out that spending all the 
money did not imply performing on the objectives, but that this was beyond the 
responsibility of the Provincial Treasury to monitor. 
 
Despite the recognised spending challenges, interviewees within the FSDoH 
indicated that the province would probably spend their entire HIV/AIDS budget in 
the current year, and would furthermore probably overspend in future years if the 
number of ARV patients continued to increase. These rapid improvements in 
spending performance were praised by some, whereas for others it was a matter of 
concern: some respondents expressed concerns on how funding could be spent 
properly and strategically when there were such pressures to spend all funding and to 
do so quickly. 
 
In addition, many participants in the Free State expressed the concern that, although 
funding was not a problem at the moment, it could become an issue in the future. 
Some suggested that funding would not suffice in coming years: “money won‟t 
hold” [Academia interviewee]. There was no clear strategy of where to obtain extra 














6.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored stakeholders‟ perceptions around absorptive capacity in 
financing the Comprehensive Plan for HIV/AIDS in South Africa. South Africa‟s 
absorptive capacity was described as being relatively good, yet still insufficient, 
given the large need for HIV/AIDS treatment and the relatively strong health service 
delivery capacity in the country.  
 
The rollout of the Comprehensive Plan remained below targets, although it has 
nevertheless been remarkably good given the challenges. In fact, interviewees 
revealed grave concerns that a too rapid implementation might compromise other 
health goals, such as inter-provincial equity. It was indicated that not enough was 
known about the dynamics around the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. 
Recommendations were made to monitor its implementation both more closely and 
more widely, rather than focusing excessively on the number of patients on ART. 
 
The research found that there was widespread acknowledgement that substantial 
funding had been made available to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic. At the same time, 
there was consensus that spending had lagged behind funding, especially in the 
initial years of the conditional grant, and that this was a critical challenge for the 
implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. The improvements in spending patterns 
suggested that the capacity to benefit from existing resources has increased. Other 
interviewees, however, viewed these improvements in spending with concern, 
because not enough was known about the quality of that spending and its ability to 
strengthen the health system. Concerns were also raised around the availability of 
sufficient future funding that was required to scale up the treatment program. 
 
The comparison between the Western Cape and the Free State revealed substantial 
differences in their respective capacities to utilise funding, their financial inputs, and 
their implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. These differences suggested that 
more emphasis should be placed on understanding the particular dynamics in each 












CHAPTER 7  BOTTLENECKS IN SCALING UP HIV/AIDS 
FUNDING IN SOUTH AFRICA  
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on perceptions regarding bottlenecks experienced and obstacles 
encountered in spending HIV/AIDS funding. During the interviews, participants 
were shown a copy of Table 3.2 (page 58), which sets out the categories of various 
bottlenecks and lists potential obstacles to HIV/AIDS funding, as presented in 
Chapter 3. Interviewees were asked to comment on the following questions: do those 
bottlenecks and obstacles apply to South Africa and/or (in the case of the provincial 
case studies) to the particular province? Which bottlenecks and/or obstacles do you 
think were most important? Do you think there are other bottlenecks and/or obstacles 
to funding not listed here?  
 
Most respondents agreed that problems around human resources were the main 
bottleneck holding back the program, both nationally and in the two provinces. The 
lack of managerial capacities and the shortage of pharmacists were perceived as 
major obstacles. Financial bottlenecks were important in impeding the spending of 
funding, particularly because of the requirements of the conditional grant and the 
insufficient financial management capacity, both nationally and in the Free State. 
Infrastructure featured as a major bottleneck in the Western Cape and to a lesser 
degree in the Free State, though it was hardly mentioned in national interviews. The 
inadequate national leadership to drive the response was highlighted as the major 
obstacle by many respondents, whereas for others it was not an issue. Thus, 
differences emerged in perceptions of national and provincial level stakeholders 
regarding the bottlenecks that constrain HIV/AIDS funding and the ART rollout. 
 
This chapter summarises the feedback on each of the issues in Table 3.2 in Chapter 
3, following its structure. Section 7.1 deals with financial bottlenecks, Section 7.2 
with human resources bottlenecks, Section 7.3 with infrastructural bottlenecks, 
Section 7.4 with institutional bottlenecks, and Section 7.5 with structural 













7.2  Financial bottlenecks 
 
There were financial bottlenecks to the spending of funding. The most serious 
obstacles were the stringent reporting requirements of the NDoH with regard to the 
HIV/AIDS conditional grant and insufficient financial management capacity.    
 
A  Demanding reporting requirements for conditional grants  
 
Most participants noted that the HIV/AIDS conditional grant had stringent 
requirements, more so than did other health grants, which hindered access to 
funding. To start with, conditional grant funding may only be spent in certain areas 
and on certain items within these areas. In addition, provinces had to report spending 
down to each detailed item, such as stationery and telephone, which was a great 
administrative burden. Sometimes, although the money had been spent, it was not 
always journalised as such due to the cumbersome procedure involved: it required 
dedicated personnel to deal exclusively with those finances, and such personnel was 
not generally available. 
 
The information required by the conditional grant is heavy. In fact, we were only 
one or two provinces that met last year the requirements. The other provinces 
couldn‟t because the requirements are very complex. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
The initial period was a struggle because I think one was the instrument of 
conditional grants proved quite onerous for many provinces with respect to 
allocating the funds in terms of the business plan. Firstly developing the business 
plan, there was not much experience. Secondly the issue of allocation of those funds, 
and thirdly the use of those funds and accounting for management. So the blockages 
were a consequence of the system that was set up for managing the fund. [NDoH 
interviewee] 
 
In most of the provinces ... they have reported just by slotting things wherever they 
could. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
The HIV/AIDS conditional grant hindered spending in other ways. Provinces could 
only shift expenditure from one area of their business plan to another with the 
consent of the NDoH. The Free State, for instance, reported problems with spending 
funding because such authorisation had arrived too late. This not only was not 












into provincial affairs and a restriction of their use of discretion. In addition, 
quarterly reporting from PDoHs to NDoH occupied a great part of managers‟ time: 
“National needs to come visit us every quarter, and to spend three days looking at 
that is just a waste of time” [FSDoH interviewee]. The business plans were also 
criticised because they had turned into an end rather than a means, and because they 
used up too much of the time and energy of managers. It is worth noting that these 
complaints were raised at national level and in the Free State, but not in the Western 
Cape, which suggests that these obstacles were not relevant for this province, 
perhaps because of stronger capacities to prepare the business plans.  
 
The inflexibility of the grant was partly due to the lack of clarity about its 
functioning. For instance, some managers believed they could not pay program 
management from the conditional grant. Although this was in fact not the case, they 
would not be confident in paying for program management because of uncertainty. 
Other respondents indicated that they did not use conditional grant funding to 
appoint HIV/AIDS personnel to permanent posts because they saw the conditional 
grant as something that was only temporary. This way of thinking was criticised by 
National Treasury, who maintained that HIV/AIDS funding would continue, whether 
through earmarked or discretionary funding.  
 
The functioning of the conditional grant hindered spending, particularly during its 
first years, but it has improved since then because (a) reporting requirements were 
relaxed, and (b) provinces gradually learnt how to use the system. Although 
improvements in financial management and reporting were reflected in better 
spending rates, some respondents commented that the design of the grant was still a 
bit obscure and that it needed to be revised further by, for example, widening the 
spectrum of interventions covered and relaxing the reporting requirements.   
 
B  No HIV/AIDS spending specification of equitable share transfers 
 
Interviewees reported that the discretionary use of equitable share funding was not 
detrimental to HIV/AIDS spending, and that it did not take up much of the 
respondents‟ attention. The Western Cape used discretionary funding for HIV/AIDS 












an official of the FSDoH noted that “it‟s a challenge to spend the [HIV/AIDS 
conditional] grant, so we won‟t be touching the equitable share” [FSDoH 
interviewee]. It is worth noting that some respondents from Provincial Treasuries 
recognised that there had been greater direction from national government on the use 
of discretionary funding in the last years, which was sometimes perceived as an 
intrusion on provincial discretion. This indicated a trend towards a more 
„conditional‟ use of discretionary funding, which might be interpreted as a desire to 
ensure that funding was spent on HIV/AIDS but avoiding the use of the HIV/AIDS 
grant. This system had the advantage that provinces could freely decide the areas of 
HIV/AIDS on which they wanted to spend the funding, without the limitations of the 
grant. However, the disadvantage was that it lacked accountability, as there was no 
established reporting system on the final use of the funding.  
 
Information on the lump sums for HIV/AIDS that were added to the provinces‟ 
equitable shares was difficult to find. In fact, most participants at PDoHs and 
Provincial Treasuries could not provide information on these allocations, thus 
reinforcing the lack of accountability in respect of such mechanism. 
 
We wanted to try to measure expenditure, and we couldn‟t because of those lump 
sums going on equitable shares, which there‟s no monitoring system in place. 
[Research institution interviewee] 
 
C  Weak financial management capacity at decentralised levels 
 
Most participants identified insufficient financial expertise as a major obstacle to 
spending available funds. Financial deficiencies also affected the quality of budget 
bids prepared by NDoH and PDoHs, hence hampering future funding, as argued by 
several National and Provincial Treasury participants. Although financial 
management structures existed, with regular reporting and audits, the actual 
management on the ground needed to be significantly improved. For example, some 
provinces used different accounting packages and/or different sub-coding systems. 
The daily attribution of expenditures against the right account did not always 
happen. In addition, the pressures to spend the conditional grant often led to „rescue 
plans‟ when the financial year was approaching its end and insufficient funding had 












the less financial skills were found. It was more difficult for the most rural provinces 
and districts to appoint suitably qualified personnel.  
 
Nevertheless, most respondents recognised that learning by doing had brought about 
significant improvements in financial management, especially in relation to the 
conditional grant. It was suggested that better results could be achieved by 
appointing financial officers to deal specifically with the HIV/AIDS conditional 
grant.  
 
Financial management was not an issue in the Western Cape, which enjoyed greater 
financial, management and administrative capacity than most of the rest of the 
country, even at decentralised levels. But in the Free State, it was a very important 
problem: “financial expertise, that‟s where our biggest challenge is” [FSDoH 
interviewee]. The Free State had recently devolved expenditure responsibilities 
down to the districts, which increased the spending problem as districts did not know 
exactly how to spend the grant.  
 
Both provinces noted the importance of financial officers, or the lack thereof, in the 
smooth functioning and administration of the grant. Whilst the Free State did not 
have any financial officer working specifically with the HIV/AIDS conditional grant 
at the FSDoH, the Western Cape had only one officer exclusively responsible for the 
Global Fund funding. Provincial WCDoH and FSDoH participants commented: 
 
I think it‟s because we‟ve added additional financing capacity to make sure that we 
keep up to date and that finances are being shown against the right place. [WCDoH 
interviewee] 
 
There‟s [finance] posts here at head office [FSDoH] available for specifically the 
grant ... is now open for three, four years; and it‟s not been filled... The HIV/AIDS 
grant is such a huge grant, we have to have a specific finance person for that grant, 
and that‟s a big problem.  [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
D  Mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations  
 
Several National and Provincial Treasury participants emphasised that budget bids 
from the NDoH and PDoHs to respective Treasuries were often not granted because 












was not enough merely to ask for more funding; it was also necessary to attach the 
necessary documentation that justified the relevant request for resources. Deficient 
budget proposals were interpreted by some respondents as though the NDoH was not 
really interested in the additional funding: “they seem very much in two minds 
whether they want additional money for HIV/AIDS or not” [Provincial Treasury 
interviewee]. Other interviewees maintained that deficient budget proposals were 
more accurately due to insufficient financial capacity. 
 
The NDoH was criticised for over-budgeting, specially in the early years of the 
existence of the conditional grant, by putting forward proposals which were more of 
a „wish list‟ rather than a realistic plan based on actual capacities, thus resulting in 
„astronomical bids‟. Unrealistic demands also translated into underspending. 
Reasons for over-budgeting included the insufficient knowledge of how many 
people would demand the services, and the allocation of the equitable share formula 
based on the number of people sick, rather than on the number of people treated. 
Gradually, however, the development of better business plans contributed to better 
budgeting. 
 
In addition, many participants noted the willingness of National Treasury to fund 
HIV/AIDS programs in a generous way, regardless of the results attained, thus 
leading to underspending. Other arguments pointed to the limited communication 
between NDoH and National Treasury in particular in finalizing the national budget. 
From another perspective, part of the problem lay in the disjuncture between 
planning and budgeting, as these often functioned as two separate departments, both 
in the NDoH and in PDoHs.  
 
In the case of the Western Cape, the mismatch between the funding requested and 
the actual allocation received was attributed to different reasons. Funding proposals 
demonstrated sufficiently that the province had the capacity to treat more patients. 
Funding limitations were thus believed to be an attempt to compensate other 














E  Fiscal policies may restrict health spending 
 
Most respondents were of the opinion that fiscal policies did not restrict health 
spending in South Africa, and this issue consequently received very little attention. 
Nonetheless, a few participants did feel that fiscal policies were definitely a problem. 
Although social expenditure (including health) took a major cut of the national 
budget, other areas such as infrastructure were growing in importance. This signalled 
a shift in policy priorities, which might have compromised social allocations. For 
instance, many respondents believed the preparations for the World Cup 2010 were 
becoming a major budget priority, thus limiting the budget expansion in social areas, 
including health. This concern was particularly highlighted in the Western Cape. In 
addition, health expenditure had to compete with other social spending as well. 
 
7.3  Human resources bottlenecks 
 
The major bottleneck identified by all participants lay with human resources, “the 
single biggest blockage to absorptive capacity” [NDoH interviewee]. The lack of 
medical personnel was problematic across the public health service, but especially 





A large part of that [underspending] relates to human resources. They advertise 
posts and they simply don‟t get them filled. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
The capacity largely revolves around human resources and that‟s the single biggest 
blockage to absorptive capacity. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
A  Shortage of personnel 
 
There was an overwhelming agreement among all the interviewees that there was a 
severe shortage of medical personnel willing to work in the public service. This 
shortage translated into high vacancy rates throughout the public health service, not 
just in the ART program. The problem was not the shortage of personnel per se but 
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rather the inappropriate distribution of available staff, especially between the public 
and private sectors.  
 
It‟s simply not enough people there. Then lots of them fall out of the existing pool, 
for various reasons, they‟re dying, they‟re going to private sector, or they‟re going 
abroad. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
Generally, the Western Cape was better off in terms of personnel availability; the 
province was also able to recruit professionals from other provinces, as it was 
considered a more attractive place to live. Despite this advantage, however, a 
shortage of medical staff was still identified as the biggest bottleneck for the 
program in the province. This suggests how much more troublesome the shortage of 
personnel might be for those provinces with greater recruiting difficulties. 
 
In the Free State, human resources were also the biggest bottleneck. Yet, it was also 
noted that other provinces were able to deliver more services with the same staffing 
problems as the Free State, suggesting that there were other obstacles hampering the 
program. Some Free State respondents noted that the ART program in the province 
was actually overstaffed. Their ART budget spent more on personnel and used more 
nurses per patients than other health programs, without providing proportionally 
more services.  
 
The ART rollout was particularly affected by the shortage of pharmacists, doctors, 
nurses and program managers. The most acute shortage of personnel was 
experienced in the most rural and deprived areas. A few participants mentioned the 
attrition of medical personnel by HIV/AIDS as another important issue, though no 




The shortage of pharmacists featured as particularly critical, especially in the 
provincial interviews: “pharmacists are harder to find than doctors” [FSDoH 
interviewee]. Pharmacists were crucial for the ART program because it was a drug-












program‟s a drug-driven program” [FSDoH interviewee]. Moreover, as the 
complexity of the medicines increased, so would the need for pharmacists.  
 
There aren‟t sufficient pharmacists „in stock‟ to draw from them in order to expand 
ART sites. Not in the Western Cape. Not in terms of salary and working conditions 
in the public sector. They are already struggling to recruit and retain at the moment. 
Increasing them would be a big challenge. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
The divide between the public and private health sector was particularly acute 
among pharmacists. A respondent noted that less than 20% of registered pharmacists 
were employed in the public sector, and they received poor salaries relative to what 
they could earn in private practice. Consequently, there was a very high turnover of 
pharmacists and great difficulties in recruiting pharmacists in the public sector. 
 
This bottleneck was emphasised by both provinces. The Western Cape 
acknowledged that they struggled to retain pharmacists, particularly in informal 
settlements. In the Free State, pharmacist occupancy rates fell far below 50%, and 
were thus even lower than for doctors. To overcome this problem, the Free State was 







Surprisingly, respondents did not dwell much on the shortage of doctors, though the 
importance of this problem was recognised. The impression was that the shortage of 
doctors was taken „for granted‟, that it was a widely known and discussed obstacle, 
and that it thus did not require further explanation. The understanding was that 
doctors were scarce all over the country, even prior to the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Plan, and that their shortage would grow as ART was scaled up. 
 
Provincial differences however emerged. Whilst the Western Cape enjoyed better 
availability of doctors than other provinces, doctors were scarcer in the Free State, 
especially in rural areas, where it was common to find doctors from other countries. 
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 It would have two or three pharmacists plus ten pharmacy assistants. The idea was for this central 












Nevertheless, some FSDoH respondents recognised that the province had 
overestimated the number of doctors required in areas with few patients and 




The availability of nurses was widely discussed by respondents. There was a 
shortage of qualified nurses in South Africa, even in the private sector. Furthermore, 
many qualified nurses were in administrative positions and did not do clinical work. 
The shortage of nurses cut across both provinces: “even in the Western Cape we 
struggle to recruit nurses” [WCDoH interviewee]. Interestingly, the nurse occupancy 
rate in the public sector was higher in the Free State than nationally.  
 
Some participants argued that, if nurses were to take over more ART delivery 
responsibilities, their shortage would become even more important for the program.  
 
Getting the nurse to do more of the work, it makes so much sense. Where are these 
nurses. This hospital has got a 50% vacancy rate for nurses. Then show me the 
nurses, where are those nurses. So either you must train more nurses which is going 
to take a few years or you must reallocate nurses. You must take all these nurses out 
of paper work jobs and make them work as nurses. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Conversely, it was noted that, in the event of the HIV/AIDS program being 
incorporated into the overall functioning of health centres, the need for extra nurses 
for the Comprehensive Plan would not be that intense. Other respondents went 
further and questioned the need for so many nurses in the public health sector; they 
suggested that the current over-use of nurses in the country should be revised, and 
that other staff categories such as administrative clerks and community workers 
ought to be employed to take on some of their responsibilities.  
 
Counsellors and home-based care workers  
 
Lay counsellors and home-based carers emerged as a major support to fill gaps in 
medical personnel. However, concerns were raised about the quality of their work 












a high turnover of volunteers as they were paid a stipend by the NGOs, which 
impeded the formation of a skills base and was ultimately not cost-efficient. It was 
strongly emphasised that counsellors and home-based carers needed to be adequately 
supervised to ensure the provision of quality services: “We hear about counsellors. 
We never see them” [FSDoH interviewee]. The need for supervision featured more 
strongly in the Free State than in the Western Cape.  
 
Program managers  
 
A critical category of personnel identified as a major constraint was the lack of 
adequate program managers; „adequate‟ here refers not to the number of program 
managers but to a lack of suitably qualified personnel. Management involves a 
complex set of functions: strategic planning, M&E, operational management of 
financial and human resources, coordination of the implementation platform, etc. 
Thus, management deficiencies affect all these aspects of the program. Most 
respondents referred to management at mid-level – such as program, district or 
facility coordinators – as being problematic, although some also referred specifically 
to high-level management as being problematic – such as the head of the PDoH.  
 
For me the key is what I call mid-level management. So the poor capacity of mid-
level ...  And I think the weakness of that layer is across all [health] programs but 
especially in the ARV one. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
A major aspect of management identified as missing by respondents was the need 
for innovation and „thinking outside the box‟ to solve local challenges as they 
appeared: “[it is] more about [the] capacity of managers to think creatively about 
what‟s going on and reorganise the system to adapt to new things” [Research 
institution interviewee]. Inadequate management related to the insecurity of 
managers or their fear of being penalised for taking decisions, which might be 
interpreted as deviating from the official line or overstepping boundaries. Managers 
preferred to follow „word for word‟ what the Comprehensive Plan said rather than 
taking the risk of being considered disobedient or non-compliant.  
 
[Program managers] don‟t have the capacity to innovate, and have very weak 












that local problem-solving which is absolutely essential for the program to be 
working well and scaled-up. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
The insufficient capacity of managers was partly due to the way in which they took 
on their posts. Often nurses or doctors took on positions as managers without being 
trained in specific management skills. Moreover, the current transformation in the 
country and the prioritisation of previously disadvantaged population groups led to 
the employment of new personnel who did not necessarily have the specific 
background required for the specific position. This transformation was said to take 
place much faster in the public than in the private sector.  
 
The shortage in management skills implied that large-scale training on strategic and 
operational management was needed across the health sector. Nevertheless, the high 
work load and pressures to deliver quickly meant that managers did not have 
sufficient time for training. In addition, managers‟ work-time was often taken up by 
day-to-day business, leaving little space for analysis in order to stay on top of the 
process in a pro-active way.  
 
It‟s hardly possible for these top managers to, whatever gaps they might have, to 
learn it while they‟re on the job, because they‟re working anyhow overtime. [NDOH 
interviewee] 
 
Moreover, managers burnt out quickly, leading to a high turnover at NDoH and 
PDoHs where it was common to find acting managers, especially among top level 
managers, and particularly in the HIV/AIDS program. In fact, several managers 
interviewed as part of this research at the time had been either newly appointed or 
were about to vacate their post, or had recently left to take up a position outside 
government. The FSDoH had had an acting head for two years. One respondent 
acknowledged that the HIV/AIDS program managers had recently stabilised 
nationally, which was translating quickly into better spending.  
 
Data capturers and administrative clerks  
 
According to respondents, the availability of non-medical personnel like data 













B  Poor human resource practices  
 
Many participants argued that the major cause of human resource bottlenecks was 
inadequate personnel practices: “we are not making proper use of our personnel” 
[WCDoH interviewee]. This came up strongly in both provinces as well as 
nationally. Personnel management involved more than training; it also included 
looking at competence, staff morale, ensuring on-time payment of salaries, valuing 
workers‟ contributions and making them feel like important members of the team, 
etc. Many of these aspects were difficult to measure and monitor, yet were critical to 
the success of the program. The following example illustrates how better use could 
be made of existing personnel: 
 
In KwaZulu-Natal in many clinics 60 % of women are now HIV-positive  but the 
midwife is still doing the same things that she did 20 years ago. And all the HIV 
work is being taken up by new lay counsellors who are the least qualified people to 
do it ... and that has arisen because there‟s a lack of management capacity and 
imagination to think of how do we creatively change the way we do things. 
[Research institution interviewee] 
 
 
Shifting responsibilities  
 
One of the major suggestions raised in the interviews was the use of new modes of 
ART delivery to make better use of scarce human resources. The heavily doctor-
centred approach for ART delivery as stipulated in the Comprehensive Plan emerged 
as a major constraint to scaling up ART, given the large case load in the country and 
the severe shortage of medical personnel, especially in rural areas. Thus, 
interviewees suggested that personnel responsibilities should be revised and that 
tasks among doctors, nurses and the rest of the health care team should be reassigned 
in order to utilise their skills better. In particular, respondents called for nurses to 
take on more responsibilities in providing ART. However, this shifting of tasks 
would also exacerbate the current shortage of nurses. 
 
You can appoint the wrong people in terms of the wrong categories of people. 
Where you need a nurse you appoint a doctor ...  we, at least up till now, did these 













Do you need a nurse to write in the file of the patient? Can‟t a clerk do that? Can‟t 
we use the nurse to see follow-ups? [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
In fact, both the Western Cape and the Free State were moving towards a less 
doctor-driven and more nurse-driven delivery system for ART, and both provinces 
were highly supportive of this system. The need to move away from the doctor-
driven model to delivery of ART was underscored as a pre-requisite for scaling up 
the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
The criticism that the accreditation of ART sites required high numbers of staff also 
extended to other professions. Respondents also questioned the need for dieticians, 
social workers and counsellors in every ART clinic. 
 
What must a counsellor do? The counsellor is usually there to break bad news, to tell 
people they‟re positive. Once the person gets to the ARV clinic, they‟re positive 
already. They‟ve been tested and everything for a long time. There is no new 
counselling to be done. They sat there doing nothing. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Recruiting and retaining personnel  
 
The system of hiring staff in the public sector was very slow and thus held back 
spending and the implementation of the program. In fact, many participants shared 
their own personal recruiting experiences to illustrate the very frustrating nature of 
the recruitment system. The slow process of recruitment was linked to the 
bureaucratic character of the public system. Both provinces complained repeatedly 
of the troublesome process of hiring any professional, not only high level ones: “in 
the past, it has taken seven months to fill in a data capturer post” [WCDoH 
interviewee]. These delays affected the running of the program directly, as posts 
remained vacant, as well as indirectly, as the difficulty in recruiting the desired 
personnel created frustration within the program management team.  
 
Even more problematic than recruiting was the failure of the system to retain 
personnel in the public sector. Personnel moved to private practice or emigrated 
abroad, where they found better salaries and working conditions. The so-called 












recruitment efforts should be accompanied by policies to retain personnel in order to 
be effective.  
 
Yes, recruitment is a problem. But when you look at most companies, you will find 
that increasingly people are putting a lot more effort into keeping the staff that they 
have in the system. That‟s where I think the public sector is really struggling. 
[Research institution interviewee] 
 
Salaries and incentives  
 
Financial compensation was seen as a strategic area where money could ease human 
resource bottlenecks. A first step in attracting medical personnel from the private to 
the public sector and retaining them was to reduce the salary gap.  
 
Some respondents argued that personnel policies should have focused on tackling 
the problems specifically in rural and disadvantaged areas, where the most acute 
shortages were, rather than applying overall benefits across personnel. This implied 
the need to increase the incentives specifically for personnel to move to rural and 
less attractive areas, including reallocation pluses, housing and education benefits, 
bonus incentives, and opportunities for professional promotion. Although rural 
allowances were paid to health workers, benefits were considered insufficient to 
compensate for the wide spectrum of perceived disadvantages of rural areas, and 
consequently rural posts were not filled: “I think it‟s more the situation than the 
money” [FSDoH interviewee]. These issues, such as bonuses and promotion, are 
discussed in the section below on personnel motivation and support.  
 
However, there were concerns about the extent to which salary increases translated 
into service enhancement. A concern that was raised in relation to the Free State was 
that in order to attract professionals to the less attractive places, high posts were 
being created and paid for, though the work done was not worth that much. For 
example, when a Senior Medical Officer post remained vacant for a long time, it was 
replaced by a higher Principal Medical Officer post, to ensure that it was filled. As a 














Motivation and support  
 
A significant number of participants commented that the „soft issues‟ such as 
motivation and support were more important than the salary itself (the „hard issue‟) 
in recruiting and maintaining personnel. Job satisfaction was about ensuring 
minimum decent work and life conditions in terms of motivation, feeling of 
usefulness, good team environment, promotion possibilities, housing, children‟s 
schooling, etc. An issue that featured often in the interviews was the perception of 
personnel not feeling supported by managers but rather feeling constrained and 
being afraid of managers. These issues were believed to be crucial in the success of 
any program, though they were often not taken into account. It is worth noting that 
these „soft issues‟ were not included in the table of bottlenecks and constraints 
shown to interviewees. As a result, many respondents added these issues to the list.  
 
There‟s no ways in which this injection of money into the public service is drawing 
people from the private sector into the public service … It‟s not people‟s salaries 
that matter, it‟s whether they feel supported and valued. [Research institution 
interviewee] 
 
Some participants reported that the ART program was one of the most satisfactory 
health programs because medical personnel could quickly see that they were making 
a radical difference to the well-being of the patient. However, for managerial 
employees it was said to be particularly frustrating because of the political pressure 
and controversies around HIV/AIDS and ART, in particular at the national level and 




There was general agreement on the need to train more medical personnel to enter 
the system and thus to broaden the pool of professionals. Training of medical 
students was a shared responsibility of the DoH and the DoE, thus limiting the role 
of the NDoH to influence the number of new medical professionals. In addition, 
training was costly in terms of time, as personnel had to be taken away from their 
posts to receive training. To avoid this, the FSDoH organised the training of 












(iCAM), a satellite-based training centre that decentralised health training through 
television to the 40 facilities in the province
64
. iCAM was praised in the province for 
reaching a high number of professionals.   
 
The promotion of middle-level personnel was devised as a crucial strategy to deal 
with personnel shortages. The middle-level category applied to several professions: 
doctors, pharmacists, dentists, occupational therapists, etc. Personnel in this category 
had to work under the supervision of the relevant high-level professionals. For 
example, middle-level doctors, also called medical associates, were a category 
between doctors and nurses. They would work under the supervision of a doctor. 
Their training was devised to start in 2007. Pharmacy assistants were also seen as 
another crucial category due to the shortage of pharmacists. A pharmacy assistant 
would work under the supervision of a pharmacist.  
 
Now we are moving though towards the development of a mid-level as a way of 
filling the gaps. And we think also if we do it correctly we would not be under 
skilled. So we know we won‟t get as many pharmacists as we need. So we‟ve 
developed a pharmacy assistant, mid level. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
Respondents were very positive about this new development as a medium-term 
solution to the human resource shortage, as it would take a few years to train such 
personnel. However, concerns were raised that a fight between the professions about 
scopes of practice would emerge.  
 
Where do you draw the line? If you have an assistant doctor in the rural area and 
there is no doctor, how far will he get into the scope of the medical profession? 
[FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Several participants mentioned the community service required from medical 
personnel as another avenue to keep medical personnel in the public system. Besides 
graduating doctors, who were already doing this service, nurses were also projected 
to work one year after graduation in the public sector. It was suggested that doctors‟ 
services should be increased from one to two years, and that financial support 
provided to students should require them to work in the public system for a few 
years after they finished their training. 
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 ICAM existed before the ART program. It provided four courses per year for the implementation of 













7.4   Infrastructural bottlenecks 
  
At the national level, infrastructure was not mentioned as a major bottleneck. It was 
recognised, however, that in some instances physical infrastructure might have been 
a problem with regard to lower level facilities needing upgrading.  
 
Provincial interviews, in contrast, identified infrastructure as a major constraint in 
complying with timely spending of the grant and expanding the program. The first 
ART sites selected were those with higher capacity to comply with the accreditation 
criteria; thus, as the program progresses, new facilities will require greater 
infrastructure investments, which means that infrastructure is likely to become a 
more important bottleneck. In the Western Cape, where ART programs had been 
running longer, infrastructure featured as the second biggest bottleneck faced in 
expanding the program, after human resources. In the Free State it was identified as 
a bottleneck, though not a significant one; it is likely to become more important as 
additional ART sites are opened.  
 
We can‟t employ more personnel until the physical structure has been expanded, 
because there is no space to put more people. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
The problem with infrastructure projects was that they were slow: “the challenge 
with infrastructure is basically just to respond quickly” [WCDoH interviewee]. This 
was partly because of the time required for construction, but also because the 
Department of Public Works (DPW) had to execute the projects. The DPW operated 
through the tender processes, which took time: “the swollenness around the 
infrastructure spending is the tender process” [Provincial Treasury interviewee]. 
Furthermore, the DPW took into account Black Economic Empowerment issues, 
thus pursuing the employment and training of local people in awarding contracts. 
Yet, it was noted that infrastructure for ART was relatively small compared to other 
infrastructure projects of the WCDoH. 
 
There‟s an immediate need to accommodate 25% more surface space in this area. 












time you‟ve addressed that need, when you reach 48 months, there‟s a bigger need. 
[WCDoH interviewee] 
 
Infrastructure projects allowed for the absorption of large amounts of funding, 
although it was difficult to foresee when such funding could be registered as spent. 
The FSDoH reported difficulties in financially managing their infrastructure 
expenditure because infrastructure projects exceeded the budget time frame: “only 
then in the middle of nowhere they will slam you with all those accounts from the 
previous year” [FSDoH interviewee].  
 
The high infrastructural requirements for accreditation of ART sites were criticised, 
such as the actual need for a separate room to ensure confidentiality of VCT or the 
need for a new pharmacy exclusively for ART. In the Free State, some interviewees 
argued that the province had perhaps over-invested in „nice‟ infrastructure, which 
was perhaps not necessary for delivering quality services. Moreover, these high 
standards put ART on a pedestal, as the department had invested in ART 
infrastructure but not in the rest of the clinic. This contributed to dividing ART 
spaces from the rest of the clinic or hospital space, thus hindering the integration of 
services.  
 
Moreover, respondents from the PDoHs criticised the DPW, and respondents outside 
government also criticised PDoHs for not allowing for temporary solutions to 
address needs in the short term. 
 
One of the bottlenecks in this province [Western Cape] has been the reluctance of 
public works to allow temporary space to be built, prefabs, containers. Public works 
object every time anyone wants to put one up. [Academia interviewee]  
 
As soon as you say what about temporary structure, “no, nothing is allowed to be 
temporary”. What about mobile clinics, “no, it can‟t be mobile”. What about renting 
or buying a house outside the hospital premises and have the clinic there? “No, 
that‟s not good either”. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
In the Western Cape, the Global Fund grant had initially covered infrastructure 
projects, but this changed. At the time of this research, it was not clear whether the 
new Global Fund policy applied retrospectively and where the money for the 












for future needs, the WCDoH was in the process of recruiting a manager to deal with 
matters pertaining to ART infrastructure.  
 
More specifically the lack of clinic/hospital space, of the space to store drugs, and of 
the laboratory infrastructure is discussed below.  
 
A Insufficient clinic/hospital space  
 
The accreditation of treatment sites required spaces for doctors, nurses, adherence 
counsellors, support groups, etc. At the clinic level, the space was difficult to find, 
and new rooms thus had to be constructed. At the hospital level, it was easier to find 
unused space which could be adapted. Initially, the bottlenecks table shown to 
interviewees referred only to hospital space, but respondents made the point that the 
lack was more about space at the clinics. The table was updated accordingly. 
 
B  Lack of storage space for drugs  
 
The ART program uses high volumes of drugs, and sufficient storage space was 
required for sites to be accredited. Paediatric medicines in particular took up a lot of 
space. Some ARV drugs needed refrigeration. In addition, the increasing use of 
second line drugs exacerbates the space problem.  
 
If you want to provide the ART service at community health centre level, as a rule 
you need to increase the size of the pharmacy by 25%; it‟s high volume drugs. 
[WCDoH interviewee] 
 
You design a clinic and you say we‟re going to have 500 people, we need so much 
storage space. Now we‟re 200 people on the program and the space is just not 
enough. So the space for drugs is quite a big problem as well. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Although expanding storage space did not always happen quickly, it was not 
generally perceived as an obstacle for the program. It was argued that expanding the 
number of sites delivering ART would lower patient loads and ease storage 
limitations. The central depot used in the Western Cape, for instance, eased the space 












stock within a week. This allowed sites to drop their stock to 2-4 weeks. Other 
provinces like the Free State needed to keep 2-3 months‟ worth of stock.  
 
C  Inadequate laboratory infrastructure  
 
Laboratory infrastructure was not a bottleneck for the program nationally or in the 
two provinces: “I don‟t think it‟s a big problem in South Africa comparing now to 
other places” [WCDoH interviewee]. Problems, nevertheless, were reported in rural 
areas. The National Health Laboratory Services (NHLS) was criticised for being 
reluctant to expand existing laboratory services or transport systems, and the NDoH 
was criticised for not being able to supervise the NHLS‟s service. The turnaround 
time of results of the NHLS was said to be too high, even for a program like 
tuberculosis. The NHLS was characterised by some as a business-minded but not 
patient-oriented organisation.  
 
7.5  Institutional bottlenecks 
 
The group of institutional bottlenecks embraced several obstacles related to various 
elements of the public health system, including M&E systems, procurement systems, 
integration of tuberculosis and HIV interventions, existence of pilot studies, and 
leadership, as discussed below.  
 
A  Poor M&E systems 
 
Most participants, though not all, characterised the M&E systems of the 
Comprehensive Plan as unsatisfactory, and thus as an important obstacle for the 
program. Deficient M&E systems hampered spending and progress on the ART 
rollout in several ways. Firstly, information was not readily available for planning, 
budgeting and management purposes; thus, better M&E systems were necessary to 
overcome the obstacles mentioned above, such as weak budget proposals and 
inadequate program management. Secondly, it made the program less accountable, 
as it was difficult to report on progress. Thirdly, insufficient and partial data led to 












away from more relevant operational issues. Finally, the lack of information also 
impeded the recognition of achievements. 
 
I think it [insufficient M&E systems] is holding the program back politically 
because it leaves space for sceptics to doubt if the program is working. [Academia 
interviewee] 
 
The M&E system for the Comprehensive Plan was set up independently, outside the 
regular DHS structure, in order to pursue higher quality of information. Although 
data capturing was problematic across the health system, it was even more so for 
ART because: (a) HIV/AIDS was politically sensitive; and (b) ART was a life-long 
treatment, more complex than tuberculosis, for example
65
. However, having a non-
integrated M&E system created an opportunity cost because the efforts invested in it 
could not benefit the existing general M&E system.  
 
Respondents also indicated that different M&E systems were used for the 
Comprehensive Plan across the country. Provinces used different data collection 
systems, which were not necessarily aligned with each other, while the private sector 
used still different tools. Moreover, national indicators were not always clearly 
defined and were sometimes interpreted differently by NDoH and PDoHs, such as, 
for example, the definition of „awaiting treatment‟. In addition, each province 
reported on three types of M&E instruments to different structures of the NDoH. 
Moreover, both the WCDoH and the FSDoH each used its own self-defined M&E 
instruments for management purposes, which were not the same as the indicators 
reported nationally: “I don‟t even know what national indicators are; I know what 
ours are” [WCDoH interviewee]. Finally, the variety of M&E systems was not being 
coordinated consistently by the NDoH. PDoHs also complained that feedback 
received from the NDoH on reported data, if any, was not useful. Not only did 
provinces lack direction from the NDoH, but they even questioned the use of the 
information by the NDoH. The multiplicity of reporting systems consumed time and 
effort, and led to apparently contradictory information, which in turn led to questions 
about the reliability of data, thus hampering the aggregation and comparison of data 
on progress on the Comprehensive Plan. 
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We have initiatives that are expensive. Rolls Royce things. Patient information 
systems, looking great on paper, implemented, piloted ... and two years down the 
line, we don‟t have the feedback to say: does it work?  [NDoH interviewee] 
 
The M&E of the rollout was criticised for not providing even the most basic 
information, such as the numbers of patients currently on ART, let alone others, such 
as the side-effects of ARVs or the impact of the implementation on the overall health 
system. Several provincial respondents argued that the Western Cape and the Free 
State were the only provinces reporting on the number of people currently on ART.  
 
One of the terrifying things is that inadequate M&E system in place, and recording 
and reporting systems, so people couldn‟t tell you exactly how many patients where 
on treatment. They‟d say „oh, it‟s about 600 or 800 on the waiting‟, or „oh, we could 
take a few more hundred, but not many after them‟. It wasn‟t precise enough 
[Research institution interviewee] 
 
Interviewees complained of the inadequate quality of the resultant information. The 
poor quality of data was both a cause and a consequence of officials not using the 
data, in a catch-22 situation. Even provincial managers did not always use the 
available data, indicating that existing systems were not fully adapted to the needs of 
the people working in the program. Sometimes the M&E systems included too many 
criteria, thus collecting the maximum information rather than focusing on the main 
priorities.  
 
Significant differences emerged between the M&E systems of the two provinces. 
The Western Cape initially had a paper-based register. Designed by the province, it 
was adapted to the province‟s existing needs and capacities, providing satisfactory 
feedback to provincial managers. The province was planning to move to an 




Conversely, the electronic system of the Free State was heavily criticised because of 
the insufficient feedback provided and concerns about the ownership of the 
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 Some sites were already using computers, parallel to the paper register, to monitor children‟s 












information. The data warehouse was in Cape Town
67
 and it was argued that the 
FSDoH lacked control over the data. Furthermore, it was a complex data warehouse, 
and it was difficult to retrieve information from it or to change its original design. 
Other respondents questioned the incentives of the partners managing the 
warehouse, indicating that researchers might have been more interested in publishing 
than in disseminating the information openly and quickly to program managers.  
 
The danger is that we have researchers sitting on data and wanting to publish and 
they are gatekeepers of data, and government or policy makers entrust them with 
this information. [Academia interviewee] 
 
In addition, the Free State M&E system suffered from significant backlogs in data 
reporting, it did not report information disaggregated by sites, and it did not report 
on the children in the program. It was noted that the use of an electronic system did 
not guarantee better information unless the data was properly entered: “garbage in is 
garbage out” [NDoH interviewee]. Moreover, it was argued that the FSDoH would 
rather use the pharmaceutical data from the chief pharmacists of the ART program 
instead of the warehouse data to report on progress to the NDoH, as it was more 
accessible to the department. The use of pharmaceutical data instead of warehouse 
data was problematic because the former was less exposed to quality controls and it 
provided higher estimates than the figures gathered through the registers. 
                                                 
67
 The M&E system of the Free State was set up by the MRC and the Lung Institute of the University 
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B  Weak procurement systems 
 
Despite existing challenges, capacity in procurement and distribution systems was 
good and acceptable in South Africa, especially compared to other African countries, 
and most participants did not consider it to be a bottleneck. Weak procurement 
systems referred to both drugs and medical equipment. 
 
Drug procurement  
 
This was a very large part of the ART program, and timely availability of ARVs was 
critical for the patient‟s progress and for avoiding resistant strains of the virus. There 
had been some delays in the distribution of ARVs, but significant funding had been 
invested in drug tracking systems and issues had been sorted out.  
 
Provincially, whilst the Free State noted stock-outs of some drugs, the Western Cape 
noted that it had not experienced any stock-outs since the program started. 
Awareness of the importance of timely availability of ARVs, together with the 
independent ARV depot in the Western Cape, meant that the province‟s distribution 
system worked better than for general medicines. The WCDoH established a parallel 
ARV pharmaceutical service, independent from the one used for all other drugs, 
which was considered effective in the short term, as it enabled tight management and 
fast delivery of ARVs.  
 
In order to avoid drugs going missing, ARVs were managed as a Schedule 6 
medication, similar to morphine, although they were legally a Schedule 4 drug. This 
implied more control over how ARVs were kept and distributed through drug 
registers. This regulation implied a greater workload, and this was highlighted as a 
major hindrance to the expansion of the program in the Free State. 
 
The ARV tender processes were regarded as another obstacle for the program 
because they took too long to finalise and were not flexible enough to procure the 













There‟s one drug with a good formulation and a bad formulation, and only the bad 
formulation is available, because there‟s a three year tender for that formulation 
even though the newer one is now on the market. [Academia interviewee] 
 
Medical equipment and general procurement  
 
Frustrations were expressed in the provincial interviews, but not at national level, 
about the overall slow pace of making the procurement system work. Procurement 
was said to be slow because of the bureaucratic nature of the public system, which 
requires the ‟collection‟ of many authorizations.  
 
Procurement is definitely a limitation. It‟s incredibly frustrating ... you have to run 
and chase and follow. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
Details about equipment limitations were often given as an example of simple things 
that made the difference between an enabling or challenging environment; in the 
case of doctors, for instance, having a working telephone in their office so that they 
could access patient‟s results, made a big difference to their working conditions. In 
fact, general procurement was not included in the table of obstacles, but was added 
to it by several respondents, arguing that general procurement problems, such as, for 
example, in relation to telephones or computers, also hindered the spending of 
budgets.  
 
Every time they tell us we‟ve got millions of rands, we have to spend it. Tell us what 
you want. Then we say we need filing cabinets, we need telephones. Then, sooner or 
later, at the end of the financial year they say we are in trouble, we did not spend the 
millions. Now all of a sudden, buy lots of stuff; then the people buy TVs, water 
dispensers. And I say what happened to the telephones we need? We still haven‟t 
got the telephones. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
C  Need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis services 
 
The need to integrate HIV and tuberculosis services was recognised across 
respondents, but was not considered a bottleneck. The entry points to integrate 
tuberculosis and HIV were not clear, and more research was required to clarify what 













I don‟t think you want to put a patient with multi drug resistant tuberculosis in the 
same waiting room as the patient with HIV immune suppression. [WCDoH 
interviewee] 
 
Some respondents feared that greater interventions by the two programs might have 
led to further stigmatisation of tuberculosis due to the high stigma already around 
HIV/AIDS. Although some pilot projects were mentioned, little was known of the 
obstacles confronted in integrating the two services. Other participants 
recommended the integration of HIV/AIDS programs into the larger PHC system, 
and not only with the tuberculosis programs. 
 
D  Insufficient use of successful pilot studies 
 
The overwhelming majority of participants acknowledged that South Africa had 
conducted numerous pilot studies around ART delivery, some of which had been 
incorporated into the development of the Comprehensive Plan. The presence of 
research projects was therefore considered an important asset for the implementation 
of ART in South Africa, especially in comparison to other countries, and thus it was 
not a bottleneck. Nevertheless, there was insufficient dissemination, debate and 
learning from previous and existing studies. The NDoH was criticised for not pulling 
together and taking advantage of this existing body of knowledge.  
 
E  Inadequate political leadership 
 
Most respondents noted that inadequate national leadership was a major obstacle for 
the program.  
 
National leaders are investing heavily in the program. But what they must 
understand is that money is not enough. They have to endorse it publicly for this to 
actually work. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
I think above all is the need for kind of clear leadership that doesn‟t confuse either 
the masses or health professionals ... There isn‟t a single national message on what it 
is that actually needs to be done. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
The most important constraint to leadership highlighted by respondents was the 












HIV/AIDS, in particular ARV treatment. These leaders were criticised for sending 
out mixed messages around HIV/AIDS and ART, which caused controversies and 
fuelled confusion among medical professionals as well as the public in general. In 
particular, political leaders did not clearly promote the uptake of ART by individuals 
in need: “if you can find a speech in the last year in which Mbeki has said the word 
antiretroviral, well done. There aren‟t, they don‟t exist” [FSDoH interviewee]. Most 
respondents believed that the ambiguity of top leaders was largely responsible for 
the delay in rolling out the Comprehensive Plan, as well as for the insufficient 
demand for ART. In particular, early underspending on ART was partly the result of 
it not being „politically correct‟. Furthermore, it was argued that, despite the 
existence of the Comprehensive Plan, AIDS denial by top leaders was not over.  
 
The inability of the Minister of Health and the President to unambiguously say to 
people: “we‟re totally behind this program; go get tested; go and access treatment” 
... translates into a huge amount of confusion on the ground. [Academia interviewee] 
 
To me, what would make the greatest difference in terms of capacity tomorrow? I 
reckon it would be if the president went down to Khayelitsha or to any clinic and 
just put his arm around a health worker, a nurse, and say “I think you‟re doing a 
wonderful job.” He doesn‟t have to mention AIDS, but I think it‟s that feeling that 
we are doing something that is important that is supported by leaderships whom we 
trust and we admire. [International organisation interviewee] 
 
At the same time, responses also revealed different understandings and expectations 
of leadership. Leadership was described as having a clear vision that would guide 
and promote the technical implementation of programs. Other respondents assessed 
the existing political leadership as per the existence of plans and guidelines to 
address HIV/AIDS, together with the allocation of sufficient funding. For other 
respondents in turn leadership was also about the commitment to make those plans 
work, i.e. overseeing the implementation of plans to ensure results. Other 
participants viewed leadership as the capacity to strategise and plan in advance, 
providing the means to prepare for future challenges. Other interviewees pointed as 
the ability to coordinate efforts and engage with all stakeholders, i.e. an 
empowerment process in which the role of a leader was to support others to act to 













Because the civil service is quite bureaucratic ... it works like an army .,.it‟s difficult 
to start an AIDS treatment service unless the boss agrees: the head of the army. 
[Treasury interviewee] 
 
According to those criteria, leadership in South Africa was considered as very good 
because it had drafted the Comprehensive Plan and guidelines to support its 
implementation, and also because it had ring-fenced substantial funds to fight the 
epidemic. However, the leadership of the NDoH was criticised for not sufficiently 
monitoring the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan, for not planning 
strategically with forward thinking, and for failing to work productively with civil 
society and the private sector. 
 
Donors all thought that AIDS denialism was dead because we‟ve got this ARV 
treatment programme.... wrong, totally wrong. AIDS denialism is alive and 
flourishing. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
This ambivalence on the part of national leaders trickled down to provincial program 
managers, preventing the full support of the program in the provinces:  
 
You do definitely get a sense at a national level, which is then picked up by senior 
people at provincial level, that there‟s a bit of ... ambivalence ... there isn‟t like 
100% commitment, we‟re doing this and it‟s got to be done but there‟s not a 
wholehearted. [Academia interviewee] 
 
Provincial doesn‟t want to go against national and therefore they‟re not running at 
full steam [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
I can‟t tell you how much time that takes from mangers, to actually try and ... get 
past the national department. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
In cases where the province was fully backing the ART program, it was described as 
a “war between national and provincial” [Research institution interviewee]. In fact, 
the NDoH was perceived as undermining the work of the provinces, as the former 
did not publicly and widely support the advances on the ART programme. The 
provinces‟ political strength and confidence was determined by the extent to which 













Thus, big differences emerged between national leadership, mostly characterised as 
lacking, and provincial leadership in the Western Cape and the Free State, regarded 
as much more satisfactory. Other examples of good provincial leadership were 
reported for Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal and North West province. It is worth noting 
that these provinces were not exclusively the most urban or those with better health 
systems, which suggests that leadership was not dependent on the existing resources 
or health systems.  
 
A lot of strong provincial leadership of the programme and some provincial leaders 
really taking it on board and steering it – even in politically aligned provinces – in 
very clever ways politically. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
So despite the lack of national leadership around this, what you've had is actually a 
lot happening on the ground. I think that's because you've got a lot of bottom-up 
leadership happening. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
 
In fact, extraordinary leadership in the Western Cape was regarded as one of the 
major factors contributing to the success of the program in the province. The 
province had provided ART before it had been approved as a national policy, and 
this had required strong commitment on the part of leaders „to stick their necks out‟ 
against the political climate. The province‟s commitment was also demonstrated in 
the detail of its planning and in the good collaborations and relationships with civil 
society organisations. The provincial leadership was characterised by strong 
individuals working together as a strong team. 
 
We [Western Cape] had leadership ... he managed to achieve the political buy in and 
the buy in from top management within the province. He also established a core 
team to drive the program, a team of drivers to get the things done. [WCDoH 
interviewee] 
 
In the Free State, respondents reported both positive and negative aspects of 
leadership. The province was fortunate to have political and departmental leaders 
who fought for the program, and the establishment of an ART Task Team
69
 within 
the FSDoH devoted to coordinating the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. 
                                                 
69
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Task Team to coordinate the execution of the Comprehensive Plan. This body included several 
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Some respondents praised the role of the Task Team in creating the space for the 
participation of all role players and allowing everyone to be informed of the progress 
and problems encountered. However, some interviewees expressed their frustration 
at actively engaging in the regular meetings but not being able to obtain solutions to 
the problems presented in this forum. Hence, this coordinating structure was 
criticised for lacking the power or assertiveness to take important decisions.  
 
It was also noted that, in the tension between national and provincial leaderships, 
there was a political factor too. In the initial years, spending on HIV/AIDS was not 
„politically correct‟ because “the health minister and to some extent the political 
leadership was not clearly pro-treatment” [WCDoH interviewee]. Consequently, 
“provinces where politics dominated policy were slow to start treatment” [WCDoH 
interviewee]. This related to the political alignment of the province with the main 
national political party, the African National Congress (ANC). Provinces like the 
Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal which were governed by a coalition of parties, 
allowed more room to provide treatment. But it was also said to relate to the political 
position within the ANC. For instance, the province of Gauteng had a significant 
power base of its own and was politically powerful within the ANC. Hence, they had 
also more room to draw the line in relation to treatment. Thus, provincial political 
strength and confidence determined the extent to which provinces needed to tow the 
national line.  
 
Nevertheless, a participant emphasised that, while inadequate leadership was an 
important obstacle, it could not explain by itself the difficulties in implementing the 
Comprehensive Plan: 
 
There's no lack of political leadership around TB. There's no controversy around 
TB, and yet TB is still a terrible problem. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
In order to approach the issue of leadership more constructively, several respondents 
recommended looking at alternative voices of leadership, which had proved good 
examples, including provincial governments like the Western Cape, other national 
departments such as the DSD, individual champions at specific health centres, and 












need to focus on the positive signs around ART, to recognise them and celebrate 
them. It was hoped that as the Comprehensive Plan continued to advance and show 
positive results, political controversies would become less of an issue. 
 
There needs to be much more celebration of the successes and the progress which 
has been made. It‟s true that there are many thousands of people today who are alive 
because treatment is there. [International organisation interviewee] 
 
7.6   Structural bottlenecks 
 
Structural bottlenecks included those obstacles outside the domain of the public 
health system, such as access issues, reliability, predictability and coordination of 
funding, ownership of decision-making, government bureaucratic system, PPP, 
community outreach and participation, and the need for social insurance.  
 
A  Issues of access: cultural barriers, stigma and transport 
 
Access issues were not seen as holding back the expansion of the program, as in 
most cases the demand for ART services clearly exceeded the existing delivery 
capacity of facilities. However, as the number of ART facilities increases, it will be 
necessary to intensify the demand for treatment in order to achieve the objectives of 
the Comprehensive Plan. Moreover, expanding demand for services is crucial for the 
treatment program‟s success.  
 
Cultural barriers however influenced health seeking behaviour patterns and the level 
of trust the community had in the clinic. In rural areas, compared to urban ones, 
more people preferred to use the Sangomas (traditional healers) over public health 
services. Respondents expressed concern that stigma prevented people from being 
tested and accessing services, although this was not considered a bottleneck. 
Furthermore, as treatment services were functioning on the ground, stigma became 
less significant: “sometimes with confidentiality we create a bigger problem than it 

















You have to go to the hospital to give blood because this clinic cannot take blood for 
CD4 count; 200km to get the blood, 200km to get the result, and then 200km for a 
review. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
Transport was seen as a potential bottleneck in provinces with very poor 
infrastructure, such as the Eastern Cape. In the Western Cape and the Free State, 
transport was considered an important logistical problem, but not a bottleneck as 
such. The use of mobile clinics for VCT and the expected decentralisation of the 
program towards PHC facilities were expected to ease the transport problem. 
 
 
B  Insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of funding 
 
Problems of insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of funding, very 
common with donor funding, were not believed to be relevant for South Africa 
because the Comprehensive Plan was primarily financed domestically. Yet, other 
nuances in respect of these issues emerged. Firstly, donors contributed substantial 
financial and non-financial aid to support ART delivery. In the Western Cape and 
Free State, moreover, the contribution to HIV/AIDS financing of foreign funding 
was substantial: in the Western Cape, the Global Fund covered as much as one third 
of patients on ART, while an official of the FSDoH noted that the non-financial 
contributions of donors were more important than the financial ones in this province. 
Respondents argued that there was inadequate coordination among donors and also 
between donors and the government, which sometimes led to duplication of efforts. 
Further, it was noted that, although donors had offered significant funding to South 
Africa, the said funding had neither been accepted nor rejected due to the lack of a 
decision from NDoH regarding donor aid. Apart from that, the cumbersome 
procedures to get these authorisations prevented some national organisations, 
especially smaller ones, from accessing donor funding: “too much work for too little 
money” [Research institution interviewee]. 
 
                                                 
70
 Regular, timely visits to clinics and/or hospitals were compulsory for the drug readiness 












Secondly, domestic HIV/AIDS financing was not entirely free of obstacles. For 
example, the availability of public funds transferred to provinces depended on the 
timely delivery of approved business plans, which was regarded as complicated for 
many provinces, therefore compromising the reliability of funding. In addition, the 
predictability of the budget was affected by last minute adjustments, as argued by a 
FSDoH official. In addition, the coordination of financing between the vertical levels 
of the DoHs was often insufficient. For example, the decentralisation of financing 
responsibilities from the FSDoH to districts was affected by inadequate 
communication between the province and the districts. Although these funding 
issues were relevant to the program, they were not considered to hold it back.  
 
C  Lack of ownership of decision-making 
 
Most respondents argued that South Africa did not have any problems of ownership 
of decision making, because funding was mainly domestic. Decisions on funding 
were made „in house‟, following the country‟s priorities. It was recognised that lack 
of ownership was a big problem for other African countries. Yet, several participants 
complained about the insufficient ownership of the existing donor funding in South 
Africa.: 
 
We would like to have more funders; but the funders shouldn‟t dictate to us what to 
do. [FSDoH interviewee]  
 
Likewise, several respondents complained that there was too much top-down control 
from the NDoH over the implementation, as the approval of NDoH was required for 
many important decisions at provincial level. Thus, PDoHs were left with little 
discretion. 
 
D  Slow government bureaucratic system 
 
Many respondents criticised the bureaucratic nature of the public administration and 
governance system, as it obstructed and delayed procedures. 
 













 A repeated frustration was that every action within the health department required 
numerous authorisations and signatures, taking too much time and effort from 
personnel. This was illustrated for example by the cumbersome procedures required 
to hire personnel within the DoH, which ultimately demoralised staff. The 
bureaucratic nature of the process was linked to perceptions of a lack of decision 
making power due to conservative attitudes among managers and heads of 
departments. Bureaucratic hurdles were also highlighted in respect of the numerous 
requirements to accredit ART sites.  
 
There are a lot of bureaucratic and administrative bottlenecks ... the process will take 
three to six months, easily; six months to a year. The whole process of submission, 
authorization levels to get what is in the plan being approved for the actual activity 
to take place is very slow. [NDoH interviewee] 
 
However, it was also recognised that the cumbersome regulations within the public 
system served to ensure that the right processes were followed to avoid faulty 
practices. Consequently, although these procedures might have been perceived as 
slowing down the rollout, in fact they made the process more sound and sustainable, 
and thus facilitated better outcomes. It was up to managers to work within these 
rules, planning in advance to avoid delays. For some respondents, the bureaucratic 
character of the public administration system should not have been a bottleneck for 
the Comprehensive Plan, because the system had always been there and people 
found ways to go around the bureaucratic hurdles.  
 
E  Need for PPP  
 
Although partnerships between public and private entities in relation to HIV/AIDS 
were numerous, not enough was done to take advantage of the extraordinary pool of 
expertise available in the private sector in South Africa, both for profit and not-for-
profit. However, the need for more PPP was not considered to be an obstacle for the 
program. 
 
One major area requiring better collaboration was human resources, as the private 












service. Collaboration was needed in terms of clinical service delivery, such as 
recruiting doctors in sessions to see complicated cases. Yet, national and Free State 
responses pointed out that the public health sector had been rather slow and/or 
reluctant to hire private practitioners, despite the availability of funding. Another 
potential area for collaboration identified by respondents was financial management 
expertise.   
 
Several factors prevented the intensification of existing partnerships and the 
formation of new ones. The building of trust between the public and private sectors 
was challenging, partly because HIV/AIDS was a very political issue in the country, 
affecting for example, the timing of signing agreements between sectors. In addition, 
collaborations implied risk transfer and risk taking, and required close vigilance of 
agreements and unintended consequences. It was argued that the public sector did 
not always have the spare capacity to oversee the work of the private sector, in 
particular in rural areas, where partnerships were needed most. In fact, partnerships 
could actually add an extra burden on the already limited management and/or 
administrative capacity of the public sector:  
 
The public sector is weak enough as it is, there‟s very few places where it has the 
capacity to engage with formal contractual relationships with private. And where it 
has done, quite often it‟s come out much worse because it just hasn‟t got the 
capacity to monitor and to draw up. [Research institution interviewee]   
 
Although a system was in place for establishing joint ventures, the political climate 
within the NDoH was not favourable. While there was willingness for collaboration 
at the technical level and from civil society, these efforts were not supported 
politically. The insufficient confidence over the progress of the ART rollout within 
the NDoH, related to the insufficient M&E systems, led to precaution or fear of the 
strong civil society, thus preventing managers from engaging with it. The presence 
of SANAC was acknowledged as bringing together a multidisciplinary team, though 
its role was viewed with disappointment by many participants. The development of 
the new HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan, however, was based on consultations and 
consensus-building across stakeholders and created new opportunities for 













Both provinces benefited from several partnerships, including research 
collaborations with academia. In addition, the WCDoH collaborated with the Global 
Fund, MSF, Absolute Return to Kids (ARK), and other NGOs, though it did not 
accept PEPFAR funding. The WCDoH was said to have successfully aligned its 
partners to harness their expertise according to the department‟s needs. For instance, 
ARK put up temporary buildings when infrastructure projects took too long, and 
provided for temporarily staff while government posts were being advertised. The 
WCDoH viewed these PPP as temporary pillars of the program, until the public 
system had built the capacity to manage those responsibilities on its own. At the time 
of the study, the WCDoH was taking over its partners‟ contributions and the number 
of partners was being reduced.  
 
We‟ve been able to respond to human resource and infrastructure by working in 
partnership with other organisations, NGOs, outside which have much more 
flexibility. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
The FSDoH also had several partners, including the Catholic Relief Services, 
Correctional Services, Netcare, and some PEPFAR-funded NGOs delivering ART in 
the province. However, participants in the Free State were not content about existing 
joint ventures, and expressed the need to intensify partnerships: “We haven‟t 
explored that very much” [FSDoH interviewee]. 
 
F  Lack of community outreach and participation 
 
Community outreach was given credit for the resilience with which the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic was fought on the ground. Both provinces reported fruitful engagements 
with communities with regard to ART delivery. The positive impact of community 
participation was especially felt in the rural areas where there were wider gaps to be 
filled in terms of services provision. Other participants, however, were of the 
opinion that community participation had been constrained to too few aspects of 
ART, given the nature of the challenges faced.  
 
We still have a program where the community‟s role is very passive of maybe 
making adherence monitoring at best. Whereas if we‟re going to get them to scale 














Moreover, it was argued that, although a full service package, including community 
outreach, was important, its absence should not be a reason to hold back the rollout. 
Some of the responsibilities placed on communities in supporting the ART program 
should have been taken at different levels: for example, treatment adherence should 
have been promoted through mass media campaigns and mass education.  
 
I think having community outreach will improve quality of care but I don‟t think it‟s 
a structural barrier to scale up. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
Transferring resources to communities remained a challenge. The high requirements 
of conditional grants hindered the participation of NGOs in this funding. At the same 
time, the substantial funding made available to community participation had brought 
about the emergence of new organisations, raising accountability issues.  
 
G Need for social insurance schemes 
 
For most participants, social insurance was not a bottleneck or even an issue for the 
current implementation of the Comprehensive Plan. Although the NDoH discussions 
on social health insurance touched upon the inclusion of HIV/AIDS as part of the 
prescribed minimum benefit, its relevance for the ART scale-up was only considered 
in the end. The ART rollout was still at a stage where it only reached people who 
themselves sought ART, and who were better off socio-economically. As the 
program expands to include people who are harder to reach, support in terms of 
insurance or grants will become a bigger issue; although the ART program is free, 
there are associated costs like transport, which the ART program does not cover.  
 
7.7  Conclusion 
 
This chapter reported on the complex web of bottlenecks and obstacles faced in 
increasing funding for the scale-up of ART in accordance with the Comprehensive 
Plan. The bottlenecks were grouped into five broad themes. For each type of 
bottleneck, a number of obstacles were identified. According to interviewees, the 












of the shortage of medical personnel in the public sector but also because of the 
misuse of skills and inadequate management. Financial bottlenecks were also very 
relevant, because of the combination of the laborious reporting and administrative 
systems of conditional grants and personnel‟s inadequate financial skills. The 
financial bottleneck had been particularly relevant during the first years of 
HIV/AIDS earmarked funding, but had become less so as the requirements of the 
grant were relaxed and officials learnt to manage the grant. Infrastructure bottlenecks 
were also important, created by delays in building the infrastructure required for 
service provision, as PDoHs worked through the DPW and depended on its 
procedures. Two institutional bottlenecks arose: weak M&E systems, which were 
not providing the necessary information to follow up on results and learn from the 
experiences; and inadequate leadership, as contradictory messages from top national 
leaders around HIV/AIDS and ART created confusion and ambivalence among 
professionals and the general population, thus preventing full endorsement of the 
program. Finally, one structural bottleneck was underscored, viz. the slow 
bureaucratic nature of the public system, which delayed every aspect of 
implementation, including the spending of funds.  
 
When comparing the provinces, the human resource bottleneck was the most 
important at national level as well as in the two provinces. However, while the 
second most important bottleneck nationally and in the Free State was the financial 
bottleneck, in the Western Cape it was infrastructure. Equally, poor M&E systems 
were a major obstacle nationally and in the Free State, whereas for the Western Cape 
it was less relevant. Insufficient national political leadership was for most 
respondents one of the major obstacles in South Africa as a whole. Yet, the existence 
of committed provincial leaders, especially in the Western Cape, had been crucial in 
making the program succeed. These results suggest that the obstacles faced by the 
Free State were closer to those identified at the national level than the obstacles 













CHAPTER 8 STRENGTHENING THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
SYSTEM AND ITS EFFICIENCY, EQUITY 
AND SUSTAINABILITY  
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter reports on the issues raised by respondents in relation to the impact of 
rapid increases in HIV/AIDS funding on the health system, and on its equity, 
efficiency and sustainability. As set out in the conceptual framework, these were the 
constituent principles of the concept of absorptive capacity, and they furthermore 
represent the main aims of the Comprehensive Plan. Interviewees likewise 
considered these issues as crucial in determining absorptive capacity for HIV/AIDS 
funding. Section 8.2 deals with issues of strengthening the health system. Section 8.3 
explores efficiency issues, while Section 8.4 looks into equity matters. Finally, 
Section 8.5 discusses the sustainability challenges, and Section 8.6 summarises and 
concludes this chapter. 
 
8.2  Health system strengthening  
 
Respondents agreed that the health system had to be strengthened in parallel to the 
rollout of ART, and they acknowledged the importance given to this issue by the 
Comprehensive Plan.  
The challenge is how do you offer the service with HIV and AIDS with all these 
components in a way that doesn‟t undermine other programmes. [NDoH 
interviewee] 
However, the varying provincial responses on this matter reflected a lack of 
unanimity on what was actually expected. It was argued that the ways in which 
HIV/AIDS funding could or should have spillover effects in the larger health system 
should have been made more explicit.  
 
Strengthen services, facilitate implementation, all buzz words. Where is the action? 
How do you actually do that? What do you mean by strengthen services? What are 
you actually going to deliver? I think the national department could actually provide 













It was necessary to study both the positive and negative implications of the 
Comprehensive Plan on the health system. On the one hand, the scale-up of ART 
had numerous advantages for the health system. It mobilised substantial financial 
and non-financial resources (human, infrastructural) invested within the health 
sector. These resources strengthened the platform for care provision in several ways, 
such as the recruitment and training of staff, the mobilisation of a new cadre of 
volunteers, the expansion and upgrading of infrastructure, and the strengthening of 
drug supply and laboratory systems. In addition, HIV/AIDS brought attention to the 
need to enhance health care delivery systems.  
 
HIV has focused the world‟s attention on the health system, and that must be turned 
into an opportunity. The best example I use is the PMTCT program and antenatal 
services. If you want to run an effective PMTCT program, unless you fix the 
antenatal services, you won‟t achieve that. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
However, the question remained as to what extent the resources invested in the 
Comprehensive Plan supplemented existing resources, or instead represented 
reallocations only from other health programs. For example, would non-HIV/AIDS 
health expenditure have grown more if the HIV/AIDS expenditure had not grown so 
much? Were human resources taken away from other health functions? Was 
infrastructure upgrading prioritised for HIV/AIDS facilities to the detriment of other 
services?  
 
In order to have quick disbursement it means that you need to build a parallel 
system. Parallel system it means that you poach staff from the public sector. For 
instance in Swaziland the nurses, or health workers who work in the AIDS sector are 
paid more than in the rest of the health service, which means that then you poach. 
It‟s normal; it makes sense that people then leave the rest of the health sector. So 
basically you kill the rest of the health sector. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
The possibility that the Comprehensive Plan was deflecting funding, personnel, and 
attention from other health matters, implied that the Comprehensive Plan weakened 
rather than strengthened the health system in certain areas. The prioritisation of ART 
delivery over other health interventions may have overwhelmed and distorted the 
overall balance within the health system. In view of the above, the rest of the section 













Crowding-out expenditure  
 
It was difficult to ascertain the actual displacement of non-HIV/AIDS specific health 
expenditure by HIV/AIDS specific programs. Because the health budget was 
influenced by many factors, it was difficult to isolate the effect of HIV/AIDS 
expenditure over the rest of determinants. In order to look further into this issue, it 
was suggested that it should be investigated at the micro level, focusing on specific 
resources at the facility level.  
 
It was argued that the crowding-out of health expenditure was not a major issue in 
the Western Cape at that time. In this province, health funding had always grown 
consistently. Strong political commitment to health care existed in the province and 
ensured sufficient financing for health programs. Well-functioning provincial 
organisations such as the WCDoH and Western Cape Treasury enabled the province 
to attract additional HIV/AIDS funding from non-government sources. Moreover, 
the provincial HIV/AIDS prevalence and the resultant need for treatment were 
relatively small compared to the rest of the country.  
 
The potentially positive impact of such HIV/AIDS funding on other programs was 
limited, even in the Western Cape, because it was largely ring-fenced through 
conditional grants. In addition, the pressure on provinces to spend grant allocations 
in a timely manner made it more difficult to plan long term. Therefore, arguments 
were made in favour of moving towards equitable share funding in order to ensure 
that the whole health system benefited from these increments in HIV/AIDS funding.  
 
So unfortunately, I think, the one hope that this injection of money through 
HIV/AIDS services would strengthen the PHC services hasn‟t had that ramification 
because of being tied to HIV/AIDS services. I think they should have made it for all 
PHC services. But then I expected it would have been swollen up by other silly 
things. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
Other respondents discussed the potential crowding-out effect of HIV/AIDS 
financing from the patient‟s perspective. The highest burden of HIV/AIDS on the 
health system was on the general care services, when HIV-infected patients got sick 












HIV/AIDS interventions such as ART or VCT. Throughout the country, HIV/AIDS 
patients were crowding out non-HIV/AIDS patients in health centres. This argument 
underlined the constraints of looking at HIV/AIDS services in isolation from general 
health programs.  
 
Moreover, both provinces reported that the rollout of ART had not brought about a 
tangible reduction in the burden of HIV-positive individuals on hospitals and clinics 
so far: “It‟s not really doing it at all” [FSDoH interviewee]. Personnel from the 
WCDoH and FSDoH agreed that they had not seen such a positive effect yet, 
because they did not have enough people on ART. It was noted, however, that a 
noticeable decrease in inpatient care for sick AIDS children had been noted in the 
Western Cape, but this was not replicated in adult patients. It was pointed out that 
the perception in the Western Cape was that the burden on hospitals had actually 
increased, probably because hospitals were tackling a combination of two different 
burdens: patients with complications who were not on ARVs, plus patients who had 
started on ART and experienced its complications: “We‟ve not replaced the one 
burden with the other burden; the two burdens coexist” [WCDoH interviewee]. Only 
when all or most of the people in need were on ART would one burden replace the 
other, and would the positive impact on hospitals be felt. This argument supported 
the need to sustain the thrust of the Comprehensive Plan. 
 
Human resources  
 
In relation to mobilising new personnel, it was argued that, although many new posts 
had been created for the Comprehensive Plan, many of them remained vacant. This 
was illustrated clearly for the case of the Free State. A Free State interviewee 
referred to this phenomenon as the difference between „real‟ and „perceived‟ 
strengthening. Furthermore, when tracking down the new appointments for ART in 
the province, it was found that only a few of them were actually new entrants into 
the system: the majority of appointees had either shifted from other positions or been 
promoted within the public health system. This highlights the extent to which 
additional human resources for service delivery capacity did not materialise on the 
ground in the Free State. Such failure indicates the limitations of the Comprehensive 













 They failed in bringing in new blood ... The main idea was strengthening the whole 
health system in the Free State. We failed there. Actually, we did nothing. [FSDoH 
interviewee] 
 
The shifting of personnel in the public health system towards ART was partly due to 
the conditions offered to recruited personnel. Personnel recruited in ART facilities 
receive the same salary as any other professional employed at that level in a different 
program. However, what made the difference in the Free State was that professional 
posts were advertised for high levels in order to attract personnel, thus creating 
promotional opportunities within the system. For example, ART nurses hired for the 
program in the Free State were elevated to level 7. Thus, other nurses in the same 
facilities working in a different program but employed at lower levels, had an 
incentive to apply for L7 positions in the ART program.  
 
If we appoint nursing staff, we don‟t attract them from other provinces. It‟s simply 
nursing staff in the province that moves over to the ARV section. If you increase the 
salaries you just get more personnel and more empty spaces in other places. [FSDoH 
interviewee] 
 
Other provinces with difficulties to attract new personnel also faced significant 
limitations in strengthening the system. The Western Cape, however, found it easier 
to recruit personnel from other less attractive and needier provinces. Yet, many of 
the personnel employed in ART sites in the Western Cape also came from their PHC 
services. 
 
Many of the personnel that had been employed in the ARV treatment sites, or in the 
ARV treatment program within the community health centres, in fact had come 
across from other parts of the primary care services. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
It was also argued that newly appointed ART personnel helped with non-AIDS work 
in the facility. Personnel employed for ART were also sometimes working elsewhere 
in the hospital or clinic, which might have had a positive impact on the larger health 
system. However, opinions differed greatly on the extent to which this happened or 
not on the ground. Whereas in some ART facilities personnel was already 
overburdened by existing ART patient loads, personnel in facilities attending to less 













From the beginning, they talked about strengthening of the services. So the hospital 
appointed three nurses. But you can go to the ARV clinic, there is one nurse. If there 
is one nurse. The other two are working in the rest of the hospital, in casualties, in 
the ward somewhere. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
The need to improve capacity amidst the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan 
was further undermined by high personnel turnover. In particular, the high turnover 
of managers was a major drawback. 
 
Stronger focus on tuberculosis  
 
Several respondents argued that HIV/AIDS policies helped to bring a stronger focus 
and support to tuberculosis and other diseases closely related to HIV/AIDS. The 
other side of this argument was that diseases not so closely related to HIV/AIDS 
were not prioritised.  
 
For disease burdens that were closely linked to HIV, it might have positive benefits. 
For more remote kinds of problems like chronic diseases and the epidemic of 
chronic diseases, that‟s silently emerging behind HIV, there‟s much less attention on 
that. [Academia interviewee] 
 
Parallel systems  
 
The aim of introducing parallel systems for ART services, such as the M&E and 
drug procurement systems, was to improve these programs‟ outcomes. However, the 
drawback of a parallel system is that it limits the positive spillover effect on the 
overall health system: “it‟s been like a patch on a flat tyre”. In fact, parallel systems 
may even have eroded existing structures where staff came from the same pool. In 
order to use parallel services for the benefit of the overall system, it was crucial to 
use such systems as a transitory mechanism only and to develop strategies for their 
integration into the overall health platform at an early stage.  
 
What should have happened is that this vertical system should have gone horizontal, 
to try and strengthen the public health service. Instead what‟s happened is we‟ve set 
up these vertical ARV programs .... It actually worsen[s] the situation because we‟ve 
depleted human resources in other programs to staff the ARV treatment programs. 















Although ART international funding was substantial, donor ART programs invested 
little in expanding existing capabilities of the public health system.  
 
There‟s very little donor money available for general health systems improvement. 
It‟s got to be sexy. It‟s got to be HIV. It‟s got to be tuberculosis XDR [extreme drug 
resistant]. It can‟t just be tuberculosis, it‟s got to be XDR. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Another problem was that donor funded interventions utilised capacity which was 
not necessarily spare, thus taking resources from the public sector. As such, South 
Africa was left with the difficult task of building up capacity in order to deliver 
health services. In particular, it was argued that donor programs were often an „exit 
door‟ for managers wanting to leave the public sector, thus exacerbating the existing 
shortage of personnel, and in particular of managerial skills. In fact, two Provincial 
DoH managers interviewed had just moved to donor organisations, or moved to 
these during the research:  
 
There are a whole range of senior managers that went to PEPFAR ... and it‟s that 
level of management capacity you need if you want to spend money, and it‟s been 
just depleted by donor funding. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
PEPFAR funding especially was given as an example of the restrictions attached to 
donor funding, noting that PEPFAR funded only HIV/AIDS treatment initiatives but 
not prevention initiatives. 
 
Guarding the right balance  
 
An official from the NDoH emphasised that health system strengthening was much 
more complex than normally considered. Strengthening was not merely a process of 
adding more resources, but more importantly, it was about maintaining the right 
balance between its several components. The health sector was a powerful sector, 
which mobilised substantial funding and had several associated lobby groups, such 
as pharmaceuticals, laboratories, universities or tertiary hospitals. Given this context, 
a substantial increase in budgets, such as the one driven by the Comprehensive Plan, 
attracted the attention of these lobby groups, who wanted to direct this expenditure 













The approach to health system strengthening in terms of balancing its components 
looked at the control of the financing flows, and at who was getting what from the 
budget. In order to defend the most appropriate balance for the health system, strong 
managers were required to take firm positions amidst the conflicting interests. These 
managers needed to understand which players were involved and the way in which 
„the game was played‟. Therefore, from this point of view, the core factor for 
strengthening the system was a very strong strategic capacity to ensure that the 
balance was not distorted. It was argued that this strategic knowledge was eroded by 
the high turnover of managers. 
  
System strengthening basically means that you‟ve got the interdependence of the 
system components as important; otherwise you were not doing system 
strengthening. If the balance was not there then the system was not strengthened. 
[NDoH interviewee] 
 
Such a view highlights the inappropriateness of those indicators often used to assess 
the strengthening of the health system, such as budget increases and capacity 
building within specific interventions. For example, substantial increases in 
laboratory budgets were often mentioned as an indication that the health system was 
being strengthened. However, from the above point of view, this could also suggest a 
distortion in the balance, which could happen when the increases were driven not so 
much by necessity but rather by the pressure of interest groups.  
 
In fact, it was mentioned that the space taken by the drug and laboratory components 
in the Comprehensive Plan might have grown too far. Despite the fact that ART was 
a drug-intensive program, these components might have grown too much financially 
when compared to standards and other interventions, as well as in relation to the 
comprehensive activities envisaged in the Comprehensive Plan.  
 
Balancing positive and negative effects  
 
Respondents were asked to strike a balance between the positive and negative effects 
of the HIV/AIDS program on the overall health system. Most participants found this 












because very little was known on what was actually happening on the ground. For 
some respondents, the Comprehensive Plan had not had massive distorting effects on 
the ground yet. The burden of the epidemic on the health system was so high that 
relieving it through ART or any other intervention compensated for the costs of the 
negative effects on the wider health system. 
 
AIDS was distorting the health system so fundamentally, that actually we had no 
option but to treat it as a kind of special case, in a way. [Research institution 
interviewee] 
 
For others, nonetheless, the opportunity cost to the health system of ART 
outweighed its benefits. The catastrophic scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South 
Africa made it impossible for the country to manage the epidemic without taking 
resources from other areas. There was not sufficient capacity to respond to the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic without having a significant negative effect on the rest of the 
system, not even in the best case scenario, such as in the province of the Western 
Cape. For this province, it was estimated that, broadly speaking, around one quarter 
of all PHC visits and hospital admissions would be HIV-related by 2010 [WCDoH 
interviewee]. Even if all the required financial and human resources were available, 
the public health sector still would not be able to expand to the scale needed in the 
short term, and it would also not be desirable to skew the whole health system 
towards the epidemic, to put for, example, ART ahead of diabetes treatment. 
 
Striking the balance therefore between tackling the epidemic and simultaneously 
investing in the overall health system, was difficult. Nonetheless, interviewees 
agreed that maintaining parallel systems would become counterproductive in the 
end, and that it would be more beneficial to integrate ARV treatment programs 
within chronic disease management programs at the PHC level. Moreover, the 
beneficial effect of the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan on the wider 
health system depended on the existence of proactive management capacity and 
leadership to harness available resources and to monitor the side-effects of the 
implementation. Empowerment at the implementation level was also crucial to take 













8.3  Efficiency 
 
Most respondents noted that not enough was known about the efficiency of the 
Comprehensive Plan and its multiple aspects. Even interviews with government 
officials provided little specific information. Understanding the value for money of 
the funding invested in the program remained a big challenge. Respondents‟ took 





Allocative efficiency  
 
Claims were made that, in general, insufficient information was available to 
correlate finances to outputs to costs. Although there were regular financial reports 
and audits on the program, and in particular on the spending of the conditional grant, 
information was insufficient to reflect the full picture of the efficiency of the 
program: “we are not yet there” [NDoH interviewee]. In addition, the discretionary 
funding devoted to HIV/AIDS related areas was not easy to track. Several factors 
hampered the attempt to determine the allocative efficiency, including: (a) financial 
managerial capacity is insufficient to manage the conditional grant; (b) high 
centralisation of funding prevented financial responsibilities by the spending 
institutions; (c) staff wages were increased in order to maintain and recruit 
personnel, but the extent to which these salary increases translated into efficiency 
increases was a concern; (d) pressures to spend quickly compromised good 
spending. 
 
Technical efficiency  
 
Opinions converged in that the numerous requirements for the accreditation of ART 
delivery sites ensured that the accredited services were equipped with high quality 
staff and supporting systems. Moreover, it was questioned whether such high 
standards were actually necessary. It was suggested that some of these standards be 
changed or lowered in order to scale up the program, such as shifting to a nurse-led 
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 Allocative and technical efficiency are explained in the development of the concept of absorptive 












mode of delivery. For the particular case of the Free State, the province was said to 
have under-performed, given the staff employed in the program: “we can do much 
better with the staff that we have” [FSDoH interviewee]. This was partly because 
staff employed per patient varied considerably depending on the density of patients 
in the area.  
 
A particular aspect of technical efficiency was clinical efficiency, which related to 
the efficiency of the ARV treatment. Clinical efficiency was understood to 
encompass a variety of outcomes such as adherence rates, virological and 
immunological response, treatment side-effects, drug resistance, and mortality rates. 
The treatment efficiency of the programs was believed to be very high in terms of 
adherence rates in particular for the two provinces studied. However, it was 
recognised that virological and immunological response, as well as treatment side-
effects and drug resistance were hardly studied nationally. The Western Cape 
seemed to be more closely following side-effects and drug resistance, but only at 
some sites. Concerns were also raised about the quality of counselling and social 
support provided. Counselling and social support were crucial for helping patients to 
cope with the disease and with the needs and effects of the medication, which had an 
effect on their quality of life, as well as to improve with program retention and 
treatment adherence rates.  
 
Particularly worrisome was the high mortality among HIV-positive individuals who 
had enrolled on the program but were not yet on treatment, either because they did 
not qualify, or because they were on the waiting list. The information provided by 
the Free State in this regard suggested that the system was failing to care for this 
group. Thus, although the clinical efficiency of patients on ART might have been 
high, the clinical efficiency of the program overall was much lower.  
 
Pressures compromising quality  
 
Interviewees were asked whether the pressure to spend funds quickly and to scale up 
ART in accordance with the targets of the Comprehensive Plan affected the quality 
and appropriateness of the services provided. There was overall concern about the 












pressures to spend the conditional grant: “The moment you apply pressure on any 
grant to be spent, the people spend it on stuff that‟s not necessarily part of the 
business plan” [FSDoH interviewee]. However, it was not easy to track the impact, 
because (a) at the time of the research, the program was still too young, and there 
was insufficient information to evaluate program outcomes, including quality; and 
(b) existing M&E systems were not geared towards assessing the quality and 
appropriateness of service delivery. Thus, although the government assessed budget 
spending performance, further evaluations should put more emphasis on monitoring 
the quality of spending. 
 
Every time they tell us we‟ve got millions of rands, we have to spend it. Tell us what 
you want. Then we say we need filing cabinets, we need telephones. Then, sooner or 
later, at the end of the financial year they say we are in trouble, we did not spend the 
millions. Now all of a sudden, buy lots of stuff; then the people buy TVs, water 
dispensers. And I say what happened to the telephones we need? We still haven‟t 
got the telephones. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Furthermore, some respondents argued that in some cases the increasing workload in 
a facility compromised the quality of services provided. In addition, the envisaged 
decentralisation of ART provision towards PHC and less accessible areas was 
expected initially to lower the overall quality of services provided.  
 
8.4  Equity 
 
Overall, the sense was that, despite the recognised aim of the Comprehensive Plan to 
redress inequalities in health care, in practice the implementation was not 
diminishing the differences across provinces as much as it could. Promoting equity 
in the ART rollout faced numerous challenges due to capacity constraints in rural 
areas with a high HIV burden.  
 
Inter-provincial equity  
 
Overall, participants felt that allocation of financial resources contributed towards 
inter-provincial equity. However, the actual benefit derived from such allocations by 
disadvantaged provinces was hampered by the presence of strong obstacles to 












serious obstacles preventing the absorption of funding. Thus, what was needed was 
to harness funding to aid disadvantaged provinces to absorb and benefit from the 
allocated funding.  
 
Resource allocation formulas for equitable shares and conditional grants were 
designed to seek an equitable distribution of funding across provinces. It was argued 
that equitable allocation mechanisms needed to take into account the capacity of the 
provinces to absorb funding. Although traditionally disadvantaged provinces needed 
extra resources in order to address backlogs in capacity, it was also important to look 
at the speed at which they could absorb funding. This balance was sought via the 
business plans, by which provinces estimated how much funding they would need 
and would be able to use.  
 
Many participants felt that not enough support was given to traditionally 
disadvantaged provinces in order to build capacity while delivering services. These 
provinces needed not only funding, but also additional support mechanisms to help 
them set up functional health systems. In addition, because the conditional grant was 
not used for capacity building
74
, it was left to provinces to use their own resources 
for this purpose, which some provinces were unable to do because they were already 
short of resources.  
 
Equity of rural-urban allocations  
 
All respondents recognised the wide rural-urban divide existing in the country, and 
the serious challenges it posed for the most rural provinces, such as Limpopo and the 
Eastern Cape. A major challenge was to attract qualified human resources to work in 
the rural areas, which were less attractive, especially for highly qualified personnel. 
Even though posts were created in rural areas and a rural allowance was provided to 
attract personnel, these posts often remained vacant. A participant of the FSDoH 
illustrated the challenges faced: 
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 As discussed in Chapter 7, although the HIV/AIDS conditional grant could have been used for 
capacity building, this was often not done because of confusion and insecurity among provincial 












People don‟t want to go to the rural areas where they must travel 30km just to get 
Kentucky. They don‟t want to go there ... The other challenge was that you get a 
person willing to go. They struggle for three months to get accommodation and they 
leave after three months because there was no decent accommodation for them. 
[FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Access issues were believed to be more problematic in rural settings than in urban 
ones. Travel distances to the nearest health centre were larger, due to the 
combination of low population density and fewer ART sites. Limited transport in 
rural areas further hampered access to health centres. These access issues such as 
transport were difficult to tackle because they did not depend on the DoH. 
 
Scale-up in provinces with the lowest capacity  
 
Interviewees were asked whether they thought the Comprehensive Plan could be 
successfully scaled up in provinces with the lowest health service delivery capacity. 
Most responses agreed that this was not possible with the current implementation 
patterns. The high criteria for the accreditation of ART facilities made it very 
difficult for rural provinces to open treatment sites. There was a consensus that 
further scale-up would require a decentralisation of ART service points to PHC 
facilities, as well as a move from a doctor-based to a nurse- or team-driven ART 
delivery program. In addition, wider involvement of communities at the local level 
was needed, especially in the most remote areas. It was felt that existing work along 





It was argued that the Comprehensive Plan was more centred on equality than 
equity
75
. The national policy aimed to ensure that every district, and later on every 
sub-district, had at least one ART accredited site. This objective was criticised for 
not taking into account the HIV/AIDS prevalence in an area. For instance, interviews 
in the Free State revealed substantial differences in patient workload across facilities, 
depending on HIV prevalence and population density. Consequently, whilst some 
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facilities struggled to cope with the high demand for ART, other facilities were 
under-utilised. This situation questioned the very equality principle pursued in the 
Comprehensive Plan, which ultimately affected the equity of the services offered in 
each area.  
 
Access by whom  
 
Some participants acknowledged the existence of current discussions and studies 
looking at who was accessing treatment in terms of their socio-economic profile. 
Interestingly, both the Western Cape and the Free State had proportionally more 
women than men accessing treatment. Patient profiles, however, varied from case to 
case. For example, those accessing ART in certain townships in the Western Cape 
were actually among the poorest of the poor, with lower asset indexes than the 
general population of the particular township. These cases showed that it was 
possible to reach especially the poor or disadvantaged population through the ART 
program. Research in the Free State, however, suggested that there might have been 
a sort of socio-economic stratification or rationing taking place at the ART service 
provision point, favouring those with more stable and reliable socio-economic 
conditions. 
 
Efficiency vs. equity trade-off  
 
The opinion of interviewees was sought in relation to the efficiency vs. equity 
dilemma: as the main objective of government was to have more people on 
treatment, strategically it made sense to invest in those provinces with a comparative 
advantage for delivering this service, those that already had the capacity, and those 
facing high, concentrated HIV burdens. Nevertheless, this would have undermined 
the equity principle of investing in those provinces with lower capacity that needed 
extra support in order to ensure the provision of services, and to pursue equity in the 
delivery.  
 
At the same time, concerns were raised that the budget of provinces such as the 
Western Cape, which were able to increase the number of patients on ART, should 












Such a strategy would not be efficient and it would have cut opportunities for 
patients to access ART. 
 
Some participants tackled this dilemma by conceptualising the notion of efficiency 
somewhat differently. Efficiency needed to be understood in relation to what the 
government aimed to achieve, i.e. the main objective of the Comprehensive Plan. In 
the case of South Africa, the government had a strong commitment to facilitate 
equitable access to services. From such a perspective, therefore, efficiency meant 
producing equitable access to health services (rather than merely providing more 
services). Thus, rolling out ART services only in the most productive provinces, 
such as the Western Cape and Gauteng, would have been neither equitable nor 
efficient.  
 
Therefore, the answer to whether efficiency was compromised by equity concerns, 
or vice versa, depended on the definition of efficiency taken. In a strict sense, yes, 
more people could have been put on treatment if no equity considerations had been 
taken into account. However, in a broader sense, the efficiency of ART consisted of 
equitable service provision, and thus, ensuring equity issues were taking into account 
reinforced, and not undermined, the efficiency of the program.    
 
Public and private  
 
The gap between the public and private sector resources was a major root of 
inequality in health care, and the biggest concern for some interviewees. As 
discussed earlier in the chapter, the private sector attracted most medical personnel, 
leaving a chronic shortage in the public sector. Salaries varied greatly between both 
sectors. Moreover, low job satisfaction and unsatisfactory working conditions in the 
public sector led workers to seek employment in the private sector, which generally 
provided greater job satisfaction and working conditions that were more satisfactory.  
 
Those same issues created challenges for PPP, because the public sector could offer 













The way you remunerate session doctors they can only do it for the good cause and 
goodwill, because the public sector cannot pay as much as they could make in the 
private one. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
8.5  Sustainability 
 
The opinion of participants was also sought in relation to the challenges and 
opportunities for the sustainability of the program. The major factors touched upon 
are summarised below.  
 
Sustainability of funding  
 
Most participants recognised that financial sustainability was not such a big issue as 
it was for other African countries, mainly because the Comprehensive Plan was 
primarily funded through domestic resources.  
 
First of all, South Africa compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, the major major 
difference, as it has implications for everything (for policy issues, for dealing with 
stakeholders in the country, for implementation issues) is that the money is coming 
from South African taxpayers. All the other Sub-Saharan countries, the major part is 
coming from the donor community. So, compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, at 
least the money, which is made available from own resources is outstanding. 
[International organization interviewee]  
 
Nevertheless, other concerns were voiced in relation to (a) possibly increasing costs, 
and (b) uncertainty of sufficient increases in funding. 
 
Firstly, some participants raised concerns about the future cost of the program. As 
the program scaled up, financial needs would grow accordingly. Major cost drivers 
of the ART program, such as personnel, drugs and laboratory tests, required 
significant recurrent funding. In addition, there was insufficient information and 
estimates on the future cost of ART delivery. Furthermore, a full scale national 
program would change some of the projection parameters: especially as the program 
was decentralised to PHC levels, further investments in service delivery capacity 
were required. Given economies of scale, some respondents expected drug costs to 
decrease as more people enrolled in the program and with the greater availability of 












need second and third line treatments, which were three to four times more 
expensive than ARVs used in first line treatment. It was argued that even for 
countries like Botswana, who had implemented a full national ART program for 
much longer, not enough was known on the evolution of costs and expenses. 
 
Secondly, despite the general satisfaction with current levels of funding, the 
availability of future funding was a major challenge for many respondents, for some 
even the biggest challenge. Many participants expressed concerns that HIV/AIDS 
funding had lost its momentum, with massive expenditure increases required to start 
the program quickly not materialising in future years. Other competing priorities, in 
particular the 2010 World Cup preparations, were likely to constrain the funding 
capacity of Treasury for social programs.  
 
The only thing that stops us on infrastructure at the moment is the capacity of the 
private sector to deliver simply because we‟ve got the soccer World Cup coming at 
the moment ... that‟s stretching to the limits the resources of this construction 
industry. [WCDoH interviewee] 
 
Moreover, available funding also depended on how much the economy would grow 
as a whole. Given this context, some participants expressed the difficulties of 
making long-term commitments based on the 3-year budget cycle of the MTEF. The 
insecurity around the long-term sustainability of the necessary significant increases 
of funding was identified as a factor leading to conservative approaches to financial 
management. Hence, it was important to ensure budget commitments over longer 
periods in order to guarantee that HIV/AIDS financing would not be affected by 
unforeseen events.  
 
For other respondents, however, the clear commitment so far of National Treasury to 
fighting the epidemic served as a reassurance of its willingness to maintain 
expenditure levels in the future. Most respondents expressed confidence in Treasury 
to maintain current funding, but less so in expanding funding to match growing 
treatment targets. Hence, the massive scale of the epidemic and the need to keep 
expanding funding emerged as critical challenges for the future financial 













In relation to the modalities of delivering funding, the equitable share mechanism 
was considered more sustainable in the end, because it facilitated the utilisation of 
funding for the strengthening of the health system, the discretionary administration 
of expenditure by provinces, as well as the integration of the HIV/AIDS program 
within the larger PHC system. In fact, it was argued that some provinces 
increasingly used part of their equitable share funding for HIV/AIDS related 
activities. Suggestions were made to start shifting some core areas of the 
Comprehensive Plan gradually out of the conditional grant and into discretionary 
funding via equitable shares. PMTCT was identified as one of the areas to shift first, 
as it had existed longer and could be integrated into the same funding stream as 
antenatal care. Leadership at both national and provincial levels was considered 
central to ensuring the financial sustainability of the program in the context of these 
changes.  
  
Western Cape innovation  
 
The Western Cape provided an innovative example of how to provide for sustainable 
funding. The province started to make arrangements to ensure the maintenance of 
funding inflows after the Global Fund grant expired. The WCDoH proposed that the 
Global Fund spread the grant over four years instead of the initial three. During this 
period, one of the sites funded would be taken off the grant program each year, and 
financed through the national conditional grant funding stream. This meant that in 
the fourth year, one site only would be funded by the Global Fund, and that this site 
would become publicly funded in the fifth year. The WCDoH would continue to 
report to the Global Fund on those five sites to show that activities continued with 
government funding.  
 
Consequently, the WCDoH requested the Provincial Treasury to commit funds to 
those patients coming off the Global Fund grant. Increases in the conditional grant to 
match this plan, which amounted to R150 million, had already been affected at the 
time of this research. This strategy ensured a gradual and smooth transition from 
donor funding to regular government funding. The Global Fund accepted this 













Human resources  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, the limited availability of human resources had so far 
hampered the spending of funding and the implementation of the program. Thus, 
actions to remove these obstacles were critical for the sustainability of the program. 
Respondents pointed out the need to invest in the production of additional medical 
professionals and in the training of existing health workers and related staff. In 
addition, the need to move from a doctor-based to a nurse-driven delivery of ART 
was underscored as a fundamental condition to sustain the program in the future.  
 
To me the critical thing is staff. That‟s going to be the limiting factor [to 
sustainability]. [FSDoH interviewee] 
 
Fast speed vs. sustainability  
 
Respondents expressed concerns that the ambitious targets for patient numbers set in 
the Comprehensive Plan, together with the political pressures to achieve them, had 
rushed the commencement and pace of the program. Fast implementation may have 
overlooked the negative effects on the health system and the long-term sustainability 
of the program. It was argued that fast spending was not necessarily the best 
spending in the context of sustainability. Particularly because ART was not a once-
off emergency but rather a life-long treatment, the issue of sustainability was crucial.  
 
There was the problem that AIDS and the way this money was given looks at 
emergency as if emergency means quick and short, as if it was a fire. But the 
problem was the fact that it was an ongoing emergency. It means that the issue of 
sustainability had to be addressed in a very different way from a national disaster, a 
tsunami. [Research institution interviewee] 
 
Several participants emphasised that the right speed of increasing funding depended 
on the balance between the need to roll out the program quickly, at the same time as 
making it sustainable in the end. However, to achieve such balance on the ground 
might have meant that the process would not move as fast as some desired. Quick 
disbursement was a sign of success and it allowed access to future funding. 
Furthermore, quick implementation was urged, given the late start of the treatment 












on PDoHs to spend and implement quickly, both internally (from NDoH) and 
externally to the health department, such as from politicians, civil society and 
donors. It was also noted that sustainability concerns could only be taken into 
account in decision-making if there was sufficient ownership of the program.  
 
My concern is ... is the sustainability of these fast growing programs is not 
sustainable in the long term. The wheels are going to come off somewhere. [FSDoH 
interviewee] 
 
8.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviewed the implications that the scale-up of funding for the 
Comprehensive Plan, in combination with the presence of obstacles to absorb such 
funding, will have for the strengthening of the health system, and its efficiency, 
equity and sustainability. Research revealed that, although there was great concern 
among respondents on these areas, very little concrete evidence was available as to 
what was actually happening on the ground. Yet, reflections on the early years of the 
Comprehensive Plan‟s implementation did reveal numerous concerns on these 
matters. It was suggested that under current arrangements, the Comprehensive Plan 
was unlikely to achieve future treatment targets in the desired system-supportive, 
equitable, efficient, and sustainable way. In order to adapt to the challenges 
identified, the research points at several ways in which current financing 
mechanisms as well as implementation modes could be revised, which will be 
further discussed in Chapter 9. Overall, the evidence underscores the need to monitor 
closely the scale-up of the Comprehensive Plan to ensure that its core principles are 











CHAPTER 9 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
9.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter summarises, discusses and takes forward the study findings presented in 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8. Section 9.2 builds on the characterisations of absorptive 
capacity emanating from the study to provide a tool to assess absorptive capacity, 
which could be replicated for other health interventions. Section 9.3 classifies the 
obstacles to ART funding and implementation into three categories according to 
their perceived severity, as noted by respondents, and then compares these obstacles 
with those in Table 3.2 (page 58), before discussing commonalities and differences 
between the two provinces and national level. Then, overall strategies and specific 
recommendations to remove the bottlenecks encountered are proposed in Sections 
9.4 and 9.5 respectively, based on the suggestions made by respondents themselves. 
Section 9.6 draws conclusions from these findings.  
 
9.2  Reflections on the concept and assessment of absorptive 
capacity 
 
How do the study findings advance our knowledge on absorptive capacity? The 
framework of study and the data gathered have proved useful in clarifying the core 
issues at stake: (a) South Africa‟s public health system does have problems of 
insufficient absorptive capacity for the available HIV/AIDS treatment funding, and 
(b) several obstacles have been identified that create bottlenecks in areas where 
funding does not flow.  
 
The operationalization of the definition of absorptive capacity by means of this study 
generates a tool to assess absorptive capacity, which could be replicated in other 
studies. In particular, this tool could be useful for other public health programs. It 
could guide a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of absorptive capacity. 
The objective is not to measure absorptive capacity per se, but rather to elucidate the 


















The tool to assess absorptive capacity that originates from this research consists of a 
list of questions divided into three phases. The first phase refers to the inputs, that is, 
the expenditure invested in the program. It does not need to refer to substantial and 
sustained funding increases as it does in this particular thesis; absorptive capacity 
problems could also be present in a context of non-increasing funding. In this phase, 













Is there underspending?  
Is the program sufficiently funded?  
Who are the main funders? 
What are the financing allocation 
mechanisms? 
 
Are there bottlenecks and in which areas?  
What are the major obstacles creating 
such bottlenecks? 
Which obstacles are more severe?  
How are they interconnected? 
What measures are necessary to remove 
such obstacles? 
How long would they take? 
Who is responsible for those measures? 
 
Is the program on target? 
Are the main principles guiding the 
program respected, in particular 
health system strengthening, 













mechanisms. A crucial question is whether there is underspending or not. However, 
although budgets may not reveal underspending problems, this does not guarantee a 
lack of spending difficulties.  
 
The second phase refers to the processes, that is, how funding is translated into 
outputs. This phase investigates whether there are obstacles impeding the utilisation 
of funding, and it identifies where bottlenecks are created. This identification should 
also consider their level of severity, in other words, whether these obstacles hold 
back the program, what options there are to remove them, and who should be 
responsible for such changes. The evidence of this particular research suggests that 
the transformation of financial resources into program results is very much a 
managerial decision, and not merely a financial one. Thus, program managers, and 
not only financial officers as initially thought, are critical for absorptive capacity.  
 
The third phase refers to the outputs. Outputs are not only the specific targets of a 
health intervention, but also the guiding principles behind that intervention. In the 
case of South Africa, these principles were the strengthening of the health system, 
equity, efficiency and sustainability. But these principles may not apply to other 
contexts, where, for example, an emergency health intervention needs to be carried 
out irrespective of its effects on the health system. It is worth noting that this third 
phase deals with outputs and not with outcomes, which belong to another phase 
beyond the diagram. The extent to which inputs translate into outputs does not seem 
to be affected by the absorptive capacity of expenditure invested.  
 
Therefore, this guiding framework for assessing absorptive capacity goes beyond an 
expenditure review, and beyond a program evaluation. Although it takes into 
account those elements, it adds other considerations in relation to the funding agents 
and recipients, their relationships and allocation mechanisms used. It also brings into 
the equation the overarching principles behind a program, which should be 
considered upfront when establishing the adequate speed of scaling up funding. This 
holistic assessment makes it possible to look for solutions beyond the injection of 
funding. Critical measures to remove bottlenecks may instead involve the 













Another comment to be made is that absorptive capacity is different to health service 
delivery capacity, although they do overlap in many areas. This research shows that 
absorptive capacity for HIV/AIDS treatment funding goes beyond the capacity of the 
public health sector to provide services, medical personnel, infrastructure, and so on. 
It highlights the importance of the financial mechanisms employed to transfer the 
funding, as well as the relationships between stakeholders, including those outside 
the public health sector. In particular, the research found that absorptive capacity 
was greatly constrained by inadequate national political leadership, which hindered 
efforts at the implementation level. This distinction is important because it reinforces 
the usefulness and importance of studying absorptive capacity in a holistic way, 
instead of looking only at health system capacity. 
 
Another important consideration is whether there is an ideal speed for increasing 
funding for a given health program. This study shows that respondents had different 
views on what the adequate speed of budgeted increases should be in relation to 
ART. The accomplishment of immediate targets by placing more people on 
treatment demanded a quick disbursement of funds. However, longer term objectives 
in terms of strengthening the health system and sustainability of the program called 
for more gradual spending of funds. Thus, the ideal speed for increasing and 
absorbing funding seems to lie in balancing both short- and long-term objectives. 
 
9.3  Discussion of major obstacles  
 
Which of the obstacles identified are more serious? It is difficult to rank obstacles 
according to their severity due to the qualitative nature of the study. Nevertheless, it 
is possible to classify obstacles into three groups depending on whether they were 
identified by respondents as (a) relevant obstacles which held back the program; (b) 
relevant obstacles which did not hold back the program; and (c) irrelevant obstacles. 
This classification is shown in Table 9.1 overleaf. This table summarises the results 
of the study for South Africa, the Western Cape and the Free State together because 
most underscored obstacles were common across both provinces and at the national 
level, though with some exceptions discussed later in the section. This implies that, 












because it featured strongly in the provincial interviews, although at the national 












Table 9.1: Obstacles to the spending of ART expenditure in the South African public health sector, classified by their relevance  
Bottleneck  Obstacles holding back the program Obstacles not holding back the 
program 
Neutral or positive factors 
Financial 
Conditional grant reporting 
requirements highly demanding 
Weak financial management capacity  
Mismatch between DoH requests and 
Treasury allocations 
No HIV/AIDS spending specification of 
equitable shares  
Insufficient reliability, predictability 
and coordination of funding 




Shortage of pharmacists, doctors,  
nurses  
Inadequate program managers 
Poor human resource practices 
Inadequate use of lay counsellors and 
home-based carers 
Availability of data capturers and 
administrative clerks  
 
Infrastructural Insufficient clinic/hospital space Lack of storage space for drugs Laboratory infrastructure 
Institutional 
Poor M&E information systems 
Inadequate national political leadership 
Weak drug and medical equipment 
procurement systems 
Need for integration of HIV and 
tuberculosis services 
Existence of successful pilot studies  
 
Structural 
Slow government bureaucratic system Issues of access: cultural barriers, 
stigma and transport 
Need for PPP 
Ownership of decision-making  
Community outreach and participation  












Table 9.1 shows a few variations from the original Table 3.2 tested in the study, in 
addition to the classification into three groups according to their severity:  
 
o The insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of funding featured as 
a structural bottleneck in Table 3.2, but these issues were reclassified into the 
financial bottleneck category. The reason for classifying them as a structural 
bottleneck in Table 3.2 was that it related to donor issues, and hence was beyond 
the scope of the public health system. However, the fieldwork results showed 
that these funding issues were instead related to domestic financing factors, and 
thus were more appropriately classified as a financial bottleneck. 
 
o Table 3.2 distinguished between medical and non-medical staff, but this 
classification did not add any value during the study and was somewhat artificial, 
as program managers, for example, fell between the two categories. Therefore, 
each staff category is treated independently in Table 9.1.  
 
o „Inadequate personnel management and training‟ has been rephrased as „poor 
human resource practices‟, to better reflect respondents‟ perspectives.  
 
o Home-based care workers were not included in Table 3.2 but discussed 
extensively by participants, and therefore this group was added to the results 
table. 
 
o The word „inadequate‟ replaced the word „shortage‟ in relation to counsellors 
and program managers, as the issues related to these staff categories related more 
to quality than to quantity.  
 
o „Inadequate use of lay counsellors replaced „inadequate lay counsellors‟, to 
better reflect respondents‟ perspectives. 
 
o „Inadequate political leadership‟ refers specifically to the national level, as 













The following parts of this section will first explain further the categorisation of 
obstacles into the three groups. Thereafter, general considerations of these findings 
will be discussed, and, finally, the commonalities and differences across provinces 
and at the national level will be explained.  
 
A Classification of obstacles into three groups according to their severity 
 
The first group in the results table is comprised by the obstacles considered to hold 
back the financing and implementation of the program. These are the more serious 
impediments for the ART program, those that actually impede progress, and thus 
those that definitely need to be removed in order to unblock the bottlenecks. Most 
obstacles in this group are financial and human.  
 
The mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations was also classified as 
a major obstacle holding back the program because early underspending was partly 
caused by DoH‟s over-budgeting and the willingness of Treasury to fund HIV/AIDS 
programs. 
 
It is worth noting that only one out of the six structural obstacles was considered to 
be holding back the program, namely the slow government bureaucratic system. This 
suggests that, overall, the most important obstacles impeding the scale up of funding 
for ART fell within the responsibility of the NDoH and PDoHs. Hence, these Health 
Departments had the authority to control and tackle the major impediments to the 
spending and implementation of the ART program. Two clarifications, however, are 
necessary. Firstly, financial bottlenecks are not completely under the control of the 
NDoH and PDoHs but also part of Treasury‟s responsibility. Secondly, inadequate 
national political leadership, although classified under institutional bottlenecks, also 
referred most importantly to the leadership by the President of the nation, and thus 
fell outside the Health Department‟s territory.   
 
The second group of obstacles are those that affected the ART program but that did 
not hold it back. These obstacles made it more difficult to spend funding and 
implement the program smoothly, but were not regarded major impediments, either 












substantial. These issues were, for example, the lack of storage space for drugs and 
issues of access.  
 
This second group of obstacles also includes factors, which were not considered 
major obstacles, but viewed as areas where some improvement would benefit the 
program substantially. For instance, although drug and medical equipment 
procurement systems were considered to be reasonably good, significant 
improvements could have resulted from making tender processes for ARVs faster 
and more flexible, and from managing ARV drugs below the adopted Schedule 6. 
Equally, despite the acknowledged numerous PPPs related to the Comprehensive 
Plan, there were not enough such partnerships, given the substantial capacity of the 
private sectors in the country. As another example, the emergence of a new category 
of lay counsellors and home-based care workers was a new form of capacity, which 
could have been improved by more training and supervision. 
 
Included in this second group are also those obstacles, which were believed to be 
important, though their precise effect was not known. In a way, these obstacles are 
included in this group by exclusion, because they were not regarded as major 
bottlenecks holding back the program, nor were they irrelevant. These factors 
include, for example, the lack of HIV/AIDS specification of equitable shares, 
because interviews revealed insufficient knowledge of how much of the HIV/AIDS 
toppings on equitable shares were actually spent on HIV/AIDS. Another example is 
the need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis, about which, despite it being 
recognised as crucial, not much was known about existing practices and its 
implications. 
 
The third group comprises obstacles, which were disregarded for not being 
detrimental in the South African case. Some of these obstacles were not seen as 
relevant, such as the potential restriction of fiscal policies on health spending or the 
shortage of data capturers and administrative clerks. Furthermore, other obstacles in 
fact came up as strengths or enabling assets for the program, such as, for instance, 
the existence of substantial pilot studies and the community outreach and 












in a neutral or positive way. For example, Table 9.1 refers to the availability, rather 
than shortage, of data capturers and administrative clerks.  
 
B            General considerations 
 
The divisions among the three groups are nonetheless not always clear. Firstly, 
responses did not always converge; for instance, inadequate political leadership was 
for most respondents a major bottleneck holding back the program, whereas other 
respondents did not find it problematic. Secondly, the distinction between obstacles 
that held back the program and ones that did not, was not always made clear by 
respondents. Given the way in which the interviews were conducted, it was easy for 
respondents to list problems encountered; all areas could be improved in one way or 
another. However, the difficulty lay in ascertaining which problems were responsible 
for preventing the spending of available funding. This is why this study‟s aim to 
discern between the obstacles holding back and not holding back the program, the 
first and second group, is particularly valuable.  
 
In addition, these obstacles were interconnected. Leadership was depleted by 
insufficient human resources and inadequate personnel management. The lack of 
financial officers made it difficult to comply with the high requirements of the 
HIV/AIDS conditional grant. The slow government bureaucratic system delayed 
personnel recruitment and compliance with the conditional grant requirements. 
Equally, the inadequate M&E systems undermined the capacity to show progress on 
the program and support budget bids. This interconnection means that what is 
needed is to tackle all these factors and not just some of them. 
 
This classification referred to the obstacles encountered up to the time when the 
interviews took place. It was noted that some of the obstacles, which at the time 
were regarded as irrelevant or not holding back the program, were believed to 
become more relevant in the near future. For instance, fiscal limitations over health 
spending were believed to represent a potential future obstacle due to the funding 
needs of the preparations for the World Cup in 2010. Access issues were also 












issues considered not relevant overall, were nonetheless reported as being important 
in rural areas, such as, for example, inadequate laboratory infrastructure. 
 
Many of these obstacles were not specific to the ART program but common across 
the public health system, although some may have affected the ART program in 
particular for several reasons. For example, although the shortage of medical 
personnel was said to be endemic throughout the public health sector, the shortage of 
pharmacists was felt particularly in the ART program due to the intense use of 
ARVs. Although a high turnover of personnel was common throughout the public 
health sector, burnout among HIV/AIDS program managers was especially high due 
to the controversies attached to the disease and the lack of political support for the 
ART program. The drug tender processes affected the ART program especially due 
to the intense use of ARVs and the high cost of drugs. Although it was recognised 
that weak M&E systems were prevalent throughout the health system, they were a 
major drawback for the ART program because they led to confusion around the 
progress of the program rollout, which was especially detrimental given the political 
controversies around the ART program. The bureaucratic nature of the public system 
affected the whole public health sector, though it may have been more relevant for 
the implementation of ART because of the high requirements it had to comply with 
in relation to the HIV/AIDS conditional grant and the high standards for 
accreditation of ART sites.  
 
C  Comparison of the national level, the Western Cape and the Free State  
 
Most severe obstacles were common across both provinces as well as at the national 
level, though with some exceptions and nuances. The human bottleneck was 
underscored as the most important bottleneck throughout South Africa, including in 
both provinces studied. 
 
Both the Western Cape and the Free State were better-off than South Africa at a 
national level on several fronts. Both provinces were further ahead than the rest of 
the country in terms of their M&E systems, which meant that they were able to 
provide substantial information for this research. Yet, the paper-based system in the 












system of the Free State. Provincial leadership was clearly more satisfactory in both 
provinces, especially in the Western Cape, than national leadership. Lastly, both 
provinces benefited and had a positive attitude towards donors‟ contributions, 
whereas the attitude of the NDoH was not clear.  
 
Comparing both provinces, the obstacles confronted by the Free State resembled 
more closely the national ones, whereas the Western Cape stood out in that it was 
not affected by some of the obstacles confronted at national level and in the Free 
State. For example, the financial bottleneck emerged as the second most important 
obstacle for South Africa, and in the Free State in particular, although it was not so 
important in the Western Cape. In fact, the high requirements of conditional grants 
were not a problem in the Western Cape at the time of the study because the 
WCDoH had the financial capacity to deal with the requirements of the grant, even 
at the district level. These differences related directly to the employment, or absence 
of, financial officers to deal specifically with the HIV/AIDS conditional grant. The 
appointment of the relevant personnel indicates the determined leadership of the 
Western Cape in taking action to overcome the identified obstacles, though it is also 
important to acknowledge that the Western Cape was more capable of hiring 
professionals. 
 
The Western Cape showed the biggest concerns for funding cuts. The province was 
already under budgeted given their capacity to treat more people and to manage 
larger funds. In addition, the province showed the greatest concerns about the 
financial limitations posed by the World Cup 2010, especially in the area of 
infrastructure, probably because of the strong participation of this province in the 
event.  
 
The bottlenecks faced in the Western Cape also relate to a second set of obstacles, 
which arose after a few years of implementing ART, as the program in this province 
had been running longer than in the rest of the country. This is important because if 
this is the case, the Western Cape example could warn of bottlenecks that other 
provinces may experience in the near future, such as infrastructure, which was the 













9.4  Strategic options to remove bottlenecks 
 
What could be done to remove the obstacles encountered? To what extent would the 
injection of more funding help to ease these problems? Which obstacles were more 
responsive to increases in funding? These questions were put to interviewees, and 
their responses gave rise to the strategic options of removing bottlenecks presented 
in this section.  
 
Because the bottlenecks identified arose precisely in a context of substantial 
financing increases, further funding would only be able to eliminate these 
bottlenecks if such funding was targeted towards removing the existing obstacles. 
Injecting more funding in general might help to some extent but on its own it might 
not overcome the existing obstacles. Other policies or measures were needed. For 
example, improving financial incentives for medical personnel in the public sector in 
order to reduce the public-private financial divide may help in dealing with the 
human resources bottleneck. However, it probably would not stop personnel 
migrating unless staff satisfaction, morale and the working environment are also 
improved. For other institutional bottlenecks such as inadequate national leadership, 
increasing funding was unlikely to make a difference, as they depended on changes 
within the organisation, not on funding.  
 
In designing policies for removing existing bottlenecks, the classification of 
obstacles by their severity as in Table 9.1 serves as a useful guide. Firstly, the 
priority is the group of obstacles holding back the spending of ART expenditure, as 
these represent the major hindrance. Critical interventions must address this group 
first, if they are to have an impact on the necessary processes. However, given the 
interlinkages between the obstacles highlighted, they need to be tackled hand in hand 
with the other impediments identified, that is, those belonging to the second group. 
Thus, responses to the problems identified need to be comprehensive. The emphasis 













In view of the above complexities, the following sections discuss key strategic 
approaches to unblock the identified bottlenecks and to enhance absorptive capacity 
of ART funding in the South African public health sector. These approaches emerge 
from the fieldwork findings, and they are complemented by some related theories. 
The objective of this is to illustrate where existing evidence on this area overlaps 
with or contradicts the study findings.  
  
A  Integration of ART services within the overall health system  
 
The provision of ART in South Africa was a mix of vertical and horizontal 
approaches. The government policy sought to deliver ART through the existing 
service platform. However, rolling out ART based on services provided exclusively 
by accredited sites and on an exclusive funding extreme (the conditional grant) 
created a vertical structure in the program. This helped to ensure quick 
implementation and high standards of adherence. However, it also created numerous 
complications, such as duplicating management structures and personnel, which is 
particularly problematic in the context of a severe shortage of human resources in 
the public health sector.  
 
Participants emphasised the imperative of further integrating the delivery and 
management of ART within the existing structures. The provision of HIV/AIDS 
treatment and care needed to be further integrated within the overall health service 
platform, for several reasons: to avoid fragmentation and duplication of human 
resources; to enhance support to the program among all health professionals; to 
allow the influx of monetary and non-monetary resources invested in ART to benefit 
the whole system; and to make the program accessible to all South Africans in need. 
These reasons resemble those highlighted in the literature of horizontal vs. vertical 
approaches (Oliviera-Cruz et al. 2003).  
 
Ideally, a person walking into a health facility should not need to go to one place for 
ART care and to another place for any other treatment. All these services should be 
provided to the patient at a single venue. This functional integration requires all 
health personnel to be knowledgeable about ART, rather than only an exclusive 












too far removed from current capacities, and thus too much to seek for in the short or 
even middle term. Before reaching that stage, several smaller steps need to be taken. 
A more realistic strategy would, for instance, focus on reducing the vertical 
structures at different points of the ART process, whether diagnosis, initiation of 
treatment, follow ups, drug dispensation, etc. In the particular case under study, 
being more flexible on the requirements for accreditation of ART delivery sites 
emerged as an instrumental consideration for opening the door to smaller PHC 
facilities to integrate ART services.  
 
The functional integration at the clinic level was perceived as the driver for 
promoting financial and managerial integration at higher levels, which are more 
complex. Personnel at the clinics have a more pressing need and motivation to 
integrate, whereas this is less relevant at the higher levels. Moreover, the impetus to 
move towards higher levels of integration might lie within the line functions, such as 
training, as opposed to programs. Respondents argued that systematic and proactive 
action towards integration was needed in the country. The current divide between 
ART and non-ART resources, together with the obstacles impeding the 
implementation of the rollout, are preventing integration from happening on its own 
at the necessary speed.  
 
Although respondents were very enthusiastic of the need to move towards 
integration, literature suggests that moving away from a vertical approach to 
delivering integrated services also has its drawbacks (Simms et al. 2001), and even 
more so for a lifelong and complex intervention such as ART (Schneider et al. 
2004). For example, Simms et al. (2001) note that the financial cost of integration is 
very high, and often underestimated. In this particular research, it was noted that 
some areas such as M&E, which are deficient even in the more tightly monitored 
ART system, are likely to be further affected when integrated into the general 
system. At the same time, technological developments may facilitate the clinical 
treatment of the disease, such as with simpler regimes facilitating treatment 
adherence, which would ease the integration process. Moreover, the possibility of 
moving from client-initiated VCT towards routinely offered VCT, a highly debated 
shift in the country, might open windows of opportunity for normalising ART within 













B  Decentralisation of health services towards PHC 
 
Another key strategy, and closely linked to the integration of ART services, is the 
decentralisation of the provision of ART towards the PHC level. It involves 
spreading ART services geographically, including towards rural and disadvantaged 
areas. Respondents felt strongly that this expansion is crucial to boost access to the 
program, to promote equity and sustainability, and to support the current processes 
of strengthening the DHS system in the country. Moreover, decentralisation could 
also expand to other crucial aspects of the program beyond service provision, such as 
funding and decision-making responsibilities. Decentralising control of the 
HIV/AIDS conditional grant and business plans from the NDoH to the PDoH and 
district levels may enhance financial skills and ownership at lower levels. 
 
In order to see a significant impact with regard to this expansion, a systematic 
approach or deliberate policy to roll down ART to PHC centres is needed. Lessons 
could be learnt however from the provinces studied and from the larger literature on 
decentralisation in relation to other health interventions (Hall and Roberts 2006). 
The Western Cape envisaged that the ART program would fit into their provincial 
strategic plan for restructuring their health system by decentralising services to cover 
distant areas. In the Free State, the moving of ART towards the clinics was promoted 
by combining assessment and treatment sites. More specifically, the Free State 
decision to allow assessment sites to do CD4 testing was a step forward in 
decentralising ART towards PHC structures. Thus, a systematic decentralisation 
process would involve the identification of treatment and care functions to be scaled 
down towards lower levels of care. 
 
In relation to existing literature, previous studies tend to converge on the importance 
of the particular context in successful decentralisation (Bankauskaite and Saltman 
2007). The decentralisation approach relies strongly on local structures and 
managerial capacity, which could be better supported by innovative structures such 
as flexible learning networks (Bailey 2003). In addition, a previous study of 












of the community could be even more important in implementing decentralisation 
than the health service delivery capacity (Hall and Roberts 2006). 
 
However, previous experiences in decentralising health services suggest that 
decentralisation is a major challenge in terms of public health policy (Hall and 
Roberts 2006). Literature warns that, although decentralisation attempts to enhance 
equity and access, it can have the opposite effect, in addition to having other 
negative effects such as decreasing quality and increasing costs (Bankauskaite and 
Saltman 2007; Lush 2002; Simms et al. 2001; WHO 2000c). In fact, the 
decentralisation towards the DHS in South Africa in itself is not free of challenges 
(Hall and Roberts 2006), and it would become even more complicated when a 
complex intervention such as ART is to be incorporated further into the PHC 
structures (Blaauw et al. 2004).  
 
The decentralisation process required strengthening lower level facilities, which 
were unequally capacitated. Given the serious deficiencies across the PHC structure, 
especially in the most rural areas, the decentralisation of the ART program towards 
lower levels of care could be regarded as a medium-term objective. Furthermore, as 
the literature shows, problems in decentralisation often arise because training needs 
to be adapted to the local needs; this is difficult, given the personnel shortages in 
local areas, and the need for strong supervision, which is also difficult for the same 
reason (Bankauskaite and Saltman 2007). 
 
C  Changing the mode of ART delivery 
 
Another emerging strategy was the need to reconsider the tasks that different levels 
of workers were doing in order to make the best use of trained personnel. This 
required nurses to take on some of the doctors‟ responsibilities, and for data 
capturers to take on some of the nurses‟ responsibilities. The goal would be to have 
each specialist to do his/her own job, and no less than that. The current mode of 
ART delivery was believed to under-utilise personnel‟s skills, which, given the 













In particular, whilst the Comprehensive Plan is a „doctor-based‟ model of ART 
delivery, respondents agreed strongly on the imperative need for a „nurse-led‟ 
approach, which was implemented in the Western Cape and the Free State. In a 
nurse-driven program, the nurse would be able to initiate and follow up on most 
patients on ART, and even to deal with drug dispensation. Only patients with severe 
complications, as established by certain parameters, would be seen by doctors. 
Nurses could take on some of the doctors‟ responsibilities because (a) they were 
capable of doing so and maintaining the program results, as shown in the Western 
Cape and Free State experiences; (b) it would optimise the use of available skills; 
and (c) given the shortage of doctors, a nurse-driven model was a precondition to 
scaling up the program and to decentralising it towards rural areas.  
 
The reassignment of staff roles was also proposed for other professions, not only 
nurses. The imperative of having dieticians, social workers and counsellors in every 
ART clinic could be reconsidered; a more flexible performance of these support 
tasks according to the human resources available at the health facility may be 
possible without significant losses in quality of treatment.  
 
The intensification of the nurses‟ workload, nonetheless, would place greater stress 
on them; nurses were already scarce, and it would also require economic 
compensation to match greater responsibilities. Thus, shifting responsibilities 
between professions would raise questions about scope of practice and necessary 
compensation for doing more advanced work. In addition, it would be necessary to 
safeguard the quality of services offered to patients. 
 
It is important to note that shifting responsibilities between professions would not 
solve all human resource constraints and that it would not by itself address staff 
needs to scale up ART. Shifting tasks should thus be considered as one of several 
measures to address to increase, retain and sustain personnel. Other interventions 
proposed, as explained in Chapter 7, include: promoting middle-level professionals, 
lay counsellors, and community health workers; improving staff support and 
introducing incentives to enhance staff satisfaction and retain personnel; and 













The same emphasis on task shifting for ART scale-up is echoed internationally. A 
growing literature is focusing on the delegation of tasks, in particular in relation to 
doctor vs. nurse driven approaches to ART (Philips et al. 2008; WHO 2008). WHO 
(2008) specifies a list of HIV clinical tasks, and assigns them to health cadres to 
guide on the potential scope of practice for each cadre. Specifically in relation to 
ART, WHO (2008) notes that non-clinician physicians and nurses can actually 
perform a wider range of tasks, especially in relation to first line regimes, including 
establishing eligibility, initiating, and prescribing first-line ART (with some 
exceptions).  
 
However, it is also argued that task shifting for ART is “not a panacea” for Sub-
Saharan Africa, and that “it must be part of an overall strategy that includes 
measures to increase, retain, and sustain health staff” (Philips et al. 2008). The 
delegation of tasks can actually lead to burnout, as it imposes new responsibilities 
(Philips et al. 2008). In addition, it is argued that lay and community workers should 
be paid sufficiently, and that they should focus on clearly specified tasks to ensure 
quality (Philips et al. 2008). 
 
D  Balancing the conditional grant and the equitable share mechanisms  
 
Which financial mechanism is more appropriate to enhance absorptive capacity: 
equitable shares or conditional grants? On the one hand, the availability of a 
dedicated budget for HIV/AIDS served to prioritise and facilitate the provincial 
funding of HIV/AIDS treatment and care. On the other hand, ring-fenced funding 
brought about underspending and management problems due to the restrictions 
attached to the grant. Moreover, the equitable share mechanism supported the overall 
health system beyond the particular HIV/AIDS interventions, which the conditional 
grant could not do. In summary, both mechanisms have their advantages and 
disadvantages.  
 
The choice between the two financial instruments needs to balance several criteria, 
of which spending is only one. Other considerations include accountability, the 
broader fiscal framework, and intra-governmental relationships. For example, the 












requirements attached to the grants. At the same time, it was precisely these 
reporting requirements, which enhanced the transparency and accountability of 
public expenditure. In fact, the HIV/AIDS conditional grant was a powerful political 
instrument, as it allowed government to show clearly their commitment to fighting 
the disease. Thus, there is a trade-off between accountability, as given by detailed 
reporting, and spending flexibility, as favoured by the relaxation of the requirements. 
Another example is provided by the lack of accountability of the targeted increases 
on equitable shares, as there was no legal mechanism to make provinces accountable 
for following the spending indications of treasury. In fact, the research revealed 
concerns that the targeted increments intended for HIV/AIDS did not trickle down 
completely to HIV/AIDS programs, or at least it did not do so in all the provinces.  
 
In terms of the broader national fiscal framework, equitable shares were perceived to 
be more supportive than conditional grants of the current fiscal framework of 
decentralisation of fiscal responsibilities from national to provincial spheres of 
government, because this mechanism is more conducive towards provincial spending 
autonomy. In fact, some provincial managers saw conditional grants as interfering 
with their financial planning. Were the national political and fiscal frameworks to 
change, it would have an impact on the desired mechanism. Such change may not be 
a distant prospect given the currently debated proposals to amalgamate provincial 
governments, as raised by some participants and reflected in the literature (Ajam and 
Aron 2007). However, the evidence from this research does not suffice to judge 
whether a fiscal federal structure as South Africa would increase or lessen problems 
with absorptive capacity. The lesson is to combine the existing mechanisms in a way 
that balances the identified pros and cons.  
 
With respect to the intra-governmental relationships, conditional grants strengthened 
the decision-making power of the NDoH, which dictates the provincial distribution 
of the grant, and approves provinces‟ business plans. This was not the case with 
equitable shares, for which the ultimate control remains within National Treasury, 
which allocates the equitable share pool across the nine provinces, and with the 
provincial government, which allocates their share across provincial departments. 
Consequently, the ultimate choice between the two mechanisms is also a decision of 












shifting the balance between the two funding mechanisms shifts the balance of 
power: in other words, more reliance on the conditional grant mechanism will shift 
the balance towards the NDoH. 
 
Looking ahead, the question to be asked is if or when the HIV/AIDS conditional 
grant to PDoHs would or should eventually be replaced with equitable share 
funding. Such shift is central to integrating HIV/AIDS treatment and care financially 
into the larger health system. To assess the provincial readiness or willingness to 
sustain HIV/AIDS expenditure when funding is not conditional, an important 
indicator would be the sustained increases in discretionary funding made from 
PDoHs towards HIV/AIDS interventions (Hickey and Ndlovu 2004). For instance, 
the high discretionary allocations made by KwaZulu-Natal and the Western Cape 
suggest that ring-fencing may not be required to ensure spending on the 
Comprehensive Plan in these provinces (Hickey and Ndlovu 2004). However, the 
difficulty of making the right choice remains, given the diverse situation of 
provinces in terms of their spending priorities, which are also dependent on the 
balance of political power in individual provinces. Overall, participants perceived 
that the country as a whole was not yet ready to shift from conditional to non-
conditional funding.  
 
Some respondents pointed out that the time to shift from the HIV/AIDS conditional 
grant to equitable share would come only when provinces have run HIV/AIDS 
treatment and care programs for some time. The assumption would be that, once 
they have ongoing ART programs, they could not stop expenditure on this program, 
especially because ART is a life-long treatment, which cannot be interrupted. 
Nevertheless, this argument may not be sufficient to ensure future spending on 
HIV/AIDS, given the numerous other health and social needs in the country. It was 
also argued that shifting from conditional to non-conditional funding could come 
first for wide-reaching interventions, such as PMTCT and maybe even VCT, but that 
it would take longer for the more recent ART program. Thus, it might be possible to 
consider a gradual shift along particular HIV/AIDS interventions currently covered 













Overall, findings point towards maintaining the HIV/AIDS conditional grant for 
some more years in order to ensure spending in this priority area. Despite the 
awareness of the need for ART, there was a great concern that without the 
conditional grant, money would be deviated to other competing priorities. In the 
meantime, the conditional grant could be reshaped to tackle the obstacles 
encountered, such as covering more services, in particular related to building up 
capacity, relaxing the detailed reporting conditions, and permitting provinces to 
adjust funding within the approved budget as the need arose.  
 
E  Enhancing coordination between DoH spheres and clusters and with 
Treasury 
 
The research showed that significant improvements in several aspects of expenditure 
management and implementation of the ART program could be achieved by 
enhancing the communication and collaboration of the various government 
departments and spheres involved.  
 
Firstly, enhancing closer communication and understanding between NDoH and 
PDoHs was central to ensuring the proper functioning of the whole process of 
financing and implementation of the ART program. Although implementation 
responsibilities lay with the provincial level, some critical decisions were taken at 
the national level. Tensions emerged though, as communication was often perceived 
as top-down, coming from the NDoH, or because information exchanges took a long 
time or did not always take place. Consequently, it is important to improve the 
channels of communication between the NDoH and the PDoHs in order to favour 
more open sharing and interaction.  
 
Secondly, significant advantages could also be gained from promoting further 
engagement and joint collaboration between DoH and Treasury, especially at 
national level. The budget process could benefit from intensifying the meetings and 
joint work between both departments, in particular in the preparation of budget bids. 
Closer collaboration could help the Health Department to make stronger proposals, 
substantiating its budget bids to meet the information required by Treasury in order 












perceived as being undermined by Treasury‟s financial authority over HIV/AIDS 
funding. To maintain a strong position, DoH needed to show they were in control of 
the program, showing progress and results against expenditure. In addition, National 
Treasury should also be accountable for the targeted increases on equitable shares 
for HIV/AIDS, providing information on the use of such funding.  
 
Thirdly, better understanding and further cooperation between the DoH clusters 
involved in the ART program could also benefit its progress, both at national and 
provincial levels. Closer collaboration between DoH clusters was needed in order to 
bring together the expertise and inputs of several areas related to ART 
implementation. For example, although the HIV/AIDS and human resources 
departments needed to work together to manage personnel needs, their cooperation 
was considered deficient by study participants. As part of the problem was the 
perception that the HIV/AIDS department was privileged within the health service, 
the progressive integration of HIV/AIDS within existing structures was expected to 
enhance collaboration within the DoHs.  
 
9.5  Policy recommendations  
 
The study proposes a number of approaches for dealing with each bottleneck and 




o National Treasury together with NDoH should redefine the conditional grant 
in order to relax its requirements in terms of the detailed reporting, and to 
expand the interventions covered by the grant; 
o NDoH and PDoHs, with support from their Treasury counterparts, should 
enhance the DoH‟s planning capacity by documenting budgets proposals 
with the relevant information to justify demands for more funding;  
o NDoH and PDoHs should work towards improving communication and 













o PDoHs, in collaboration with NDoH, should promote the constructive use of 
business plans for good planning, rather than as a mean to receive funding;  
o PDoHs should ensure that that each province has appointed financial officers 
to deal specifically with the HIV/AIDS expenditure at PDoHs, including the 
conditional grant;  
o PDoHs should support financial management capacity at the district level, 
prepare for the transfer of financial responsibilities, and enhance their 
participation in the business plans; 
o Donor partners should inform NDoH of international funding given to the 
country in order to enhance accountability and improve coordination of 
donor resources.  
 
Human resources bottlenecks 
 
o NDoH should promote policies to address the public-private mismatch of 
resources, in particular by working on retaining personnel in the public health 
sector and utilising the private sector‟s capacity; 
o NDoH and PDoHs should enhance personnel management, paying more 
attention to the motivation and morale of staff;  
o NDoH and PDoHs should support program managers in particular, by 
encouraging proactive management and innovative solutions, and providing 
them with the necessary training and support;  
o NDoH and PDoHs should reduce the number of acting positions and procure 
stable postings, in particular among managers;  
o NDoH and PDoHs should rationalise the time and procedures required for 
recruiting personnel, allowing for example group advertisement or 
headhunting when necessary; 
o NDoH and PDoHs should target the shortage of human resources, most 
especially in the rural areas; 
o NDoH and PDoHs should train nurses to take on some of doctors‟ 
responsibilities in ART delivery and create incentives for task shifting;  
o NDoH and PDoHs should enhance the work of lay counsellors and home-












o NDoH should increase the number of health professionals, and train all new 
students on ART; 
o NDoH should continue with the promotion of middle-level professionals for 
doctors and pharmacists. 
 
Infrastructural bottlenecks  
 
o NDoH should reconsider the infrastructure standards set in the 
Comprehensive Plan, and consider the possibility of turning some of the 
compulsory requirements into optional ones;   
o NDoH should ensure that NHLS boosts laboratory infrastructure in rural 
areas; 
o NDoH and PDoHs should allow for temporary infrastructure to deal with 
immediate needs while infrastructure projects are being developed, such as 
use of prefabs or containers, or renting facilities;  
o PDoHs should have a provincial central depot with a very quick response rate 




In the area of M&E: 
 
o NDoH should enhance the coordination of M&E systems employed across 
provinces, and rationalise the indicators to be reported from provincial to 
NDoH; 
o NDoH should further clarify ART indicators used to avoid different 
interpretations; 
o NDoH should intensify the use of information provided by provinces to show 
progress achieved and support decision-making by program managers; 
o NDoH should make special efforts to collect and provide information on the 
number of people currently on treatment, clarifying the number of patients 
lost to follow-up;  
o NDoH should promote overseeing the impact of the ART program on the 












o PDoHs could employ paper-base registers for M&E as they have proved to 
be sufficient, but could employ electronic systems if sufficient capacity to 
enter and analyse data is available.  
 
In the area of national political leadership: 
 
o High political leaders, such as the President of the Nation and the Minister of 
Health, should send clear and unambiguous messages acknowledging the 
advancements of HIV/AIDS treatments and promoting the uptake of ART for 
individuals in need in order to overcome previous ambivalence around the 
stance of the government in relation to HIV/AIDS and ART;   
o NDoH should provide further leadership by closely watching over the 
implementation and uptake of the program and by giving strategic guidance 
in order to overcome existing obstacles and plan for future challenges; 
o NDoH should make use of examples of good leadership in combating the 
epidemic in order to encourage others by focusing on the positive 
experiences. 
 
In the area of drug and medical equipment procurement systems: 
 
o NDoH should reduce the management regulations pertaining to ARVs 
according to their legal status as schedule 4 medication; 
o NDoH should seek more flexible tenders to adapt to the new drugs and 
formulations available in the market at good prices; 
o NDoH and PDoHs should promote more flexible general procurement 
processes to allow quicker procurement of goods without compromising 
accountability standards.  
 
In the area of integration of HIV and tuberculosis services: 
 
o NDoH should promote research to clarify the appropriate entry points for 
integrating HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis services; 












o NDoH should procure the integration of HIV/AIDS not only with 
tuberculosis but within the health system as a whole.  
 
In the area of pilot studies: 
 
o NDoH should promote further dissemination and discussion of existing 
evidence on ART delivery experiences; 
o NDoH should decide on the use or not of funding offered by donors for 




In the area of government bureaucratic system: 
 
o NDoH and PDoHs should promote innovative problem-solving attitudes, 
allowing the application of local solutions, and promoting flexible decision-
making;  
o NDoH should relax the administrative procedures linked to the accreditation 
of ART sites, procurement of drugs and equipment, and recruitment of 
personnel. 
 
In the area of access issues: 
 
o NDoH together with PDoHs should work together to provide a framework 
for gradually decentralising ART provision towards PHC clinics; 
o PDoHs should work together with traditional healers to promote demand for 
ART services, especially in the most rural areas; 
o PDoHs should promote mobile units in the remote areas where transport is 
lacking. 
 
In the area of PPP: 
 
o NDoH and PDoHs should take stock of provincial examples of good public-












o NDoH should make more use of existing capacities outside the public health 
sector, in particular in relation to human resources in terms of clinical service 
delivery and financial management; 
o NDoH should revitalise SANAC to promote the space for interaction and 
cooperation of stakeholders around ART within and outside the DoH. 
 
In the area of ownership of decision-making: 
 
o NDoH should respect and encourage the discretion of provinces with regard 
to the delivery of health services, including expenditure management. When 
approvals are required from the NDoH, this should be given quickly so as not 
to delay processes. 
o PDoHs should enhance the gradual decentralisation of implementation 
responsibilities to districts, in particular around financial management. 
 
In the area of community outreach and participation: 
 
o PDoHs should support grassroots in accessing and managing large funds 
used for implementing the Comprehensive Plan;  
o NDoH should strengthen mass media campaigns in order to support the work 
of communities which are promoting access and adherence to treatment. 
 
9.6  Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented a tool for assessing the absorptive capacity of other public 
health programs funding. This tool consists of a series of questions to be examined 
in three phases in relation to inputs, processes and outputs. This chapter furthermore 
discussed the study findings presented in Chapters 6-8, classifying the obstacles 
encountered into three types according to their severity. The most serious 
bottlenecks holding back the implementation of the program are human and 
financial. Furthermore, only one structural obstacle was identified as impeding the 
spending of funding and the implementation of ART, namely the slow, bureaucratic 












the ART program are within the domain of the NDoH and PDoHs, thus indicating 
that the DoHs have the capacity, as well as the responsibility, to take appropriate 
actions to unblock the bottlenecks encountered. 
 
This chapter also proposed a number of ways to unblock these bottlenecks. The 
following key strategic policies are suggested: integration of ART services within 
the public health service platform; decentralising ART towards PHC; changing the 
delivery mode of ART; balancing the two financial mechanisms of conditional 
grants and equitable shares; and enhancing coordination along and within the DoH 
spheres and clusters. These solutions do not depend on the injection of funds but 
rather on modifications or reforms within the public health system. Lastly, for each 
bottleneck that was identified in the study, a set of specific policy recommendations 












CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSIONS  
 
10.1  Introduction 
 
Currently, South Africa is the country with the largest population being treated with 
ARVs in the world. This achievement has been made possible thanks to substantial 
increases in HIV/AIDS public expenditure. This thesis has reviewed the implications 
that the rapid scale-up of funding for the Comprehensive Plan, in combination with 
the presence of obstacles to absorb such funding, has had in strengthening the health 
system and its efficiency, equity and sustainability.  
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive definition of absorptive capacity in the context 
of HIV/AIDS funding in South Africa‟s public health sector. In addition, the study 
constructed a framework for identifying the bottlenecks to spending and obstacles 
encountered. In terms of the methods employed, the qualitative face-to-face 
interviews are the main pillar of the research, supported by a quantitative budget 
analysis. The study focuses on South Africa and, in particular, the provinces of the 
Western Cape and the Free State.  
 
This chapter provides, firstly, an update on the research findings in Section 10.2. 
Section 10.3 reviews the study contributions and limitations. Section 10.4 reflects on 
the generalisability of the findings. Section 10.5 presents areas for further research, 
and Section 10.6 concludes. 
 
10.2  Impact of recent events 
 
Since the completion of data collection for this thesis, several important events had 
taken place which have relevance for the study findings. Firstly, the new HIV & 
AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa 2007-2011 (NSP) was endorsed (DoH 
2007a,b). The treatment objective of the new NSP is more moderate than the 
objective of the Comprehensive Plan, which supports the argument that the targets of 
the Comprehensive Plan were too ambitious. In addition, several of the objectives of 












9 (see Appendix 24). In terms of cost implications, the NSP also recognises that 
ART is by far the major cost-driver in the plan (DoH 2007a), supporting the 
importance of focusing specifically on the ART program.   
 
The impetus given by the NSP is accompanied by other changes, which may further 
strengthen its thrust. SANAC has been re-structured in order to make it a stronger 
platform for interaction among stakeholders. In addition, both the Minister of Health 
and the President, criticised for their controversial messages around HIV/AIDS and 
ART, were replaced in 2008. The new Minister of Health, in particular, has been 
clear in encouraging the fight against the epidemic and supporting the ART program 
(News24 2008a,b,c).   
 
Secondly, the ART program has expanded substantially, signalling that the 
Comprehensive Plan is in fact bearing fruit in expanding ART across the country. It 
is estimated that around 458,951 people were receiving ART at the end of 2007, 
including public and private patients (UNAIDS 2008), which is a 41% increase from 
2006. However, it also implies that by December 2007, only about 28% of the 
people in need of ART were receiving it. Thus, progress is still very far from 
reaching the objectives of the Comprehensive Plan, and even of the NSP. 
 
Thirdly, public HIV/AIDS funding has continued to grow substantially up to 2008. 
Appendix 25 compares the financial trends pictured in Chapter 5 (containing data 
available up to May 2006) with trends based on budget figures updated in January 
2009. The updated financial budgets show that major increases in funding were 
recorded in 2007/08-2008/09, confirming the interpretations in Chapter 5 that MTEF 
projections of HIV/AIDS funding have been revised upwards. The same is true for 
the two provinces studied. This suggests that the commitment to financing the scale-
up of HIV/AIDS policies has been sustained over this period. Conditional grant 
funding continues to be the preferred mechanism for financing HIV/AIDS policies, 
amounting to around double the recorded contribution of HIV/AIDS discretionary 
funding in provincial budgets. In the Free State, however, HIV/AIDS funding 













Fourthly, in 2008, financial markets collapsed internationally, driving global 
economies into recession (The Economist 2008a,b,c and 2009). Economic growth 
internationally was likely to fall from over 5% in 2007 to 3.9% in 2008, and perhaps 
to less than 3% in 2009 (Minister of Finance 2008). Growth forecasts for South 
Africa have also been revised downwards, with GDP growth declining from around 
5% per year up to 2008 to 3% in 2009 (Minister of Finance 2008). This economic 
crisis is likely to compromise the growth of HIV/AIDS funding. In addition, 
international sources of funding are also likely to be affected by the economic 
downturn, and aid agencies have already signalled that foreign assistance will be 
reduced (News24 2008d,e). As a result, the global financial crisis is creating a new 
scenario where it will be very difficult, even unlikely, to sustain the large historical 
increments in HIV/AIDS funding. Given this reduction in financial resources, the 
problem of absorptive capacity as studied in this thesis, i.e. in a context of high and 
sustained funding increases, becomes irrelevant, as such increases are unlikely to 
occur in the imminent future. Nonetheless, what becomes more urgent is the need to 
make better use of available resources. To do so, it is critical to overcome the 
identified obstacles to the absorption of funding. Therefore, the findings of this 
research do remain relevant, if not even more important, given the envisaged period 
of economic recession ahead.   
 
Finally, an interesting development in the financing of the FSDoH merits special 
attention. The FSDoH has moved from underspending to running out of funding, not 
only for ART, but for the entire FSDoH. In October and November 2008, the 
FSDoH issued cost-containment measures “to avoid cash-flow problems” given the 
“critical financial situation of the Free State Province” (FSDoH 2008a, p.1; FSDoH 
2008b; FSDoH 2008c). Moreover, in mid-November 2008, the FSDoH mandated 
ART facilities to stop immediately putting new people on to ART due to budget 
constraints (FSDoH 2008d; News24 2008f; Thom 2008a; Beresford and David 2008; 
Flanagan 2008a). Furthermore, on the 25
th
 of November 2008, the FSDoH 
announced cost containment measures for 31 hospitals, including postponing all 
non-emergency surgery and stopping all non-critical staff appointments until the end 
of January 2009 (Thom 2008b; Flanagan 2008; The Citizen 2008). Whereas the 
FSDoH claims they were under-funded, the Provincial and National Treasury point 












Flanagan 2008b). In response, the NDoH injected R9.5 million into the FSDoH to 
enable it to buy ARVs and the Minister of Health announced the establishment of a 
team, an “in-house treasury” at NDoH, to monitor spending in PDoHs (News24 
2008f,g). These events reinforce the reported need to strengthen provincial financial 
management in order to monitor the quality of spending and not only the level of 
spending. It also confirms the concerns about the usefulness of the business plan in 
planning and budgeting. In addition, the fact that the FSDoH took such drastic 
measures suggests that communication and collaboration between the FSDoH and 
the NDoH and provincial Treasury remain insufficient and even a hindrance to 
dealing with problems encountered. All these implications underline the importance 
of dealing with the identified obstacles to absorptive capacity in order to optimise 
funding for HIV/AIDS. 
 
10.3  Thesis contributions and limitations 
 




The main contributions of this thesis are two-fold, viz. conceptual and operational. 
  
On the conceptual analysis of absorptive capacity: 
 
 The study reviews the literature on absorptive capacity from several disciplines; 
it shows the absence of a common understanding of the term and indicators to 
measure it; the closest group of theories relate to absorptive capacity in respect 
of international aid; 
 The thesis demonstrates that it is relevant to study absorptive capacity for 
HIV/AIDS funding in relation to public expenditure, and not only in relation to 
international aid;  
 The study provides and tests a comprehensive definition of absorptive capacity 
of public HIV/AIDS funding in South Africa. This definition was positively 












 The study creates and tests a framework for identifying and disentangling the 
nature and severity of the major barriers hampering the utilisation of ART 
funding in the public health sector. This framework proved useful for 
systematically collecting participants‟ assessments of the bottlenecks and 
obstacles encountered, and consequently suggesting policy recommendations. 
        The study provides a tool to assess absorptive capacity for financing public 
health interventions. This tool consists of a series of questions to be examined in 
three phases, which relate to inputs, processes and outputs. 
 
On the operational study of the South African case:  
 
 The thesis provides a budget analysis of HIV/AIDS funding and spending 
patterns in South Africa and, more specifically, in the Western Cape and the Free 
State provinces. The budget analysis also compared conditional and discretionary 
funding; 
 The study assesses absorptive capacity in respect of public HIV/AIDS treatment 
expenditure in South Africa, as well as in the Western Cape and the Free State 
provinces;  
 The research identifies, explores and categorises the major obstacles holding 
back the scale-up of ART funding and implementation; in so doing, it provides 
an assessment and understanding of the issues involved through a systematic 
study; 
 The thesis suggests a set of overall strategic policy changes, and a set of specific 
policy recommendations to overcome the identified obstacles and to enable the 
utilisation of available funding in a system-supportive, effective, efficient and 
sustainable way; 
 The study compares the provinces of the Western Cape and the Free State, and 
draws lessons from their differences and commonalities.  
 
From the commencement of the Comprehensive Plan, several lessons can be learnt. 
This thesis aims to contribute to the South African ART program by systematically 
analysing the problems encountered and recommending policy options to make 












African National and Provincial DoHs to be better equipped to confront the 
challenges of scaling up ART. It is the investigator‟s hope that this research will 
support members of the DoHs in taking evidence-informed spending decisions, and 
in that way, facilitate sustained increases of HIV/AIDS funding from Treasury too. 
 
The research has provided a space for stakeholders involved in ART financing and 
implementation, whether from inside or outside government, to voice their opinions 
on progress freely, and to suggest ways of improving the program. This neutral 
space is especially valuable given the noted controversies and fear of expressing 
opinions around HIV/AIDS and ART. The numerous quotations provided in 
Chapters 6-8 serve to illustrate respondents‟ opinions in their own words. 
 
This research has also contributed to the understanding of the politics of HIV/AIDS 
financing policies, investigating the actors, financial instruments and processes 
involved in financing the implementation of the ART program. 
 
In addition, as a critical input, the approach taken in this research has highlighted the 
side-effects of the ART rollout for the rest of the public health system, exploring 
related challenges and opportunities. The importance of promoting this 
understanding cannot be overemphasized.  
 
Moreover, this thesis contributes to international efforts to track the results of the 
international funding mobilised for ART by drawing attention to the importance of 
considering specific national issues, which determine the utilisation of such funding.  
 
Limitations of this study  
 
A major limitation of this research is that it makes policy recommendations to 
enhance absorptive capacity in South Africa based on a qualitative study at the 
national level, and on a more in-depth study in only two provinces, out of the nine 
South African provinces. Clearly, it would have been beneficial to study the other 
provinces in more detail too, especially those facing the biggest challenges to 
absorbing funding and implementing the ART program. However, as explained in 












provinces hindered the viability of such study at the time. In addition, extending the 
study to other provinces would have been too time-consuming for the scope of this 
research. The appropriateness of selecting the Western Cape and the Free State as 
the two provinces to be studied was moreover corroborated by respondents in the 
interviews at the national level. 
 
Qualitative research has its strengths and limitations. It has proved useful in 
exploring the understanding of the concept of absorptive capacity and its constitutive 
elements among a wide set of stakeholders. However, the qualitative method is more 
limited in assessing absorptive capacity and major bottlenecks, as it is dependent on 
the subjective opinion of respondents, as well as being dependent on the 
objectiveness of the researcher in analysing and reporting data. To create a more 
systematic method of enquiry, interviews were conducted based on interview guides, 
and the enquiry of major bottlenecks was based on a table shown to all interviewees. 
This was also a limitation of the study, as the table guided interviewees‟ responses, 
and hence it might have created a bias in the fieldwork. In addition, the researcher 
used qualitative software to analyse the data. Furthermore, only forty-two people 
were interviewed as part of the fieldwork. Extending this research to other related 
organisations or governmental departments would probably have enhanced the study 
findings, but the time costs of such exercise would have been very high, and it 
exceeded the limits of this research. 
 
Another major limitation is that the budget analysis was done for overall HIV/AIDS 
budgets, even before the Comprehensive Plan had been launched, whilst the 
fieldwork focused more specifically on the ART component of that plan. Although 
ART is the highest cost driver of the Comprehensive Plan, and ART is delivered in 
conjunction with other care and support interventions, this study would have been 
more complete if it had also included a budget analysis of exclusively ART-related 
expenditure, such as, for example, the ART expenditure component of the 
HIV/AIDS conditional grant. However, such analysis was not possible due to data 
restrictions. In addition, data restrictions in relation to discretionary funding are 













10.4  Generalisability of the findings   
 
The contributions of this thesis on the conceptual front are transferable to studies on 
absorptive capacity in other settings, whether in other countries or other 
interventions, as it provides an analytical framework for undertaking such research, 
which could be adapted to the particularities of each case. In particular, the tool to 
assess absorptive capacity provided in Chapter 9 is particularly relevant for public 
health interventions.  
 
More specifically, the analysis of the Western Cape and the Free State is particularly 
relevant for other South African provinces. The Western Cape is better off than other 
provinces in terms of resources, ART progress, and their lower HIV prevalence. Yet, 
the lessons of this province are crucial for the other provinces too, because as the 
Western Cape‟s ART program has been running the longest, it provides lessons 
about obstacles that are likely to emerge in other provinces a few years hence. The 
Free State province closely approximates other provinces in terms of its resources 
and the status of the epidemic, and it would thus offer useful lessons for other 
provinces too.  
 
This research also imparts insights that are relevant for other African and low- and 
middle-income countries affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, which are likely to 
face similar obstacles, such as a shortage of medical personnel or poor M&E 
systems. Depending on the angle taken, South Africa can be considered worse-off or 
better-off than other affected countries. On the one hand, South Africa faces the 
challenge of having the largest HIV-population in the world. On the other hand, 
South Africa is better resourced than other African countries affected by the 
epidemic; not only is it a middle-income country, but it has strong private for-profit 
and not-for-profit sectors. Because the study does not focus specifically on the most 
deprived South African provinces, the emerging results may be more relevant to 














This research emphasizes that a long-term and holistic perspective is needed in 
scaling up ART, as otherwise the whole health system is put in danger. In addition, it 
indicates the importance of overcoming bureaucratic barriers in order to enhance 
absorptive capacity in the public sector. The results also emphasise that good 
leadership strongly influences the success of expanding any medical intervention  
 
The greatest limitation to generalising the findings of this study to other low- and 
middle-income countries is posed by South Africa‟s uniqueness in funding the 
HIV/AIDS response mainly through domestic resources. In contrast, donor-driven 
provision of ART is most common in low- and middle-income countries. For these 
countries, obstacles arising from the donor-recipient relationship, as reviewed in 
Chapter 3, should also be taken into account. Yet, the need to consider the domestic 
obstacles to absorptive capacity described in this thesis remains valid; it is also a 
new contribution to existing literature. Furthermore, the research also revealed that 
donor funding was more important than initially thought. 
 
Extrapolation of the results of this research to other HIV/AIDS areas, such as 
prevention interventions, would be difficult because prevention interventions are not 
specifically delivered through the health system; they require more diverse policies 
involving a wider group of agents, not only medical staff in health centres. Thus, 
issues are likely to differ significantly. However, some institutional and structural 
obstacles, such as inadequate national leadership and the slow bureaucratic system, 
are also likely to affect HIV/AIDS prevention interventions. For other HIV/AIDS 
interventions delivered through the health system, such as VCT or PMTCT, the 
method and results of this research are more relevant. 
 
10.6  Agenda for further research 
 
Several areas of this investigation should be researched further. Firstly, in relation to 
the policy recommendations outlined in Chapter 9, there is a need for further 
operational research to guide the processes of integration and decentralisation of 
ART delivery through the PHC structure, as well as to investigate the feasibility and 












Given the bottlenecks identified in this research, clarifying the steps that are required 
to implement these changes gradually is crucial for scaling up ART in South Africa. 
Moreover, following up through appropriately focused research on each of the 
specific recommendations to unblock the major bottlenecks holding back the ART 
program would directly benefit the optimisation of resources.  
 
In addition, further work should seek to track HIV/AIDS expenditure, both 
conditional and non-conditional. There is a need to monitor the resources invested to 
enhance accountability and to ensure that funding is being utilised optimally. Future 
HIV/AIDS increases should be closely tracked to ensure that funding is sufficient, 
not only to sustain current programs, but also to meet the growing need for 
treatment. It is also necessary to track underspending of allocations as an indicator of 
potential inability to absorb funding. Furthermore, special efforts should be devoted 
to tracking HIV/AIDS allocations made from discretionary funding, and in particular 
the targeted increases for HIV/AIDS made to the equitable share by National 
Treasury.  
 
While working towards the scaling-up of ART, it is also important to harness 
research to monitor the broader implications of the program in terms of efficiency, 
equity and sustainability, and the impact on the overall health system. The analysis 
of these system-wide implications should constitute a core feature of the HIV/AIDS 
response. In particular, the understanding of health system strengthening as a matter 
of keeping the right balance among the components of the program, as explained in 
Chapter 8, opens an innovative avenue for research in this field.   
 
A contested area of debate throughout this thesis was whether the requirements for 
the accreditation of ART sites could or should be relaxed without comprising service 
quality. The idea is not to reduce the standards but to explore alternative, innovative 
ways of delivering treatment. Thus, further research devoted to investigating 
alternative ways of ART delivery, in particular given the restrictions pointed out in 
this research, would be useful to facilitate the expansion of the ART program.  
 
A particular area of further research lies within human resources. The research 












to ART in the WCDoH and those working in the FSDoH, particularly in relation to 
financial officers. These differences related directly to the different performance of 
both DoHs in those areas. Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate further the 
personnel infrastructure in both DoHs, their number, positions and skills, and their 
relationship with the absorptive capacity of each province.  
 
Finally, the research in the Free State pointed out the need to follow up on those 
individuals who tested HIV-positive, but who do not yet qualify for ART, whether 
because of their clinical status or because they are waiting to start ART. Although 
the Comprehensive Plan stipulates that they should be provided with comprehensive 
care, the research has ascertained that this is not normally the case, and in fact many 
of these individuals died before ever accessing ARV treatment. Thus, further efforts 
should be devoted to understanding this loophole in the health service delivery, and 
to identifying the necessary steps to tackle this problem.  
 
10.7  Conclusion 
 
The study investigates whether insufficient absorptive capacity prevented the 
utilisation of funding and the expansion of the HIV/AIDS treatment program in 
South Africa. The research centres on the issue of absorptive capacity, not merely in 
relation to how much could be spent, but even more importantly on whether South 
Africa can afford to roll out the Comprehensive Plan in an equitable, efficient and 
sustainable manner at the same time as strengthening the overall health system. 
 
The research shows that a number of obstacles are blocking the optimal utilisation of 
increasing ART funding. The major constraints relate to the shortage and poor 
management of human resources, in particular of program managers and 
pharmacists, and to the restrictions related to conditional grant funding and related 
financial processes. In addition, other key impediments holding back the program 
are: insufficient M&E information systems; inadequate political leadership; the slow 
bureaucratic nature of the government; and insufficient space in health facilities. The 
study makes specific recommendations to deal with each obstacle identified, while 












services within the public health service platform; decentralising ART towards PHC; 
changing the delivery mode of ART; balancing the conditional grant and the 
equitable share mechanisms; and enhancing coordination along and within the DoH 
spheres and clusters. These measures are crucial to unleashing the capacities that 
will enable the scale-up of HIV/AIDS treatment in the country through ARVs. This 
research expects to contribute to the better utilisation of existing resources for the 
ART program in a manner that strengthens the overall South African public health 
system. In addition, the contribution is also conceptual because it deepens our 
understanding of absorptive capacity and because it provides a tool to assess this 
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APPENDIX 1 List of interviewees  
 
INTERVIEWEE POSITION DATE 
National Department of Health, Pretoria  
Comprehensive Plan, HIV and AIDS, TB and STI cluster 09.05.2006 
Health Economics and Finance Unit 14.06.2006 
STI and AIDS Prevention Unit 14.07.2006 
HIV and AIDS, TB and STI cluster 01.09.2006 
Strategic Planning Cluster 07.09.2006 
South African National AIDS Council 11.12.2006 
National Treasury  
Social Services 10.08.2006 & 
27.03.2007 
Outside government, national level  
AIDS Budget Unit, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 
Cape Town 
30.03.2006 
AIDS Budget Unit, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 
Cape Town 
30.03.2006 
Monitoring and Evaluation, Global Fund for fighting AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria, Geneva 
05.07.2006 
Health Systems Trust, Durban 07.07.2006 
Social Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Health, Human Science 
Research Council, Pretoria 
10.07.2006 
Regional Support Team for East and Southern Africa, UNAIDS, 
Johannesburg 
12.07.2006 
Medical Research Council, Cape Town 13.07.2006 
Health Policy Unit, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg 19.07.2006 
Medical Research Council, Cape Town 31.07.2006 & 
04.08.2006 
Western Cape province, inside and outside government  
Budget Office in the Provincial Treasury 04.10.2006 













Strategic Programs, PDoH 18.10.2006 
Global Fund Program, PDoH 20.10.2006 
ARV program, PDoH 27.10.2006 
HIV/AIDS, STI and Tuberculosis, PDoH 31.10.2006 
Provincial Treasury 17.11.2006 
Monitoring and Evaluation, ARV program, PDoH 14.12.2006 
Health Economics Unit, University of Cape Town 01.03.2007 
District Health Services and Programs, PDoH 12.03.2007 
Free State province, inside and outside government  
ARV Program, PDoH 30.11.2006 
Human Resources department, PDoH 30.11.2006 
Financial department, PDoH 30.11.2006 & 
06.12.2006 
ARV Program, PDoH 30.11.2006 
Centre for Health Systems Research and Development, 
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein 
04.12.2006 
ART Centre for Excellence, Medical Faculty, University of the 
Free State, Bloemfontein, and ART Task Team Member, PDoH 
11.12.2006 
Centre for Health Systems Research and Development, 
University of the Free State, Bloemfontein 
11.12.2006 
Consultant for the ART Program, PDoH 11.12.2006 
Consultant for the ART Program, PDoH 06.03.2007 
National Hospital and ART Task Team Member, PDoH 16.03.2007 
PDoH and ART Task Team Member, PDoH 30.11.2006 & 
16.03.2007 
iCAM Training Program, PDoH 16.03.2007 
Social Expenditure, Provincial Treasury 16.03.2007 
Social Expenditure, Provincial Treasury 16.03.2007 
Social Expenditure, Provincial Treasury 16.03.2007 
Local government  













APPENDIX 2 Examples of interview guides used 
 
Example 1: Interview guide for DoH program managers 
 
SECTION I  Introduction 
 Letter of consent to sign 
 Recording  
 Research proposal: The aim of the study is to explore the concept of absorptive 
capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS policies, and to learn from the South African 
experience. The study looks at the critical areas for scaling up ART where 
bottlenecks may arise.   
 Participant‟s background  
o Position 
o How long have you been in the post? 
o Mandate/focus of work, and how it relates to the area of absorptive 
capacity 
 
SECTION II  Absorptive capacity (AC) 
My definition: “A country‟s absorptive capacity for higher HIV/AIDS funding for 
scaling up HIV/AIDS treatment through the public health sector is the capacity of 
the country, mainly the health system but not exclusively, to absorb and use the funds 
for the intended objectives in a way that tries to maximize the positive and minimize 
the negative impact on other health areas and that respects the core principles of 
equity, efficiency and sustainability of the country's health policy.” 
 
 What do you understand by absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS 
financing? 
 How would you characterise the level(s) of absorptive capacity in South Africa 
(SA)? 
 And in relation to expected future funding increases to respond to need? 
 Do you think that there is also spare capacity that could be utilized? Where?  
 In your opinion, do AC limitations hinder the expansion of the HIV/AIDS 












 It is possible to devise a two-phase plan of scaling up, firstly when there is spare 
capacity that can be utilised for the new program, and secondly when there is no 
spare capacity and thus new capacity needs to be built. Where are we? 
 
SECTION III Financing of the Comprehensive Plan (CP) 
 Do you think public HIV/AIDS financing has increased sufficiently and in a 
timely manner to respond to the demands of the CP?  
 Do you think that underspending of allocations is a key problem or could be in 
the future?  
 Does the implementation of the CP need more funding than that which is 
budgeted? In which specific areas?  
 Are the big increases in funding reflected on the ground, at the implementation 
level? 
 Are there provinces having problems with spending all allocated funds? And 
overspending? Which ones? 
 
SECTION IV  Progress in the implementation of the CP 
 Based on your experience, how would you describe the progress in the 
implementation of ART in SA? 
 How would you compare it with other African countries? 
 What are the main results achieved in terms of objectives, and which ones need 
further work?  
 Are there provincial differences in the implementation, and if so, what are they? 
 
SECTION V       Where are the bottlenecks in the South African experience?  
 
 Is HIV/AIDS financing, especially for the CP, experiencing bottlenecks to 
spending? (IMP) 
 At which level are limitations to absorptive capacity greater: local, provincial or 
national?  













 GIVE TABLE: Categorization of critical areas where bottlenecks may arise and 



















-Conditional grants reporting requirements highly demanding  
-No HIV/AIDS spending specification of equitable shares 
-Weak financial management capacity at decentralised levels 
-Mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations  
-Fiscal policies may restrict health spending 
HUMAN 
-Shortage of medical personnel: doctors, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacists, nutritionists, counsellors 
-Shortage of non-medical personnel: program managers and 
administrators, data capturers and administrative clerks 
-Inadequate personnel management and training 
INFRASTRUCT
URAL  
-Insufficient clinic/hospital space 
-Lack of storage space for drugs 
-Inadequate laboratory infrastructure 
INSTITUTION
AL 
-Poor monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information systems 
-Weak drug and medical equipment procurement systems 
-Need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis services 
-Lack of successful pilot studies 
















-Issues of access: cultural barriers, stigma and transport 
-Insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of 
funding 
-Lack of ownership of decision-making  
-Slow government bureaucratic system 
-Need for public-private partnerships 
-Lack of community outreach and participation 














 Other obstacles? In which of the four categories? 
 Which areas of the above still have spare capacity? 
 What options are available to overcome these obstacles? 
o Which obstacles would be more responsive to the injection of funds 
(IMP) 
o Other than increasing funds; for example, reorganization of tasks   
o What actions have been taken to tackle the obstacles you have identified? 
o What are the potential negative impacts of these actions? 
 
SECTION VI  Health system strengthening (HSS) 
 
 To what extent is the implementation of the CP crowding out and strengthening 
overall health services? 
 Which effect is stronger? How do you strike a balance? 
 How would you reconcile the need to devote more resources (financial, human, 
and infrastructural) to HIV/AIDS and the need to maintain a balance in public 
health systems? 
 
SECTION VII Efficiency, equity and sustainability  
Recognition of different measures and interpretations of these concepts 
 
Efficiency  
 To what extent may pressures to spend quickly and scale up ART rapidly 
compromise quality?  
 Do differences between provinces reflect the overall differences in health 
systems? Are there other factors? 
 Do you think that the CP can be successfully scaled up in the provinces with the 
lowest capacity?  
 
Equity 













 Provincial equity (dealing with historical backlogs); urban vs. rural inequalities; 
gender; access issues. 
 How does the NDoH measure progress on equity?  
 
Sustainability 
 What do you think are the challenges for the sustainability of ART in the long 
term? [Examples: financing; implications of second line treatments – costs and 
need for more training; drug resistance; integration of ART within public health 
services] 
 Do you think the CP, as it is, is sustainable in the long term? What changes need 
to be made? 
 What provisions are made by the DoH to ensure the sustainability of the CP in 
the future?  
 Which other ones would you recommend in the case of SA? 
 
SECTION VIII Final issues 
 
Further questions 
 Donors‟ role  
 AC is dynamic: In which ways could AC be boosted for scaling up ART without 
compromising the overall goals and principles of health systems?  
 Could you give me your opinion on the tentative selection of the Western Cape 
and Free State provinces for the purposes of this case study? 
 
Petitions and Suggestions 
 Further thoughts  
 Questions by the participant  
 Relevant grey literature 












Example 2 Interview guide for Treasury participants 
 
SECTION I   Introduction 
 Letter of consent to sign 
 Recording  
 Research proposal: The aim of the study is to explore the concept of absorptive 
capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS policies, and to learn from the South African 
experience. The study looks at the critical areas for scaling up ART where 
bottlenecks may arise.   
 Participant‟s background  
o Position 
o How long have you been in the post? 
o Mandate/focus of work  
 
SECTION II  Absorptive capacity (AC) 
My definition: “A country‟s absorptive capacity for higher HIV/AIDS funding for 
scaling up HIV/AIDS treatment through the public health sector is the capacity of 
the country, mainly the health system but not exclusively, to absorb and use the funds 
for the intended objectives in a way that tries to maximize the positive and minimize 
the negative impact on other health areas and that respects the core principles of 
equity, efficiency and sustainability of the country's health policy.” 
 
 What do you understand by absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS 
financing? 
 How would you characterise the level of absorptive capacity in South Africa? 
 And in relation to expected future funding increases? 
 Do you think that there is also spare capacity that could be utilized? 
 In your opinion, do the limitations of AC constitute an obstacle for the expansion 
of ART? 
 How does Treasury assess the speed of funding increases in order to ensure 
absorption of funds? (IMP) 













 Which indicators are used to assess the effects of increasing HIV/AIDS 
financing on expanding absorptive capacity?  
 
SECTION III HIV/AIDS financing  
Mechanisms 
 Roles of Treasury in relation to HIV/AIDS financing- allocation of conditional 
grant (CG) to NDoH and equitable share (ES) to provinces. 
 Relationships between Treasury levels (national, provincial) in relation to AIDS 
financing 
 Relationship between Treasury and DoH, national and provincial  
 3 major mechanisms: CGs since 2000/01; ES targeted increases; own revenue  
 Preferred mechanism for funding HIV/AIDS, the CP and health, and why. 
 
Financing  
 How much has HIV/AIDS funding increased, and how much more is it expected 
to grow?  
 Possible to identify funding for the CP and/or ART? – “the new ARV treatment 
program announced in November 2003 is financed via R300 million added to the 
health HIV CG in the 2004/05 budget” (Hickey and Ndlovu 2005, p.629) 
 Which of the two mechanisms, CG and ES, is allocating more funds for 
HIV/AIDS and CP?  
 How do Treasury allocations compare to requests from DoH through business 
plans? (78% in 2002) 
 Are there HIV/AIDS programs demanding more funding than the allocated one? 
Examples 
 Is National Treasury willing to give more AIDS funding than what the NDoH is 
willing to accept? 
 
SECTION IV  Conditional grants, equitable shares and own financing 
 
Conditional Grants (CG) 












o There has been a “massive improvement in spending of conditional 
grants, from 36% in 2000/01 to 99% in 2004/05” (ref. Ndlovu email 23 
march 05)  
o “From 2001/02, aggregate spending on HIV/AIDS conditional grants 
matched or exceeded average spending on conditional grants generally” 
(Hickey, Ndlovu and Guthrie 2004, p.147) 
o The Free State and the Western Cape recorded 99% and 79% spending of 
AIDS conditional grants in 2003/04, and 97% and 100% in 2004/05. 
 Allocation formula at national, provincial and local levels:  
o Criteria and responsible agents  
o To what extent does Treasury look at provincial underspending 
 Strong requirements, though some were relaxed in 2002/03 to facilitate spending 
– which ones in particular?  
 How do these requirements compare to requirements of other health conditional 
grants? 
 Three conditional grants for HIV/AIDS. The biggest is the one for health. Future 
trends among the three 
 Health CG for AIDS – how is it increasing over the years; what are the biggest 
components?  
 What other CG for health exist? For how long? Performance? 
 
Equitable Shares (ES) 
 Only few provinces allocating discretionary expenditure, especially Gauteng and 
KZN 
 Allocation formula:  
o Criteria for national ES allocations and provincial selection for 
HIV/AIDS by Cabinet 
o How do provinces know how much of targeted ES is allocated to 
HIV/AIDS? (IMP)  
 How do Treasury and NDOH ensure HIV/AIDS investments of ES?  














Provincial own revenue 
 Could donor funding contribute to provincial revenue directly? In which cases? 
 
SECTION V  HIV/AIDS spending 
 
 Are there provinces having problems with spending all funds allocated? And 
overspending? Which ones? 
 Do you consider that underspending of HIV/AIDS funding is a problem? Has it 
been so in the past, or may it become an issue in the near future? (IMP) 
 How would you describe the level and evolution of spending of HIV/AIDS and 
for the CP?  
 Are spending rates higher for CG or ES? Are „rollovers‟ taken into account? 
 How does it compare with underspending in other health areas 
 Do you think that underspending of allocations is a key problem or has it been so 
in the past?  
 To what extent is it a problem now in 2006? 
 Does the implementation of the CP need more funding than budgeted? In which 
specific areas?  
 Is Treasury able and willing to increase allocations for HIV/AIDS and health, 
provided there is good spending performance (quantity and quality of spending)? 
 Have there been cases where funds unspent in certain provinces are being 
reallocated towards other provinces with better spending performance? Claus 
23.b. For both CG and ES? And non-AIDS? (IMP) 
 Provincial underspending - “some remain problematic and may struggle to 
spend the new ARV funds, notably the Eastern Cape and Mpumalanga” (Guthrie 
and Hickey p.158) 
 For these provinces are ES or CG more appropriate? What is done to redress 
capacity imbalances? 
 How and when is spending accounted for in SA public system? When funds are 













Rollovers, and funds committed but not spent 
Important as an indicator of money unspent 
 What are the guiding principles for rollovers for both ES and CGs – calculation 
and management 
 Are rollovers taken into account when calculating HIV/AIDS spending? 
 Are they more important for CG than for ES?  
 In which particular areas are rollovers higher? 
 
SECTION VI  Performance-based budgeting 
 
 Moving towards performance-based budgeting? Which provinces doing better? 
 Mechanisms used by Treasury and by NDoH to measure and implement budget 
performance 
 Agents responsible for monitoring spending for ES and CG  
 Is money spent 100% in designated HIV/AIDS targets? ES is difficult to track 
 Indicators of financing performance used by Treasury 
 How does HIV/AIDS financing score according to those indicators? 
Below/above average? 
 Are there pressures to spend HIV/AIDS funding quickly? (IMP) 
 Do you think pressures to spend quickly may compromise the quality of 
spending? 
 Disbursement of funds: Responsible agent and criteria  
 Integration of CG into ES in the future?  
 How does the decentralisation process across the three levels affect HIV/AIDS 
financing performance? 
 
SECTION VII Foreign contributions to HIV/AIDS financing 
 
 How much are donors contributing to health and HIV/AIDS financing 
 In which way are they contributing: financing and technical assistance  
 Please explain mechanisms for assistance, funding through NDoH?  













 Position of Treasury in relation to donor funding for HIV/AIDS  
 How would you describe the relationship between donors and the SA 
Government in relation to HIV/AIDS?  
 
SECTION VIII      Where are the bottlenecks in the South African experience?  
 
The focus of the analysis follows the flow of AIDS funds from National to PDoHs. 
Several obstacles can be encountered that may lead to the formation of bottlenecks 
where funds cannot be spent at the necessary speed. This study defines „bottlenecks‟ 
as areas of congestion in the flow of funds. 
Two criteria for identifying bottlenecks: (a) Where funding is allocated but not 
spent; (b) Where there is a need for funding (to achieve targets) but resources are not 
in place 
 
 Is HIV/AIDS financing, especially for the CP, experiencing bottlenecks to 
spending? (IMP) 
 At which level are limitations to absorptive capacity greater: local, provincial or 
national?  
 Which of the following obstacles are hindering AIDS spending, especially for 
CP? (IMP) 
 GIVE TABLE: Categorization of critical areas where bottlenecks may arise and 





























-Conditional grants reporting requirements highly demanding  
-No HIV/AIDS spending specification of equitable shares 
-Weak financial management capacity at decentralised levels 
-Mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations  
-Fiscal policies may restrict health spending 
HUMAN 
-Shortage of medical personnel: doctors, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacists, nutritionists, counsellors 
-Shortage of non-medical personnel: program managers and 
administrators, data capturers and administrative clerks 
-Inadequate personnel management and training 
INFRASTRUCT
URAL 
-Insufficient clinic/hospital space 
-Lack of storage space for drugs 
-Inadequate laboratory infrastructure 
INSTITUTION
AL 
-Poor monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information systems 
-Weak drug and medical equipment procurement systems 
-Need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis services 
-Lack of successful pilot studies 
















-Issues of access: cultural barriers, stigma and transport 
-Insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of 
funding 
-Lack of ownership of decision-making  
-Slow government bureaucratic system 
-Need for public-private partnerships 
-Lack of community outreach and participation 
-Need for social insurance schemes 
 
Further questions 
 Other obstacles? In which one of the five categories? 












 To what extent CG and ES are used for tackling these bottlenecks? (IMP) E.g. 
training in financial and project management skills – to what extent do 
HIV/AIDS CGs include and use funds to build up provincial capacity? 
 Could you please specify, for the obstacles you identified before, which ones are 
more serious? 
 What options are available to overcome these obstacles? 
o Which obstacles would be more responsive to the injection of funds 
(IMP)? 
o Others than increasing funds; for example, reorganization of tasks?   
o What actions have been taken to tackle the obstacles you have identified? 
o What are the potential negative impacts of these actions?  
 
SECTION IX  Health system strengthening (HSS) 
Crowding out 
 How much money is being allocated to HIV/AIDS in comparison to other 
diseases?  
 Is increasing AIDS expenditure crowding out in any way financing of other 
health areas?  
 How can this be checked through a budget analysis? See Hickey and Ndlovu 
(2005) analysis 
 What mechanisms are used for ensuring the balance between AIDS and health 
financing? 
 Do the fast increases of HIV/AIDS funding become a burden on government 
officials in terms of management needs?  
 
Strengthening 
 Is increasing AIDS expenditure strengthening health system financing? In which 
ways?  
 Which effect is stronger: strengthening or overwhelming health systems? How 
do you strike a balance? 
 How would you reconcile the need to devote more resources (financial, human, 
infrastructural) to HIV/AIDS and the need to maintain the balance in public 












SECTION X  Efficiency, equity and sustainability  
Recognition of different measures and interpretations of these concepts 
 
Efficiency  
 What are Treasury‟s objectives in terms of the efficiency of HIV/AIDS and 
health financing?  
 Mechanisms used by Treasury to measure and seek efficiency  
 How are increases in HIV/AIDS financing impacting on efficiency objectives of 
health financing?  
 Are there significant differences in the efficiency of funding spending by 
provinces? 
 Do these differences reflect the overall differences in health systems? Other 
factors? 
 To what extent may pressures to spend quickly compromise the efficiency of 
spending?  
 How is the increasing financing for the CP impacting on the overall objective of 
efficiency in public health? 
 Do you think that the necessary financing for the CP can be successfully scaled 
up in the provinces with the lowest capacity?  
 
Equity 
 What are the objectives of Treasury in terms of equity of HIV/AIDS financing?  
 What mechanisms are used by Treasury to measure and procure equity of 
financing for AIDS/health? 
 To what extent may pressures to spend quickly compromise the equity in 
spending?  
 How is the increasing financing for the CP impacting on the overall objective of 
equity in public health? 
 Provincial differences 
o Which provinces are receiving more funding (in relation to need)? 












o How does resource allocation procure building up the capacity of 
worse off provinces? 
 Mechanisms to deal with other equity issues: urban-rural inequalities; access 
issues; gender inequalities 
 
Sustainability 
 What do you think are the challenges for the sustainability of ART in the long 
term? 
 In particular, what are the financial challenges? 
 Does the rapidly increasing HIV/AIDS funding have any consequences at the 
macroeconomic and governance level in South Africa? 
 What funding mechanisms, ES or CG, would be more sustainable in the long 
term? 
o If there is a need for earmarked funding, does it happen for any other 
disease interventions?  
 Do you think the financing levels and mechanisms of the CP are sustainable in 
the long term? 
 What provisions are made to ensure the sustainability of CP financing in the 
future?  
 What other provisions would you recommend? 
 Alternative financing mechanisms 
 
SECTION XI  Final issues 
 
Further questions 
 From your experience, in what ways could AC be boosted for the CP?  
 What are, in your opinion, the main challenges and opportunities that SA faces in 
scaling up HIV/AIDS funding?  
 Could you give me your opinion on the tentative selection of the Western Cape 
and Free State provinces for the purposes of this study? (IMP) 














Petitions and Suggestions 
 Further thoughts  
 Questions by the participant  












Example 3 Interview guide for non-governmental participants 
 
SECTION I  Introduction 
 Letter of consent to sign 
 Recording  
 Research proposal: The aim of the study is to explore the concept of absorptive 
capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS policies, and to learn from the South African 
experience. The study looks at the critical areas for scaling up ART where 
bottlenecks may arise.   
 Participant‟s background  
o Position:  
o Mandate/focus of work  
o How long have you been in the post? 
o Work from your organisation related to this research 
 
SECTION II  Absorptive capacity (AC) 
 What do you understand by absorptive capacity in the context of HIV/AIDS 
financing? 
 How would you characterise the level of absorptive capacity in South Africa? 
 How would you characterise it in relation to expected future funding increases? 
 Do you think that there is also spare capacity that could be utilized? 
 Do the limitations of AC constitute an obstacle for the expansion of ART? 
 Which mechanisms could be used to indicate the level of absorptive capacity for 
ART across provinces? 
 It is possible to devise a two-phase plan of scaling up, firstly when there is spare 
capacity that can be utilised for the new program, and secondly when there is no 
spare capacity and thus new capacity needs to be built. Where are we? 
 
SECTION III  Progress in the implementation of the Comprehensive Plan (CP) 
 How would you describe the progress of implementation of ART/CP in SA?  
 How would you compare it with other African countries? Is the SA approach 
more horizontal? 











 Statistics: number of people tested, on ART; number of women receiving 
PMTCT; number of sites accredited and delivering ART  
 Which objectives have been achieved, and which ones need further work?  
 What provincial differences exist in the implementation? 
 Do you think there is strong pressure put on the DoH to deliver ART quickly? 
 
SECTION IV  Financing of the CP 
 Do you think public HIV/AIDS financing has increased sufficiently and in a 
timely manner to respond to demands?  
 Are the big increases in funding reflected on the ground, at the level of 
implementation? 
 Are there provinces that have a problem to spend all funds allocated? And 
overspending? Which ones? 
 Do you have any special comments on the Western Cape and the Free State? 
 Do you think that insufficient capacity to spend is a problem or has it been so in 
the past?  
 In your opinion, does the implementation of the CP need higher increases of 
funding than the planned ones? In which specific areas?  
 Do you think that public HIV/AIDS funding is going to the right areas? 
(prevention vs. treatment; ...) 
 
SECTION V      Where are the bottlenecks in the South African experience?  
The focus of the analysis follows the flow of AIDS funds from National to PDoHs. 
Several obstacles can be encountered that may lead to the formation of bottlenecks 
where funds cannot be spent at the necessary speed. This study defines „bottlenecks‟ 
as areas of congestion in the flow of funds. 
Two criteria for identifying bottlenecks: (a) Where funding is allocated but not 
spent; (b) Where there is need for funding (to achieve targets) but resources are not 
in place 
 Is HIV/AIDS financing, especially for the CP, experiencing bottlenecks to 
spending?  













 GIVE TABLE: Based on your experience, which of the following obstacles are 


















-Conditional grants reporting requirements highly demanding  
-No HIV/AIDS spending specification of equitable shares 
-Weak financial management capacity at decentralised levels 
-Mismatch between DoH requests and Treasury allocations  
-Fiscal policies may restrict health spending 
HUMAN 
-Shortage of medical personnel: doctors, nurses, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacists, nutritionists, counsellors 
-Shortage of non-medical personnel: program managers and 
administrators, data capturers and administrative clerks 
-Inadequate personnel management and training 
INFRASTRUCT
URAL 
-Insufficient clinic/hospital space 
-Lack of storage space for drugs 
-Inadequate laboratory infrastructure 
INSTITUTION
AL 
-Poor monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information systems 
-Weak drug and medical equipment procurement systems 
-Need for integration of HIV and tuberculosis services 
-Lack of successful pilot studies 
















-Issues of access: cultural barriers, stigma and transport 
-Insufficient reliability, predictability and coordination of funding 
-Lack of ownership of decision-making  
-Slow government bureaucratic system 
-Need for public-private partnerships 
-Lack of community outreach and participation 
















 Which areas of the above still have spare capacity? 
 Importance of obstacles  
 What options are available to overcome these obstacles? 
o Which obstacles would be more responsive to the injection of funds? 
o Which other options besides increasing funds? For example, 
reorganization of tasks  
o What actions have been taken to tackle the obstacles you have identified? 
o What are the potential negative impacts of these actions?  
o How long would it take to tackle these issues? Short-, medium-, long-
term  
 
SECTION VI  Health System Strengthening (HSS) 
 To what extent does HIV/AIDS erode the capacity of health systems to deliver 
services? 
 Which areas of health systems are more directly affected by the implementation 
of the CP?  
 Which approach would you say prevails for ART: using existing structures (TB, 
ANC) vs. creating new ones? 
 To what extent and in which way do you think the implementation of the CP is 
strengthening overall health services?  
 Do you think that the priority given to HIV/AIDS treatment services is 
jeopardising other health areas?  
 Which effect do you think is stronger: strengthening or overwhelming health 
systems?  
 How would you reconcile the need to devote more resources (financial, human, 
infrastructural) to HIV/AIDS and the need to maintain a balance in public health 
systems?  
 Do you see the process of integration of ART within public health services 
happening through a more horizontal approach rather than a vertical one, 













SECTION VI  Efficiency, equity and sustainability  
Efficiency  
Recognition of different measures of efficiency 
 Are there significant differences in efficiency in the implementation of ART by 
the different provinces? 
 Do you think these differences reflect the overall differences in health service 
delivery?  
 How is the implementation of the CP impacting on the objective of efficiency of 
public health services?  
 To what extent do you think that pressures to spend quickly may compromise 
efficiency of service delivery?  
 Still, do you think that the CP can be successfully scaled up in the provinces with 
the lowest capacity?  
 Challenges and opportunities- recommendations 
 
Equity 
 How is the implementation of the CP impacting on the overall objective of 
equity? 
 Provincial equity: Need to deal with historical backlogs 
 Urban vs. rural inequalities  
 HIV/AIDS prioritised over other diseases, creating inequities within health 
systems  
 Capacity to benefit: access issues  
 Gender equity 
 Challenges and opportunities – recommendations 
 
Sustainability 
 What do you think are the challenges for the sustainability of ART in the long 
term? 
 Do you think the CP, as it is, is sustainable in the long term? 
 What provisions are made to ensure the sustainability the CP in the future?  
 What other provisions would you recommend? 












 Challenges and opportunities – recommendations 
 
SECTION VIII Final issues 
Further questions 
 From your experience, in what ways could AC be boosted for the CP?  
 Could you give me your opinion on the tentative selection of the Western Cape 
and Free State provinces for the purposes of this case study? 
 
Petitions and Suggestions 
 Further thoughts  
 Questions by the participant  
 Relevant grey literature 












Example 4  Specific questions by area of interest 
  
 (A)  On Human Resources (HHRR)  
 
New National Human Resources Plan for Health 
 There is the new plan A National Human Resources Plan for Health to provide 
skilled human resources for healthcare adequate to take care of all South 
Africans 2006 in response to the human resource demands. Could you please 
describe the core areas of this plan?  
 Major steps taken in implementation of the plan.  
 What specific areas are expected to benefit more directly from the 
Comprehensive Plan?  
 
HHRR for HIV/AIDS-related programs 
 Could you please describe the department‟s strategy in responding to the needs 
of HIV/AIDS programs, specifically the CP?  
 How many people have been trained and employed for HIV/AIDS specific issues 
and/or the Comprehensive Plan? 
 What proportion of the newly trained personnel on HIV/AIDS is recruited from 
other health areas?  
 Could you please compare the demands placed on HHRR by HIV/AIDS 
treatment programs in relation to other health programs? 
 
Challenges and options  
 What are the main challenges faced in building the capacity of HHRR for the 
CP? 
o Medical personnel: doctors, nurses, lab technicians, nutritionists, 
counsellors 
o Non-medical personnel: program managers and administrators, data 
capturers and administrative clerks 
o Personnel management and training 












o Injection of funds: Which obstacles would be more responsive to the 
injection of funds? (IMP) 
o What other options are there besides increasing funds, e.g. reorganization 
of tasks?   
o What actions have been taken to tackle the obstacles you have identified? 
o What are the potential negative impacts of these actions?  
o How long would it take to tackle these issues? Short-, medium- or long-
term 
 What is the strategy of the department in relation to issues of  
o Brain drain and employment of overseas personnel 
o Recruitment of personnel for rural and less attractive areas 
o Demands on salary increases, if an issue? 
Critical issues  
 Are the new resources for HIV/AIDS policies facilitating revitalisation of HHRR 
for the overall health system (not just for HIV/AIDS programs)? In which ways? 
 Is training of HIV/AIDS related personnel a priority over other health 
interventions? Is it taking away resources (in terms of funds, time and attention) 
from other health areas? 
 Do HHRR employed on HIV/AIDS-related programs have better working 
conditions than their equals in other programs? 
 May pressures to increase personnel on ART undermine the overall health 
system‟s balance? 
 What is the department doing to manage the competing demands? 
 Tensions between private vs. public sectors 
 In which ways do you see HIV/AIDS policies having a positive impact on the 
overall health system‟s capacity? 
 Are there provincial differences, in particular for the provinces of the Western 
Cape and Free State 
 Donor support, specifically for HIV/AIDS programs  
 How does the department share responsibilities with other departments in 













(B) On drug procurement 
 
 Can you please describe the ARV drug procurement system of the Western Cape 
and the Free State? Who does what?  
 Has the CP changed the system in any ways? 
 There is a parallel system for ART in the Western Cape – how was this decision 
taken? 
 How does it compare with SA‟s? 
 Is procurement outsourced?  
 Is it related to medical procurement and laboratory at all? 
 Outputs/efficacy of drug procurement in terms of the CP – what are the 
challenges? 
 Financing 
 Human resources –  
o Accreditation of ART sites require a pharmacist – is this a problem?  
o There is low payment in the public sector – is this a problem? 
o Will middle level professionals solve the problem? 
 Procurement 
o Tender processes – long time to finalise;  
o Nationally managed 
o Importation of drugs 
 Management 
o Lack of storage space 
o Stock-outs? Stock management capacity– at different levels 
 ARVs 
o Drug resistance 
o Lack of trust related to Minister‟s double messages 
 Others  
o Registration of new drugs, i.e.  
o Package of drugs from local industry in ways that support adherence 
o Using drugs that are easier to take  
 Is drug procurement and management holding back expansion of ART in the 




















Demographic    
Population density per km
2
  36.6 22.79 38.86 
Population mid-year estimate (2006) 4,745,500 2,958,800 47,390,900 
- proportion African 23.57% 85.07% 77.99% 
- proportion Coloured 53.74% 2.84% 8.54% 
- proportion Indian 1.06% 0.1% 2.45% 
- proportion White 21.61% 11.9% 11.0% 
Economic    
Contribution to national GDP 2005 14.7% 5.5 % 100% 
GDP per head (2006) (Rds) 41,138 16,504 35,994 
GDP growth rate (2006) 5.7% 4.2% 5.4% 
Gini coefficient (2005) 0.58 0.64 0.65 
Education    





3.4% 9.2% 10.3% 
Proportion of people 15+ literate 
b
 (2005) 95.3% 89.9% 88.5% 
Learner-to-educator ratio (2006) 29.8:1 29.2:1 31.8:1 
Matric 
c
 pass rate (2006) 84% 72% 67% 
University entrance pass rate (2006) 27% 20% 16% 
Health    
Maternal mortality rate
d
 (2003) 70 234 110 
Life expectancy at birth, projected (2010) 60.3 46.5 50.4 
Under-five mortality rate 
e
 (2007) 39 86 74 
Proportion of women attending antenatal 
clinics HIV-positive (2005) 
15.7% 30.3% 30.2% 
Total HIV infections (2006) 267,289 387,770 5,372,474 
AIDS deaths (2006) 11,922 27,207  













TB cases reported (2004) 58,577 29,790 529,320 
Proportion of TB and HIV-positive  (2004) 50.4% 70.5% 66.4% 
People without medical aid (2005) 3,599,000 2,541,000 40,273,000 
Residents per public sector doctor (2006) 3,539:1 5,438:1 4,974:1 
Residents per qualified nurse 
f
 (2006) 346:1 258:1 241:1 
Beds in public and private hospitals (2004) 14,185 7,677 135,977 
Estimated per capita health spending (public 
sector) (2006/07) (Rds) 
1,622 1,398 1,206 
Proportion of public health professional 
posts vacant (2006) 
16.9% 40.4% 29.0% 
Living conditions    
Households living in formal dwellings 
(2005) 
78.7% 69.2% 69.6% 
Households living in informal dwellings 
(2005) 
17.3% 18.3% 15.9% 
Households living in traditional dwellings 
(2005) 
0.0% 4.7% 11.8% 
Households without water in dwellings 
(2005)  
30.8% 67.6% 62.8% 
Households without basic sanitation
 g
 3.4% 3.1% 7.9% 
Households without electricity (2005)  5.8% 12.6% 19.8% 
Households without access to a 
cell/telephone (2005) 
1.6% 7.5% 6.0% 
People living on less than 1$/day (2006) 97,945 283,899 4,228,787 
Rate of urbanisation (2006) 89.7% 73.8% 56.4% 
a 
People aged 20 years and older
 
b 
People 15 and older, excluding people who could only read 
c 
South African exam taken at the last year of secondary schooling 
d
 The number of women who die as a result of childbearing, during the pregnancy, or within 42 days 
of delivery or termination of pregnancy, in one year 
e 
The number of children under five years old who die in a year per 1.000 live births 
f 
Public and private sector nurse 
g
 Basic sanitation is defined as a pit latrine with ventilation 












APPENDIX 4 Participation consent form 
 
Title of Research: HIV/AIDS Policies and Absorptive Capacity in South Africa: 
Identifying the Bottlenecks, Unleashing the Capacity. 
 
Purpose of Research: This research aims to contribute to the understanding of 
HIV/AIDS policies and absorptive capacity in the South African context. The 
objective is to identify the major bottlenecks created by HIV/AIDS funding and the 
major obstacles encountered, specifically in the provinces of the Free State and the 
Western Cape. The research is conducted in partial fulfilment of the doctoral degree 
of the investigator at the University of Cape Town. 
 
Funding of research: The research is partially funded by the Spanish Foundation 
Fundación Carolina, a non-governmental and non-political organization, 
www.fundacioncarolina.es.  
 
Interview process: If you agree to participate, the investigator will interview you in 
accordance with a questionnaire, in order to collect information in a systematic 
manner. The expected timeframe of the interview is 1 hour.  
 
Confidentiality: If you consent, the interview will be recorded. Records of the 
interview will be kept strictly confidential, and your reference and name will not 
appear in any reports of the study without your consent. 
 
Risk and harms. There is no risk in participating in this research.  
 
Expected benefits to your organisation and others. You will not benefit directly 
or personally from this study. Hopefully, however, findings from this study will be 
useful to your organisation and other related HIV/AIDS organisations in South 
Africa.  
 














Contact person. Further communication after the interview in order to clarify 
issues, expand on the contents of the interview, or raise concerns is welcome at any 






Consent of the participant 
 
I, Dr./Mr./Ms. _________________________________ have read and understood 
the information above. By appending my signature to this form, I hereby consent to 
participate freely in this study. I also understand that I have the right to withdraw at 
any time without being penalized.  
 
___________________   ___________________ 
Name of the Participant  Signature 
 
 
___________________   ___________________ 
















APPENDIX 5  The methodology of National AIDS Spending  
Assessment (NASA) 
 
NASA follows financial transactions from the source to the beneficiaries. The 
methodology employed is based on double entry tables – matrices – to represent the 
origin and the destination of resources. Financial flows and expenditures related to 
the response to HIV/AIDS, both health and non-health related, are organised 
according to three dimensions and six categories: 
 
1. Financing:  
a. Sources: public, private, international 
b. Agents: who decide the use of the funds 
2. Provision: 
a. Providers: hospitals, ambulatory services, pharmacies, Ministry of 
Health and other Ministries, etc. 
b. Production factors: health, health-related, non-health 
3. Use: 
a. Spending categories: budgetary items such as salaries of health 
personnel, equipment, administration, etc.  
b. Beneficiaries: population beneficiary segments such as vulnerable 
groups, schools, military, children, recipients of treatment, etc. 












APPENDIX 6  The Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness: 
Indicators of progress  
 
The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to 
which over one hundred Ministers, Heads of Agencies and other Senior 
Officials agreed to adhere, and in terms of which they committed their countries 
and organisations to increasing their efforts in harmonisation, alignment and 
managing aid for results with a set of actions and indicators to be monitored. They 
agreed upon a total number of 12 indicators of progress: 
 
1. Partners have operational development strategies 
2. Countries have reliable financial and procurement systems  
3. Aid flows are aligned to national priorities 
4. Capacity is strengthened through co-ordinated support 
5. Countries‟ public financial management systems are used 
6. Countries‟ procurement systems are used 
7. Capacity is strengthened by avoiding parallel implementation structures 
8. Aid is more predictable 
9. Aid is untied 
10. Common arrangements or procedures are used 
11. Frameworks are results-oriented 
12. Donors and recipients are mutually accountable   
 


















APPENDIX 7   HIV/AIDS Epidemiology in South Africa: Basic statistics, 2000-2006* 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Numbers (total and infected)         
Total population 44871939 45504436 46086931 46608823 47071290 47486216 47866984 48218209 
Total HIV infections 3559585 4024100 4419443 4741791 4997457 5203773 5372476 5511751 
Total AIDS sick (in the middle of year) 182823 253502 333807 418592 503725 554629 599298 633931 
Non-AIDS deaths  (in the year starting 1 July) 377113 377271 381010 384324 387210 389753 392053 394197 
AIDS deaths  (in the year starting 1 July) 147525 191589 237435 282348 315870 336901 354379 367000 
Accumulated Aids Deaths (to middle of the year) 302790 450315 641904 879339 1161686 1477556 1814457 2168836 
Prevalence rates         
Antenatal clinics 22.3% 24.1% 25.5% 26.5% 27.3% 27.9% 28.3% 28.7% 
Women aged 15 – 49 15.2% 16.7% 18.1% 19.1% 20.0% 20.7% 21.2% 21.6% 
Men aged 15 – 49 12.2% 13.4% 14.2% 14.7% 15.0% 15.2% 15.4% 15.4% 
Adults aged 15 – 49 13.7% 15.1% 16.2% 17.0% 17.6% 18.0% 18.3% 18.6% 
Total population 7.9% 8.8% 9.6% 10.2% 10.6% 11.0% 11.2% 11.4% 
Incidence rates         
Total population 1.5% 1.4% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2% 
Total new infections 621415 600940 578065 559688 546473 531935 521607 512931 
Mortality statistics         
Life expectancy at birth 56.2 54.9 53.5 52.2 51.4 51.0 50.7 50.5 
Maternal orphan statistics         
Total orphans (in middle of year) 739054 819651 922786 1051849 1203969 1371626 1542201 1708032 
Total AIDS orphans (in middle of year) 158073 240533 349506 486940 650736 832246 1018548 1201675 
Staging         
Pre-AIDS 3376762 3767835 4076157 4302039 4455024 4548084 4588562 4589436 
Untreated AIDS 182823 252580 330647 411539 490822 520942 537759 537803 
On ART 0 3424 11700 26020 47434 123990 225775 351489 
Discontinued ART 0 260 939 2194 4177 10757 20379 33022 
* For flow items over the standard calendar year (1 Jan to 31 Dec) 












APPENDIX  8 Provincial epidemiology of HIV/AIDS in South Africa, 2006* 
 EC FS GT KZ LM MP NC NW WC 
Numbers (total and infected)          
Total population 6693156 2795556 9683782 9791815 5748394 3335162 888715 3773095 4994244 
Total HIV infections 666822 387770 1407486 1540183 396873 446010 61415 480387 267289 
Total AIDS sick (in the middle of year) 64096 46249 156328 193028 39474 57470 5385 54083 19736 
Non-AIDS deaths  (in the year starting 1 July) 65247 25801 70956 85124 37869 25606 8108 30147 41691 
AIDS deaths  (in the year starting 1 July) 39987 27207 89309 113082 24344 33392 3326 32077 11922 
Prevalence rates          
Antenatal clinics 27.7% 33.7% 35.8% 40.2% 19.6% 32.5% 19.9% 29.2% 15.5% 
Women aged 15 – 49 21.2% 25.1% 24.5% 29.7% 14.9% 25.1% 13.3% 22.9% 10.8% 
Men aged 15 – 49 13.2% 19.1% 20.0% 22.3% 8.7% 18.3% 9.0% 18.1% 6.4% 
Adults aged 15 – 49 17.4% 22.2% 22.2% 26.2% 12.1% 21.8% 11.2% 20.5% 8.6% 
Total population 10.0% 13.9% 14.5% 15.7% 6.9% 13.4% 6.9% 12.7% 5.4% 
Incidence rates          
Total population 1.3% 1.5% 1.3% 1.7% 0.9% 1.4% 0.8% 1.3% 0.6% 
Total new infections 80968 35073 111589 136582 46691 40684 6907 44153 27605 
Mortality statistics          
Life expectancy at birth 48.8 46.7 52.2 43.0 56.0 46.4 57.3 50.2 61.5 
Maternal orphan statistics          
Total orphans (in middle of year) 225618 102737 277109 480004 136752 143919 17160 114628 77739 
Total AIDS orphans (in middle of year) 124055 69265 203287 360026 78569 106895 7884 78262 29830 
Staging          
Pre-AIDS 585298 329748 1188560 1299662 344011 374185 53674 409594 229520 
Untreated AIDS 58287 42325 135462 177198 35011 52685 4600 48513 13725 
On ART 21371 14379 76514 58089 16371 17511 2888 20441 22029 
Discontinued ART 1866 1318 6951 5234 1480 1629 254 1839 2015 
* Flow items over the standard calendar year (1 Jan to 31 Dec) 
EC: Eastern Cape, FS = Free State, GT = Gauteng, KZ = KwaZulu-Natal, LM = Limpopo, MP = Mpumalanga, NC = Northern Cape, NW = North West, WC = 
Western Cape 












APPENDIX 9 Estimated new AIDS cases per province, 2003-
2007 
 
Province 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Eastern Cape 48,758 60,228 71,975 83,259 93,278 
Free State 29,310 34,987 40,128 44,247 46,960 
Gauteng 64,150 77,036 88,638 97,751 103,429 
KwaZulu-Natal 124,511 144,430 160,930 172,311 177,547 
Limpopo 34,823 42,507 50,190 57,311 63,296 
Mpumalanga 38,670 44,649 49,673 53,336 55,403 
Northern Cape 3,948 4,977 6,039 7,057 7,949 
North West 36,155 43,545 50,421 56,106 60,079 
Western Cape 8,376 10,482 12,664 14,803 16,779 
South Africa 388,701 462,841 530,658 586,181 642,720 
Figures exclude people covered by medical aid. Figures are not cumulative 













APPENDIX 10 Chronological overview of South African 
HIV/AIDS policy developments  
 
1992:  National AIDS Coordinating Committee of South Africa formed 
1994:  National AIDS Plan for South Africa formulated 
1995:  HIV/AIDS and STD Program (1995-1996) developed by DoH 
1997:  Review of HIV/AID strategy and program leads to government five-year 
action plan (1998) 
1998:  National Interdepartmental Committee on HIV/AIDS (IDC) established to 
coordinate and support response to HIV/AIDS by national government 
departments.  
1998:  Partnership Against AIDS launched to provide for greater multisectoral 
collaboration 
1998:  South Africa national AIDS Council (SANAC) set up to represent 
partnership between government  and civil society 
2000:  HIV/AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2000-2005, adapted, 
providing framework for coordinated response to HIV/AIDS, STIs and other 
opportunistic infections 
2000:  Impact and Action Project launched to assist public sector in mitigating 
impact of HIV/AIDS 
2000:  Nine HIV/AIDS-related guidelines on the management of HIV/AIDS 
launched 
2000:  Formal partnership formed between government and South Africa AIDS 
Vaccine Initiative 
2001:  Integrated Plan for Children and Youth Infected and Affected by HIV/AIDS 
developed 
2003:  Summary Report of The Joint Health and Treasury Task Team Charged with 
Examining Treatment Options to Supplement Comprehensive Care for 
HIV/AIDS in the Public Health Sector. 01 August 2003. 
2003:  Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management And 
Treatment for South  Africa. Launched 19 November 2003. 
2004:  1
st
 Progress Report: Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and 











2004:  National Antiretroviral Guidelines. 1
st
 Edition 
2006:  Progress Report on Declaration of Commitment on HIV and AIDS. Prepared 
for United Nations Assembly Special Session on HIV and AIDS 
2006: Broad Frame-work for HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South 
Africa, 2007-2011. November 2006. 
2007: HIV and AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for South Africa, 2007-2011.  
 












APPENDIX 11  Requirements for the accreditation of service 
points for the Comprehensive Plan  
 
The following criteria summarise the conditions necessary at an ART service point 
to ensure high quality comprehensive HIV/AIDS care and treatment. 
 
1. Presence of a service point project manager, who will supervise program conduct 
and expansion. Where practical and effective, a project manager may supervise 
program conduct and expansion for more than one service point. 
 
2. Availability of a trained care team on-site with representation of all relevant 
professions (clinicians, nurses, and counsellors), easy access to trained laboratory, 
pharmacy and nutritional staff, and links to NGOs and other service providers. The 
care team should consist of sufficient staff in appropriate ratios to manage the 
projected number of patients. 
 
3. Implementation and maintenance of current standards of care as provided by the 
National Treatment Policy Guidelines. 
 
4. Access to care 24-hours a day at the service point, or in the direct vicinity, with 
coverage relationships explicit to both facility staff and patients. 
 
5. A staff recruitment, training and skills development plan in place for health care 
workers responsible for HIV and AIDS care and treatment (including volunteers and 
lay counsellors) based on initial needs and projected long-term patient numbers. 
 
6. Appropriate numbers of consultation, treatment and counselling rooms should be 
available to assure patient confidentiality, based on projected patient numbers. 
 
7. Access to appropriate laboratory services, which have appropriate equipment, 
trained operators, and an effective maintenance plan, overseen by the NHLS. 
Adequate specimen preparation protocols should be in place for service points 













8. Secure and adequate pharmacy storage, and sufficient cold-chain capacity, 
appropriate to handle Schedule 5 drugs. 
 
9. Adherence to drug dispensing Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for OI 
prophylaxis and treatment, and ARVs. 
 
10. Access to patient nutritional status assessment and nutritional support. 
 
11. Existing links with on-site and/or proximal VCT centres, antenatal clinics, FP 
clinics, TB clinics, STI clinics, TB/HIV demonstration districts, and any other 
patient referral facilities, to ensure that HIV-positive patients are formally referred to 
the accredited service point. 
 
12. A PMTCT program in place for service points providing antenatal care and a 
referral system in place for sites without antenatal care facilities. 
 
13. Formal referral systems and links with other operations within the service point 
(inpatient wards, other clinics, support units) and outside expertise 
(secondary/tertiary care facilities and sub-specialties, including neurology,  
ophthalmology, oncology, pulmonary and infectious diseases). 
 
14. Referral systems and linkages with community resources (NGOs, CBOs, home-
based care, faith-based organisations, PLWHA groups, traditional health 
practitioners, community leaders, industry, and other support organisations) that 
complete the continuum of medical care and support services. 
 
15. Linkages in place with support organisations and NGOs to ensure continuous 
care and support in the home and community, including support groups, adherence 
support, educational activities, bereavement counselling and family support.  
 













17. A system in place to maintain medical records and to transmit core data to a 
central data collection point. 
 
18. A system in place to ensure that durable equipment is appropriately inventoried 
and service and maintenance agreements are in place. Where equipment is needed, 
the service point shall have a plan for procuring and installing the equipment. 
 
19. 24-hours post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) access, according to the latest national 
guidelines. 
 
20. A plan for channelling into the care system HIV-positive blood donors, patients 
treated with PEP, and prison populations identified as HIV-positive. 
 
21. Established links with the provincial HIV and AIDS Unit to coordinate briefing 
of local officials and to streamline input from local advisory committees. 
 
22. Identification of technical assistance needs in administrative and various other 
technical areas, including medical training. 
 
23. Participation in Information, education and communication activities, in 
particular by enlisting resources to help educate patients, families and communities 
about the basics of HIV and AIDS care and treatment, the role that ARV treatment 
can play, and the difficulties inherent in lifelong treatment for affected individuals 
and their families. 
 














APPENDIX 12  Evolution of projected costs in the Comprehensive 
Plan, disaggregated by intervention, 2003/04-
2007/08 
 
R thousand 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
New healthcare staff 21 322 432 662 1,027 
Laboratory testing 20* 152 311 520 806 
Antiretroviral drugs 42 369 725 1,118 1,650 
Nutrition 63 343 421 532 656 
Other health system 
upgrades 
70 171 184 160 160 
Program 
management  
16 103 128 128 128 
Capital investment 30 75 100 100 0 
Research 34 55 55 48 48 
Total 296 1,590 2,358 3,268 4,474 
* Includes R20 million advance payment to NHLS until March 2004 













APPENDIX 13 Core indicators of the Comprehensive Plan to be 
reported within six months of the launch of the 
plan  
 
 Number of accredited service points per district; 
 Percentage of facilities experiencing stock-out of a basket of tracer drugs at 
any time in the last month; 
 Full time equivalent per category as proportion of required personnel; 
 Male and female condom distribution rate; 
 Percentage of eligible patients receiving supplement meal and micronutrient 
supplements; 
 Proportion of adult patients on antiretroviral therapy with adherence lower 
than 70% (unacceptable level of adherence); 
 Number of CD4 counts done per month; 
 Number of patients on treatment; 
 Number of viral loads completed per month; 
 Proportion of registered patients on regimen 1a or 1b, 2 or child regimen; 
 Percentage of patients with viral load < 400 copies/ml; 
 Percentage of patients with CD4> 200/mm3; 
 Percentage of patients with weight gain >10% compared to baseline. 
 












APPENDIX 14 Coverage of new AIDS cases per new ART 






























Eastern Cape 9,664 24,920 15,256 83,259 18% (5)  
Free State 1,478 6,950
 e 
 5,472 44,247 12% (7) 
Gauteng 27,904 55,580 27,676 97,751 28% (3) 
KwaZulu-Natal 21,470 59,404 37,934 172,311 22% (4) 
Limpopo 3,689 11,660 7,971 57,311 14% (6) 
Mpumalanga 2,766 7,989 5,223 53,336 10% (8) 
Northern Cape 8,598 21,579 12,981 7,057 184%
 g 
(1) 
North West 1,464 4,476 3,012 56,106 5% (9) 
Western Cape 11,810 21,270 9,460 14,803 64% (2) 
Total 88,843 213,828 124,985 586,181 21% 
a 
The source does not specify if it refers to public and private provision of ART or only to provision 
through the public sector.
 
b 
Not cumulative. Calculated as deduction of cumulative cases in September 2006 from those in 
September 2005. It is not clear from the source whether it includes those on medical aid or not.
 
c 
Not cumulative, from December 2005 to December 2006. It only includes those not covered by 
medical aid. 
d
 Percentage of new ART enrolments from new AIDS cases. It is an imprecise indicator due to the 
difference in months (September – December) of both components, and there may be an error if 
people covered by medical aid are included in the estimated new ART enrolments. Provincial ranking 
in brackets. 
e
 This number may underestimate the real figure, as data for September was not reported and the 
number for June 2006 was used instead. 
f
 A figure over 100% may be due to (a) the assumption that there are more people in need of ART 
than people sick with AIDS, as the ASSA2003 model (ASSA 2003b) assumes that 75% of people 
cease to be classified as 'AIDS sick' after starting ART; however, this is unlikely as it is not 
cumulative data, only new cases; (b) it may indicate enrolment of patients from other provinces, 
although the number seems too high to be explained by this factor only; or (c) inaccurate data. 
g
 The figure for the Northern Cape showing approximately three times as many people enrolled as 
people sick from AIDS suggests that there may be something wrong with the data, but no explanation 
can be provided. 
Source: Author‟s calculation of new ART enrolments based on data from DoH (2006a) for 2006, and 
SACOB (2007) for 2005. Data for estimated new AIDS cases from DoH (2003a). Coverage of new 














APPENDIX 15  Inflation and deflators used in the budget analysis 
in Chapter 5 
 
Inflation rates based on the Consumer Price Index
a 
 
Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2000 7 7.2 7.4 7.7 7.9 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.1 8 7.7 7.7 
2001 7.7 7.7 7.5 6.7 6.5 6.4 6.4 6 5.8 5 6.3 6.5 
2002 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.3 8.6 9.2 9.1 9.9 10.8 11.3 11.3 10.8 
2003 10 9.3 9.3 8.5 7.7 6.4 6.6 6.3 5.4 4.4 4.4 4 
2004 4.2 4.8 4.4 4.4 4.4 5 4.2 3.7 3.7 4.2 4.6 4.3 
2005 3.6 3.1 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.5 4.2 4.8 4.7 4.4 3.7 4 
2006 4.3 4.5 3.8 3.7 4.1 4.8 4.9 5 5.1 5 5 5 
2007 5.3 4.9 5.5 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.5 6.3 6.7 7.3 7.9 8.6 
2008 8.8 9.4 10.1          
a 
Projection of CPIX for 2008/09 is 5.4 (NT 2008a)   
Source: SSA (2008a) and NT (2008a)    
 
Deflator used with 2006/07 base year  
 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Deflator  0.67 0.73 0.78 0.87 0.92 0.96 1.00 1.07 1.13 













APPENDIX 16  Increases in total, conditional and discretional  
HIV/AIDS funding in PDoHs, nominal and real  
 
Growth in total HIV/AIDS expenditure, nominal and real 




67 97 317 614 1,148 1,682 2,441 2,734 2,960 
Real expenditure 
(R million) 
99 132 405 707 1,248 1,754 2,441 2,548 2,617 
Growth rate, 
nominal (%) 
 44.8 227.3 93.5 86.9 46.5 45.2 12.0 8.3 
Growth rate, real 
(%) 
 33.4 206.1 74.5 76.4 40.6 39.2 4.4 2.7 
 
Growth HIV/AIDS conditional grants expenditure to PDoHs, nominal and real 




17 54 210 334 782 1,135 1,567 1,646 1,735 
Real expenditure,  25 74 268 385 850 1,184 1,567 1,534 1,534 
Growth rate, 
nominal (%) 
 217.6 288.9 59.0 134.1 45.1 38.1 5.0 5.4 
Growth rate, real 
(%) 
 192.8 263.7 43.4 121.0 39.2 32.4 -2.1 0.0 
 
Growth in HIV/AIDS discretionary expenditure in PDoHs, nominal and real
a
 
















-20.7 133.7 135.1 23.2 43.5 53.3 16.0 6.8 
Real terms in 2006/07 prices.  
a
 Calculated by deducting conditional grants from the total HIV/AIDS expenditure of provincial 
budget statements 
Source: Author‟s calculations from provincial HIV/AIDS budgets (NT 20006a-2006i), NT (20002b) 












APPENDIX 17  Proportional contribution of conditional and 
discretionary funding to HIV/AIDS expenditure 
in PDoHs  
 
(%) 00/01 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Conditional 
grant 
25 56 66 54 68 67 64 60 59 
Discretionary 
expenditure 
75 44 34 46 32 33 36 40 41 













APPENDIX 18  Comparison of HIV/AIDS discretionary funding 



















NT in Blecher and Harrison (2006) IDASA (2006,2005)




R million 01/02 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
This thesis 43 107 280 366 547 874 1,088 1,225 
Blecher and 
Harrison (2006) 
 98 335 419 568 958 1,185 1,327 
IDASA (2005 & 
2006)  




43 -5 216 411 609 650 825  
 
In nominal terms 
Source: Blecher and Harrison (2006); IDASA‟s studies: Ndlovu and Daswa (2006a) for the period 
2003/04-2008/09, and Hickey and Ndlovu (2005) for 2002/03; Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2005 












APPENDIX 19  Comparison of targeted allocations for HIV/AIDS 
added to the equitable shares transfers, 2002/03-
2007/08  
 
Targeted allocations for HIV/AIDS added to the equitable shares transfers 
R million 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
In 2002 Budget 400 600 900 954 1,011 1,062 
In 2003 Budget 0 500 1,000 1,500 1,590 1,670 
Source: NT (2002a) and Mark Blecher (National Treasury, personal correspondence April 2008). 
Budget 2003 figures for 2002/03- 2004/05 are also in NT (2002a). However, figures for 2005/06-
2007/08 could not be found in any of the NT budget documents for 2002 or 2003 available on the 















APPENDIX 20  Real increases in HIV/AIDS expenditure in the 
Western Cape and Free State DoHs, total, 
conditional and discretionary  
Real increases of HIV/AIDS expenditure in Free State and Western Cape DoHs  
 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Western Cape (R thousands) 25,133 43,934 102,638 132,219 150,954 147,719 147,587 
Free State (R thousands)  39,416 82,541 105,223 152,703 152,568 155,928 
Western Cape growth rate (%)  74.8 133.6 28.8 14.2 -2.1 -0.1 
Free State growth rate (%)  65.4 109.4 27.5 45.1 -0.1 2.2 
National growth rate (%) 206.1 74.5 76.4 40.6 39.2 4.4 2.7 
 
Real increases of HIV/AIDS conditional grants in Western Cape and Free State 
DoHs 
 01/02 02/03  03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Western Cape (R 
thousands) 
5,911 14,960 27,877 63,024 86,006 115,670 113,191 113,255 
Free State (R 
thousands) 
6,441 23,829 34,718 76,080 105,223 142,265 139,215 139,294 
Western Cape 
growth rate (%) 
 153.1 86.3 126.1 36.5 34.5 -2.1 0.1 
Free State growth 
rate (%) 
 270.0 45.7 119.1 38.3 35.2 -2.1 0.1 
National growth rate 
(%) 
 263.7 43.4 121.0 39.2 32.4 -2.1 0.0 
 
Real increases of HIV/AIDS discretionary funding in Western Cape and Free 
State DoHs  
 02/03 03/04 04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09 
Western Cape (R thousands) 10,173 16,057 39,614 46,213 35,284 34,527 34,332 
Free State (R thousands)  4,079 5,942 0 10,438 14,328 18,812 
Western Cape growth rate (%)  57.8 146.7 16.7 -23.6 -2.1 -0.6 
Free State growth rate (%)   37.5 -100.0  27.9 24.6 
National growth rate (%)  208.3 18.1 30.0 61.7 15.3 6.2 
 Real terms in 2006/07 prices 
Source: Author‟s calculations of growth rates and real terms from NT (2002b, 2004a, 2006b, 2006i, 













APPENDIX 21  Relative contribution of conditional grant over 
discretionary funding in HIV/AIDS provincial 
expenditure, Western Cape, Free State and 
national  
 
 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Western Cape (%) 63/37 61/39 65/35 77/23 77/23 77/23 
Free State (%) 88/12 98/8 100/0 93/7 91/9 89/11 
National (%) 54/46 68/32 67/33 64/36 60/40 59/41 














APPENDIX 22  Spending of the HIV/AIDS conditional grants to 





2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Allocated Spent Spent 
% 
Allocated Spent Spent 
%  
Allocated Spent Spent 
%  
DoE 26.93 6 22.3 63.5 41.956 66.1 144.605 125.041 86.5 
DoH 16.819 10 59.5 54.398 45.095 82.9 210.209 172.879 82.2 
DSD 5.62 2 35.6 12.5 10.156 81.3 47.5 44.019 92.7 













APPENDIX 23 Analysis of HIV/AIDS expenditure in PDoHs per 
per HIV-positive population, per AIDS sick 
population, and per patient on ART, 2006/07 
a , b 
 








patient on ART 
Eastern Cape 356 (8) 3,706 (5) 11.115 (3)  
Free State 394 (6) 3,302 (7) 10.620 (5) 
Gauteng 366 (7) 3,297 (8) 6.737 (9) 
KwaZulu-Natal 525 (3) 4,188 (4) 13.916 (2) 
Limpopo 443 (4) 4,455 (3) 10.742 (4) 
Mpumalanga 304 (9) 2,363 (9) 7.755 (7) 
Northern Cape 1,141 (1) 13,018 (1) 24.274 (1) 
North West 404 (5) 3,593 (6) 9.506 (6) 
Western Cape 565 (2) 7,649 (2) 6.853 (8) 
a 
In 2006/07 real prices 
b
 Numbers in brackets indicate provincial ranking 
c
 HIV positive population from December 2005 to December 2006  
Source: Author‟s calculations from (NT 2006a-i; 2006l; 2008a); ASSA (2005a) for total, HIV-
positive and AIDS sick population; uninsured population from SAA (2006); new AIDS cases from 













APPENDIX 24  The new HIV & AIDS and STI Strategic Plan for 
South Africa 2007-2011 (NSP) 
 
The new NSP was endorsed on the 30
th
 of April of 2007 as the main guiding 
document to lead the multisectoral response against HIV/AIDS for all sectors 
involved in the fight against the epidemic, not only the health sector. The NSP aims 
to expand access to appropriate treatment, care and support to 80% of all HIV-
positive people and their families and to reduce new HIV infections by 2011 (DoH 
2006a). Several objectives of the NSP corroborate the recommendations identified in 
this thesis:  
 
 To improve care for HIV-positive people not yet on ART, including the 
promotion of a wellness package
77
 and wider delivery of cotrimoxazole;  
 To strengthen the PHC platform to be able to provide quality services so that 
the location of care can be shifted from hospitals towards PHC facilities; 
 To delegate activities to less qualified cadres, to train PHC nurses (rather 
than doctors) to initiate ART, and to train lay counsellors with regard to their 
responsibilities around rapid HIV tests;  
 To conduct research on human resource requirements for the implementation 
of the NSP;  
 To establish and implement a functional M&E system, and to use the M&E 
data to identify the barriers to the implementation of the NSP;  
 To enhance coordination and communication among government 
departments and with other stakeholders.  
 To monitor funding for the NSP and its cost-effectiveness by focusing on 
several outcomes of treatment through surveillance; 
 To seek partnerships, both with key donors (Global Fund, PEPFAR and 
others) as well as with the private health sector, in order to make this plan 
feasible. 
Source: DoH (2007a,b) 
                                                 
77
 The wellness care program includes: regular CD4 counts; prophylaxis and treatment of 
opportunistic infections; cervical screening; advice on lifestyle, nutrition, contraceptive use and 












APPENDIX 25 Comparison of updated HIVA/AIDS expenditure 
with projections in Chapter 5, total, conditional, 
and discretionary, 2004/05-2008/09 
 
This appendix compares the financial trends pictured in Chapter 5 (with data 
available up to May 2006) with trends based on budget figures updated in January 
2009: audited financial statements up to 2006/07 (in Chapter 5 only up to 2004/05), 
pre-audited estimates for 2007/08 (rather than MTEF projections), and MTEF 
projections for 2008/09. Real terms are still using 2006/07 as the base year.  
 
It is also important to note that higher nominal allocations have been made by 
National and Provincial Treasuries and DoHs in order to compensate for the high 
inflation rates over recent years, and in particular medical inflation (WCDoH 2008; 
FSDoH 2008e). Average inflation in 2008/09 was 12.1, compared to 7.6 in 2007/08 
and 4.9 in 2006/07 (SAA 2008b). 
 
Graphs 1-3 illustrate differences in growth projections in Chapter 5 with those 
updated, for total national, conditional, and discretionary HIV/AIDS funding in 
PDoHs respectively. 
 
Figures 4-6 compare the updated increases with those of Chapter 5 in relation to the 
Western Cape HIV/AIDS total, conditional, and discretionary funding respectively.  
 
Figures 7-9 compare the updated increases with those of Chapter 5 in relation to the 

































Est ima t ed in Chapt e r  5 Upda t ed da t a  
 
 





















Estimated in Chapter 5 Updated data 
 
 





















































Estimated in Chapter 5 Updated data 
  
 
Figure 5: Western Cape HIV/AIDS conditional grant funding in the DoH, 
updated in January 2009 
 
 
Figure 6: Western Cape HIV/AIDS discretionary funding in the DoH, updated 



































Estimated in Chapter 5 Updated data 
 
 





















Estimated in Chapter 5 Updated data 
 
 


















Estimated in Chapter 5 Updated data 
 
Source: Author based on NT (2002b, 2003b, 2004a, 2005c, 2006b,i,k,l, 2008a-l); WCDoH (2008); 
FSDoH (2007) and SSA (2008a,b) 
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